A FAITH-BASED INITIATIVE MEETS THE EVIDENCE: DOES A FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME REALLY FACILITATE CURRENT ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT?

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Abstract—it is often asserted that a flexible exchange rate regime would facilitate current account adjustment. Using data on over 170 countries over the 1971–2005 period, we examine this assertion systematically. We find no strong, robust, or monotonic relationship between exchange rate regime flexibility and the rate of current account reversion, even after accounting for the degree of economic development and trade and capital account openness. This finding presents a challenge to the Friedman (1953) hypothesis and a popular policy recommendation by international financial institutions.

We also agreed that an orderly unwinding of global imbalances, while sustaining global growth, is a shared responsibility involving ... greater exchange rate flexibility.

—G-20 communiqué, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Cape Town, South Africa, November 17–18, 2007

The third part of the strategy [to address global current account imbalances] was to increase exchange rate flexibility in order to facilitate the adjustment of the current account over time.

—John Taylor, professor of economics at Stanford University, speech at the IMF, April 21, 2006

From a global perspective, exchange rate flexibility ... would also help contribute to an orderly process for resolving global current account imbalances.

—IMF Staff, “People’s Republic of China: Staff Report for the 2006 Article IV Consultation”

I. Introduction

It is often asserted that a more flexible exchange rate regime would promote current account adjustment. The three quotations at the beginning of this paper come from a group of large national governments, a prominent academic, and a premier international financial institution, respectively. Moving to a more flexible exchange rate in order to facilitate current account adjustment is a frequent policy recommendation made by the IMF and others. Cauriously, this is not a proposition that emerges from formal models in international macroeconomics as codified in the graduate-level textbooks by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and Vegh (forthcoming). The lack of a formal model is not a problem for the proposition if it is considered self-evident by now. Indeed, the logic was expounded more than half a century ago by Milton Friedman in his famous essay, “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates” (1953). However, that essay was written during an era of limited financial integration, which could be different from today’s world with substantially more cross-border capital flows. In any case, there is no systematic statistical evidence that we can find supporting this proposition for either the recent period of elevated financial integration or the earlier period. Until one finds persuasive evidence, the policy recommendation is only a faith-based initiative—based on something widely assumed to be true and actively peddled to countries as a truth but with little solid empirical support.

Indeed, it is not difficult to find counterexamples. While both Egypt and China have a relatively rigid exchange rate regime, Egypt has a relatively fast current account convergence, but China does not. On the other hand, while both South Africa and Japan have a flexible exchange rate regime, South Africa has a relatively fast convergence, but Japan does not. We can come up with other examples, but there is a limit to how much we can learn from individual cases.

In this paper, we seek to address this deficiency by systematically investigating any relationship in the data between exchange rate regimes and speed of current account adjustment. Rather than using officially announced exchange rate regimes, we appeal to de facto regimes in place. We use two well-established and familiar approaches for classifying a country’s exchange regime on a de facto basis, by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003a, 2003b), and by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), respectively.

It is important to note that we focus on the speed of current account convergence toward the mean. If an “orderly current account adjustment” has other connotations, they would lie outside the scope of our investigation. Moreover, we are not making the claim that a faster current account adjustment necessarily represents higher welfare. In general, a free float does not necessarily lead to efficient levels of exchange rates, as Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010) highlighted. The mapping between welfare and exchange rate regime depends on whether the financial market is complete and prices are flexible and whether exporters predominantly follow local currency pricing or producer currency pricing, among other things. Our goal is more limited: we seek to determine whether more rapid adjustment in a statistical sense occurs under more flexible regimes.
the enormous effort by international financial institutions and some national governments in linking more flexible regimes with faster current account adjustments, this research question still have important relevance for economic policy making.

To anticipate the results, after experimenting with a large number of statistical specifications, we find no support in the data for the notion that countries on a more flexible exchange rate regime robustly exhibit a faster convergence of their current account (as a percentage of their GDP) to the long-run equilibrium, regardless of which de facto exchange rate regime classification scheme we employ. This is true when we control for trade and financial openness and when we separate large and small countries.

To be sure, the current account balance does have a tendency to revert to its long-run steady state; it does not wander off or stay away from the long-run equilibrium forever. This is clearly reflected in our empirical work. However, the speed of adjustment is not systematically related to the degree of flexibility of a country’s nominal exchange rate regime.

This empirical result presents a challenge to the Friedman (1953) hypothesis on the merit of a flexible regime in promoting faster external adjustment and a challenge to a key policy recommendation by international financial institutions in using exchange rate flexibility to reduce global current account imbalances. To understand why the pattern may be reasonable, the second part of our analysis examines whether the nature of a country’s nominal exchange rate regime significantly affects the pace of real exchange rate adjustment. The current account responds to the real exchange rate, not the nominal exchange rate. If the real exchange rate adjustment does not depend on the nominal exchange rate regime, then the current account adjustment would not depend on the nominal exchange rate regime either. Indeed, we find that the real exchange rate adjustment is not systematically related to how flexible a country’s nominal exchange rate regime is. Again, this is true regardless of which de facto exchange rate regime classification we use. If anything, there is slight, but not very robust, evidence that less flexible nominal exchange rate regimes sometimes exhibit faster real exchange rate adjustment. Although the evidence on real exchange rate adjustment is suggestive, we hope this paper could inspire additional work in rethinking the role of a nominal exchange rate regime in an economy’s external adjustment.

The literature on current account is too large to be comprehensively summarized here. In terms of relatively recent theoretical work, Blanchard (2007) points out that one cannot automatically assume that a current account imbalance needs to be corrected by a policy unless one has clearly identified the relevant distortions. For empirical work on estimating current account adjustment, an excellent set of papers is collected in Clarida (2007), which contains references to the earlier literature. As far as we know, the existing literature has not systematically addressed the question of whether a flexible exchange rate regime speeds up convergence of the current account. In this sense, this paper fills an important void.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II lays out the empirical methodology, data, and benchmark results. Section III conducts a series of extensions and robustness checks. Finally, section IV concludes.

II. Benchmark Statistical Results

We start by explaining our econometric specifications and the definitions and sources of the key variables. We then present and discuss benchmark regression results.

A. Methodology

We estimate the rate at which current account balances (expressed as a share of GDP) revert to their mean values, using variations on this basic autoregression:

\[ ca_t = \rho_0 + \rho_1 ca_{t-1} + \nu_t, \]

where \( ca_t \) is the current account to GDP ratio for country \( i \) in year \( t \). One can determine how the autoregressive coefficient varies with the exchange rate regime in a variety of ways. The simplest would be to order the exchange rate regimes by degree of flexibility and then interact with the lagged endogenous variable. Since this approach imposes a monotonic relationship between the degree of exchange rate flexibility and the rate of current account reversion, we do not focus on this approach in our presentation. Rather, we discuss estimates obtained by either of two methods: stratifying the sample by exchange rate regime and running separate regressions by regime, or interacting binary dummy variables for each regime with the lagged current account and estimating the differential effects in a single regression.

For simplicity of exposition, equation (1) assumes a fixed mean value of the current account. Subsequently, we allow this mean to vary over time. In general, a country’s current account need not be 0 even in the steady state. Kraay et al. (2005) arrive at this result by treating foreign asset holdings (cumulative current account balance) as a portfolio choice problem. Ju and Wei (2007) argue that the relative size of frictions to capital flows versus frictions to goods trade can affect the size of current response to a given shock. As a result, the average size of current account across countries

1 We check for higher-order autoregressive terms and find that an AR(1) is sufficient for the annual data. The sole exception is for the category of nonindustrial countries (and nonindustrial excluding oil exporters) under a fixed exchange rate regime. In that case, the second lag is typically statistically significant. However, the pattern of persistence, as measured by the sum of the autoregressive coefficients, is unchanged relative to the baseline specification.

2 We did estimate regressions of this form and did not obtain any significant results. Subsequent results indicate a lack of the requisite monotonicity, which explains why this approach does not yield significant estimates.
could partly reflect the relative importance of frictions to capital flows versus goods trade. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) focus on the implications of cross-country differences in financial development. They argue that a country with weak financial development tends to send savings to a country with a strong financial system. As a result, the weak-finance country runs a current account surplus, while the strong-finance country runs a deficit. If one models financial frictions differently, Ju and Wei (2010) argue that the current account patterns become less clear-cut. An intensified competition in the marriage market, as triggered by an increase in the ratio of young men to young women, could lead to a rise in the aggregate savings rate and a rise in the current account imbalance (see Du & Wei, 2010, for a theoretical model and some cross-country evidence, and Wei and Zhang, 2011, for household and regional-level evidence from China). While the current account would still be balanced in the steady state, a higher sex ratio could produce a large and positive current account that persists for many periods. In a finite sample, this may show up as a non-zero mean for the current account. In order to be general, we do not restrict the mean of the current account to be zero.

The first approach relies on estimating equation (1) for each category of exchange rate regime. The second approach involves estimating equation (2):

\[ ca_i = \rho_0 + \rho_1 ca_{i-1} + \theta_0 \sum_{j=0}^{k} \text{regime}_{j|i} + \theta_1 \left( ca_{i-1} \times \sum_{j=0}^{k} \text{regime}_{j|i} \right) + \nu_i. \]

The variable \( \text{regime} \) is the de facto exchange rate measure.\(^3\) (As an extension, we allow for both country fixed effects and year fixed effects. This does not alter the basic conclusion of the paper.)

The first approach imposes the fewest assumptions but might yield imprecise estimates due to a substantially decreased number of observations for each regression. The second approach will yield the same point estimates as obtained in the first approach but different estimated standard errors. The validity of this approach for making inference depends on the condition that the error term is distributed in a similar fashion across exchange rate regimes.

It is important to allow a different constant for each regime, given the Friedman hypothesis (1953), which argued that flexible exchange rates would be consistent with more rapid adjustment. In our context, one might think that flexible exchange rate regimes would generate smaller current account imbalances on average. There is some evidence of this effect in the aggregate, and for the nonindustrial countries (although it is entirely absent for industrial countries), on an unconditional basis.\(^4\)

In all instances, we would like to control for other structural variables that might also affect the rate of reversion. In the case of equation (2), we augment the equation with level and interaction effects,

\[ ca_i = \rho_0 + \rho_1 ca_{i-1} + \theta_0 \sum_{j=0}^{k} \text{regime}_{j|i} + \theta_1 \left( ca_{i-1} \times \sum_{j=0}^{k} \text{regime}_{j|i} \right) + \text{controls}_{i} + \nu_i, \]

where the list of \( \text{controls} \) includes different measures of economic openness, including trade and financial openness, described in greater detail below.

B. Data

The current account and trade openness data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The trade openness variable is the standard measure (the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP). Over the 1971–2005 period, 170 countries are included. The sample encompasses both developed and developing countries as classified by the IMF.

The de facto exchange rate regime variables come from two sources: the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003a, 2003b) and the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) measures. The Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger index ranges from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating inconclusive determination, 2 free float, 3 dirty float, 4 dirty float/crawling peg, and 5 fix. In this study, we drop 1s and subtract 2 off the index, so that the revised index ranges from 0 to 3 (hereafter, the LYS index).

The Reinhart and Rogoff index ranges from 1 to 14, from more to less fixity. We aggregated the series into three categories. The first is fixed (from no legal tender to de facto peg), the second is intermediate (from preannounced crawling peg to moving band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%), and the third is floating (managed floating to freely floating).\(^5\) These categories are then reversed so the index (hereafter, the RR index) ranges from low values (high flexibility) to high values (high fixity).

While it is well understood that a country’s actual exchange rate regime often differs from its de jure regime, Frankel (2007) notes that the two popular de facto classification

\(^3\) We have also employed the de jure index based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions instead of the de facto measures. The results indicate no systematic relationship.

\(^4\) A panel regression of the absolute value of current account balances on regime dummies indicates a significant positive effect for the fixed exchange rate dummy in the full and nonindustrial country samples. Industrial countries exhibit no pattern, either allowing for fixed effects or not.

\(^5\) This means we have omitted the “freely falling” regime observations, following Graciela Kaminsky’s observation that such episodes are fundamentally distinct from freely floating.
cation schemes have a correlation of only 0.40, indicating that they have much disagreement over how to classify a given country in a given year. Given this disagreement, we opt to work with both classification schemes. Figures 1 and 2 present the histograms for the LYS and RR indices, respectively. The number of observations on LYS and RR is comparable, at around 4,000. There are some differences in the distribution of regimes, but the same general pattern is replicated. The fewest observations are in the freest-float- ing category, and the greatest number of observations is found in the most fixed category.

C. The Basic Results

We estimate country by country the autoregressive parameter in equation (1), incorporating shifts due to different exchange rate regimes. Since some countries are on the same exchange rate regime for only a short period, a caveat is that some of the autoregressive parameters are estimated over relatively short samples. In any case, one sees in figure 3 a slight impression of higher degrees of persistence as one moves to higher degrees of exchange rate fixity. However, a closer examination indicates that the impression is being driven by the lack of negative coefficients in the least flexible regimes. The mean of the estimated coefficients is virtually the same across regimes. This result holds up if a deterministic trend is included in the specifications; the resulting distributions are displayed in figure 4. The bottom line is that there is no clear evidence that more flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with a faster current account adjustment.

Other ways to formally quantify the effect of each regime is to stratify the data by each regime and run separate

6 The samples have been truncated below at −1 and above at 2 to eliminate imprecisely estimated coefficients.
regressions or, alternatively, to interact the LYS variable with the autoregressive parameter in a pooled regression.

First, we present the results obtained by stratifying the sample by exchange rate regime. In table 1, the LYS index is used to categorize the regimes. Moving from left to right are increasing degrees of fixity. In the first four columns of table 1, pertaining to the full sample, the degree of persistence is 0.63 under the most flexible regime and rises to 0.76 and 0.79 as the regime gets progressively less flexible. Thus far, these results are in accord with the conventional wisdom. However, this is not robust or at least nonlinear. When one gets to the most fixed regime, the degree of persistence declines to 0.74. Beyond the point estimates, it is important to note that one cannot reject the hypothesis that any pair of these AR(1) coefficients is the same. Therefore, there is no statistical evidence that a more flexible exchange rate regime is associated with a faster current account adjustment.

There is a high degree of heterogeneity in the sample given that the sample encompasses both industrial, developing, and oil exporting countries. Focusing on the industrial countries, one finds the greatest degree of persistence (essentially a random walk) in an intermediate regime category. In any case, the industrial countries have not been the focus of the policy discussions. Rather, it is the non-industrial countries on which most analysts have concentrated on.

Moving to the right in table 1, one finds that indeed the fastest rate of reversion is in the floating category. However, once again the relationship is nonlinear. Increasing degrees of fixity lead to greater persistence, until one gets to the fixed regime. Then the degree of persistence declines. This pattern is replicated if one focuses on non-oil-exporting nonindustrial countries. While this outcome might be taken as partial vindication of the conventional wisdom, it is of interest that the transition that is most relevant to the current policy debate is that between the fixed and dirty float/crawling peg. And here the results are counter to what has been argued. For instance, China’s move from a de facto fixed regime to a dirty float would result—if other countries’ experience is any guide based on our estimation—in slower current account reversion.

An alternative means of identifying the differences in current account persistence across regimes is to use interactive dummies, as indicated in equation (2). The only substantive difference between the two methods involves the second moment; the dummy variable approach assumes that the same error distribution applies to all regimes. To verify this, note that in table 2, the point estimate for the full sample rate of reversion under freely floating is the same using the two methods. The estimated coefficient on the interaction term (lagcurrent1) is the implied effect on the reversion coefficient of being in the dirty float versus the free float in the LYS schema. Adding 0.132 to 0.630 yields 0.762, which equals the point estimate in column (2) of table 1. The only additional information provided by this dummy
The basic specification outlined in equation (1) incorporates mean reversion. An alternative is to allow trends in the ratio of the current account to GDP. Consistent with the approach adopted in the literature, we detrend the current account ratio before testing for patterns across exchange rate regimes. The results, reported in table 4 (for four different samples), suggest little change in the conclusions one would take from the analysis.
### Table 3.—Current Account Persistence, by Country Sample, by Reinhart-Rogoff Exchange Rate Regime

<table>
<thead>
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<th>(3)</th>
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<th>(9)</th>
<th>(10)</th>
<th>(11)</th>
<th>(12)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Floating</td>
<td>Band/</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Floating</td>
<td>Band/</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Floating</td>
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<td>Floating</td>
<td>Band/</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Crawling Peg</td>
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<td>Crawling Peg</td>
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<td>Crawling Peg</td>
<td></td>
<td>Crawling Peg</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA(−1)</td>
<td>0.663***</td>
<td>0.799***</td>
<td>0.719***</td>
<td>0.925***</td>
<td>0.840***</td>
<td>0.946***</td>
<td>0.621***</td>
<td>0.795***</td>
<td>0.688***</td>
<td>0.656***</td>
<td>0.800***</td>
<td>0.655***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−0.005*</td>
<td>−0.005**</td>
<td>−0.015***</td>
<td>−0.006**</td>
<td>−0.021***</td>
<td>−0.007**</td>
<td>−0.006**</td>
<td>−0.021***</td>
<td>−0.009**</td>
<td>−0.007**</td>
<td>−0.026***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0.666</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>0.663</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.662</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>0.673</td>
<td>0.431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent variable: CA. Exchange rate regimes are based on Reinhart-Rogoff definitions. Free-fall regime observations omitted. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.

### Table 4.—HP Detrended Current Account Persistence, by Country Sample, by Exchange Rate Regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>(11)</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Floating</td>
<td>Dirty Float</td>
<td>Dirty Float/Crawling Peg</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Floating</td>
<td>Dirty Float</td>
<td>Dirty Float/Crawling Peg</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Floating</td>
<td>Dirty Float</td>
<td>Dirty Float/Crawling Peg</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA(−1)</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.457</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.119)****</td>
<td>(0.116)**</td>
<td>(0.043)**</td>
<td>(0.079)**</td>
<td>(0.177)**</td>
<td>(0.237)**</td>
<td>(0.069)**</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td>(0.121)****</td>
<td>(0.117)**</td>
<td>(0.042)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>2,139</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>1,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent variable: HP detrended CA. Exchange rate regimes are based on Levy-Yeyati and Sharanegger definitions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, and *$p < 0.1$.
B. Adding Variables: Openness to Trade and Capital Flows

Two key missing regressors are trade openness and capital account openness. One might conjecture that greater trade openness makes it easier for trade accounts to respond to real exchange rate changes and therefore is associated with a faster current account reversion. On the other hand, greater capital account openness makes an economy more susceptible to financing shocks, which may result in more frequent current account reversals. Without controlling for the effects of trade and capital account openness, the true relationship between exchange rate regimes and current account adjustment may be more difficult to detect.

A number of variables could be used to proxy for trade and capital account openness. We appeal to two commonly used and easy-to-interpret measures. For trade openness, we use the sum of imports and exports to GDP ratio (OPEN). On the capital account openness side, we appeal to real exchange rate changes and therefore is associated with a faster current account reversion. Without controlling for the effects of trade and capital account openness, the true relationship between trade openness makes it easier for trade accounts to respond to real exchange rate changes and therefore is associated with a faster current account reversion. On the other hand, greater capital account openness makes an economy more susceptible to financing shocks, which may result in more frequent current account reversals. Without controlling for the effects of trade and capital account openness, the true relationship between exchange rate regimes and current account adjustment may be more difficult to detect.

A number of variables could be used to proxy for trade and capital account openness. We appeal to two commonly used and easy-to-interpret measures. For trade openness, we use the sum of imports and exports to GDP ratio (OPEN). On the capital account openness side, we appeal to the Chinn and Ito (2006) financial openness index (KAOPEN). This measure is the first principal component of four categories of restrictions on external transactions, including dual foreign exchange rates, restrictions on current account transactions, restrictions on capital account transactions, and finally the surrender of export proceeds. We switch the sign so that higher values of this index represent greater financial openness.

Table 5 presents the results from specifications incorporating these variables (in the context of the LYS index). Notice first in the full sample that the estimated rates of reversion differ from those obtained in table 2. This outcome is to be expected, to the extent that the openness terms, when interacted with the lagged current account balance, are statistically significant. What the results indicate is that a lack of a clear pattern for any country grouping between degrees of exchange rate fixity and current account persistence. The estimated autoregressive coefficient (holding at
0 trade and financial openness) is never the highest in the fixed regime. Rather it is often the dirty float/managed peg category that exhibits the greatest persistence.

Here are some other notable points. First, in the dummy variable regressions (not shown), current account balances in the fixed exchange rate regimes exhibit less persistence than the freely floating regimes. In the full sample and the nonindustrial country sample, the difference is statistically significant. Second, trade openness does not appear to be an important determinant of current account persistence, but financial openness does. In the dummy variable regressions (not shown), a country with a more open capital account tends to exhibit greater persistence in current account imbalance, and this is true in every country grouping. The effect is statistically significant for every grouping save the nonindustrial ex-oil group and is most pronounced for the industrial country group. Similar results are obtained using the Reinhart-Rogoff measure, although in this case, we also find lower persistence for the nonindustrial ex-oil group as well.

One question is whether treatment of openness as a continuous variable, as in table 5, is appropriate. One could alternatively ask if the rates of reversion differ under fixed and flexible exchange rates when each openness indicator is viewed as dichotomous. Then one could examine the rate of adjustment under four combinations of high/low trade and financial openness. In order to examine this issue, we defined high trade and financial openness as instances where the indicators are higher than the mean values. For the combinations to have an interesting impact, the coefficients on the resulting dummy variables need to be statistically significant.

For the nonindustrial countries, these dummy variables do not exhibit statistical significance in many cases (results not reported). For floating rates, countries with high trade openness display higher reversion, regardless of financial openness. For fixed rates countries, high financial openness is associated with slower reversion, regardless of trade openness. These results are only slightly different from those reported in table 5. Holding constant trade and financial openness, there is no evidence that a move to a more flexible exchange rate regime necessarily produces a faster current account convergence.

C. Nonlinearities and Asymmetric Effects

A number of observers have pointed out that large current account deficits appear to adjust in a different fashion from small deficits. This suggests that there are nonlinearities and threshold effects in current account adjustment that we need to test for. In addition, Ghosh, Terrones, and Zettelmeyer (2008) argue that such effects might invalidate our results.

To address the first issue of nonlinearity, we proceed by estimating for each regime:

\[ ca_{it} = \rho_0 + \rho_1 ca_{it-1} + \rho_2 |ca_{it-1}| + \text{controls}_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \]  

(4)

It would be possible to account for nonlinearities in equation (3) for the pooled sample, but at the cost of introducing many additional interaction terms (for example, regime by current account size). Hence, we rely on separate regressions on stratified samples. We allow the nonlinearity to enter in a smooth, rather than discrete, fashion.\(^{10}\)

The results of estimating equation (4) are presented in table 6. They show clear evidence of nonlinear effects. However, accounting for these effects does not overturn our previous conclusions. The nonlinear effect is obscured in the full sample encompassing industrial and nonindustrial countries and shows up only for the fixed exchange rate regime. It is true that in that instance, larger balances—either large or small—induce faster reversion, at least in a statistical sense. However, the other coefficients associated with the posited nonlinearity are not statistically significant. Similarly, inference regarding the strength of the nonlinear effects is hampered in the industrial country sample by the small number of observations in certain categories. The only conclusion that can be made is that the rate of reversion under fixed rates does not appear to be any slower than flexible rates. This is true either controlling for and holding constant the absolute size of the current account balance or taking into account the average size of the absolute current account balance.

Since the issue of current account adjustment and exchange rate regimes is centered on nonindustrial countries, we direct our attention to table 6. Holding constant the average absolute current account balance, the rates of reversion in the dirty float/crawling peg regime and the fixed regime appear about equal. Evaluating the reversion coefficient at the respective means of the average absolute current account balances, it would appear that reversion in the fixed category is definitely faster than under dirty float/crawling peg category.\(^{11}\)

A separate but related issue is whether reversion rates differ when a surplus, as opposed to a deficit, is being run. In order to examine this type of asymmetry, we define a dummy variable, \( posCA = 1 \) if \( CA > 0 \), and 0 otherwise, and estimate the following equation:

\[ ca_{it} = \rho_0 + \rho_1 ca_{it-1} + \rho_2 |ca_{it-1}| posCA_{it-1} + \text{controls}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}. \]  

(5)


\(^{10}\) Ghosh et al. (2008) finds that large surpluses, defined as surpluses above the 75th percentile, are more persistent in fixed and intermediate regimes, while large deficits exhibit less persistence in intermediate regimes. We cannot replicate these exact results using our measures of de facto exchange rates and our sample of countries. We also find that the results vary substantially by country grouping. The industrial country grouping, in particular, exhibits different patterns from the nonindustrial country grouping.

\(^{11}\) Here, we incorporate the nonlinear effects only when the relevant coefficient is statistically significant.
The coefficient $\rho_1$ represents the rate of reversion when the current account balance is negative, whereas the sum of two coefficients $\rho_1 + \rho_2$ represents the rate of reversion when the current account balance is positive. The estimates are reported in table 7.

While there is some evidence of asymmetry in the full sample, this seems to be an artifact of pooling. Among industrial countries, there is an indication that the asymmetry exists only for those on floating rates, and in this case there is no evidence of reversion. The point estimate is 1.36, suggesting explosive behavior for surplus countries.\footnote{There are too few observations in the dirty float and dirty float/crawling peg categories to make inferences.} Even when the balance is negative, the evidence for reversion is weak, since the point estimate is 0.96. In contrast, under fixed rates, the rate of reversion is 0.67, and there is no evidence for this type of asymmetry.

Turning to the most important categories, the nonindustrial and nonindustrial ex-oil countries, one finds that the asymmetry shows up only in the intermediate categories. When countries are experiencing current account deficits, it is clearly true that the rate of reversion is slowest in the dirty float/crawling peg regime. When a current account surplus exists, there is some evidence that the intermediate regimes have the fastest rates of reversion. The evidence is particularly marked for the nonindustrial countries (taking out the oil exporters weakens the result, so only in the dirty float/crawling peg regime does the rate of reversion look substantially faster than in the other regimes). One notable result is that the floating rate and fixed rate rates of reversion are about the same regardless of whether these countries are running a surplus or a deficit.

We also investigated whether the nonlinear effect shows up after accounting for asymmetry. While there is some evidence of both effects being present, only in one case are both effects manifested simultaneously: nonoil nonindustrial countries under a fixed exchange rate regime. Reversion is faster when the current account balances are bigger and is faster still when the current account balance is positive. In no other case do both effects show up. In other words, sometimes the nonlinear effect is symmetrical, and in other instances, the nonlinear effect occurs (at statistically significant levels) only when balances are positive or negative.

An important finding in these sets of results allowing for both nonlinearities and asymmetries is that the slowest rate of reversion in each category of countries is often, though not always, the dirty float/crawling peg regime.\footnote{While Ghosh et al. (2008) pool over all countries in a given regression, we break down by groupings in our finest detail. Our specification is in principle more general and more flexible. In addition, our samples are also larger.} In any case, after allowing for asymmetries and nonlinearity, we still do not find robust evidence that increasing exchange rate flexibility would deliver a faster current account adjustment.
### TABLE 7.—Current Account Persistence and Asymmetry with Openness, by Country Sample, by Exchange Rate Regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>All Industrial Countries</th>
<th>Nonindustrial Countries</th>
<th>Nonindustrial Countries ex-Oil</th>
<th>Dirty</th>
<th>Dirty</th>
<th>Dirty</th>
<th>Dirty</th>
<th>Dirty</th>
<th>Floating</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>Current</th>
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<th>Current</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>Current</th>
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<th>Current</th>
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<td>CA(1)</td>
<td>0.706***</td>
<td>0.640***</td>
<td>0.970***</td>
<td>0.664***</td>
<td>0.964***</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>2.339***</td>
<td>0.667***</td>
<td>0.684***</td>
<td>0.580***</td>
<td>0.961***</td>
<td>0.628***</td>
<td>0.662***</td>
<td>0.629***</td>
<td>0.930***</td>
<td>0.590***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA(0)/C0</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.400)</td>
<td>(0.699)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d(CA(1)/C0)</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.438*</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.400**</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.251***</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade Openness</td>
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<td>0.184***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.251***</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial Openness</td>
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<td>0.070</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.048###</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.003</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.048###</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.026</td>
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<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

D. **Size**

Country size could affect the pattern of current account dynamics: for a large country, the only way for its current account deficit to shrink is for the rest of the world to do an opposite adjustment. This means that the adjustment of a large country’s current account depends on factors that affect other countries’ adjustment, potentially including other countries’ exchange rate regimes (Ju & Wei, 2007). A simple way to account for this possibility is to run separate regressions for large and small economies.

Table 8 reports results stratified by economic size. We used both the dollar measure and the PPP measure of GDP to split the samples by average GDP. That is, for each year, we calculated the average GDP for the entire sample and placed countries in either the high or low subsample. We then reestimated the dummy variable specifications to examine whether the effect of exchange rate regimes differed depending on economic size.

We report only the results for PPP-defined size (the results using market exchange rates are similar but less statistically significant). First, note that a simple autoregressive characterization (no controls) indicates very similar degrees of current account persistence across large and small countries. However, differences become highlighted when additional controls are added. With the exchange regime dummy variables included, the large country current account balances are much less persistent than those for the smaller countries, even though few of the regime variables are statistically significant. The big difference comes when the openness variables are also included. Then for the large countries, all regimes exhibit less persistence than the free float, although the difference is not significant for the dirty float/crawling peg.

Another way to break the groups into large and small is to focus on the G7 countries as opposed to all others. In this case, the most important features are that, unconditionally, G7 current account balances are much more persistent than other countries’ balances (results not reported). When regime and openness effects are allowed for, it appears that financial openness in particular induces much greater persistence (especially in the G7 countries, although the effect is visible for both sets of countries).

Turning to the regime results, for the G7, a dirty float/crawling peg induces much greater persistence in both economic and statistical terms. For the non-G7, a fixed exchange rate induces much less persistence. This effect is statistically significant. This seems counter to the general presumption, although it must be allowed that the result obtains only when the openness variables are included.

E. **Inflation**

One could argue that the exchange rate regimes proxy for other, more fundamental factors. Given the popularity of nominal anchor argument as a means of reducing inflation,
it makes sense to examine robustness by including inflation in our regressions.

We augment the basic specifications using dummies for the LYS indicator variable with CPI inflation measured as the log difference in the CPI (the results are not reported to save space). It turns out that we retain the basic pattern highlighted in table 2. In particular, exchange rate regimes still do not display a statistically significant impact on reversion rates, and to the extent that they do, more rigid regimes are associated with faster reversion rates after controlling for inflation. Indeed, the only instances in which the inflation rate variable comes into play are those involving the industrial countries. There, higher inflation is associated with faster reversion.

**F. Endogeneity**

The preceding discussion assumes that one can take the exchange rate regime selection as exogenous with respect to current account persistence. But we cannot take this assumption for granted. Hence, we undertake an examination to see whether the conclusions are robust to possible endogeneity of exchange rate regimes.

What variables enter into the determination of de facto exchange rate regimes? Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003b) present evidence that regime selection depends on initial foreign exchange reserves, a dummy for islands, economic size, area, and average exchange rate regime in the region.

Motivated by their results, we use a two-stage procedure to reestimate the equations for specifications excluding and including openness variables. In the first stage, we estimate a multinomial probit model for each indicator variable (regime 0 through regime 3, ranging from floating to fixed), using as regressors the initial foreign exchange reserve to GDP ratio, GDP in PPP terms, land area, and a dummy variable for islands. The probit regressions yield probabilities that we then use in the second-stage regressions. Note that the probit regressions are more successful for the extreme regimes than for the intermediate regimes.

The second-stage regression results are reported in table 9. The regressions, excluding openness variables, indicate that except for the industrial countries, there is no evidence that differing exchange rate regimes are associated with statistically significantly differing rates of current account reversion. And in this case, the implied rates of adjustment for the intermediate regimes do not make a lot of sense.

A Hausman test for the exogeneity of the regime variables rejects in almost all cases involving nonindustrial countries. Hence, treating the regime indicator variables as endogenous is appropriate. The Sargan test statistic for overidentifying restrictions fails to reject in all instances. In a pure statistical sense, these instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the main regression.

We also attempted to back out binary indicator variables based on the predicted probabilities from the multinomial probit regressions. However, because the model has a difficult time predicting the intermediate regimes, the estimated
dirty float and dirty float/crawling peg variables are collinear, and hence we are unable to obtain independent effects from each of these regimes. We find that the rate of adjustment in the fully fixed regime is not statistically different from that of the fully flexible regime; hence, once again we fail to discern a strong association between exchange rate rigidity in nominal terms and current account adjustment.

IV. Exchange Rate Regimes and Persistence of the Real Exchange Rate

Why doesn’t a more flexible exchange rate regime generate a faster convergence of the current account? This section aims to investigate this question. Our hypothesis is that the current account responds to the real exchange rate, not the nominal exchange rate. If the real exchange rate adjustment does not depend very much on the nominal exchange rate regime, then the current account adjustment would not depend very much on the nominal exchange rate regime either. We now examine whether the nature of a country’s nominal exchange rate regime significantly affects the adjustment process of its real exchange rate.

In order to accomplish this aim, we repeat a similar process from the previous section, except that we replace the current account with real effective exchange rates—CPI-deflated trade-weighted indices—as calculated by the IMF.

We estimate the basic specification, then augment with dummy variables for the regime, and then incorporate the openness measures. The results in table 10 indicate little evidence that the nature of the exchange rate regime matters. In column 1, a simple AR(1) specification indicates a 20% rate of real exchange rate reversion for the entire sample of countries; adding in regime interaction terms yields an essentially unchanged rate of reversion (22%) and no hint that any of the interaction terms with exchange rate regimes are anywhere near statistical significance (column 2). This conclusion is not altered at all by the inclusion of two openness measures. The rate of reversion is still the same (21%).

As an aside, it is interesting that we find that real exchange rates are mean reverting. This result is in line with other panel studies of real exchange rates (Murray & Papell, 2005). In addition, greater trade openness is associated with faster reversion of the real exchange rate. This finding does not fit in with Cheung and Lai (2000), Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2001), and Cashin and McDermott (2006), but is in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REER(−1)</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
<th>(9)</th>
<th>(10)</th>
<th>(11)</th>
<th>(12)</th>
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<td>0.797</td>
<td>0.782</td>
<td>0.785</td>
<td>0.624</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td>0.803</td>
<td>0.814</td>
<td>0.832</td>
<td>0.779</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>0.728</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.024)**</td>
<td>(0.056)**</td>
<td>(0.053)**</td>
<td>(0.055)**</td>
<td>(0.103)**</td>
<td>(0.102)**</td>
<td>(0.024)**</td>
<td>(0.054)**</td>
<td>(0.060)**</td>
<td>(0.030)**</td>
<td>(0.043)**</td>
<td>(0.066)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>REER(−1) × LYS1</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>-0.119</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.019</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.083</td>
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<td>REER(−1) × LYS2</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
<td>-0.115</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
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<td>(0.159)</td>
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<td>(0.106)</td>
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<td>0.096</td>
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<tr>
<td>REER(−1) × LYS3</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.032</td>
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<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.126</td>
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<td>(0.083)</td>
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<td>LYS1</td>
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<td>0.121</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
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<td>(0.349)</td>
<td>(0.340)</td>
<td>(0.732)</td>
<td>(0.647)</td>
<td>(0.360)</td>
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<td>0.518</td>
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<td>(0.701)</td>
<td>(0.729)</td>
<td>(0.503)</td>
<td>(0.483)</td>
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<td>0.449</td>
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<td>-0.106</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>-0.270</td>
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<td>(0.390)</td>
<td>(0.352)</td>
<td>(0.471)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>REER(−1) × Trade Openness</td>
<td>-0.115</td>
<td>-0.122</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.052)**</td>
<td>(0.052)**</td>
<td>(0.056)**</td>
<td>(0.056)**</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.212)*</td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
<td>(0.213)*</td>
<td>(0.242)*</td>
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<td>Financial Openness</td>
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<td>(0.112)</td>
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<td>(0.255)**</td>
<td>(0.256)**</td>
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<td>(0.462)**</td>
<td>(0.112)**</td>
<td>(0.245)**</td>
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<td>(0.139)**</td>
<td>(0.205)**</td>
<td>(0.333)**</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>92</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>58</td>
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<td>R²</td>
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<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.47</td>
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<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.64</td>
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</table>

Dependent variable: REER. LYS1 is a dummy variable for the dirty float regime. LYS2 is a dummy variable for dirty float/crawling peg. LYS3 is a dummy variable for fixed. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. 

Table 10.—Real Exchange Rate Persistence, by Country Sample.
Table 11.—Real Exchange Rate Persistence with Time Fixed Effects, by Country Sample

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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<th>(9)</th>
<th>(10)</th>
<th>(11)</th>
<th>(12)</th>
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<tr>
<td>REER(−1)</td>
<td>0.776</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td>0.731</td>
<td>0.624</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td>0.696</td>
<td>0.768</td>
<td>0.731</td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>0.750</td>
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<td>(0.024)***</td>
<td>(0.055)***</td>
<td>(0.050)***</td>
<td>(0.057)***</td>
<td>(0.097)***</td>
<td>(0.112)***</td>
<td>(0.026)***</td>
<td>(0.056)***</td>
<td>(0.063)***</td>
<td>(0.032)***</td>
<td>(0.046)***</td>
<td>(0.071)***</td>
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<tr>
<td>REER(−1) × LYS1</td>
<td>−0.011</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>−0.026</td>
<td>−0.135</td>
<td>−0.011</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.067</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
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<tr>
<td>REER(−1) × LYS2</td>
<td>−0.092</td>
<td>−0.102</td>
<td>−0.071</td>
<td>−0.096</td>
<td>−0.092</td>
<td>−0.100</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>−0.016</td>
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<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
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<tr>
<td>REER(−1) × LYS3</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>−0.040</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.164</td>
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<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.068)*</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>(0.071)*</td>
<td>(0.093)*</td>
<td>(0.085)**</td>
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<td>0.609</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>−0.099</td>
<td>−0.304</td>
<td>−0.336</td>
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<td>(0.331)</td>
<td>(0.329)</td>
<td>(0.655)</td>
<td>(0.695)</td>
<td>(0.338)</td>
<td>(0.330)</td>
<td>(0.363)</td>
<td>(0.373)</td>
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<td>LYS2</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>0.455</td>
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<td>0.387</td>
<td>0.426</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.507)</td>
<td>(0.478)</td>
<td>(0.915)</td>
<td>(0.997)</td>
<td>(0.506)</td>
<td>(0.475)</td>
<td>(0.462)</td>
<td>(0.460)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LYS3</td>
<td>−0.381</td>
<td>−0.533</td>
<td>−0.290</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>−0.425</td>
<td>−0.650</td>
<td>−0.739</td>
<td>−0.885</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.368)</td>
<td>(0.313)*</td>
<td>(0.439)</td>
<td>(0.500)</td>
<td>(0.383)</td>
<td>(0.332)*</td>
<td>(0.443)</td>
<td>(0.405)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>REER(−1) × Trade Openness</td>
<td>−0.107</td>
<td>−0.057</td>
<td>−0.113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.056)*</td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(0.057)*</td>
<td>(0.058)*</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>REER(−1) × Financial Openness</td>
<td>−0.032</td>
<td>−0.061</td>
<td>−0.023</td>
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<td>(0.021)</td>
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<td>Trade Openness</td>
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<td>(0.245)</td>
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<td>Financial Openness</td>
<td>0.162</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.052</td>
<td>1.236</td>
<td>1.487</td>
<td>1.763</td>
<td>1.965</td>
<td>1.533</td>
<td>1.089</td>
<td>1.218</td>
<td>1.635</td>
<td>1.174</td>
<td>1.615</td>
<td>2.123</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.113)***</td>
<td>(0.265)***</td>
<td>(0.257)***</td>
<td>(0.287)***</td>
<td>(0.494)***</td>
<td>(0.587)**</td>
<td>(0.118)***</td>
<td>(0.322)***</td>
<td>(0.338)***</td>
<td>(0.149)***</td>
<td>(0.298)***</td>
<td>(0.370)***</td>
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<td>Time fixed effects</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Number of cn</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
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<td>59</td>
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<td>R²</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.77</td>
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<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.74</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Dependent variable: REER. LYS1 is a dummy variable for the dirty float regime; LYS2 is a dummy variable for dirty float/crawling peg; LYS3 is a dummy variable for fixed. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
accord with the panel study of Alba and Papell (2007). 
(Trade openness is also associated with a stronger real
exchange rate on average.)

These results appear to be driven by the developing
countries; they do not appear in the industrial country cate-
gory (columns 4–6). It is notable that for the developing
countries, the estimated rate of real exchange rate persistence is not
altered noticeably when one includes indicators for exchange
rate regimes and measures of economic openness.

It turns out that the results, at least pertaining to the
exchange rate regime, do depend on whether one accounts
for time fixed effects. In table 11, the specifications are
augmented with time fixed effects. More fixed exchange
rate regimes are not generally associated with slower reversion.
That is, going from a floating rate to a dirty float/crawling peg does not result in a slower rate of reversion.
However, we do find that except for the industrial country sample, the fixed regime induces substantially slower real
exchange rate reversion.16

To put this into perspective, for the nonindustrial ex-oil
countries, the rate of reversion under flexible rates is 0.37.
Under fixed exchange rates, the rate of reversion is 0.18.
The half-life of a deviation in the former case is 1.5 years,
and in the latter it is 3.5 years. However, this result is some-
what sensitive to the choice of specifications and country
samples. For example, without the two openness measures
(as in columns 2, 5, and 8), there is no statistical difference
between fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes.

To summarize, there is no strong and robust evidence of
a monotonic relationship from more flexibility in an
exchange rate regime to a faster speed in the convergence
of real exchange rates toward the long-run equilibrium.
This pattern is consistent with the lack of a strong
and robust relationship between exchange rate regimes and the adjustment speed of current accounts.

V. Conclusion

The notion that more flexibility in an exchange rate
regime implies speedier adjustment in current accounts is
very plausible ex ante. The only problem is that it does not
hold in the data. In this paper, we examine the connection
between the two for over 170 economies from 1971 to
2005. We make use of two leading classification schemes
of de facto exchange rate regimes. The key finding is an
utter absence of any robust association between the de facto
nominal exchange rate regime and the speed of current
account adjustment.

We further explore the reasons behind the disconnect.
What matters for current account adjustment is real, not
nominal, exchange rate. Yet there is no strong, monotonic
relationship between the flexibility of a nominal exchange
regime and the speed of convergence in real exchange
rates. This finding again is independent of which de facto
exchange rate regime classification scheme we use.

Accounting for the most obvious explanations, such as
the omission of important determinants of current account
reversion, fails to overturn these findings. The endogeneity
of the exchange rate regimes also does not seem to explain
the lack of a relationship between exchange rate regimes and rates of current account adjustment.

We therefore conclude that there is no robust and sys-
tematic association between a country’s nominal exchange
rate regime and the speed of current account adjustment. If
public policies can work on the level of real exchange rate
directly, they may have some hope of altering the pattern of
current account imbalances. However, changing nominal
exchange rate regimes does not reliably alter the pace of
real exchange rate reversion.

We regard our empirical results as a challenge to the
well-known Friedman (1953) hypothesis in favor of a flexi-
ble exchange rate regime. This is true even in cases where
the degree of financial openness is low, as it was during the
time when Friedman first made his argument. Hence, our
results pose a challenge to an increasingly assertive policy
recommendation by international financial institutions on
the virtue of a flexible regime in promoting current account
adjustment. We hope future work will be inspired by the
evidence in the paper to rethink the role of a nominal
exchange rate regime in an economy’s external adjustment.

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Du, Qingyuan, and Shang-Jin Wei, “A Sexually Unbalanced Model of Cur-
rent Account Imbalances,” NBER working paper 16000 (2010).

15 Mark and Sul (2008) have argued that the standard practice of using
time fixed effects overstates the rate of convergence when there is serial
correlation in the common factor. To the extent that their argument is
valid in our sample, it would tend to reduce the discrepancy between the
reversion rates estimated for each exchange rate regime.
16 Cashin and McDermott (2006) obtain similar results using the Rein-
hart-Rogoff classifications.


Vegh, Carlos, Open Economy Macroeconomics for Developing Countries (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, forthcoming).


DATA APPENDIX

The data used in this paper were drawn from a number of sources. We provide a listing of the mnemonics for the variables used in the analysis, descriptions of these variables, and the sources from which the primary data for constructing these variables were taken. A listing of the countries in the final sample, along with the country groupings used in the analysis, is provided in the working paper version of this paper. For most countries, data were available from 1971 through 2005.

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<tr>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
<th>Source*</th>
<th>Variable Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>CAGDP</td>
<td>WDI</td>
<td>Current account to GDP ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REER</td>
<td>IFS</td>
<td>Real effective exchange rate, CPI deflated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEN</td>
<td>WDI</td>
<td>Openness indicator: ratio of exports plus imports of goods and nonfactor services to GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RYUS</td>
<td>WDI</td>
<td>Real GDP in USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RYPPP</td>
<td>WDI</td>
<td>Real GDP in PPP terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RER</td>
<td>IFS</td>
<td>Real effective exchange rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAOPEN</td>
<td>Cl</td>
<td>Capital account openness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR</td>
<td>RR</td>
<td>Reinhart/Rogoff de facto exchange rate regime measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA</td>
<td>Rose</td>
<td>Area in square km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISLAND</td>
<td>Rose</td>
<td>Island dummy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserves</td>
<td>IFS</td>
<td>Foreign exchange reserves ex. gold</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These are mnemonics for the sources used to construct the corresponding. CI: Chinn and Ito (2006); WDI: World Development Indicators (2006); IFS: International Financial Statistics. LYS: Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003a, 2003b), updated to 2004 from http://200.32.4.58/~fsmuraz/leyevyeyatiSturzeneggerbase_2005.zip. RR: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), updated to 2004 by Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia from http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~eichengr/updated_rr_nat_class.pdf. Rose denotes data set downloaded from http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rose/StabData.zip. RR is an aggregated version of the Reinhart Rogoff index, with a reversed ordering. RR1 encompasses regimes from freely floating to managed floating; RR2 encompasses regimes from moving band that is narrower than or equal to ±2% to preannounced crawling peg; RR3 encompasses regimes from de facto peg to no legal tender. KAOPEN is the first principal component of four indices. In order to simplify the interpretation, this variable is adjusted such that the minimum value is 0, that is, KAOPEN ranges between 0 and some positive value.