WEAKLY RELATIVE POVERTY

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Abstract—Prevailing measures of relative poverty are unchanged when all incomes grow or contract by the same proportion. This property stems from seemingly implausible assumptions about the disutility of relative deprivation and the cost of social inclusion. We propose “weakly relative” lines that relax these assumptions. On calibrating our measures to national poverty lines and survey data, we find that half the population of the developing world in 2005 lived in poverty, only half of whom were absolutely poor. The total number of poor rose over 1981 to 2005 despite falling numbers of absolutely poor. With sustained economic growth, the incidence of relative poverty became less responsive to further growth. The number of relatively poor rose, just as the numbers of absolutely poor fell.

I. Introduction

The methods used to set poverty lines have differed radically between rich and poor countries. Poverty in the developing world is typically measured using absolute lines, which aim to have the same real value at different dates and places. Virtually all developing countries use such lines, and at the global level, the World Bank’s “$1-a-day” line is an absolute line, aiming to have the same purchasing power in different countries and at different dates. By contrast, most developed countries use what we shall call “strongly relative poverty lines,” which are set at a constant proportion—typically 40% to 60%—of the current mean or median income.

This difference in how poverty lines are set matters greatly to the properties of the resulting poverty measures. The bulk of the literature has confined attention to measures that are homogeneous of degree 0 between the mean and the poverty line for any given Lorenz curve. Using an absolute line, such a poverty measure automatically falls when all incomes grow at the same proportionate rate—which we term inequality-neutral growth—while any measure based on strongly relative lines will be unchanged with such a growth process. So it is hardly surprising that this choice has been found to matter greatly to assessments of how poverty is changing over time, as well as to cross-sectional poverty comparisons.

Two main arguments can be identified in support of strongly relative lines. The first views poverty lines as money-metrics of utility and claims that people attach value to their income relative to the mean in their country of residence. Since this presumes that relative income is a source of utility, it can be called the welfarist argument for relative poverty lines.

The second (nonwelfarist) argument says that poverty lines should allow for differences in the cost of social inclusion, which can be defined as the expenditure needed to cover certain commodities that are deemed to have a role in ensuring that a person can participate with dignity in customary social and economic activities. This argument does not rest on the view that social inclusion is a (direct or indirect) source of utility. Rather it is seen as a desired capability for not being deemed poor in a specific context. The most influential exponent of this line of argument has clearly been Sen (1983, 1985), who argued that it is a person’s capabilities that should be seen as absolute. In the context of poverty measurement, this means that “an abso-

4 Note also that for a given Lorenz curve, the median is directly proportional to the mean. Thus, this strong relativity property also holds when the poverty line is a fixed proportion of the median.

5 For example, the UNDP (2005, based on Nolan, Munzi, & Smeeding, 2005) showed how relative poverty measures for Ireland were rising despite higher absolute living standards for the poor. Thus, the UNDP (p. 334) warns that “when economic conditions change rapidly, relative poverty measures do not always present a complete picture of the ways that economic change affects people’s lives.” Similarly, Easton (2002) argued that relative measures for New Zealand were deceptive in showing falling poverty despite lower absolute levels of living for poor people.

6 For example, OECD (2008) reports the same poverty rate for the United States as Mexico. In another example, the urban poverty line proposed by Osberg and Xu (2008) for China (set at half the median) is 2.4 times their rural line, or 1.7 times when deflated by the Ravallion and Chen (2007) absolute lines. The Osberg-Xu method suggests little difference in poverty incidence between urban and rural China, while the Ravallion-Chen method indicates far higher poverty measures in rural China.

7 While the idea that utility anchors poverty lines is not common in applied work, it is consistent with a strand of the literature on welfare measurement in economics whereby cost-of-living indices and equivalence scales are anchored to some reference level of utility. On the welfarist interpretation of a poverty line as a point on the consumer’s cost function corresponding to a reference level of utility, see Blackorby and Donaldson (1987). For an overview of economic approaches to welfare measurement, see Slesnick (1998).

8 It can be granted that social inclusion is a broader concept than this definition allows and may well require more than commodities, including, for example, freedom from discrimination according to gender or ethnicity. However, the concern here is with the measurement of poverty in terms of command over commodities.
though often suggesting that higher absolute levels of living also found results broadly consistent with the idea of RD, eighteenth-century Europe:

- The idea that people care about relative income has a long history. It is sometimes called the theory of relative deprivation (RD), following Runciman (1966), although economists often refer to it as the relative income hypothesis, following Duesenberry (1949). Some version of RD has often been invoked to explain observed behavior. While early discussions lacked evidence on the existence of RD effects, there is now a body of supportive evidence from both observational studies and experiments, though mainly in developed country settings. Experiments have suggested that relative position matters to behavior. Regressions for self-reported satisfaction with life or perceived economic welfare have also found results broadly consistent with the idea of RD, though often suggesting that higher absolute levels of living (in various dimensions) are valued positively independent of RD. There has been much less research on whether very poor people care about RD; in one of the few studies, Ravallion and Lokshin (2010) found evidence for Malawi that for very poor people, the positive externalities from having better-off friends and neighbors outweigh the negative externalities through RD, although this pattern reverses at higher income levels. This suggests that the weight attached to RD rises with one’s absolute level of living.

- The idea that certain socially specific expenditures can be deemed essential for social inclusion is also long-standing. Famously, Adam Smith (1776, book 5, chapter 2, article 4) pointed to the social-inclusion role of a linen shirt in eighteenth-century Europe:

> A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably though they had no linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty which, it is presumed, nobody can well fall into without extreme bad conduct.

The social roles of certain forms of consumption have also been noted from research in poor countries. Anthropologists have pointed to the social roles played by festivals, celebrations, and communal feasts (see, for example, Geertz, 1976, and Fuller, 1992). Rao (2001) documents the importance of celebrations to maintaining the social networks that are crucial to coping with poverty in rural India. Banerjee and Duflo (2007) report seemingly high expenditures on celebrations and festivals by very poor people in survey data for a number of developing countries. In Yemen, participants at “qat sessions” discuss local economic and social affairs while chewing this mild stimulant; these sessions serve an important social role—and no less so for poor people—such that “refusing to take qat is tantamount to accepting ostracisation” (Milanovic, 2008, p. 684). Clothing can also serve a social role. Friedman (1990) describes how poor Congolese acquired clothing with a conspicuous designer label, which he interpreted as status-seeking behavior. A field experiment by van Kempen (2004) reveals that poor people in Bolivia are willing to pay a premium for a designer label, which, he argues, serves as a symbolic expression of social identity for the poor.

In the light of such observations, there is a case for asking what a relative poverty measure for the developing world might look like, analogous to the $1-a-day absolute measure. The purpose of this paper is to provide such a poverty measure. However, we argue that neither the welfarist nor capabilities-based arguments provide convincing justifications for strongly relative lines. We argue that the welfarist justification requires an implausibly high weight on relative position and that the nonwelfarist, capability-based justification makes the implausible assumption that the cost of inclusion goes to zero in the limit as a person becomes very poor.

We propose instead that poverty measures should satisfy the following weak relativity axiom (WRA): if all incomes increase (decrease) by the same proportion, then an aggregate poverty measure must fall (rise). In any standard poverty measure, this will be satisfied as long as the elasticity of the poverty line to the mean does not exceed unity. This does not, of course, preclude the possibility that people care about RD or that there are social inclusion needs. But it does impose a limit on the weight attached to such effects when measuring poverty.

One can find antecedents to this idea in the literature. Research on social-subjective poverty lines—poverty lines based on responses to survey questions concerning the “minimum income to make ends meet” or perceived con-

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9 Easterlin (1974) used RD to explain why economic growth in the United States has had little effect on the proportion of people who think they are happy. Other examples of the use of relativism to explain behavior can be found in Frank (1997), Oswald (1997), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Walker and Smith (2001), and Hopkins (2008).

10 See, for example, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Alpizar, Carlsson, and Johansson-Stenman (2005).

11 Examples include van de Stadt, Kapteyn, and van de Geer (1985), Clark and Oswald (1996), Solnick and Hemenway (1998), Pradhan and Ravallion (2000), Ravallion and Lokshin (2002, 2010), McBride (2001), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Kingdom and Knight (2007), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Luttmer (2005), and Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008). It should be noted, however, that there are reasons that past tests for RD using subjective data may well be biased toward finding evidence of RD when it is not in fact present (Ravallion, 2008; Ravallion & Lokshin, 2010).

12 For a more general discussion of the social-symbolic roles that consumption can play, see Khalil (2000).
sumption adequacy—has pointed to mean-income elasticities of the poverty line that are positive but generally less than unity. The National Research Council’s proposal for revising the official poverty line of the United States would also be likely to generate poverty lines with a positive (though intertemporally variable) elasticity less than unity. Each of these approaches can be questioned. However, and most important for this paper, these approaches are not operational for global poverty measurement. We need a schedule of weakly relative poverty lines with global applicability.

Past global poverty measures have used absolute lines, converted to international dollars at purchasing power parity (PPP). The original $1-a-day line was an average for low-income countries (Ravallion, Dat, & van de Walle, 1991). Atkinson and Bourguignon (AB) (2001) proposed a schedule of global poverty lines also calibrated to national lines. These were hybrid lines, being absolute for low-income countries (set at the $1-a-day line) and strongly relative for middle-income and developed countries. We follow the same basic approach of using national poverty lines to identify our proposed schedule of international poverty lines. However, unlike AB, our proposed lines satisfy the weak relativity axiom, which we show to be consistent with the data on how national poverty lines vary with mean consumption across countries.

Section II proposes our new measures of weakly relative poverty. Section III discusses the identification assumptions, while section IV describes key features of the data. Section V calibrates the parameters of our poverty lines to the observed relationship across countries between national poverty lines and mean consumption. Section VI presents our estimates of the new measures of relative poverty. Section VII concludes.

II. Revisiting the Theory of Relative Poverty Lines

An exclusive focus on absolute poverty is justified if one accepts two axioms: subgroup additivity and subgroup anonymity (Ravallion, 2008). The first says that aggregate poverty is the sum of all individual levels of poverty in the population, implying that if poverty increases in any subgroup and does not change for any other group, then aggregate poverty must increase. The practice of poverty measurement has largely been confined to such additive measures. Less attention has been paid to subgroup anonymity, which says that moving a person between groups, with no absolute loss to own consumption, cannot increase aggregate poverty. This precludes the possibility that a person’s poverty depends on her income relative to her group.

As discussed in section I, both welfarist and nonwelfarist arguments can be made for relaxing anonymity. The following discussion will show how weakly relative poverty lines can be derived consistently with both approaches.

The welfarist interpretation argues that poverty should be seen as absolute in the space of “welfare,” rather than in the consumption or income space, and that welfare depends (positively) on both own income and relative income—own income relative to mean income in the country of residence. It follows that for a poverty line to be a money-metric of welfare, it must be an increasing function of mean income. To see this more formally, suppose that welfare depends on “own income,” $Y$, and “relative income,” $Y/M$, where $M$ is the mean for the country of residence. Welfare is $W(Y, Y/M)$, which is taken to be smoothly nondecreasing in both $Y$ and $Y/M$. The poverty line in the income space is denoted $Z$ and is defined implicitly by

$$\bar{W} = W(Z, Z/M),$$

where $\bar{W}$ is the fixed poverty line in the welfare space. The solution for $Z$ is then a smoothly nondecreasing function of $M$ with elasticity given by

$$\eta = \frac{W_{Y/M}}{W_Y + M W_Y} (0 \leq \eta \leq 1)$$

(where subscripts denote partial derivatives). At the lower bound, $\eta = 0$, relative income does not matter ($W_{Y/M} = 0$), while at the upper bound, $\eta = 1$, only relative income matters ($W_Y = 0$). Thus we can state the following result:

**Proposition 1.** Welfarist poverty lines satisfy the weak relativity axiom as long as both own income and relative income are valued positively.

Notice that the elasticity of the poverty line ($\eta$) will rise with the mean only if the weight attached to relative income rises sufficiently. More precisely, $\eta$ will be increasing in $M$.
if (and only if) the elasticity of the marginal rate of substitution \( MRS = W_f/W_{YM} \) with respect to \( M \) is less than \(-1\).

The utility of relative income has not, however, been the main argument made for relative poverty lines. Rather, the case has been seen to rest on the view that there are certain demands on income that are socially determined and that a person is absolutely deprived if those demands cannot be met in a specific social context.

Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001) proposed a neat way of implementing this idea for the purpose of measuring global poverty. They postulated two key capabilities: physical survival and social inclusion. The former is the capability of being adequately nourished and clothed for meeting the physical needs of survival and normal activities. On top of this, a person must also satisfy certain social inclusion needs, which are assumed to be directly proportional to mean consumption in the country of residence. Each capability has a corresponding poverty line, giving the absolute and relative lines. The AB proposal is that one should be deemed “not poor” only if one is neither absolutely poor nor relatively poor. Letting \( Z^* \) be the minimum expenditure needed to ensure that basic consumption needs are met, measured at purchasing power parity (PPP), the AB poverty line for country \( i \) is

\[
Z^\text{AB}_{i} = \max(Z^*, kM_i)(0 < k < 1). \tag{3}
\]

There are two unknown parameters in equation (3): \( Z^* \) and \( k \). AB proposed that \( Z^* \) should be set at the World Bank’s $1-a-day line on the grounds that this can be considered a reasonable lower bound, since it is anchored to the poverty lines found in the poorest countries (Ravallion et al., 1991). AB then argued that the value of \( k \) could also be based on national poverty lines above those found in the poorest countries by studying those lines vary with mean consumption in the original database of poverty lines used by Ravallion et al. (1991) to set the $1-a-day line. By visual inspection of the Ravallion et al. (1991) data set on national poverty lines at 1985 PPP, Atkinson and Bourguignon set \( k = 0.37 \). Subsequently, Chen and Ravallion (2001) found that \( k = 1/3 \) gave a better fit with the Ravallion et al. (1991) data set at 1993 PPP.

However, the AB schedule of lines fails the WRA in that it has an elasticity of unity for all countries with \( M_i > Z^*/k \). This is surely implausible. The idea that inequality-neutral growth has no impact on the extent of poverty in a new middle-income country such as China is very hard to accept (not least, we would conjecture, in China). The violation of the WRA stems from the seemingly implausible assumption that the cost of social inclusion is directly proportional to the mean. While the costs of social inclusion may be very low for very poor people, they are unlikely to vanish in the limit.

To address this concern while preserving the neatness of the AB solution, we propose the following generalized AB poverty lines:

\[
Z = \max(Z^*, \alpha + kM_i). \tag{4}
\]

This adds a third parameter, \( \alpha \geq 0 \), which is the lower bound to social inclusion needs. The elasticity is strictly less than unity for \( \alpha > 0 \). We can thus state:

**Proposition 2.** The generalized Atkinson-Bourguignon poverty lines satisfy the weak relativity axiom as long as the cost of social inclusion has a positive lower bound.

Note that these lines converge to strongly relative lines in the limit as the mean goes to infinity.

The schedule of weakly relative lines in equation (4) can also be given a welfarist interpretation in which the underlying utility function takes the form

\[
W(\cdot) = Y \text{ if } M \leq M^* \equiv (Z^* - \alpha)/k \tag{5a}
\]

\[
= Y \left(1 - \frac{k(M - M^*)}{Y}\right) \text{ if } M > M^*. \tag{5b}
\]

In other words, concerns about relative deprivation emerge only when the mean is above some critical level, and beyond that the utility from own consumption is discounted according to the degree of relative deprivation (with mean utility of \((1 - k)\bar{M} + kM^* \) for \( M > M^* \)). The marginal disutility of relative deprivation rises with the mean once it is above the critical level.

### III. Identification from National Poverty Lines

The original $1-a-day line was chosen to be representative of the poverty lines found in the world’s poorest countries, and this principle has guided subsequent updates. We follow Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001) and Chen and Ravallion (2001) in also calibrating the schedule of relative poverty lines to national poverty lines. We assume that the differences in the real value of poverty lines between countries at different levels of mean consumption reflect differences in either the value attached to relative deprivation (following the welfarist approach) or differences in the costs of social inclusion needs (following the nonwelfarist approach). Our empirical implementation makes the further assumption that our global (weakly) relative poverty lines change over time consistently with the cross-sectional variation seen between countries. This section reviews the arguments for and against these identifying assumptions.

From a welfarist perspective, it is plausible that absolute consumption needs dominate welfare at very low levels of...
consumption, but as countries become richer, people attach higher value to relative position; there are both theoretical and empirical arguments supporting that view (Ravallion, 2008; Ravallion & Lokshin, 2010). Similarly, it is plausible that perceptions of what it means to be socially excluded evolve with the overall level of economic development. The issue here is whether these differences will be reflected in national poverty lines. Such lines must invariably pass a test of their social relevance in the specific country context. A poverty line that is too frugal by the standards of society will no doubt be seen as such by those constructing that line, and so be rejected. Nor will a line that is too generous be easily accepted. As Ravallion (2010a), argued the very process of setting a national poverty line entails enumerable choices that appear to be guided in large part by a desire for the line to be accepted in the specific context.

This argument would seem stronger for the capabilities-based approach than the welfarist approach based on relative deprivation. Some set of capabilities is an implicit or explicit foundation for most poverty lines used in practice. Nutritional needs for good health and normal activities are commonly identified, although there is considerable discretion in terms of how such needs are mapped into the consumption space. In a poor country, it is socially acceptable, and common, to use a poverty line that attains three-quarters or more of the stipulated nutritional requirements (2100 calories per day, say) with one or two starchy food staples, while in a middle-income or rich country, the stipulated diet is far more diverse (and palatable). Allowances for nonfood consumption introduce even more discretion, and it seems plausible that ideas about social inclusion needs in specific societies would come to play an important role, particularly (but not only) for the nonfood allowances. It would hardly seem credible that the national poverty lines that emerge from the choices made in their calibration would not come to reflect prevailing views about what poverty means in the specific context.

The apparent stickiness of real national poverty lines over time sits uncomfortably with this view. While the relative poverty lines used in most OECD countries and by Eurostat are automatically adjusted over time in line with the changes in the mean, it does not appear to be common to see official poverty lines in growing developing economies being revised upward in real terms. However, it is not necessarily inconsistent with our approach to find that the real level of the poverty line is resistant to change in growing economies. For one thing, it may well be the case that a (positive) minimum aggregate income gain to a low-income country is needed before upward pressure on the poverty line emerges; in fact, that is implied by our weakly relative poverty lines based on equation (4). It must also be acknowledged that there can be a strong political resistance to revising the poverty line though upward revisions after sustained growth has been observed. The fact that actual poverty lines in practice are politically sticky is not a compelling reason against allowing them to vary for the purposes of measuring global relative poverty.

There are, of course, random differences in national lines at given mean consumption or income that one would not want to attach any normative significance to in measuring global poverty. The fact that there is political resistance to revising real poverty lines upward, and that they are set at different times in different countries, will create random differences in the poverty lines found at given current mean consumption. There are also differences in methodologies used to set poverty lines in practice. The issue here is whether there is a systematic pattern in the conditional mean national poverty line (conditional on mean consumption), such that it has a very low gradient among poor countries but then rises with mean consumption. Such a pattern was first found in national poverty lines by Ravallion et al. (1991), and we will confirm below that it is also evident in new data on national lines.

IV. Data for Measuring Global Relative Poverty

In measuring relative poverty in the developing world, we draw on three new data sources. The first is a new compilation of national poverty lines documented in Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula (RCS) (2009). This exploits the new analytical work on poverty at the country level that has been done since 1990, when Ravallion et al. (1991) collected the data on national poverty lines used for setting the $1-a-day line (and by AB for setting their encompassing line). Much of the new work has been done under the World Bank’s program of country Poverty Assessments and the program of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers by national governments, often with assistance from the World Bank or other governments or international agencies. There were very few of these studies available in 1990, but they have now been done for some 100 developing countries. Almost all include estimates of national poverty lines.

Second, we use the PPP for individual consumption by households from the latest (2005) round of the International Comparison Program (ICP) (World Bank, 2008). This is the most ambitious round to date of the ICP and entailed a substantial improvement in data quality. For the purpose of measuring global poverty, an important feature of the 2005 ICP is that it did a much better job of collecting the prices needed to measure living costs. Reliable price surveys are quite difficult to do, particularly in poor countries where nontraded goods are a large share of spending. The new sur-

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22 This is no less true of the poverty lines constructed for World Bank Poverty Assessments, which emerge out of close collaboration between the technical team (often including local statistical staff and academics) and the government of the country concerned.

23 The poverty line in China had not been revised upward in real terms for over twenty years, despite a fourfold increase in mean income. This led many observers to question the relevance of the official line to current living standards in China; see, for example, Osberg and Xu (2008). In 2009 the government revised upward the country’s official poverty lines. Similarly, the Government of India’s Planning Commission (2009) recently recommended a higher official poverty line.
veys done for the 2005 ICP used far more elaborate product descriptions to help identify comparable goods, so that we do not make the mistake of judging people to be better off because they consume lower-quality (and hence cheaper) goods. However, there are also a number of concerns about the 2005 ICP round in this context.24 These include a likely urban bias in the price surveys for some countries and the fact that the ICP is designed for comparing national accounts aggregates rather than poverty measurement.25

Third, we use our own compilation of 675 household surveys for 115 countries; the latest survey rounds cover 1.23 million randomly sampled households. This is the same data set used by Chen and Ravallion (2010b; further details can be found at the PovcalNet site). The surveys were mostly done by governmental statistics offices. We have estimated all poverty measures from the primary (unit record or specially commissioned tabulations) survey data using the methods described in Chen and Ravallion (2001, 2004, 2010b). We follow the bulk of the literature for developing countries of using consumption or income per person as the welfare indicator. This assumes that there are no economies of scale in consumption. That assumption is widely considered plausible in poor economies, where goods that exhibit significant scale economies, such as housing, account for a small share of budgets for the poor. However, the assumption can be questioned even in such settings (Lanjouw & Ravallion, 1995). When both consumption and income are available, we have preferred consumption, which is available for about 60% of the surveys, on the grounds that this is likely to be a better measure of current economic welfare. The distributions are weighted by household size and sample expansion factors. Thus, our poverty counts give the number of people living in households with per capita consumption or income below the poverty line. Interpolation methods are used to line up the survey-based estimates with the reference years at three-yearly intervals over 1981 to 2005.

Figure 1 plots the national poverty lines for developing countries against private consumption per capita from the National Accounts, both converted to international dollars using the 2005 household consumption PPP from the ICP and using each country’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) to convert its poverty line to 2005 prices.26 We see that the national poverty line tends to rise with mean consumption, which we call the economic gradient.27 The least squares estimate of the elasticity of $Z$ to $M$ is 0.655 (with a t-ratio of 13.68, based on a robust standard error).28 This is significantly less than unity ($t = 7.21$). So these data for developing countries are not consistent with strongly relative poverty, but they are consistent with weakly relative poverty—a national poverty line that rises with mean consumption but with an elasticity less than unity.

However, figure 1 also suggests that the economic gradient emerges only once mean consumption is above a critical level. Figure 1 gives a nonparametric regression of the national poverty lines against log mean consumption.29 So the same pattern found by Ravallion et al. (1991) using their compilations of national poverty lines for the 1980s is evident in figure 1, with the poverty line rising with mean consumption but with a low elasticity initially.

The data in figure 1 will next be used to calibrate our proposed schedule of weakly relative poverty lines.

V. Empirical Implementation and Implications

Recall that there are three parameters to our schedule of relative poverty lines in equation (4): $Z^*$, $\alpha$, and $k$. We set these to $1.25$ a day, $0.60$ a day, and $1/3$ respectively, giving the following schedule of poverty lines for country $i$ at date $t$ (in dollars per day at the 2005 PPP for household consumption):

$$Z_{it} \equiv \max[\$1.25, \$0.60 + M_{it}/3]$$

$$= \$0.60 + \max[\$0.65, M_{it}/3] \quad (7)$$

(where $M$ denotes consumption per capita, as in figure 1).

The value of $Z^*$ = $1.25$ a day is the international poverty

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24 For an overview of the issues in constructing PPPs, see Deaton and Heston (2010). On the impacts of some of the methodological choices on global poverty measures see Ackland, Dowrick, and Freyens (2008).

25 China is an important example of this urban bias; for further discussion and a description of how we have attempted to correct for this bias, see Chen and Ravallion (2010a).

26 The data for figure 1 are found in Ravallion et al. (2009), who also discuss the choice between using consumption per capita from the national accounts rather than mean consumption or income from the surveys.

27 Recall that these lines are only for developing countries. Ravallion (forthcoming) extends the data set to include developed countries; the pattern is very similar.

28 The estimate is also robust to outliers; a median quantile regression gave 0.647 ($t = 9.57$).

29 We use Stata’s locally weighted scatter plot smoothing method with the default bandwidth (0.8).
line proposed by RCS, which is the average poverty line among the poorest fifteen countries (although the line is quite robust to small changes in the number of countries, as shown by RCS). A visual inspection of the scatter plot in figure 1 suggests that a positive slope starts to emerge at a log of monthly consumption of around 4, corresponding to about $2 a day, and that the gradient is about one-in-three.

The parameter choices in equation (6) were confirmed econometrically, using a suitably constrained version of Hansen’s (2000) method for estimating a piece-wise linear (“threshold”) model. (The variation on Hansen’s model is that, in our case, the slope of the lower linear segment is constrained to be 0, and there is no potential discontinuity at the threshold.) This gave \( Z^* = $1.23 \) (\( t = 6.36 \)) and \( k = 0.325 \) (\( t = 12.70 \)).

We can provide a number of other statistical tests that confirm this choice. There is a high correlation between the poverty lines implied by equation (6) for our sample and the nonparametric regression function in figure 1 (\( r = 0.994 \)), as well as with the data on national poverty lines (\( r = 0.836 \)). Equation (6) also outperforms a wide range of smooth parametric functional forms. Indeed, remarkably, the standard error in predicting the national lines is actually lower using equation (6) than the nonparametric regression in figure 1; the standard deviation of the error is $1.19 for our poverty lines versus $1.20 for the fitted values using the smoothness parameter for the regression in figure 1. (Of course, a sufficiently less smooth nonparametric regression would do better than our piece-wise linear model.) There is no correlation between the errors in predicting the national poverty lines using equation (6) and the fitted values of the nonparametric regression in figure 1 (the correlation coefficient is 0.02). As a further test, neither the fitted values from the nonparametric regression in figure 1 nor a cubic polynomial in \( M \) was significant when added to a regression of the actual national poverty lines on \( Z \) given by equation (6).

The bold unbroken line in figure 2 gives our weakly relative schedule in equation (6). In our data set of national poverty lines, \( Z \) varies from $1.25 a day to $9 a day. The fact that the rising portion of our poverty lines in equation (6) is not homogeneous immediately implies that the elasticity of the poverty line to mean consumption is below unity throughout (the elasticity goes to unity in the limit, as consumption goes to infinity). The elasticity is 0 at \( M < $1.95 \) and then rises from 0.5 to close to 1.0 over the sample range. Note that if we had instead followed Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001) and Chen and Ravallion (2001) and chosen \( \max(1.25, M/3) \) as the relative poverty line at 2005 PPP, the kink would be at a consumption level of $3.75 a day instead of $1.95. This reflects the fact that our weakly relative measures allow \( \alpha > 0 \), thus shifting up the schedule (see figure 2). There are eighteen countries with \( M \) in the interval ($1.95, $3.75), that is, an extra eighteen countries in the segment where the absolute line is no longer binding.

So our new data on national poverty lines suggest that relative poverty is a more prominent concern than past work indicated. This echoes our finding that the overall elasticity of the poverty line to the mean in our sample is quite high—less than unity but similar to some past estimates for developed countries.

What might we expect on a priori grounds about the trends over time in weakly relative poverty as compared to absolute poverty? That will depend in part on how the distribution of relative incomes evolves. As a stylized fact, there is no correlation across countries between rates of growth and rates of change in a standard measure of relative inequality. In other words, among developing countries, economic growth tends to be inequality neutral on average. This motivates a consideration of inequality-neural growth as a benchmark case. To see how the trend rates of reduction in the poverty rate will differ using our relative poverty

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30 By this method, one essentially estimates the model for each possible value of consumption in the data and picks the value that minimizes the residual sum of squares. We are grateful to Michael Lokshin for programming Hansen’s method in Stata.

31 The joint F-test of the null that the three parameters in the cubic function of \( M \) are all 0 in the regression of national poverty lines on \( Z \) given by equation (6) gave \( F(3,69) = 0.14 \) (prob. = 0.93), while the t-test on the coefficient of the fitted values when added to the same regression was \( t = 0.44 \).

32 There are three special cases: China, India, and Indonesia. For these countries, we have separate rural and urban distribution data from 1981 to 2005. In addition, for China and India, we have separate rural and urban CPI over time. We treat the relative poverty line based on equation (5) as the national line for India and Indonesia and then back out the rural and urban poverty lines using the urban-rural differentials in national lines. For China, the 2005 PPP is an urban PPP, so we set the urban relative poverty line as the national line and adjust the rural relative poverty line down according to the ratio of urban to rural poverty lines (following Chen & Ravallion, 2010).

33 For the Chen and Ravallion (2001) relative lines, the kink was at a consumption level of $3.24 per day at 1993 PPP, while the new schedule of relative poverty lines in equation (6) has a kink at $1.95 a day at 2005 PPP.

34 Ferreira and Ravallion (2009) provide an overview of the evidence on this stylized fact.
measure under that benchmark, let \( F_i(Z_i) \) denote the proportion of the population of country \( i \) living below our weakly relative poverty line, while \( F_i(Z^*) \) is the corresponding poverty rate using the absolute line. Under an inequality-neutral growth process, it is readily verified that the proportionate rates of poverty reduction are:

\[
\frac{d \ln F_i(Z_i)}{dt} = \left[ 1 - \frac{d \ln Z_i}{d \ln M_i} \right] \frac{\partial \ln F_i(Z_i)}{\partial \ln M_i} \cdot \frac{d \ln M_i}{dt} \quad \text{(for } Z_i > Z^*)
\]

\[
\frac{d \ln F_i(Z^*)}{dt} = \frac{\partial \ln F_i(Z^*)}{\partial \ln M_i} \cdot \frac{d \ln M_i}{dt}.
\]

Here the partial elasticities, \( \partial \ln F_i(Z_i)/\partial \ln M_i < 0 \) and \( \partial \ln F_i(Z^*)/\partial \ln M_i < 0 \), hold both \( Z_i \) and the Lorenz curve constant. Since our relative poverty measures satisfy the WRA, the relative poverty rate will fall as long as the growth rate (\( d\ln M_i/dt \)) is positive. The absolute poverty rate will also fall with positive growth. It is an empirical issue whether the relative measure falls more slowly than the absolute measure. Ravallion (2010b) shows that for the developing world as a whole, the (absolute) elasticity of the poverty rate to the mean falls monotonically as the poverty line increases over the range \$0.75 to \$13.00 a day, certainly encompassing the range of our relative poverty lines. Then relative poverty will fall at a slower rate than absolute poverty. Furthermore, as absolute poverty falls with growth, the elasticity of the poverty line with respect to the mean (\( d\ln Z_i/d\ln M_i \)) increases, while the partial elasticity (\( \partial \ln F_i(Z_i)/\partial \ln M_i < 0 \)) tends to fall. Thus, the rate of reduction in relative poverty will tend to fall as the level of absolute poverty falls. With population growth, after some point, the numbers of relatively poor will be rising, while the numbers of absolutely poor are falling. As we will see, this prediction is confirmed by our results.

VI. Weakly Relative Poverty Measures for the Developing World

Table 1 presents our results for the developing world as a whole over 1981 to 2005 at three yearly intervals; the table also gives results for the most populous regions in terms of numbers of poor. The top panel gives the mean poverty lines by region. (The mean lines do not figure in the analysis but are still of interest.) In all regions and all years, the mean is above \$1.25 a day, implying that the relative poverty line is generally dominant. The \$1.25 line is binding for only about 20% of all the combinations of countries and years. In 2005, the average poverty lines range from \$1.54 a day in sub-Saharan Africa to \$4.98 in Latin America. Like all other relative poverty lines, our average poverty lines rise over time with economic growth and fall with contraction. For example, in East Asia, the average line rose steadily from about \$1.31 in 1981 to \$2.00 in 2005, while in Latin America, the line fell slightly during the macroeconomic difficulties of the 1980s, though it rose after 1990. (Of course, unlike strongly relative lines, our lines have an elasticity to the mean that is always less than unity.)

The next two panels of table 1 give the aggregate percentages below the appropriate weakly relative lines at country level and the numbers of poor. These calculations were done from the PovcalNet site, using the same data set as Chen and Ravallion (2010b).

We find that through most of the 1990s, about half of the population of the developing world was relatively poor. The proportion fell over time, from 63% in 1981 to 53% in 1990 and 47% in 2005. But the decline was not continual;
the aggregate incidence of weakly relative poverty rose slightly in both the late 1980s and late 1990s. The trend rate of decline over the period as a whole is −0.56 percentage points per year (with a standard error of 0.10). Projecting this trend rate of decline over 1981 to 2005 forward to 2015, the proportion living in relative poverty would be 40.5% (standard error = 2.4%).

The trend decline in the incidence of relative poverty has not been sufficient to reduce the number of poor by this measure, which rose from 2.3 billion to 2.6 billion over 1981 to 2005 (see table 1). The turning point is around 1987.

Table 2 gives the corresponding absolute poverty measures. We find that 25% of the population of the developing world—1.4 billion people—lived below $1.25 a day in 2005. Twenty-five years earlier (in 1981) the percentage was 52%. This rate of progress was sufficient to bring the count of the number of poor down from 1.9 billion to 1.4 billion. However, progress was highly uneven across regions, with dramatic declines in the poverty count for East Asia, but with much less progress in other regions, and rising numbers of absolutely poor in sub-Saharan Africa (though with some sign of progress in the late 1990s).  

Figure 3 shows the simultaneous rise in relative poverty and fall in absolute poverty. As one would expect, the proportion of the relatively poor who are also absolutely poor has fallen over time, given economic growth. In 1981, 82% of the relatively poor were absolutely poor; by 2005, the proportion had fallen to 53%.

South Asia saw the largest absolute increase in the number of relatively poor and has seen a rising proportion of relatively poor since 1999, despite falling absolute poverty incidence (table 2). East Asia experienced a falling count of both the absolutely poor and the relatively poor (though with a more rapid pace of progress against absolute poverty).

Comparing tables 1 and 2, we see some differences in the regional profile of poverty, although it is notable that the two regions with the highest incidence of absolute poverty also have the highest relative poverty rate. In 2005, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) had the highest incidence of absolute poverty, with South Asia in second place (table 2), but South Asia emerges as the region with the highest incidence of relative poverty (table 1), with SSA second. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) had the third highest relative poverty incidence, but came fourth in absolute poverty. The share of global poverty in LAC rises from 3.3% to 9.6%. The largest decline in share is for SSA, which falls from 28.4% to 16.4%; South Asia’s share falls from 43.3% to 36.1%.

Also comparing tables 1 and 2, we find that the aggregate head count index of relative poverty for 2005 is 1.88 times the aggregate index of absolute poverty; in 2002, the ratio was 1.63. It is of interest to compare these numbers to the corresponding ratios from Chen and Ravallion (2004), using their parameterization of the Atkinson-Bourguignon relative poverty lines. For the latest year in the Chen-Ravallion series (2001), the aggregate measure of relative poverty was 1.36 times the aggregate measure of absolute poverty. This upward revision in the extent of relative poverty reflects the fact that our weakly relative measures imply that the economic gradient in poverty lines emerges at a
lower level than was found using the AB poverty lines calibrated on the Ravallion et al. (1991) data set.

VII. Conclusion

It is hard to accept the underlying assumptions made by prevailing measures of relative poverty, which set the poverty line at a constant proportion of the current mean or median. While we can agree that people care about their relative position in society (at least above some level of living), it is very hard to accept that they do not also care about their absolute levels of living (at least for all except very rich societies). More plausibly, utility is derived from both absolute income and relative income.

The nonwelfarist arguments made for a poverty line set at a constant proportion of the mean are no less problematic. While one can agree that certain goods have a social role, it is hard to accept that the expenditure required to attain those goods is negligibly small for very poor people. Recalling Adam Smith’s example of the role of a linen shirt in eighteenth-century Europe, a socially adequate shirt would not presumably have cost any less to the poorest person than the richest.

Our weakly relative poverty lines relax these assumptions. From a welfarist perspective, our measures place a natural upper bound on the weight attached to relative deprivation—that it cannot matter so much that measured poverty does not fall when all incomes increase by the same proportion. From a nonwelfarist perspective, we impose a positive lower bound on the cost of social inclusion.

We calibrate our weakly relative poverty lines to a new compilation of national poverty lines, drawing on a vast amount of new poverty studies done since the 1980s. A simple data-consistent schedule of relative poverty lines is shown to provide an excellent fit to these data on national lines, with an elasticity that rises from 0 to unity but never reaches unity. The absolutely poor are a subset of the poor by our proposed definition.

On implementing our schedule of weakly relative poverty lines using almost 700 surveys for 115 countries, we find that there is more relative poverty in the developing world than has been thought and that the pace of progress against relative poverty is less encouraging than that against absolute poverty. We find that 47% of the population of the developing world lived in relative poverty in 2005, down from 53% in 1990 and 63% in 1981. This was not a sufficient rate of decline in the incidence of poverty to prevent a rise in the number of poor, in contrast to the corresponding absolute poverty measures, which show falling poverty counts in the aggregate. With economic growth, the relative poverty line tends to rise, and proportionately more as average income rises. Both the direct impact on the poverty line and the effect on the responsiveness of the poverty rate to economic growth tend to bring down the trend rate of decline in relative poverty. Slower progress against relative poverty can thus be seen as the other side of the coin to success against absolute poverty.

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