

letter of Pico della Mirandola, “refurbished” by one of Melanchthon’s students and adorned with a logical analysis by the master himself.) This edition is republished in the present volume and need not detain us further (cf. my review in *Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance*, 64 (2002): 753-755). Deservedly, it has become a classic, and it is even accessible online.

However, the scientific freedom enjoyed by the editors has its price. With the notable exception of the comprehensive, extremely useful indexes at the end of the volume (which extends to some 35 pages), there is hardly any co-ordination between the different editions. Generally speaking, there are no cross references from one text to another. Editor B, also responsible for the introduction to the volume, does refer to parallel sections of *De rhetorica*, wisely using the same 1519 Basle edition as Editor A, whereas Editor C quotes the 1521 Cologne edition. Editor A quotes the original modern edition (2001) of text C we just mentioned, rather than the new edition published in the same volume (compare pp. 30, 37, 50 n.). Editor C does not refer to notes on text A, while annotating the same concept or a similar section (compare notes on p. 50-51 and p. 277-278, on *genus didacticon*). The bibliographies of the editions are not coordinated either; Erasmus’ works for instance are quoted by one editor in a sixteenth-century edition, by another in a modern edition (e.g., Holborn), by a third in the ASD-edition. Similar remarks could be made about the editions of classical authors (Cicero, Quintilian). In one case, Cicero even completely vanished from the bibliography. But let us remember that this II/2 volume of the *opera philosophica* is the first to be published. It is a remarkable scholarly achievement and offers to the editors of subsequent volumes the occasion to think about ways to improve their overall coordination. Melanchthon would have been the first to welcome such an effort. He never tired of advocating the transparent composition and coherence of texts. After all, one of the spectacular innovations of his rhetoric was the desire to uncover the structure and elegance of major ancient texts in order to learn how to compose coherent writings for the modern world.

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Timothy Raylor, *Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Thomas Hobbes*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. xvii + 334 pp. ISBN 9780198829690

In a meticulous and learned account of Thomas Hobbes’s lifelong relationship to rhetoric and humanism, Timothy Raylor takes up the peculiar but important challenge of proving that something did not happen. That something is Hobbes’s famed double turn, his rejection of humanist rhetoric followed later by a modified return to rhetoric, as defended in Quentin Skinner’s influential study, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (1996). Raylor presents a

Hobbes steadfast in his relationship to both rhetoric and humanism, in contrast to his sharper and unrepentant philosophical turn. The book is provocative in its scrutinizing and overturning of Skinner's thesis, where it largely sets its sights. It also provokes questions beyond that horizon for the theory and practice of rhetoric in putatively rationalist philosophy.

One of several important contributions of *Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Thomas Hobbes* is its laser-like focus on the specific rhetorical and humanist traditions from which Hobbes drew insight over the long span of his life. Attending closely to his early pedagogical pursuits with the Cavendish family, the book discerns Hobbes's commitments among a broad range of humanist and rhetorical approaches available to him. It speaks of Raylor's attunement to the rhetorical tradition that he weighs pedagogical activities and topics so significantly. The examination of Hobbes's work as a young tutor and nascent poet take up his incontrovertibly rhetorical humanist phase, during which, Raylor emphasizes, he harbored the pragmatic and skeptical tendencies of a Tacitean more than a Ciceronian civic republican. While Hobbes's translation of Thucydides distances him from Cicero, the *The Briefe of the Art of Rhetorique* reveals his enduring commitment to Aristotelian notions of rhetoric. Though he was no ethical Aristotelian, Hobbes found in the *Rhetoric* a guiding structure of thought that was further inflected through Francis Bacon. Drawing Bacon into the humanist fold, Raylor rightly challenges anachronistic habits of opposing aesthetics and reason, poetry and science, in seventeenth-century philosophy. One benefit is in his richly layered reading of an early poem, *De mirabilibus pecci*. The poem incorporates catalogue of wonders, travel writing, and epideictic rhetoric, intertwining aesthetic pleasure, knowledge of natural history, and currying favour. Hobbes's humanism takes new shape here as a contribution to the concerns and methods of an emerging natural scientific inquiry. This is a less familiar Hobbes and a path not taken for a thinker who later championed materialism at the expense of experiential knowledge.

Hobbes abandoned natural history, but other Aristotelian tenets endured: a division of knowledge into *scientia* and *opinio* and a rhetoric attuned to the passions and pragmatically aimed at persuasion over loftier ethical goals. Crucial evidence for this is found in Hobbes's choice to teach Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and to prepare a Latin Digest and English *Briefe*. The documents, Raylor argues, do not reject rhetorical humanist (read Ciceronian) culture, but rather offer "a reasonable interpretation and apt condensation of Aristotle" (169). Aristotelian rhetoric is instead the structure through which Hobbes would effect a momentous change a decade later.

Reorienting Hobbes's rhetorical humanist phase around a Baconian Aristotelianism leads to the conclusion that "[i]t is not rhetoric that Hobbes, at the end of the 1630s, rejects, but philosophy—philosophy as it has traditionally been practiced" (176). Philosophy becomes the problem and object of transformation, not rhetoric. Moreover, rhetorical study becomes the driving factor in this reconceptualization of ratiocination.

The *Rhetoric* helped Hobbes to see that too much of what passed for philosophy was not certain or universal but drawn upon arguments meant to persuade, yielding, at best, probable truths. The natural histories that once interested him are based merely on “experience of fact,” producing only appearances of knowledge (201). With the demotion of natural philosophy, Hobbes elevates and transforms the study of politics into a science grounded in logical demonstration of causes from clearly defined terms, like geometry. Civil philosophy, in other words, is torn from its rhetorical roots in dialectical reasoning, experiential or prudential knowledge, and persuasion.

Why is this not a wholesale rejection of rhetoric? If not read carefully, Raylor’s Hobbes recalls a well-worn portrait of Hobbes as champion of scientific rationalism, enemy of rhetoric, and a standard bearer of a disenchanting *raison d’état*; the caricature of international relations theory or the foil of deconstruction. The chief difference, of course, is that Raylor shows how the rhetorical tradition matters greatly for Hobbes’s reconceptualization of science, and he does so with an admirably nuanced attention to the breadth and depth of the rhetorical tradition, navigating fine distinctions and grounding judgments in its long textual history. This enables him to show exactly what of rhetoric Hobbes does and does not admit into his civil philosophy. A limited concern for style notably remains because rational science needs perspicuity and elegance. Rhetoric remains as a hand-maiden for a political science now divorced from political experience.

Raylor emphasizes the consistency of Hobbes’s rhetorical understanding even as it undergoes an almost complete break with science. Once driven out of logical demonstration, rhetoric contributes to science solely within a clear division of labor limited to eloquence within the bounds of perspicuity. Here, readers may arrive at different conclusions. He cautions that without his contextualization, readers may “reasonably imagine that such ‘adorning and preferring of Truth’ is indistinguishable from the kind of rhetorical magnification Hobbes elsewhere deploras” (252). Can the rhetorical performance of *Leviathan*, including its eponymous monster, justly be construed as plain style? Raylor acknowledges, yet demurs, the challenge when he writes, “in theory, at least, the character of Hobbes’s civil science remains purely and austerely rational” (254). Should readers who give their attention to such a detailed and nuanced navigation of Hobbes’s engagement with rhetoric be satisfied with this dismissal of his practice of writing?

Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Thomas Hobbes substantially deepens our knowledge of Hobbes’s lifelong engagement with rhetoric. Its fine scholarship enriches the ground over which scholars will continue to disagree.

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