RECENT ARTICLES*

ADDISON


Collecting ancient medals—coins, that is, not military rewards (largely a nineteenth-century development)—had been an elite hobby in the Renaissance. By the early eighteenth century, the acquisition of numismatic specimens had become “a widespread practice among the gentry and the middle class,” although one that still required a classical education for a full understanding of images and inscriptions. This, however, was not always seen as a harmless, gentlemanly pastime: viewed more negatively, collecting was a foolish “antiquarian obsession” or the activity of arrivistes eager to ape their aristocratic betters. “Virtuoso” was a loaded term.

Ms. Benedict explores these cultural conflicts as revealed by Evelyn, Addison, and Pope’s response to Addison. Evelyn’s Numismata (1697), she observes, “represents [for him] not only the preservation of culture, but the opportunity for the individual understanding of history” through specific examples, a “compendium of material, text, portrait, and morality” that completes the self-definition of the learned amateur.

By the time Addison wrote his Dialogues Upon the Usefulness of Ancient Medals (1702), coin-collecting was criticized as a childish delusion, a paratactic and unscientific chase that favored accumulation over taste and selection. Addison sets up a dialogue between Cynthio, a detractor who sees numismatics as a waste of time and resources, and Philander, who recognizes the power of medals to “illuminate nonmercantile beauty and true social values.” Addison is with Philander, defending numismatics on not only aesthetic but also moral grounds. Coins “display not metal but mettle: character and heroism,” illustrating a vanished past that is nevertheless relevant for the present. The gentleman numismatist makes classical culture part of contemporary reality, which is the most effective refutation of the charge that collecting is “antisocial, obsessive, useless, and megalomaniacal.” The strength of medals lies in their materiality, their “defeat of time.”

* Unsigned reviews are by the editors.
“On Metals” (1713), Pope’s response to the Dialogues, which he received in manuscript from their author, is more complicated. On the one hand, Pope engages sympathetically with “the numismatic enterprise,” which can actually lead the collector away from minute observation of the material to “a philosophical perspective on time and mortality.” Less positively, numismatics can be another example of “mad Scriblerian systematizing.” If one adopts the gaze of the poet, drawing back from the material and the particular, however, it is possible to see both the march of human folly and “the instability of mere material” that fades and rusts, leaving emptiness. For Pope, the material is ultimately inferior to poetry, as is “past virtue” to “current merit.” The study of the relics of the past is valuable to the extent it teaches us about loss and transience—“thoughts that supersede materiality.” As for Addison, the cabinet of medals affords Pope an opportunity for “self-fashioning,” but one that “recasts the poet as imaginative collector.”

Ms. Benedict skillfully traces the shift from a “cultural conception” of collecting as an “antiquarian entertainment” to an “internalized conception of it as memory and identity.” Her discussion of Pope is particularly useful.


Addison got a bad rap, Ms. Błaszkiewicz argues, for his commentaries in the Spectator on Paradise Lost. While his remarks contributed to “the increase of actual knowledge of Milton’s work,” as literary criticism they tended to be dismissed as too “general and indeterminate” (Richard Hurd called them “frivolous”) to be of much value.

Taking what she calls “a fresh approach,” Ms. Błaszkiewicz argues that Addison wished not only to illustrate the artistic beauties of Paradise Lost but also its relationship to classical epic form—which Addison, unlike others, did not see as incompatible with a postclassical “divine poem.” Milton’s verse is both heroic (in the Homeric and Virgilian sense) and Christian, and it is also indebted to the romance tradition of Tasso.

Addison recognized, however, that there is a tension between the machinery of the classical epic and the choice of the Messiah as hero (for Addison, if not the Romantics, the only candidate). Understanding the difficulty of circumscribing “the figure of the Son within the limits of epic machines” places Addison in a position to test “the possibility of creating a fully operational Christian epic”—even if, at times, Addison shies away from applying this insight. For Ms. Błaszkiewicz, “Addison argues in favour of Paradise Lost’s status of ‘tertiary epic’—a work whose relationship to the whole epic tradition is comparable to Virgil’s stance toward Homer” but (for Addison, at least) superior to that tradition in its presentation of sublime religious truth.


See the entry under Pope, p. 47.

SANDNER, DAVID. “The Fairy Way of Writing,” Critical Discourses of the Fan-

Mr. Sandner aims to broaden the perspective of critics who customarily associate the rise of literary fantasy with the flowering of Romanticism by asserting the importance of eighteenth-century antecedents. His starting point is Addison’s admiring characterization of what he called (borrowing a phrase from Dryden) “the fairy way of writing” in Spectator no. 419 (1712): “the poet quite loses sight of nature and entertains his reader’s imagination with the characters and actions of such persons as have many of them no existence but what he bestows on them.” For examples he pointed to fairies, witches, ghosts, and the like and then summarized what he took to be the purpose of such writing—to “raise a pleasing kind of horror in the mind of the reader and amuse his imagination with . . . strangeness and novelty.”

A close reading of Spectator no. 419, this essay teases out the theoretical implications of its paradoxical qualities. So, for instance, it asks how Addison’s skeptical thinking might yet find a place for popular superstitions: perhaps the fantastic represents a sublime and pleasantly unsettling return of past folk beliefs into rational modernity—and this would also help to explain why many instances of the fantastic are implicitly nostalgic. Or, along the same lines, the fantastic might offer a backward glance into the fear and wonder of childish imaginings, now curtailed by responsible adulthood.

Mr. Sandner is particularly concerned to answer the traditional charge that fantastic literature is escapist or politically and historically unsituated and, therefore, irrelevant. In fact, Addison was happily open to the idea that fantasies could have genuine and pertinent speculative and critical value: because there are more things in heaven and earth than we yet know, imaginations continue to provoke reevaluation of the real. He was also able to suppose that the fantastic could be pleasurable and thus valuable in itself, apart from claims of truth or immediate pertinence.

If this essay has weakness, it derives from its introductory position in an ambitious book; too often Mr. Sandner uses Addison’s thoughts as springboards to look ahead to later developments in the theory of fantasy, rather than to discuss them fully in their original context.

Strawn, Morgan. “Pagans, Papists, and Joseph Addison’s Use of Classical Quotations in The Remarks on Several Parts of Italy,” HLQ, 75 (Winter 2012), 561–575.

The 1705 Remarks, one of Addison’s “most sustained engagements with classical culture,” is less a celebration of loving nostalgia than a nuanced and shaded regard, one in which 20 percent of the 127 citations embedded in the travelogue work to the disadvantage of the ancients. Mr. Strawn sees the Remarks as carrying on an “Anglican tradition of intellectual chauvinism” against both pagan and Roman Catholic cultures; for Addison, both civilizations “lacked the rationality that Christianity introduced into the world and that the Church of England sustained.” Addison uses the citations to ridicule the ignorance of the ancients; more often, he satirizes authors, such as the Christian Latin poet Claudian, for religious credulity.

Mr. Strawn helpfully includes an appendix, keying the identifiable quotations in a table marking author and source, the quotation’s context or purpose, and a paginated reference to the 1705 and late nineteenth-century Bohn edition. He could
have strengthened his fine effort by seeking a larger purchase, tracing the impact of his findings on Addison’s place in the Ancients vs. Moderns controversy.

**ASTELL**


Ms. Murphy offers a suggestive pedagogical strategy: Republican Milton, she notes, and Monarchist Astell are precisely the sort of early modern odd couple likely to speak to students interested in late seventeenth-century political debates. By coupling Milton’s *Of Education* (1655) with Astell’s *A Serious Proposal to the Ladies* (1694), instructors can introduce students to the competing rhetorical strategies of two authors who, if they agreed about nothing else, shared a belief in “the power of education as a form of social reproduction.”

Understandably, Ms. Murphy is not out to break new scholarly ground here. The focus on education nevertheless leads to oversimplifications. True, both Milton and Astell “were vociferous participants in the political conflicts of their time,” something students who have heard of Milton but not Astell need to know. Lamenting their “unequal status in our canon,” however, risks the sort of strained equivalency undergraduates already struggle to avoid. (I say this as someone who has devoted a not-insignificant number of years to studying and publishing on Astell.) Similarly, claiming that “Milton wrote as a schoolmaster, while Astell wrote to become a school mistress,” seems overstated: Milton was indeed “running a small academy with a handful of students” in the early 1640s, but the charity school for girls Astell founded in 1709 was a far cry from the educational utopia for women she had imagined fifteen years earlier in *A Serious Proposal.*

While this essay was published in 2010, the most recent secondary source cited on Astell is dated 1998; much has been published in the intervening twelve years, including many essays that address Astell’s interest in education.

**BEHN**


This thickly argued approach to *Oroonoko* ties together theorists such as Gayatri Spivack to connect Behn’s Coromantien/Surinam story with nineteenth-century British imperialism in India, Gramsci’s analysis of the subaltern, and postmodern theories about British colonial India. This raises questions that resist answers. First, Spivak and other transnationalist critics are writing about a consciously imperialist Britain and its consciously subjugated empire, not the ragtag, poorly armed colony settled in Surinam by Lord Willoughby’s patent. Second, any discussion of “colony” in Surinam has to consider that it is the indigenes who have had their lands colonized, but it is the Africans who have had their bodies colonized.

Ms. Deb raises the fears of sexual violation inherent in conquest and colonization, which plays out in the practice of the widow’s immolation in India’s *sati,* but ignores Behn’s careful depictions of the English colonists’ approach to the practiced modesty of the Carib women. Even Imoinda is spared any violence before her reunion with Oroonoko, and the violence she
had met with at the hands of the old king, Oroonoko’s grandfather, while vicious, is hardly potent. Agreed, there is a “proto-feminist transnationalism” that can be discerned, as Ms. Deb suggests, in Imoinda’s willingness to submit to her death at the hands of her loving husband, although this is not sati. Ms. Deb is also inaccurate in asserting, on more than one occasion, that Imoinda’s death entails abortion. While the unborn child cannot survive her death, there is no attempt to remove or expel the fetus. This is important since it reflects on the ethics of the two noble slaves. A symbolic abortion, if one needs one, comes rather with Oroonoko’s self-disembowelment.

To correct several points: “Ross Ballaster” is Ros Ballaster, and not “he.” The narrator’s father was designated to be lieutenant general of the colony, not the governor, and the anachronistic statement attributed to Behn’s father by Ms. Deb is actually the narrator’s assessment of the riches that Charles II, “his late Majesty, of sacred Memory,” lost when he ceded Surinam to the Dutch.


Willmore of the first part of The Rover has proved an increasingly difficult character to work with in the classroom as paradigms have shifted tolerance for male misbehavior and sexual misappropriation. A seasoned teacher of The Rover, Mr. Evans explicates changing student attitudes toward the attempted rapes and other sexual by-play. Critiquing the one available video, the BBC/Open University Women’s Playhouse Trust production, he shows how its underlying depiction of Willmore as a brute and a bully panders to his seamier side, with an effect hardly comic or even interesting.

To overcome student rejection of Willmore as comic hero, one worthy of the hand of Hellena, Mr. Evans examines the theatrical history of the initial production, in particular the actors who took the original parts. William Smith played Willmore; Smith usually played dashing, heroic roles and occasionally a “sex-mad scamp” (Judith Milhous). Comparing The Rover to The Man of Mode, in which Smith also played the libertine hero, students can understand the similarities in these two characters, as well as appreciate the presentation of the witty couple. If one reads Smith’s probable presentation of Willmore as an inept spoiler, then what has become a disturbing scene, Willmore’s drunken wandering into Florinda’s unlocked garden, is a comic mishap that never devolves to rape. The stage direction calling for Willmore and Florinda to struggle just before Belvile and Frederick enter bolsters this interpretation.

What makes this essay so important is its careful reading of the major criticism of The Rover from the 1990s and the 2000s and its incisive review of the stage history of the first productions as well as a careful study of the Open University film. All who teach The Rover should read this counter-argument to its assumed depiction of masculine dominance and sexual predation.


Ms. Fowler says well what should go without saying: that Behn borrows from her stagecraft to construct her early novels, in particular The Fair Jilt (1688), The History of the Nun (1689), and The Lucky Mistake (1689). Paying close attention to instances of “frame-breaking or meta-lepsis,” this compelling essay shows that components of these novellas, which vio-
late conventions of the modern novel, actually follow expectations of the stage. For example, the philosophical opening of *The Fair Jilt*, in which a narrator muses on love and then castigates fops, does not violate the novelistic injunction to establish setting and provide characterization but reproduces the conventions of the theatrical prologue. Or the frequent parentheticals, which provide narrative insight throughout all three novellas, need not be read as “disruptions” in realistic exposition, but as rhetorical theatrical functions—giving stage directions, acting as revelatory asides, promoting “consensus” or a shared point of view with the audience. The uses of these frame-breaking techniques are “fluid”—and Ms. Fowler draws generously on the work of other like-minded scholars such as Kristiann Aercke and Aleksandra Hultquist to show how rich Behn’s varied use of theatrical techniques can prove—but in each instance the narrator is establishing a relationship with the audience that bears more similarity to the intimacies of the stage than to the early novel.

Behn emerges in this reading as an innovator, not because she does something new in her novellas but because she imports into the prose narrative features mastered for the stage. We are reminded that Behn blurs boundaries in her writing and that her movement between mimetic and diegetic elements in her prose can be read as yet another instance of her distinctive narrative imprint. That such a matter-of-fact connection does not go without saying, however, is an interesting story in itself, although one that Ms. Fowler elects not to develop in this essay. As the essay notes, the tide has turned in Behn studies toward recognizing “the dramatic elements in Behn’s prose fiction” and away from proving its distinctiveness. The acknowledged significance of the woman writer, and in particular Behn, to the rise of the novel most likely occasions this shift, but a footnote to Ms. Fowler’s essay complicates that more celebratory reading. The footnote explains that these three novellas were chosen “because their authorship is not in question unlike that of the other novellas often attributed to Behn.” If Behn’s prose canon potentially shrinks, her dramatic output can only increase in significance. In the meantime, Ms. Fowler’s essay goes far to explain what makes Behn’s prose so clearly her own and of a piece with her impressive dramatic oeuvre.


The shift in narration in the three parts of *Love-Letters between a Noble Man and His Sister* has created some of the best discussions of Behn’s artistic control. Ms. Gevirtz first studies narrational techniques in each of the three parts—moving from the epistolary first part (1684), which uses no narrational guidance; to the partly epistolary second part (1685), which allows a narrator to intervene at times; and finally to the use in the third part (1687) of a separately defined narrator, who seems to know all—but does not quite. Despite Hamlet’s counter to his mother, “Seems, madam! Nay it is; I know not ‘seems,’” Ms. Gevirtz questions the dissonance between seeming and knowing and probes the way the emerging issues of “self” and “consciousness” were challenging questions of reality that intrigued some natural philosophers, especially in the 1680s.

The Royal Society at this time was positing a stable, reliable self who could observe detachedly and record accurately—not just nature but human beings, who logically must also be stable reliable selves.
Ms. Gevirtz shows how Behn tested the notion of the detached observer first with the epistolary mode, which allowed direct discourse but at the same time created a glimpse into motives that were not consonant with the overt claims of the lovers, and then with an increasingly intrusive narrator, who struggled to observe accurately but clearly could or would not. Whether Behn planned it or not, she finally created in the third part a narrator who became increasingly less stable and less reliable as the Cesario story took over.

In the third part of Love-Letters, the narrator is unexpectedly gentle in handling Cesario, who is, after all, a version of Monmouth, the rebellious natural son of Charles II. In life, Behn opposed his actions. In this final part of the novel, written after Monmouth’s execution, the narrator reads him as the missing center of the rebellion, a fool of the illusions of love and magic, a man whose instability and unreliability caused the rebellion to fail. Ms. Gevirtz skillfully ties up the personal and sexual betrayals that underpin the three parts of the novel to the larger political issues of “statehood, nationhood and citizenship” that collapse under the illusion of a faith in the stable and knowable self.


Ms. Ingrassia introduces Behn’s career as providing “insights into the conditions for professional writers during the Restoration and early eighteenth century in England,” but the problem here is that the role of professional writer was rapidly changing from the 1680s to the early eighteenth century. Any insights drawn from Behn’s tortured career, therefore, cannot be used as templates for those who followed her.

While Pope and Centlivre might have been protected by legal copyright, in Behn’s time copyright was simply the right to have one’s work registered and published, with the register protecting the stationer—the printer/bookseller—but not the author. Even the responsibilities of printers and booksellers were rapidly changing, and the role of a publisher was just developing. Thus, discussion of copyright belongs to the publishing world after the 1710 Statute of Anne, and perhaps to Centlivre’s world and Pope’s, but not Behn’s.

Many errors should not go unnoticed: Charles II did not die in 1682, and any problems with the theaters and their mergers at that time, while deeply embedded in politics, did not relate to the death of Charles. There is no clear evidence, despite Ms. Ingrassia’s assertion, that “Behn was writing and circulating her material within an active coterie culture.” Certainly, friends did supply poems for two of her published miscellanies, but so few of her poems show up in manuscript form that we must presume limited circulation. Ms. Ingrassia offers the “abundance of work published posthumously” as evidence of coterie circulation, but again, there are no surviving manuscripts to support this. In addition, Behn was not “forced to be” a “court poet.” While she probably did write some Tory screeds, so far not identified, she came late to public paean; she began with the death of Charles II and the subsequent mourning of Queen Catherine, followed by celebratory poems on the coronation of James II and on the pregnancy of Mary of Modena and her safe, but
controversial, delivery. There exists so far no evidence that Behn refused a “handsome commission” to greet William of Orange with an ode, as Ms. Ingrassia writes. Her poem of welcome to the new Queen Mary is ironic and bitter, and her payback to Gilbert Burnet, who may have urged Behn to welcome the new royal couple, is comic, ironic, and even more bitter than the poem to Mary.

Ms. Ingrassia states that “[f]ollowing her success in the theater, Behn was identified on the title pages as ‘The Ingenious Mrs. Behn’ or, after her most popular play The Rover (1678 [sic]) as ‘Mrs. Behn, author of the Rover.’” In fact, the phrase claiming authorship of The Rover (1677) was used only once—on the title page of Sir Patient Fancy, the play immediately following The Rover (where the phrase actually reads “Written by Mrs. A. BEHN, the Authour of the ROVER”). Since The Rover had three issues, only the last of which carried her name on the title page, Behn was making sure that she publicly claimed authorship of The Rover.

The pirated and posthumous publication of Rochester’s poems in 1680 as Poems on Several Occasions cannot be used to show, despite Ms. Ingrassia’s efforts, how Behn wrote “occasional verse which appeared in high-prestige anthologies and miscellanies,” nor can it give evidence of her “public contact with her male contemporaries who could help confer the kind of cultural credit she sought.” Creech died in 1700, not 1799. I would be remiss if I did not correct, among other errors, the misquoted first line (“I did my Sylvia to a Grove”) of the “Song” from The Dutch Lover (1673), which actually reads “Amyntas led me to a grove,” with alternate first lines in other printings: “I led my Silvia to a Grove” and “Amyntas bid me to a grove.”

Thirteen pages are too few to cover Behn, much less the profession of writing in the Restoration or early eighteenth century. Too much is demanded of a brief survey.


Building primarily on Janet Todd, Monica Fludernik, Jessica Munns, Ros Ballaster, and Bill Overton, Ms. López’s essay supplements rather than expands the scholarship on Love-Letters. Predictably, the essay argues that the novel introduces a series of generic conventions in order to use them to “different effects.” In most cases, the novel ironizes them. Hence, the genre of the female complaint, most clearly apparent in the first part, can point not only to female suffering but also to the linguistic “pleasures” of the form itself. Or the authenticity of the pastoral mode, so dominant in the second part of the work, is revealed instead as artifice or literary artifact. Lastly, infidelity, a private matter, becomes instead a marker of public betrayal, as in the third part of the novel: “Sylvia’s discourse of complaint emphasizes the association of private and public mores, connecting Philander’s infidelity to his earlier betrayal of the state.” The essay finally argues that the “narrative form of the (female) complaint in Behn’s Love-Letters . . . is used to represent the world not merely as an interplay of female abandonment and victimhood and male aggression and seduction, but also to refer to public values.” The conclusion belatedly ties the essay together.

Ms. López provides useful taxonomies for this multifaceted work and a clear lineage for this novel within the female com-
plaint. As questions have been raised about the authorship of Love-Letters, readings that show how “the changing nature of the text—from epistolary form to rogue fiction—is an allegory of the complex origin of the English novel in the seventeenth century” become even more important. Regardless of the outcome of the current debate, her essay suggests that the significance of this novel will prevail.

MARSHALL, ALAN. “‘Memorials for Mrs. Affora’: Aphra Behn and the Restoration Intelligence World,” Wo Wr, 22 (Winter 2015), 13–33.

For all its centrality to Behn’s story, remarkably little can be said with certainty about the brief period in which she served as a spy for Charles II’s government. That uncertainty, however, only adds to its appeal. During 1666–67, she lived in Flanders with her brother, under instructions to use her connection with William Scot (the son of the regicide Thomas Scot), to get him to serve as an agent of the king. This period has served as the subject matter of an Off Broadway play, “Or” by Liz Duffy (2009); it has functioned as the starting point for a 1998 novel based on Behn’s life, Invitation to a Funeral; and it has influenced, arguably disproportionately, the title of Behn’s standard biography, Janet Todd’s The Secret Life of Aphra Behn.

Mr. Marshall’s essay is poised to clarify all uncertainty. He provides the historical and rhetorical context for understanding this period in her life, although noting that her service can be viewed as “mundane,” or as he also puts it “neither as a woman in the espionage system nor as an agent of the government was she original or unique (nor, it must be said, particularly successful).” Ironically, however, context does nothing to diminish the significance of this time to her story, but rather heightens it. In particular, it demonstrates just how revealing her correspondence from this period (transcribed in 1961 in William Cameron’s New Light on Aphra Behn) can prove, particularly in understanding her development as a writer. Thus, this essay fittingly tantalizes.

Its heart is a two-page set of notes or memoranda to Mrs. Affora, laying out her duties, in what was called a “memorial” at the time. What interests Mr. Marshall is the writer-reader relationship implied in the “spy or spymaster letters,” one that took the form of a “client-patron relationship,” in which “the spy was a supplicant, eagerly seeking a master’s praise.” Judged against this expectation, Behn’s letters fail miserably, being neither sufficiently self-effacing nor self-preserving, as they make unintentionally transparent how little use William Scot will prove to her handlers. Still, the letters produce, Mr. Marshall argues, “a correspondence replete with detail and character studies worthy of the future playwright.”

The essay, however, devotes little space to developing this repletion and focuses instead on detailing the Restoration intelligence world and in particular the role of women in it. This makes compelling reading—and one suspects Mr. Marshall finds the stories of these other female spies more interesting than Behn’s.

MOlineux, Catherine. “False Gifts/Exotic Fictions: Epistemologies of Sovereignty and Assent in Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko,” ELH, 80 (Summer 2013), 455–488.

Startlingly, Ms. Molineux’s essay makes of Oroonoko an antiheroic and antieromantic tale. This conclusion startles not because it tests the common assumptions about the text—that it lionizes its titular character and celebrates the love between
this royal prince and Imoinda—but because it sneaks up on the reader. The essay begins by patiently laying out a consistent problem in reading *Oroonoko*: that the hero’s fate seems fixed to that of James II and that the novella is not fixed at all but rather full of “internal contradictions.” It also, in its opening pages, suggests a preliminary and less startling solution, that the novella’s Atlantic framework and exotic settings provide a narrative venue where Behn can creatively explore “the uncertainty and fragility of political and social bonds,” including a subject’s assent to royal sovereignty.

It is not until the essay’s section IV, “The Dissembling Female Narrator,” that one realizes how thoroughly Ms. Molineux has disabused her reader of any notion of stabilizing virtue in the novella. Rather, Behn—she argues—consistently draws attention to the provisionality of sovereignty: power emerges only through a “fundamentally unstable confluence of personal and political interest” and even “love loses” in a novella that plays out as a “series of failed bonds,” including between Oroonoko and Imoinda. For example, Oroonoko cannot even “remain true to his grief” when his desire for revenge overrides his commitment to dying alongside his wife. As civil structures of authority teeter in post-Civil War England and personal interests prevail in a commercialized New World, so goes virtue.

Most startling, however, is how exquisitely Ms. Molineux makes this reading of the novella’s exposure of virtue. The female narrator’s “forgetting” and “dissembling” create just enough room for readers to make their own moral choices: Behn’s narrator “imparts a moral exemplar that she hopes will inspire emulation, but whether Oroonoko is a false gift . . . could only be decided in the experience of assent to his embodied values. His objectified worth can be realized only when a choice is made about which narrative—the heroic or the antiheroic, romantic or anti-romantic—his story provides.” In restoring to the contemporary reader this option, Ms. Molineux’s transformative representation of the text’s value is much worth reading.


Behn’s friends were dismayed when *The Widdow Ranter*, staged five months after Behn’s death and published in 1690, failed to garner praise from the critics. In 2015, full-throated praise for the play remains scarce, although noting the parallels between this play and the much-praised *Oroonoko* has become de rigueur. Still, Behn’s friends would be happy to find the play increasingly receiving positive attention and even in some readings doing so independent of its resemblance to *Oroonoko*.

Ms. Mowry’s essay starts in this vein: “*The Widdow Ranter* is among the most formidable rebuttals generated during the 1680s to . . . the hermeneutics of collectivity.” It is strongest when it focuses on Behn’s critique of collectivity. That Behn can so effectively make this critique while retelling the story of a rebellion widely viewed as populist makes it all the more remarkable. Ms. Mowry expertly outlines the ways in which Behn’s play differs from the historical account of Nathaniel Bacon’s 1676 rebellion in Jamestown, Virginia, and hence how fabricated a character Bacon becomes. Repurposing the historical account as a fictional one only makes more effective Behn’s critique of a blind faith in
governance by popular consent; in her hands even an exceptional leader cannot make a populist rebellion work.

Regrettably, Ms. Mowry's reading does not sustain its independence from the better received *Oroonoko*. Ms. Mowry argues for Bacon's singularity, that his individual virtue and his love for Semernia distinguishes him from the others and makes him an object of awe. In other words, she makes of Bacon an Oroonoko. This argument too quickly dismisses the burlesque of Bacon's aspirations. It also does not fully address the complexities of Bacon's relationship with Semernia, including the cross-cultural chauvinism that inadvertently leads to her death at his hands. It too easily dismisses the titular character of this play, not the noble warrior in this case, but rather the enterprising Widdow Ranter. In Ms. Mowry's reading, Ranter mirrors the narrator in *Oroonoko*: “Ranter is a witness to and an ordinal point of sorts, but her position is literally a pretext for the material Behn really wanted to engage, namely, the question of whether Nathaniel Bacon's rebellion at Jamestown Virginia in 1676 could be made to yield culturally authoritative knowledge that conformed to the epistemology of singularity she sought to purvey.” That is indeed one of Behn’s questions, but it does not render Ranter and her pursuit of greater agency in the New World a “pretext.” Rather, what best speaks to the excellence of this play is how many parallel plots it can sustain and how many questions it raises about newly emerging forms of agency in the New World, including those available to a leading female character who no longer serves as just a witness to these events.


Mr. Nevitt usefully examines the relationship between Killigrew’s *Thomaso* and Behn’s *Rover*. The key points of this fine study are the revisions and excisions made by Killigrew to *Thomaso* in his own copy of his plays, which now resides in Worcester College Library. Suggesting Killigrew made these cuts so that the play could be produced, he asserts that it may well have been produced in the early 1660s although we have no evidence of this. Behn scholars might be interested in seeing exactly what and how Killigrew revised—and if these revisions could have influenced her approach to the play.


When Behn published her first long translation—one of Talleman’s *Voyage to the Isle of Love*—it was a tack-on, an extension to the volume of her *Poems upon Several Occasions*. She probably had intended it for a separate publication as was her later translation of the second part of Talleman’s *Voyage*. She had asked the bookseller Jacob Tonson for an additional £5 for this first voyage, noting “you cannot think what a pretty thing the Island will be, and what a deal of labour I shall have yet with it.” We have yet to learn if Tonson obliged; however, either she or, more likely, the Tonsons filled out her own collected poems with it.

Behn turned the combination of Talleman’s poetry and prose into a lengthy poem and as Mr. Overton demonstrates created a first-rate translation from the
French. Behn’s translations tend to be marginalized today, but as Mr. Overton stresses, it was not “a second-order activity” in her day. In fact, it was considered the province of men since women did not have—or certainly should not have had—the proper education for translation. Mr. Overton first discusses Dryden’s analysis of the three forms of translation in his preface to Ovid’s Epistles, a volume to which Behn had contributed a translation by way of “imitation.” Using this division of translation/adaptation/imitation in her approach to Tallemand, Behn tackles the thorny issues of French prosody, especially the issues of line length and stress points, major differences between the poetry of the two languages. Later, Behn would address some of the issues of translating from the French in her “Translator’s Preface” to A Discovery of New Worlds (the preface later re-titled “Essay on Translated Prose”) in 1688.

Taking just a few passages, Mr. Overton carefully presents a quick course in the prosody of the two languages and shows that Behn imitated Tallemand’s conceptualization, turning it into “clever, artful verse.” He clearly and concisely demonstrates that Behn knew her craft as a poet, her source text, and her audience.


It is difficult to read any text outside of its author’s contemporary reception. With Behn’s Oroonoko, this difficulty is magnified. Behn rarely, if ever, is the pure progressive we want her to be, yet her work has played a central role in forging a more progressive canon and a more progressive way of reading. Ms. Pacheco’s essay speaks to this difficulty. Not content with outlining key moments of skepticism toward Christianity as voiced by the honor-driven character Oroonoko, Ms. Pacheco makes the greater claim that Oroonoko’s voice in these passages represents Behn’s own, that “the second half of Oroonoko” reveals “Christianity’s worthlessness as a foundation for individual virtue and social stability and honor’s superior capacity to perform that social function.” This reading of Oroonoko, Ms. Pacheco further argues, provides Behn’s text a “startling conceptual closeness” to Pierre Bayle’s Pensées diverses sur la comète—a work purportedly anti-Catholic in its sentiments. Both works are “fiercely secular” and radical in their reading of atheists as “morally superior to the average Christian.”

Not surprising then, this reading, although helpful in advancing a case for Behn’s connection to a freethinking tradition, fails to persuade. To make of Behn’s text a companion piece to Bayle’s requires many qualifiers. For one, Ms. Pacheco cannot prove that Behn has read him—and to read Behn as “fiercely secular” requires us to ignore much of her work, including the more pragmatic comments she makes in an “Essay on Translated Prose,” which prefaces Fontenelle’s Discovery of New Worlds and which Ms. Pacheco cites just prior to arguing for the connection to Bayle. Furthermore, to make the case for honor’s greater value in providing social stability, Ms. Pacheco must gloss over the first half of the novel and evidence that honor proves no more stabilizing a force in Coramatan than Christianity does in Surinam. This last point brings up another omission: the significance of setting in establishing the novel’s message as Surinam serves as a distortion of England’s Christian values as much as its reflection.

The essay more fully persuades in its linking of Oroonoko to individual virtue
and to the important function of the oath in Behn’s work. Ms. Pacheco is right: Behn’s questioning does become more radical toward the end of her career. However, that does not make her a radical in our own time.

Pfeiffer, Loring. “‘Some for this Faction cry, others for that’: Royalist Politics, Courtesanship, and Bawdry in Aphra Behn’s The Rover, Part II,” Restoration, 37 (Fall 2013), 3–19.

The concatenation of politics and female sexuality has gained traction in Behn criticism lately, sometimes leading to a better understanding of what Behn may have been trying to do and sometimes not. This study attempts to distinguish the bawd from the courtesan to show that bawds were the target of Tory indignation while the courtesans (read Portsmouth and Castlemaine) were the subject of Whig indignation. Ms. Pfeiffer sees the bawd Petronella in The Second Part of The Rover as ultimately degraded and debased, while the courtesan La Nuche somehow gives evidence that Charles II can control his women and bend all to his power and charm. This may be true, but in many ways The Second Part of The Rover reshapes the trajectory to The Rover, with the courtesan La Nuche winning the rake that the courtesan Angellica Bianca lost in the earlier play. In addition, this second play is bound to its source, Killigrew’s Thomaso (1664), and thus much of the plot line (as well as the politics) is predefined.

Petronella is an object of scorn, the embodiment of the old bawd seeking rejuvenation at the hands of the mountebank, Willmore in disguise, and trying to substitute herself for La Nuche in bed. But in the end, while Petronella does lose her control over La Nuche, and therefore much of her livelihood as a procuress, the discovery of her theft of La Nuche’s jewels is not, as this study would have it, her unmasking as a villain. This discovery provides the comic denouement, at once exposing Petronella’s treachery and Ned Blunt’s coziness. Even more, it sets up the pathetic denouement and the clever closing of the play (if one ignores the whole farce of the glyster). La Nuche graciously covers for Petronella by indicating in her last speech that the thousands of pounds worth of jewels were merely being held by Petronella until La Nuche could transfer them to the “Captain,” Willmore. As he did in The Rover, Willmore gets the woman of his choice and the money, this time without the chains of marriage.

Finally, it would be useful if scholars would refer to the two Rover plays by the names they were published under—The Rover and The Second Part of The Rover.


In this helpful collection of essays devoted to Thomas Killigrew, Mr. Vander Motten’s should not be overlooked. While Killigrew sought to refashion himself as cavalier hero in this autobiographical drama, he remains the kind of garrulous clown who manages to play the rake until he is tamed by Serulina. Mr. Vander Motten usefully discusses the wild array of subplots, but not the cruelty of Killigrew’s self-representation, especially in the mountebank section.

Behn, as Mr. Vander Motten suggests, had to have known Killigrew, but there may be more to this story. Behn worked for Killigrew when she spied in the Netherlands. Killigrew was the proprietor of the rival King’s Company, and it is possible
that Behn started her career with this company before taking her first signed play to the Duke’s Company. One longs to know more about how Behn was able to appropriate so much of Killigrew’s work without some public response from Killigrew, although the power struggle he was having with his son over the control of his theater at the time may have distracted him. While Behn does defend herself in her Postscript to the play against accusations of misappropriation, we have none of the scurrilous diatribes that so easily circulated in that era. Where were Behn’s detractors? Where was Killigrew on this? In her biography of Behn, Janet Todd suggests that Killigrew might have approached Behn to revise the play for production or that Behn might have asked Killigrew for his play as something she knew she could turn a profit on.

This is a useful essay for anyone contemplating Behn’s source material and how she worked with it.


Rarely is Behn treated to a full-scale archival study, the last major one being William Cameron’s intensive review of documents in the Public Records Office relating to Behn’s spying mission, New Light on Aphra Behn (1961). Joining that important study is Messrs. Vander Motten and Vermeir’s extensive excavations of archival materials related to “Prince” Tarquin and Miranda, the antihero and antiheroine of The Fair Jilt. Using contemporary documents from the City Archives of Antwerp, they present the story of the Van Mechelen sisters, especially the legal proceedings against Maria Theresia Van Mechelen Tarquini (Behn’s Miranda) and François Louis Tarquini, along with the murder attempts, the humiliation and banishment (and possible torture) of Maria Theresia, and more—with one document after another. Materials related to the botched execution of the soi-disant Prince and references to the infamous couple’s two sons are clearly presented. Tarquini lived on well after Behn, dying in 1696, and documents show that Maria Theresia survived him.

Messers. Vander Motten and Vermeir use the dazzling array of materials to interrogate Behn’s presentation of the story and her position as I/eye-witness. They conclude that Behn was not present at the time the story of “Love, greed, and murder” unfolded, since she was in Surinam when most of it played out in Antwerp in the early 1660s. The failed execution of Tarquini took place in Antwerp on May 21, 1666, two months before Behn arrived. Behn’s information about the events came from published sources and likely from the gossip that must still have been circulating. In addition, Behn’s sense of place in Antwerp and her understanding of Beguines are pitch perfect, with careful physical placement of churches and the theater and accurate descriptions of women of the Beguinage.

One small point: Maureen Duffy, not Janet Todd, first published reference to a real Tarquini. However, this is not to criticize a must-read article essential for understanding Behn’s fiction.

BOLINGBROKE


Bolingbroke’s influence on Pope’s Essay on Man is a famous topic. Here Mr. Roberts focuses on whether in his “Letter to Mr Pope” (first printed 1753) Boling-
broke had that poem specifically in mind. Doubt was raised in 1824 by William Roscoe, who argued that Pope’s Moral Essays were meant instead. Mr. Roberts views as misleading the phrase “ethical epistles” and instead concentrates on other references to the work in question sufficient to identify it as the Essay: “First [Bolingbroke] describes a work which Pope has begun ‘at my request.’ Next he identifies ‘philosophical pride’ as its first topic . . . . Lastly, he warns Pope that the poem will place him at risk of a ‘direct charge of heterodoxy.’ Each of these descriptions is true of the Essay on Man, but not of any of the Moral Essays.” Mr. Roberts spells out a case for what, according to his own summaries, has been assumed by virtually all Pope scholars since the beginning of the twentieth century.

CENTLIVRE

AIREY, JENNIFER L. “‘I must vary shapes as often as a player’: Susanna Centlivre and the Liberty of the British Stage,” RECTR, 28 (Summer 2013), 45–62.

Ms. Airey begins with a helpful survey of attacks on theatrical performance in the long eighteenth century. Sir Richard Steele is a part of this tradition, she notes, but in The Conscious Lovers (1722) he also creates a space “in which acting and performance may be compatible with Whig conceptions of virtue,” including the reconciliation of individual desire with filial duty. Ms. Airey contrasts this cautious move with Susanna Centlivre’s “full-scale defense of the British stage in Whig terms.” Her analysis culminates in a discussion of A Bold Stroke for a Wife (1718), in which Fainwell and Ann Lovely “change shapes” to free Lovely from the tyranny of her father’s will and her five guardians.

Ms. Airey acknowledges that plays in which disguise leads to matrimonial freedom of choice are hardly the exclusive province of Centlivre or eighteenth-century comedy. One would like to see more of this sort of qualification. For example, Ms. Airey describes Centlivre’s heroines and heroes as “justified in their acts of domestic rebellion, social contract theory applied to the private sphere.” But she nowhere acknowledges the historical problems involved in extending emerging contract theory to women except as property that men should be free to pursue. The marriage that concludes Bold Stroke expressly characterizes Lovely as free and Fainwell as “master of that freedom.” Such an understanding cannot be glossed as “freely chosen companionate marriage,” the latter two words having engendered another critical controversy unacknowledged in this essay.

Comedy has been associated with freedom since the Greeks. Ms. Airey’s lucid and learned essay explains how the rhetoric of freedom assumes contemporary significance in Centlivre’s day. But it could do more to address the complications of that rhetoric.

CONGREVE


“Swift’s most brilliant satire more than once crackles with echoes of Congreve which have escaped editors,” Mr. Rawson says in “Congreve and Swift.” “Echoes” denotes the near-repetition or close adaptation of an acknowledged source. Mr. Rawson, however, regularly shifts back and forth between sensible suggestion and the definitive statement with which he con-
includes. “The most fertile source” for such an echo “might have been” Congreve’s Amendments of Mr. Collier’s False and Improper Citations &c” (1698). Congreve there both harshly retaliates against Collier’s attacks on his comedies and supplied Swift with venom for the early Tale of a Tub and cognate works. “Might” soon becomes “model,” just as “a hint” becomes “Swift transforms,” and “resembles” becomes “Congreve’s writings were in Swift’s mind.” Mr. Rawson wisely hedges regarding the many “details ... common to intellectual debate or satirical rhetoric.”

Nonetheless, with the Amendments as with Congreve’s Love for Love and poems, “may recall” prompts Congreve as Swift’s “shadow in the background for the Tale’s composition.” Mr. Rawson may or may not be correct to cite Congreve as a source and “suggestive trigger” for some of Swift’s images and rhetoric. He certainly is correct to say that several of the images belong to “a common stereotype” and that “both authors were drawing on common stocks of humor and common literary or learned sources.” Perhaps other editors let these allusions escape because a definite maybe is still maybe rather than a crackling echo.

Howard Weinbrot
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DAVYS

GENOVESE, MICHAEL. “Middlemen and Marriage in Mary Davys’s The Reform’d Coquet; or Memoirs of Amoranda (1724) is an implicit defense and justification of the middleman’s constructive role in a well-managed society.

The novel’s plot is conventional: the eligible young heiress, Amoranda, must experience unworthy suitors and outgrow her coquetish ways before she can advance to a happy marriage. Davys livened this formula by playing up the role of a middleman, Formator, who acts as the agent of Amoranda’s guardian Uncle Traffick and oversees her social development. Formator, introduced initially as an older man, is eventually revealed to be young Alanthus in disguise, a well-to-do and well-born gentleman who thus becomes a suitable claimant of Amoranda’s hand.

Mr. Genovese’s strategy sets aside the heroine’s coquetries and the complications of courtship; he focuses instead on the play of economic interests. In his hands the story becomes quite schematic, a kind of financial allegory. Initially unsuited to inherit her family’s fortune, Amoranda must be guided toward a clearer understanding of her economic interests and responsibilities. The unworthy suitors are predators, hoping to squander her fortune. Uncle Traffick represents Old Money looking for a safe way to transfer wealth to a new generation. The most intriguing double role in this design is, of course, Formator. Initially engaged as a merchant’s factor, he must dispassionately guide Amoranda toward her best economic interests, all the while respecting her uncle’s insistence that she choose her own course of action—even as he becomes romantically involved with her in his other role as Alanthus. The task that Formator/Alanthus jointly manages is to maneuver Amoranda into aligning her personal emotions and romantic promptings
with her long-term economic interests, and his reward for completing the task is the heroine herself.

Today, of course, this happy ending deserves examination. Amoranda’s “free” choices have in fact been predisposed by the business-like arrangements of her uncle and Formator; even a benign conspiracy is still a conspiracy. Still this design pointedly has allowed Formator/Alanthus to emerge as a principled and trustworthy middleman; through his best efforts, choice, personal affections, economic interests, and patriarchal social order have been brought into mutually supportive alignment.

DEFOE


Mr. Alff cleverly capitalizes on Defoe’s reputation as a “modern” writer to subvert the typical Ancient/Modern dichotomy of the Augustans. Specifically, he details Defoe’s celebration of ancient Roman roadways in his An Essay Upon Projects. He claims that Defoe’s call for “renovation of the nation’s harbours, canals, roadways, and marketplaces, the infrastructural underpinnings of commerce” according to the model of Rome insists on the importance of a civic will for Britain’s successful economic future. Ultimately, Mr. Alff’s cultural studies approach concludes that the specificity of Defoe’s references to Britain’s legacy of Roman roads demands more than “analyzing the transmission of literary themes and linguistic forms,” and while Mr. Alff’s insistence that we “examine how Defoe transformed old infrastructures, technologies, and cultural practices into supporting evidence for his reform projects” might seem to throw literary studies under the bus, his essay provides a succinct example of how the old always eventually seems to become new.

Robin Runia
Xavier University of Louisiana


Defoe’s claim to have secured the patronage of William III, partly by impressing him with The True-Born Englishman, as Mr. Borsing notes, has been contested by some critics and seems immune to decisive adjudication by available evidence. Mr. Borsing considers the poem’s successes as a defense of the crown while locating its rhetorical force in strategies that serve chiefly to imply parallels between author and king, to the most obvious benefit of the former: both are interlopers—“unwelcome newcomers”—in literary and social hierarchies, yet both deserve recognition based on virtue and popular appeal. Neither, according to Defoe’s satire, can be judged by suspect notions of lineage that betray an unseemly disregard for merit and the king’s constitutional obligations.

Mr. Borsing offers an uncontroversial review of Defoe’s criticism of “true” Englishness, but with particular attention to “techniques of inversion, parody, and . . . satirical reflection.” Defoe, for example, “mimics the wandering recombination of genetic code” that makes up actual (not constructed) Englishness when he evolves “sowre” into “worse” in the lines, “The
Pict has made 'em Sowre, the Dane morose; / False from the Scot, and from the Norman worse.” In other, mostly comic, reversals or mirrorings, Defoe manages to “merge High Church Jacobite with Country Whig as deluded followers of Satan”; he lampoons the Tory politician Sir Charles Duncombe—a putative “true-born” Englishman—as a social climbing upstart, and he perhaps invites comparison between English hybridity and his own genre-resistant poem. Mr. Borsing asks: “Might it not be that Defoe is no more in awe of the inheritance of poetic genre than he is of inherited nobility?”

Paul Neimann University of Colorado


Mr. Capoferro returns to the critical conflict opposing Defoe’s empiricism with his religious dissent in order to highlight his engagement in “fantastic” writing. Setting aside questions of attribution in the case of The Apparition of Mrs. Veal, he establishes useful parallels between The Apparition and other Defoe texts on both sides of the empirical/supernatural divide, including Robinson Crusoe and A Journal of the Plague Year, on one hand, A System of Magick, The Political History of the Devil, and An Essay on the History and Reality of Apparitions, on the other. These parallels focus on the role of eye-witness testimony, ascertainties of credibility, specific details of private life, and corroboration within discussions of the supernatural. Mr. Capoferro argues, “the dual focus on natural and supernatural events should not be discounted as an unproblematic formation whose paradoxical implications exist only for our secular mentality,” or, in other words, we should not ignore the oscillations of Defoe’s texts between empirical and supernatural epistemologies. They may, instead, be recognized as a distinctive narrative device. For Mr. Capoferro, the effects of such oscillations correspond to “those genres we now associate with the fantastic” and, accordingly, encourage us to complicate our notions of Defoe as the father of the realist novel.

R o b i n R u n i a Xavier University of Louisiana


The hero’s efforts in Robinson Crusoe are simultaneously “hermeneutic and therapeutic”—a pithy, apt phrase. To put it another way, this essay connects the hero’s “gradual discovery, understanding and tentative cure of the mind” to his “gradual discovery and understanding of the divine order of the world of nature and of (personal) history.” Usefully considering the novel’s interest in the relationship between macrocosm and microcosm, Ms. Corneanu describes its parable this way: “in order to grasp the hints” of divine providence, “it is essential that one understands and cures one’s excessive emotions, and cultivates the virtues of patience, thankfulness, and humility. Peace of mind and composure of body are the correlated facets of this ethical goal.” Examining “a shift in self-assessment, from a self-centred perspective to an integration of self into the order of nature and of providence,” Ms. Corneanu
seeks to expose the “ethical adventure” by which Crusoe achieves milestones in his ongoing “transformation” into a “Christian Virtuoso.”

The effort to take seriously the “moralizing” aspects of the novel (often “embarrassing” to “modern” readers, as Ms. Corneanu rightly observes) is commendable. Although the question of “ethics” (introduced as the guiding focus of the essay) is perhaps more submerged than articulated, the essay does take a fresh look at such oft-treated moments as the “accidental crop of barley” and Crusoe’s period of violent, almost hallucinatory, illness on the island. Some interaction with Patricia Meyer Spacks (“The Soul’s Imaginings”) and Homer Obed Brown (Institutions of the English Novel), both of whom have examined such scenes for their mind-body, psychological-spiritual, personal-providential dimensions, would have been helpful. Still, the engagement with Defoe’s contemporary contextual framework is illuminating—the Royal Society, Robert Boyle and his Christian Virtuoso, John Wilkins, Joseph Glanvill, and Thomas Sprat all enter the conversation—and it serves to reveal Crusoe’s narrative attempt to find a “Cure for both Soul and Body.”


Walking the reader through the five parts of Nature Delineated, this essay gives a helpful introduction to Defoe’s writing on Peter the Wild Boy. Mostly concerned with the so-called Age-Old Question of her essay’s title, Ms. Culea suggests that Defoe’s work on Peter “gave him the opportunity to criticize his contemporaries’ vices and failures” (the “mere empty shells” of fashionably women). Mainly, however, the essay’s utility lies in its status as a clear, straightforward, detailed overview: quotation-heavy as befits such an overview, it takes the reader through Part I (Defoe’s attempt to “resolve the variety of inconsistent accounts in the press”), Part II (the alleged “virtues of deafness or dumbness”), Part III (education as “the polisher of natural capacities”), Part IV (savagery within civilization), and Part V (political corruption and its causes).

The essay has limitations. For instance, there is no interlocution with (or acknowledgment of) other Defoe scholars who have discussed Mere Nature Delineated. Along with such omissions, there is at least one howler: at one point, the essay observes that “his novels, for instance Robinson Crusoe and Gulliver’s Travels,” pursue “themes like labour, colonization, human rights, race, human improvement or degeneration” (later, the essay correctly names Swift as the author of the latter text). Nevertheless, the essay opens a window onto the philosophical and literary contexts of the time (the “perfectibility debates”), makes useful connections with some of the recent work on the relationship between animals and humans during the period in which Peter the Wild Boy entered the public view and the cultural imagination, and provides a clear, detailed summary of Defoe’s text.


As the essay’s title suggests, these twenty pages seek to encompass a great deal: individualism (the individual’s social rather than psychological identity); tolera-
tion of religious difference; Daniel Defoe (his satires, especially *The Shortest Way with the Dissenters*, his novels, and his beliefs about religion, the law, and civil discourse); and “his time” (religious fundamentalism, the practice of satire, and Lockean and Swiftian contexts).

Although the leading word in the title is “individualism,” the essay’s argument is less about “individualism” and more about “an interesting link between Defoe’s position in the topical [religious] debate of his day and his fictional creativity, particularly his handling of satirical irony.” Ms. Dromart examines how Defoe’s literary output articulates his efforts to fight fundamentalism and to promote an ethic of toleration, beyond purely opportunistic strategies for the survival of the Dissenting faith, in a way that starkly contrasts with other writers, particularly Swift. A staunch defender of his religion, Defoe created characters who reflected his interest in liberty of conscience.

Because of her subject’s breadth, Ms. Dromart too often simplifies. For instance: “What Defoe tried to do [in his novels] was to show that it is not acceptable to justify a horrible, inhuman procedure in the name of a virtuous aim”; “[o]bviously Swift had more confidence in institutions for stability than in individuals, contrary to Defoe.”

The first half of the essay offers a contextualized discussion of satire and is chiefly concerned with *The Shortest Way*, its differences from Swift’s *Modest Proposal*, and a larger argument about the mode of satire; arguably, both the material on Swift and the larger inquiry into the satirical mode detract/distraet somewhat from the “toleration” thread. The essay then makes an exciting turn toward Defoe’s novels, raising significant issues that may well serve as launching points for future scholarship. Ms. Dromart writes, “[e]ach story concentrates on . . . individuals who seem to belong to no groups, who are surrounded by no supportive collective body and whose identity is preeminent social”; because their survival depends on “their ability to change names and to dress up as someone else,” they are highly tolerant of difference, such that “[w]hen they meet individuals that are characterized by their religious faith, mainly Quakers and Catholics, they praise their helpfulness and reliability.” Such claims need room to stretch, not a sentence or two (at best) per novel. If, as Ms. Dromart notes, “Robinson proudly boasts that he ‘allowed liberty of conscience throughout’ his dominions,” and if he “‘looks upon all the seeds of religious dissension as tares sowed by the Devil,’ ” does this really mean he promotes toleration for non-Christian religions, or even Catholicism, across his novels? In *The Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe*, Robinson sees all his Pagan islanders baptized, he shows toleration for the Catholic priest because the Catholic priest agrees always to act in accord with Protestant beliefs wherever the two should differ, and he viciously destroys a sacred Tartar idol without any compunction whatsoever. If Crusoe’s islanders in *Farther Adventures* explicitly learn to set aside differences and come together against threats from outside, does this actually mean that “Religion,” even among Christian denominations, “is never an issue in the novels”? Not exactly, although toleration is, without doubt, an important concept in Defoe’s novels and periodical and political writings.

Adapting the notion of “mediation” from Clifford Siskin and William Warner’s *This Is Enlightenment* (2010), Ms. Ellison argues for the merits of exploring cultural forms as they relate to modes of transmission. She sees Defoe’s interest in “mediated” contact with the spiritual world as a reaction to the proliferation of worldly information media. Her starting point may be Crusoe’s remarks, in *Serious Reflections*, on the apparent cessation—since the biblical era—of direct revelations from God. His voice, argues Crusoe, has not ceased, but he “may have changed the mediums of communication.” The claim refers us to the more difficult work of interpreting providential signs, which this essay links to Defoe’s remarks about mediating spirits or angels. According to Ms. Ellison, Defoe’s angelic interests reflect a response to information overload: both revelation and information might best be filtered, lest they overwhelm.

This argument may help explain Defoe’s odder statements about invisible realms, which can suggest a crude spiritualism. But the reading often strains Defoe’s texts: Crusoe’s statement about “media shift” occurs amid a conventional account of Providence and refers us most directly to God’s Book of Nature, not angels or spirits. Yet Ms. Ellison, having quoted the “mediums of communication” line, announces that Crusoe’s God “uses a network of angels, stationed across the globe, to mediate every transmission between heaven and earth.” Crusoe’s encounter, in the first volume, with apparently miraculous corn is not framed with reference to “helpful spirits” or “angelic converse” as Ms. Ellison suggests; Crusoe instead directly references (unmediated) God, a “Prodigy of Nature,” and “Providence.”

The anecdote itself would be at home in Calvin’s *Institutes*. Skeptical readers might wonder if an imposed fashionable terminology does more to obscure than illuminate: Are Providential signs “encrypted”? Does God “transmit” them and are Defoe’s angels in a “network” (a word that never appears in *Serious Reflections*)? Can we speak of a “media shift” if, in the case of theophany, there is no medium?


Ms. Kincade offers us a first-hand account of her expertise in analytical and descriptive bibliography. Ironically, her step-by-step narration of editing *A System of Magick* and *Essay on the History and Reality of Apparitions* proves to be strictly grounded in an entirely empiricist materialism. Specifically, she details her process for establishing a copy-text, a process that involves, first, identifying possible manuscripts and letters providing insight into the author’s writing practices as well as contemporary printing standards. Next, Ms. Kincade outlines best practices for identifying an appropriate edition and examining multiple copies of that edition to establish an ideal copy. Her subsequent discussion of the difficulties attributing texts to Defoe provides incontrovertible proof of the highly specialized knowledge of eighteenth-century publication practices as well as of Defoe’s extensive catalogue, literary connections, and influences necessary for establishing the external and internal evidence essential to this kind of scholarship. In her conclusion, Ms. Kincade hopes to have provided “something of a model for future editorial scholarship on both Defoe..."
and eighteenth-century literature in general,” and while the fitness of her model for Defoe scholars can hardly be doubted, its lack of concern that single-author scholarship may be, as the volume’s editors acknowledge, viewed by some as “unsophisticated and old-fashioned” or “economically impractical” seems almost ostentatious.

Robin Runia
Xavier University of Louisiana


Mr. Nicieja’s contentions are neither objectionable nor particularly illuminating. His premises are that China was of general interest to eighteenth-century Europeans—for everything from tea to Confucian philosophy—but that Defoe and Commodore George Anson were nonconformists, condemnatory of, rather than intrigued by, Chinese art, thought, and society.

Mr. Nicieja’s treatment of Defoe centers almost entirely on The Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe (which appears once without italics and once as The Further Adventures). In the Farther Adventures, Mr. Nicieja explains, “Defoe unleashes an astonishingly vitriolic assault on every imaginable aspect of Chinese life.” Though Defoe has Crusoe “cooperate . . . unreservedly with the representatives of other nations and religions,” the attitude toward the Chinese is immediately hostile. At the end of his plot summary, Mr. Nicieja dutifully, if briefly, surveys prominent critical explanations for this anti-Chinese sentiment. Whether he disagrees with or accepts the theories of Robert Markley and G. A. Starr, the reader is left to wonder; having characterized them, he abruptly traces Commodore Anson’s “unequivocal rejection of China,” which—we are informed—is less shocking and even more explicable than Defoe’s. Both authors, Mr. Nicieja concludes, were offering “narratives of disenchantment and cultural critique,” and both held overly simplistic views of “the Oriental other.” This is not a surprising conclusion, and indeed one wonders why it needs repeating. What Mr. Nicieja seems keen to show is that two authors whose hostility to China has been documented and explained should, because they concur in their anti-Chinese sentiment, be mentioned alongside one another. Exactly what critical gains such juxtaposition helps us make remain unclear.


Mr. Richetti returns to the topics of Moll Flanders, realism, and character development, aiming to render realism “useful or meaningful as a descriptive critical term.” He invokes his own essay for the 2008 Cambridge Critical Companion and its focus on revision and transformation within the context of a distinctly material world as a rationale for this return; he rationalizes this self-citation, in turn, according to its having been, as he writes—and in case we had forgotten the established fact of his expertise—“grounded in my experience over many years reading and re-reading Defoe’s
fictions and in my immersion a few years ago in the facts of his life in order to write a critical biography.” Nevertheless, his subsequent celebration of Crusoe’s and Moll’s psychological complexity culminates in an important insight regarding the crafting of Defoe’s protagonists. In particular, Mr. Richetti argues that the tendency of Defoe to deploy first-person retrospective narrators who engage the readers in their internal dialogue reveals a “core identity that is recovered through such dialogue.” Further, by circling back to the “realism” with which he begins his essay, Mr. Richetti concludes that it is the characters’ retrospective return to their encounters with the material world that proves their return to a core self accordingly defined through “restoration rather than development.”

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Ms. Rouse examines the permutation of Robinson Crusoe into Les Aventures de Robinson Crusoe, a European TV series (1964) that engaged “Germany’s complex engagement with the Nazi past” and must be considered within “the wider context of a neo-imperial project in the postwar period.” The essay explains how the series, “[t]ailored to appeal to heterogeneous postwar nations and generations,” appeared in different versions that used “the same visual material but employ[ed] radically different voiceovers.” For German viewers, the series not only “presented a critical view of British colonialism,” it also “recast Germany’s political future as young and adventurous” while suggesting that “the crimes of its Nazi past” were simply “those of an adolescent sinner.”

The essay is concerned primarily with the cultural and political work of the series’ German iteration, but Ms. Rouse offers a comparative view with insights especially into the thirteen-part English version (dubbed) created by the BBC (1965). She delves into, or at least touches on, the musical scores, the voiceovers, the casting, the cutting or adding of details or scenes, offering close examination of dialogue and visual stills. Readers may well miss any interlocution with the vast body of scholarly writing on Robinson Crusoe (and on adaptations, including cinematic adaptations, of Crusoe). That said, this short essay gives a valuable reading of a fascinating chapter in the adaptation history of Crusoe; with a historical approach, the German series “enabled a much more ambivalent project than the mere nostalgia for colonialism,” ultimately “follow[ing] the political double strategy of . . . Vergangenheitsbewältigung in which there is not yet a cessation with the parent generation’s comparatively accommodating attitude towards the perpetrators, but where an attempt is made to account for their crimes all the same.”


Mr. Rutkowski’s subject is the Essay on the History and Reality of Apparitions (1727), Defoe’s “commentary on popular English ghost beliefs as well as on the in-
satiated contemporary taste for ghost stories.” Ironically, for a study of spirits, Mr. Rutkowski’s argument never materializes. He offers a perfectly accurate summary of the contents of Defoe’s Essay and rightly observes that “Defoe wanted to demonstrate that the subject of apparitions was worth a serious detailed analysis.” But Mr. Rutkowski does not explain how his précis differs from the shorter but accurate characterizations offered by Paula Backscheider, John Richetti, and others, and after a brief dismissal of all previous Defoe scholars, he never takes up what others have said. In fact, the only item listed in his bibliography is the Essay itself. That Defoe’s writings on the supernatural repay critical reading seems difficult to deny, but no critical reading occurs here.


This essay makes a case for Defoe’s Colonel Jack to be considered an origin (an “embryo”) of the English sentimental novel. The approach, however, is limited to a consideration of broad generic conventions; the conclusion, thus, is superficial. Having affirmed, in a lengthy review of the text that Jack receives a sentimental education directed at feelings of compassion, gratitude, and sympathy, the essay declines to advance a historical or theoretical frame for assessing that information.

Mr. Sill dutifully acknowledges R. S. Crane, G. A. Starr, and Maximillian E. Novak but without reference to concrete avenues of inquiry, discernible in those critics, that might link Defoe to a genealogy of sentiment (through, say, religious sensibility or classical models of virtue or affect). We are left with a sound—but now commonplace—observation that questions of mimesis are insufficient for tracing novelistastic traditions that also trafficked in, for example, analyses of emotion.

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A children’s adaptation of Robinson Crusoe (USA, 1944), based on the Strange Surprising Adventures, was authored and illustrated by Gustaf Tenggren, an artist affiliated with Simon and Schuster and their line of Little Golden Books for juveniles. (Readers may be familiar with Tenggren’s illustrations for The Poky Little Puppy [1942], an investigation of pokyness).

Tenggren, a Swedish immigrant also employed as an artist by Disney, was popular enough to have his name affixed to Tenggren’s Story Book, which contained his version of Crusoe. The abridgment “mirrors the war-era social climate that encouraged laboring, scrimping, and saving,” and the work aims to present Crusoe as a “role model for children living in the United States during World War II.”

Paul Neiman University of Colorado

DRYDEN

BEACH, ADAM R. “Literary Form and the Representation of Slavery in Dryden’s Don Sebastian,” SECC, 44 (2015), 101–120.

Dryden’s Don Sebastian (1689) was a fraught play written in fraught times. The
tragicomedy’s depiction of a Portuguese king and his followers in captivity after defeat by Barbary Muslims has been viewed as a commentary on Christian-Islamic relations, a reflection on the social and political consequences of the Glorious Revolution, and a rueful view on Dryden’s own part of his narrowed circumstances after the Revolution. Mr. Beach argues that these different perspectives can be brought into coherent order, first, by focusing on the several representations of slavery in the plot, and second, by paying close attention to the playwright’s skilled use of a double-plot structure to highlight central issues.

The development of the play revolves around the question of how to respond to defeat and captivity: to be enslaved is to become a nonperson in the eyes of captors, but even slaves still have choices of attitude and strategy to make. In the “upper” plot Don Sebastian as king adopts a heroic death-before-dishonor posture, while his female counterpart, African queen Almeyda, must continually ward off threats of sexual violence and possible rape; their refusal to bend to their new circumstances allows them to express noble sentiments, but it also puts them on a course toward tragedy.

Mr. Beach finds more interest in the “lower” semicomic plot in which the nobleman Antonio must work out his captivity. On display in the slave market, he is reduced to a bridled “animal” compelled to “do Tricks” under the gaze of his captors. Like Almeyda, Antonio is subject to threats of violence and here sodomitical rape. He is not helpless, however. His response to his constrained situation is an accommodation, not a surrender: he uses wit, charm, and a limited compliance to captors’ wishes to make his way. As he himself admits, adjusting to what cannot be changed is “Not very heroic; but self preservation is a point above Honour and Religion too.” In this “lower” plot Dryden makes some gestures toward comedy, but his comedy is dark, overshadowed by coercion and threatened violence.

How do the “upper” and “lower” plots fit together? Although the two clearly contrast, they are not simply “opposites,” as there are crossovers in both: Almeyda has moments of compromise; Antonio, one or two heroic overtures. For Mr. Beach, Dryden deliberately left strategic differences unresolved, forcing his audience to confront the difficult choices that accompany defeat. For his part, Dryden knew that his own post-Revolutionary position constrained him to “please by writing” just as slavery constrained Antonio; “captivity” came in different guises.


Jacob Tonson the elder succeeded Henry Herringman as Dryden’s publisher. Mr. Bernard argues that this succession illustrates how markedly the role of a publisher changed at this time: “Tonson can be seen to be the first modern publisher in the sense of a publisher not only being a traditional bookseller publishing books, but also being a literary agent nurturing talent, and a marketing agent, promoting a literary oeuvre.” Mr. Bernard sees Dryden’s change of publishers as a function of “Herringman [becoming] a wholesale publisher, relying upon a back catalogue of his publications for his income,” while “Tonson became a publisher of new works and [a consolidator of] all the works in a writer’s output.” By reference to the books, especially Dryden’s, that the two publish-
...ers brought out, Mr. Bernard makes a convincing case.


Unpacking Mr. Burke’s title reveals much about his essay. Dryden scholars will be disappointed, as the essay is an extended comparison of Juvenal’s Tenth Satire and Johnson’s Vanity of Human Wishes, with Dryden quoted primarily as a trot for non-Latin readers. Dryden also illustrates the difference between his version of Juvenal, a translation “or what Dryden himself [called] ‘paraphrases,’” and Johnson’s “imitation,” a work inspired by the original and following it in some ideas and examples, but not all. Dryden’s version is 40 percent longer but much closer to Juvenal than Johnson’s, which is approximately the same length as the original. Johnson “changes the length of examples or illustrations drastically, shortening certain parts while expanding others,” and Mr. Burke speculates on the rationale of these changes.

More generally, Mr. Burke suggests a weakness in the traditional approach to Vanity, and to Johnson as a satirist, popularized by W. J. Bate. Bate saw the poem as “‘satire manqué’ . . . because just at the point when it was time for the satirist to come in for the kill, Johnson would pull back because an overpowering impulse toward charity would come into play.” This sympathy would require, according to Mr. Burke, a novelistic characterization of the objects of satire, instead of what Johnson gives us, pure caricature. Mr. Burke wins this battle, but primarily by his manipulation of terms. Few, if any, objects of satire are novelistic characters, if one means by that endowed with psychological depth, but surely Bate means something more akin to Johnson’s sympathies with the sinner, perhaps even with the sin. It has long been a critical commonplace, not noted by Mr. Burke, that since Pope had recently imitated Horace with Juvenalian intensity, Johnson was left to imitate Juvenal with Horatian urbanity.

A better editor would have helped eliminate some of the triteness and awkwardness that mar the essay—“Johnson’s poem goes into a slump,” “hell hath no fury . . . .” “between a rock and a hard place,” “butt-ugly,” “we have met the enemy, and he is us,” and the final sentence: “But, in the end, for better or for worse, we must all still think for ourselves.” A better proofreader would have caught the misnumbering of footnote “8” as “88,” an enumerated series of five in which numerals 1, 2, and 3 are missing, and errors in punctuation, capitalization, and spelling in eight of the quotations.


In book 8 of the Aeneid, the hero’s goddess mother Venus gives her son a shield, forged by Vulcan and depicting scenes from Roman history that have yet to unfold. As Mr. Burke points out, this ekphrastic interlude is probably modeled on a similar moment in the Iliad, where Thetis presents armor to her own human son, Achilles. But the two gifts are different: Achilles receives a replacement for lost armor, while the shield of Aeneas is extra protection—not “a mere physical shield, but something instead whose value is primarily artistic or poetic.” The shield’s “fullest meaning is not about physical or
outer realities but spiritual or inner realities.” Mr. Burke notes that the shield omits some major episodes—like the Punic wars and the assassination of Julius Caesar—that one would have thought likely to be chosen by Virgil as highlights of the ages to come. The result is a focus on events that stress the end of a century of Roman civil wars, like the victory of Octavius at Actium.

Dryden translated the *Aeneid* after 1688, when, as a Roman Catholic, he found himself deprived of office under the new regime. Mr. Burke discusses how Dryden would have responded to the shield’s vision of “the march of history.” This is speculative. While Dryden and other literate Jacobites saw the *Aeneid* as a defining myth of defeat, exile, and restoration, it is another thing to say that “what Virgil’s *Aeneid* reminded Dryden of . . . is the large role of time in human affairs.” It may well have, but that claim needs support, and it is not clear what the point is of speculating about which events would have been engraved on “Dryden’s own shield.” Dryden was translating a text that obviously resonated in the 1690s, but it is too much to say without evidence that “what mattered most to him about Virgil’s *Aeneid*” was that it offered “medicine for a badly wounded spirit who spent the last years of his life mostly down and out.” We do not have any real sense of how Aeneas’s shield helped Dryden with the challenges to his Roman Catholic faith.

Mr. Burke’s prose style has its infelicities, not least his use of what might be called the journalistic conditional (“The volatile politics that would follow would soon lead to . . .”).


Mr. Carnes offers a fascinating, ingenious, if, at times, unconvincing reading of Dryden’s *Don Sebastian* (1689). He acknowledges that he has not identified a “consistent allegory” or “cohesive system of symbolism,” and instead argues that “the play contains a series of allusions to a shared religious discourse which associates physicality with Catholic sacrament and belief.” These allusions encourage readers to see connections between Dryden’s Catholicism and the play’s sexual plots.

The essay is at its best when working closely with clusters of language such as the recurrence of “flesh and blood.” Certainly, Mr. Carnes argues effectively that the phrase helps to evoke both the characters’ sexuality and the Eucharist. But such links fall short of establishing conversion to Catholicism as somehow akin to the revelation of incest, the essay’s culminating argument. And Mr. Carnes in fact admits that the “suggestion that Dryden, a Catholic convert, would associate the conversion experience with something as terrible as incest must seem absurd at first glance. . . .” For him, this association is part of Dryden’s strategic disguise of his religious position. More generally, the essay argues that the play presents Catholicism from a Protestant point of view that early readers would have understood if not endorsed. Insofar as that perspective is located in demonized Muslim characters, this seems reasonable. But Dryden’s disguise and indirection create unstable ground on which to base an assertion that the exiled and penitent Sebastian and Almeyda are evocative of Dryden, the persecuted and closeted Catholic. Mr. Carnes claims the mercy shown the illicit lovers (in escaping death) is a model for the mercy Dryden would have extended to Catholic converts, and he finds in this “a compelling reason why Dryden would choose to veil conversion under a criminal act.” But how
compelling is the suggestion that the self-condemning incestuous lovers would evoke Catholics seeking tolerance for “the private practice of their criminal faith”?

It is sometimes difficult to pin down this essay, in part, because of its numerous qualifiers, but it is worth reading for its detailed and provocative analysis, particularly of the original audience’s and readers’ awareness of Dryden’s conversion.


Having been tricked into marriage to less than chaste Dalinda, Sancho, a wealthy fool, suggests a dance to the two foster children he must now support; he employs the same phrase, “foot it featly,” that Dryden would have remembered from Shakespeare’s *Tempest*, especially since Dryden had coauthored a revised version of the Shakespeare play some twenty-four years before. “So, having heard the phrase and doubled its usage [in the adaptation], Dryden seems to have found it useful again many years later in a similar play, insofar as the Restoration *Tempest* and *Love Triumphant* are both split-plot tragi-comedies dealing with dynastic crises and might logically have been linked in his mind.” Perhaps, but I doubt it.

To make this logical linkage, the Renaissance play must cast an ironic shadow over *Love Triumphant*: “When Ariel’s delicate poetry is dropped into Sancho’s witless prose, the outcome is a festival that celebrates vice not virtue.” An easier assumption is that the phrase was a common one associated with dance: a similar expression appears in Dryden’s version of the Wife of Bath’s tale (“‘He saw a choir of ladies in a round / That fealty footing seemed to skim the ground’”). “Foot it featly” appears verbatim, moreover, in the 1620 English translation of the *Decameron* attributed to John Florio (Night 8, Book 7), a translation with which we know Dryden was familiar thanks to other vocabulary and phrasing echoes. This Boccaccio story treats two men pursuing one less than virtuous woman, as does *Love Triumphant*, and in tone does not need irony to parallel the earthy play. Is the phrase in question, then, an echo of Boccaccio, linked in Dryden’s mind by similarities of plot and tone? This is doubtful as well.


Mr. Galbraith’s richly contextualized essay on Dryden’s *Don Sebastian* goes beyond identifying an autobiographical longing for the return of James II. It analyzes the “agency available to individuals in relations of submission” and arrives at the paradoxical conclusion that submission can demonstrate autonomy.

The concept of passive obedience is traced from the apostle Paul through Richard Allestree’s *The Whole Duty of Man* (1658) through the Tories’ use of the concept to shore up the Stuarts. Mr. Galbraith notes that “[i]n typical Anglican fashion, passive obedience offered a via media between full compliance and active rebellion.” For scholars such as Richard Kroll, passive obedience had become outmoded and survives in *Don Sebastian* only as a trace of the past. But Mr. Galbraith, citing Toni Bowers and especially Michael McKeon’s *The Secret History of Domesticity*, argues that the very act of explicitly defending what had been implicitly accepted was itself an exercise in individual autonomy, “qualitatively different from the
theme of resignation that it espoused.” In fact, rather than assume passive obedience is a conservative call to self-abnegation, Mr. Galbraith suggests it is an early theorization of the “internal exile” that Simon During has identified as a mark of modernity.

In contrast with Don Sebastian, John Crowne’s *The English Friar* (also of 1689), identifies obedience with being duped by the “plotting priest” or Catholic deception. But in Dryden’s play, the character Dorax undergoes a transformation as the result of passive obedience which allows him to embrace “pious fraud” as a means to serve Don Sebastian. Dorax moves from an insistence on “manly” honesty and active resistance to an understanding of obedience enacted through illusion. More specifically, he pretends to urge Don Sebastian to suicide as a way to help him see its sinfulness.

Mr. Galbraith challenges influential readings of Don Sebastian like that of J. Douglas Canfield, who identifies a conservative reaffirmation of “feudal aristocratic order.” Such interpretations overlook the “counter-intuitive” potential of passive obedience to enable modern selfhood. This important essay should provoke further discussion of relationships between modes of passivity and individual agency.


In the preface to the first edition of his well-regarded translation of *De Rerum Natura* (1682), Thomas Creech defended his decision to render such an “atheistical” poet as Lucretius by arguing that characters in Dryden’s heroic plays often speak disrespectfully of the gods without scandal or ill consequence. Mr. Hopkins provides documentary evidence showing that an Oxford friend, Edward Bernard, Savilian professor of astronomy, urged young Creech to curtail a remark that might easily be construed as critical of the Laureate.

In revised versions of the preface Creech softened, then eliminated altogether, the reference to Dryden. This discretion allowed the ambitious young poet to enjoy a friendly and cooperative relationship with Dryden and his publisher Jacob Tonson over the next ten years.

NG, SU FANG. “Dutch Wars, Global Trade, and the Heroic Poem: Dryden’s *Annus Mirabilis* (1666) and Amin’s *Syair perang Mengkasar* (1670),” *MP*, 109 (February 2012), 352–384.

In the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–1667), England fought the Dutch not only in Europe, but also in Asia, especially as allies of the Malay kingdom of Makassar. Makassar was the chief Asian entrepôt for goods from the Moluccas (Spice Islands) and was also under attack from the Dutch (it would fall in 1669). Amin’s Malay Rhymed Chronicle of the Makassar War (c. 1670) celebrates the heroism of Makassar’s warriors and their English allies and envisions an empire based not on territory but trade in ways similar to Dryden’s celebration of England’s valor and commercial future in *Annus Mirabilis*. Ms. Ng does not really produce significant new insights into Dryden’s poem, but her account of South Asian trade and empire fascinates.

PARRY, DAVID. “Sacrilege and the Economics of Empire in Dryden’s *Annus Mirabilis*,” *Sel*, 54 (Summer 2014), 531–553.

In August 1666, English warships under the command of Admiral Robert Holmes cornered a large unprotected fleet of Dutch merchant ships in the Vlie estuary. In the engagement that followed, English seamen
subdued, burned, and then plundered more than a hundred ships, along with the nearby town of West-Terschelling. In England these destructive exploits were quickly dubbed “Holmes’s Bonfire” and celebrated as a triumphant moment in the Second Anglo-Dutch War, even as Dutch commentators called them an outrageous attack on a trading rival and imperial foe. The problem of what to make of this controversial engagement was compounded less than a month later when the Great Fire of London destroyed much of the city. Was this new fire a divine retribution against the nation for Holmes’s Bonfire as Dutch partisans soon suggested, or was it possible to offer a more positive construction of these seemingly linked events?

Dryden faced just such questions when he chose to include both fires in *Annus Mirabilis* (January 1667). The overall thrust of the poem is certainly heroic and celebratory, an extended evocation of England’s military prowess and imperial destiny, but Mr. Parry finds the poet’s presentation of Holmes’s Bonfire qualified. He draws particular attention to a quatrain describing the sailors’ pillaging:

> Our greedy seamen rummage every hold,
> Smile on the booty of each wealthier chest,
> And, as the priests who with their gods make bold,
> Take what they like and sacrifice the rest. (829–832)

While these lines obviously suggest overconfidence and undisciplined greed, Mr. Parry supposes that the reference to priests taking what they want is more deeply sinister: he argues that the lines associate the plundering seamen specifically with Hophni and Phinehas, wicked sacrilegious priests and the original “sonnes of Belial” (I Samuel 1–2).

One quatrain cannot alone change the direction of a 1,200-line poem, but Dryden’s broaching of sacrilege raises the possibility of divine retribution and prepares his transition to the Great Fire. For Mr. Parry, Dryden’s presentation of the second fire is carefully equivocal, balancing hints of divine disapproval of the nation’s diffused sinfulness against possible renewal of Christian virtues through adversity—a view consonant with those of prominent churchmen of that time.


This essay sets out to understand why the triplet appears so much more frequently in *The Conquest of Granada* than in Dryden’s other heroic dramas. The hero Almanzor performs more triplets than any other character, and Ms. Schoenberger links this to John Winterbottom’s fifty-year-old observation that Almanzor represents a significant shift in Dryden’s heroes: from representing “rebellious individualism” toward representing “a cultural ideal.”

For her, that ideal in the case of *The Conquest of Granada* is Spanish imperialism. In one of her more intriguing, if impressionistic, observations, she claims that “[l]ike an imperial endeavor, the triplet makes more room for its native rhyme, rather than allowing a rogue line to end with an independent sound.” Somehow the heroic couplet is like an imperial power because it subdues and controls deviations from the dominant form. Yet one could argue the reverse—that the triplet’s primary effect is to signal the deviation. Here Ms. Schoenberger might have profitably consulted recent scholarship on the new formalism, starting with J. Paul Hunter, to help shape her interpretation.
The essay argues for additional meanings for the triplet, finding, for example, an emphasis on Lyndaraxa’s, Abdelmelech’s, and Abdalla’s “triangular situation” in some of the triplets in that subplot, while locating the overwhelming threat of Lyndarax’s charms in other triplets. Ms. Schoenberger returns to the link with imperialism as she notes Dryden’s emphasis, in his triplets, on expansion—in both space and time. Finally, however, she claims that at the time of the play’s genesis and performance, England was not an imperial power (which itself is debatable) and then questions why Dryden chose to write in triplets reinforcing imperial themes and aspirations. She concludes that Dryden was more interested in the acculturation of an ambitious and proud hero into a larger context than in the context itself.

SCHILLE, CANDY. “‘The King His Play’: Charles II, Christina of Sweden, and Dryden’s Secret Love, or The Maiden Queen;” Restoration, 36 (Spring 2012), 41–59.

Ms. Schille’s essay complicates the view that Dryden unequivocally affirms royal prerogative and strict succession in his tragicomedy Secret Love (1667). Qualifications of this view emerge when one reads the character of the “Maiden Queen” as modeled after Christina of Sweden, a contemporary of Charles II. Like Dryden’s character, Christina refused to wed and named a proposed suitor, her cousin, as her legal successor (parallel to Dryden’s Lysimantes). Her favorite, however, was a commoner whose marriage to the successor’s sister was arranged by Christina (in Secret Love, the match between Philocles and Candiopen). In Dryden’s play, Lysimantes also disavows marriage so that the crown will go to his sister and her husband and eventually their children. The Queen does not, like Christina, abdicate, so that royal prerogative is more clearly affirmed than it is in the historical case.

Nonetheless, Ms. Schille argues, Dryden unsettles the royalist resolution of Secret Love primarily in Philocles who, she suggests, might resemble both Henry Jermyn (later Earl of St. Albans, a favorite of Charles’s mother, Queen Henrietta Maria), and his nephew, also Henry (who wooed both Charles’s sister, Mary, and Charles’s mistress, Barbara Villiers). These troublesome and social climbing court favorites of powerful women might have influenced Charles’s response to Philocles, whose defense of the Queen’s “glory” leads him to rail against a commoner rumored to be favored by the monarch—until he learns he is that commoner. Before this revelation, he reconciles himself to a coup preventing the indecorous marriage, claiming he does so to preserve the Queen’s “glory.” But Ms. Schille claims that Dryden’s defense of Philocles in the Preface is “strained” and not consistently supported by the play. She points out that Philocles does not renounce his ambitions once he learns he is the favored commoner; instead his ambitions are checked by the Queen’s disingenuous denial of her love as part of her larger plan to make Philocles’s children heirs to the throne. Concluding that Dryden’s court favorite comes across as fundamentally self-interested, Ms. Schille argues that we do not need to believe Dryden or Charles II endorsed Philocles’s eventual reward. Here she again reminds us that Dryden’s Queen does not abdicate as Christina did, which suggests the importance of monarchical prerogative consistent with both Dryden’s and Charles’s lifelong positions. The ambitions of the commoner Philocles, however, are never disavowed; in fact, they are significantly satisfied in the Queen’s arrangement for succession.

Ms. Schille offers an explanation for the
King naming the play “His.” She suggests his attraction to a plot based on a history in which he had participated; a keen interest in issues of succession, birth, and merit; and an appreciation of “Dryden’s non-univalent examinations of power, rank, and title” that correlate with his own “thoughtful and nimble” brand of politics. Although the essay does not always pin down its arguments regarding Charles’s and Dryden’s sympathies and reservations, it successfully suggests the many historical developments that shine new light on *Secret Love*, its central characters, and its resolution.

**Stephenson, Joseph F.** “Redefining the Dutch: Dryden’s Appropriation of National Images from Renaissance Drama in *Amboyna*,” *Restoration*, 38 (Fall 2014), 63–81.

Mr. Stephenson’s essay establishes the radical turn in dramatic representations of the Dutch signaled by Dryden’s *Amboyna* (1672). Written during the Third Anglo-Dutch War, the play stirs antipathy toward the Dutch by representing the torture and killing of English citizens on this island in 1623. Interestingly, late Renaissance plays about the atrocity were suppressed because the Dutch were still generally approached as a neighbor and Protestant ally. But by 1672, antagonism between the two colonial powers was such that Dryden could freely transfer to the Dutch long-standing images of cruel, lustful, violent, and Catholic Spaniards.

In Acts I–IV, Dryden draws on older, more benign stereotypes of the Dutch as fat, merry, drunk, and foolish. He thus alludes to former, more cordial relations which contrast with a cuckoldung subplot in which a Dutchman is even more blood-thirsty than a Spanish captain. Further, Dryden alludes to and prefigures the global conflict between the two naval powers by representing the struggle over a woman’s body as a synecdoche for *Amboyna*. Ysabinda, who is contracted to the English Towerson, is raped by the Dutch Harman. Viewers are thus prepared for, in Act V, the betrayal and extended torture of the English in a violent seizure of the island itself.

Mr. Stephenson throughout identifies specific references to Renaissance plays in Dryden’s *Amboyna*, thus illustrating Dryden’s thorough familiarity with earlier drama as well as the playwright’s awareness of the political, military, and economic conflicts that occasioned *Amboyna*.


Critics have long supposed that Dryden used the election to Parliament of his country cousin, John Driden of Chesterton, as an occasion for a graceful compliment and a moment to celebrate the balanced principles of good government. Mr. Wheeler now gives considerably more partisan edge to that reading of “To My Honour’d Kinsman,” stressing its closeness to political issues in 1699–1700, the year in which it was written, and its author’s political credo. For Mr. Wheeler, the poem, written in the last year of Dryden’s long life, is complexly situated in time: it looks back to an older England as a paradise lost, even as it looks ahead by articulating political principles as a legacy to steady and guide the nation’s future.

Mr. Wheeler’s close reading notes that there was personal friendship but also considerable distance between Dryden and his country cousin: Dryden the poet was Catholic, Tory, and Jacobite; Driden of Chesterton was Protestant, Whig, and...
Williamite. The poet nonetheless praises the cousin as a responsible landowner, a benefactor and peacemaker in his shire, and an upright and patriotic citizen. In effect, Dryden idealizes the cousin as a representative of the old-money, landowning class, who expresses that class’s guiding political principles. What are those principles? Here Dryden speaks for himself more than for his kinsman: a commitment to peace and an avoidance of the Continental entanglements that bring war; a reliance on a strong navy rather than a standing army; a resistance to new taxation and the “Dutch” leadership of William of Orange; and a nostalgic regard for traditional English virtues, now sadly lapsed. Mr. Wheeler argues that these commitments taken together add up to a statement of collective “Country” party interests and a signal of resistance to “Court” interests in commercial expansion and Continental alliances.

Dryden’s poem alludes to Erasmus Dryden, the grandfather shared with his cousin, as a figure of family continuity and resistance to unjust authority. This figure—another “Honour’d Kinsman”—frames the conclusion, which Mr. Wheeler argues is deeply self-reflexive, as Dryden the poet steps forward to reaffirm his political and artistic legacy.

FIELDING, HENRY


This essay examines chapter titles in Joseph Andrews, David Simple, and The Female Quixote using Gennette’s notion of the paratext, which mediates texts and audiences, and shapes the reception of texts. Ms. Birke notes that a range of different kinds of work is performed by chapter titles, some of which straightforwardly introduce their chapters, while others are ironic or metafictional. The latter kind reflect on the role of fiction in mid-eighteenth-century Britain, examples of the auto-criticism of the novel and the genre’s participation in the cultural debate about its uses and abuses. Ms. Birke catalogues the different kinds of chapter titles used in the three novels: summary, ironic summary, metanarrative reflections on writing, and metanarrative reflections on reading. The familiar issues of the time—and of our critical moment as well—are reviewed in terms of such paratextual work. Henry Fielding’s chapter titles are congruent with his ironic text; in both places he participates in debates about entertainment and instruction, an older social order and a new commercialism, and the functions of fictions. Sarah Fielding’s chapter titles tend to be more straightforwardly didactic, and when she does use metanarrative titles to reflect on the various roles of the reader, they are more clearly separated from the text proper. Lennox uses a larger percentage of reflexive titles in order to emphasize the difference between the kind of writing Arabella loves and the kind Lennox herself writes. In each case, Ms. Birke demonstrates chapter titles can be read as fruitfully as the texts they frame.

HERSHINOW, STEPHANIE INSLEY. “When Experience Matters: Tom Jones and ‘Virtue Rewarded,’” Novel, 47 (Fall 2014), 363–382.

Who is Tom Jones? Though his novel might be said to exist to ask this question, it has not finally answered it to the satisfaction of many readers. Ms. Hershinow begins her essay by pointing to Robert...
Buchanan’s 1886 theatrical adaptation of Fielding’s novel, *Sophia*, the project of which, as the retitling indicates, is to clean up the smut and straighten out the kinks in the messy original. Ms. Hershinow notes that while missing the novel’s point, Buchanan’s play addresses the complexity of Tom’s mixed character by removing anything that makes Sophia’s decision finally to marry Tom difficult—or interesting. Has Tom learned from his experiences? For historians of the modern novel it is a cardinal truth that experience is the ground of identity, whether philosophically, psychologically, or socially: the realism of the novel shows how character is formed by experience, by plot. Sophia’s willingness to marry Tom suggests she thinks he has learned the lessons of prudence that will tame his attractive recklessness.

But does it? Ms. Hershinow explores “the production of inexperience,” the suggestion that character is not formed by experience, but rather survives the machinations of plot, tested but untainted by the world. This is a fascinating issue, and Ms. Hershinow herself seems to enact the novel’s own ambivalence about Sophia’s motives. She says, “Sophia’s choice of Tom endorses society’s blanket pardon of youthful indiscretions of gentlemen” but also, in the next sentence, “coincides” with it: “Sophia’s self-interested expression of love coincides with the social unraveling of Tom’s rakish past, an opportune occurrence that undermines his experience along with her own.” Endorsing her father’s ridiculous acceptance of Tom now that he will inherit Allworthy’s estate is quite different from Sophia’s decision dovetailing with it. While Sophia’s decision to accept Tom is linked by the narrative to her father’s predictable turning with the prevailing social winds—she does what her father demands, finally, once it agrees with what she wants—it is questionable whether the novel thereby “endorses” society’s blanket pardon of gentlemanly indiscretions as much as it offers overlapping models of assessment.

For Ms. Hershinow, Sophia’s decision to take Tom’s past as “cathartic rather than constitutive” indicates the novel’s rejection of the paradigm of prudence it routinely satirizes and “makes clear that the novel does not in fact operate on the model of Bildung.” In a compelling suggestion, Ms. Hershinow reads this aspect of Tom Jones’s plot in relation to *Pamela* rather than the contemporary *Clarissa*. While Richardson explicitly rejects in the latter novel his earlier suggestion that a reformed rake makes a good husband, Fielding concludes *Tom Jones* on the model of *Pamela*: “Sophia’s acceptance of Tom reveals a naïve faith in the constancy of a virtue that can be decoupled from experience.” From what Ms. Hershinow discusses as the multiplicity of Toms that the novel has superimposed on one another, Sophia “produces” his final one, which is fixed—both attached and corrected—through her acceptance and ratification. (It is notable, though, that Tom’s sexual reformation is undergirded by the constancy of his generosity, which is distinct from the one-dimensional Mr. B, whose reformation seems a complete overturning of his previous character.)

In recognizing the limits of the formative model of character, at least as far as Tom’s goes, Ms. Hershinow makes a strong case for the significance of Fielding’s model of character as a model of character and not just an effect of his model of plot: “to read Sophia’s acceptance as a mechanical method for resolving the turns of the plot is to neglect the process by which she must both assert Tom’s consistency and recognize the consequences that come with his newfound iden-
Ms. Hershinow notes that Sophia’s decision is like Tom’s recklessly charitable actions, and I wonder if this serves to remind us of the complexity of novelistic character more generally. Sophia’s decision indicates a willingness to recognize what lies outside of experience altogether—in this case Tom’s instinctive (or generically preloaded) generosity—and being a romance heroine, she chooses a husband who is also formed of the less worldly materials. It is not her knowledge of Tom’s character that guides Sophia but a willingness to accept what she cannot finally know with certainty, and perhaps this suggests the answer Fielding, too, offers to the question raised by the novel as a form only partially defined by epistemological challenges.


In this lively essay, Ms. Janes hops, skips, and jumps in seven-league boots across the terrain of Fielding’s works and their particular, at times peculiar, but never (pace the impatience of more thoroughly modern critics) pro forma, engagements with Christianity. Suggesting that the institution of religion “is more conspicuous in Fielding than in any other great comic artist since Chaucer,” Ms. Janes adds acridly: “But this does not make him boring, whatever it does to his critics.” Fielding’s is no orthodox Christianity, either in contemporary terms or in ours. In a lovely gem of critical summary, Ms. Janes characterizes it by stating, “Religious references percolate through the writings, which are as ostentatious in Christian sympathies as derelict in Pauline prudery or Richardsonian piety or Wesleyan grace.” Bodies, desires, pious affectations, satiric exposures, wit, violence, learning, and, yes, grace—all fill the novels, not to challenge or break their religious framework, but as the materials it necessarily works with. “Fielding finds that by Christian standards his culture is unchristian, with those making the most Christian noises the least Christian in practice.” Fielding’s religion is pragmatic, and this-worldly. “A protestant of Protestants, his religion is sola scriptura,’ but Fielding’s scriptures lack miracles, resurrections . . . all save moral injunctions to love, charity, forgiveness.” Instead, Fielding combines “immortality and morality,” the promise of another world with a refusal to let it obscure one’s responsibility in this one.

The second half of the essay examines the intensification of the anticlerical satire of *Jonathan Wild* over the course of its two editions, and suggests that *Tom Jones* is structured by a blatant but overlooked religious allegory. Fielding’s most cutting satire, of course, is reserved for his most rigorously pious characters. But despite the many, many mistakes and hypocrisies of religious affectation that the novel satirizes, *Tom Jones* is still organized by a fundamental Christian allegory, with Allworthy’s strict Old Testament justice being tempered by Tom’s New Testament mercy, charity, and forgiveness. What obscures this allusion is a “scandalous, amusing impudence: is the Son wenching?” It is this kind of “straddling,” the need to reconcile “Tom the Son with Tom the Lover,” that made—and makes—Fielding so challenging, whether for piously Christian readers or for modern readers accustomed to social and psychological discourses of the worldly and the bodily (and religious discourses of the soul). But in Fielding, Ms. Janes argues, Christianity is “poised over
one of its important thresholds,” on the
cusp of secularism, but still providing the
fundamental terms for thinking about the
world and ourselves.


Ms. Lewis reads the Journal in relation to the development of a culture of sensibility and the discourse of witchcraft. Indeed, she relates sensibility to the waning of belief in witches that is registered and legally institutionalized in the 1736 repeal of James I’s Witchcraft Act. All of this swirls around Fielding’s two mentions of witchcraft and the act of repeal in the Journal. (And much of this essay swirls—chock-full of cultural history and critical commentary tossed together and coated with associations, a tasty but promissory appetizer.) Both superstition and sentimentalism depend on impressions that are only apparent and make connections that do not necessarily exist.

In the Journal, with its portrayals of his grotesquely malfunctioning body, Fielding “perverts the very sentimental correspondences that his work superficially forges” and so parodies the emerging sentimental contract between books and readers. He even highlights its “demonic pretense,” which depends on mistaking mediating forms for sensible objects. In this, Ms. Lewis suggests, we recognize that authorial voice (startlingly vivid here even as it narrates the decay of its organism), superstition, and sensibility are all versions of magical thinking, seductions of the “spectral mediations” of graphic surfaces. She cleverly, perhaps too cleverly, suggests that Fielding is punning when he writes about witches being “put down by act of parliament”: they are “put down” in the contemporary conveyance of writing even as they seem to have been ‘put down’ in reality.” If not a belief in witches, then a belief that works like witchcraft (susceptible, let us say, to the spell of writing) continues to survive into enlightened Britain in the discourse of sentimentalism. By the end of this busy essay, Ms. Lewis marshals Tom Jones, the Atlantic on which Fielding sailed, the 1761 Thomas Colley case, “swimming” witches to test their innocence, Charlotte Lennox, Fielding’s descriptions of his hosts on Rye, Mr. and Mrs. Francis, and the letter that suggests Fielding’s Voyage is neither true nor fair to Mrs. Francis to explore the ways that the seductions of text are the modern enchantments of a culture of sensibility, which are not so far removed from the old superstitions they putatively replace.


The central concerns of the Journal of a Voyage to Lisbon, Mr. Lipski argues, are immobility, passiveness, and spectacle—but not the kind of sights one expects of the typical travel narrative. Absorbed in the details of ruined health, Fielding’s text instead directs the reader’s attention to his disintegrating body, and so shifts from the activity of traveling to a more passive “conveyance,” as Fielding puts it in the second entry of the Journey.
In contrast to Sterne’s active, curiosity-driven notion of travel, which is figured by the Prodigal Son, Mr. Lipski suggests that the archetype of Fielding’s conception of traveling is the cursed Adam. The spectacle of the diseased and passive body replaces the typical sights of travel writing. The ship itself becomes a symbolic deathbed, and readers are cast into the role of deathbed companions. Mr. Lipski notes that this grim, even gruesomely realistic death scene contrasts with Richardson’s more artificial account of Clarissa’s deathbed. True enough, but if Fielding overturns the generic conventions of travel writing in his last work, that does not make The Journal a novel, and it shares with Clarissa none of the latter’s moral, aesthetic, and emotional richness.


Mr. Lipski discusses the representation of faces in Joseph Andrews and Tom Jones. Fielding’s physiognomic portraits are idealized “concretion masks” and carnivalesque caricatures. In contrast to such characters, whose faces reveal their characteristics, are the morally worrying masks of concealment of the affected and evil characters.

When Sophia and Tom begin to control their faces in the later parts of the novel, “[t]his evolution towards masquerade by the seemingly self-consistent characters testifies to the destabilizing nature of the protagonists’ stay in London.” London complicates the neat moral oppositions of the country and the early structure of the novel.


For Mr. Maioli, Fielding’s theory of the novel is a response to empiricist epistemology. He reads Fielding into the history of empiricism rather than, as is often done, taking Fielding as a residual universalist in a culture leaving such ideas behind. Because Fielding saw his novels as tools of moral education and claimed they were grounded in an experiential knowledge of character, he develops a theory of the novel that can answer the suspicions Locke and Hume had about fiction while also adopting the epistemological tenets of their empiricism. Fielding’s moral epistemology, as articulated in “An Essay on the Knowledge of the Characters of Men,” depends on the claim that observation trumps testimony and, so Mr. Maioli says, “is thus thoroughly empirical.” Joseph Andrews and Tom Jones express this point over and over, but they substitute fictional examples for the essay’s precepts. This is how Fielding makes fiction safe and useful for an empiricist world.

Mr. Maioli discusses the conceptions of true history (in Joseph Andrews) and probability (in Tom Jones) as Fielding’s answers to the empiricists’ problems. True history provides a link between universal lessons and empirical reality, and, in an interesting claim, Mr. Maioli says it works in a somewhat similar way to Hume’s understanding of history. For both, history offers a way to discover universal principles. But while, for Hume, records of historical events serve as data for the experiments of moral philosophers, for Fielding, novels present the generalizations that the partic-
In another discussion, Mr. Maioli shows how knowledge of characters in *Joseph Andrews* depends on discerning the relationships between professions and actions, but also on assessing actions through character, a back-and-forth process that is learned through experience, and modeled by the experience of reading the novel. (That sounds even more like Hume; it is the procedure of his essays.)

In *Tom Jones*, Fielding addresses the problem of how to verify the correspondence of the novel’s world to the real world through his conception of probability. Probability is not just an empiricist tool, but Mr. Maioli suggests that Fielding’s usage reflects the additional role probability plays in empiricist epistemology, those cognitive habits of association that are nonintuitive and nondemonstrative. And this points to both the promise and the problem with Mr. Maioli’s project. Thinking about empiricism necessarily entails thinking about experience, but thinking about experience does not necessarily entail thinking about empiricism. Fielding certainly “was writing at a time when appeals to universal truth discernible through reason alone were losing traction” and justified his claims to universality through claims to the authority of experience, which is the basis of his novels’ moral education. Readers have to make the lessons of books their own, test them in the real world, and adjust them based on negotiating the complexly intertwined experiences of reading (learning) and living (testing).

But is such moral experience necessarily grounded in philosophical empiricism? Mr. Maioli’s account of the empiricist analogues of Fielding’s theoretical explanations of his fictional practice reminds us that Fielding’s work was of its time. But not just. In the continual two-step of the educative processes of Fielding’s novels (which Mr. Maioli explicates well), “the epistemic standards of empiricism” are less a basis than one strand of a theory of fiction also informed by ancient epic, Cervantian romance, and modern satire.


In this reading of *Tom Jones* (book 1, chap. 4), Ms. Purdie slowly walks through the description of Allworthy’s house to discuss how it expresses a philosophically perfect balance as well as the ideal of perfect nature that Capability Brown aspired to create in his contemporary landscapes. She avoids using the terms sublime, beautiful, or picturesque because the novel pre-dates Burke and Gilpin (but not Addison’s “Pleasures of the Imagination,” which would authorize use of the first two).

The perfection of Paradise Hall hints at Genesis (and one might also note Fielding’s nod to Milton), as well as the requisite flaw. Ms. Purdie argues that the flaw is signaled in the initial description of the house as an impossible mean between the Gothic and classical styles, which would be monstrous in the eighteenth century, so the description signals that the house exists only as a word game. While the main claim here seems right, I do not think those sentences say that the house is a mean between Gothic and classical architecture but rather that it is a Gothic building with a grandeur that rivals Greek architecture. Nevertheless, the point that the building is more generally described in such a way as to remind the reader that it is a textual construction holds up. The house then, she
concludes, warns us at the start of the novel that perfection is something achieved only in texts, while also showing us that texts cannot be fully trusted. Although houses in books are usually emblems for the characters of their owners, the flaw in Allworthy’s is not related to him (though he is not perfect either) but, unusually, related to the flaws of language itself, the ability to manipulate it and the dangers of misunderstanding it. Perhaps, then, Ms. Purdie might note that Mr. Allworthy’s house has to appear, for much of the novel, to be Blifil’s as well.


In the accidental burning of Adams’s beloved manuscript of Aeschylus in Joseph Andrews (book 2, chap. 12), Mr. Rand hears echoes of the burning of Don Quixote’s library and Paul’s statement about works being tested by fire in 1 Corinthians. Mr. Rand notes that just before this scene, Adams’s Aeschylus is put on trial and barely saved from condemnation by an ignorant justice, who mistakes the manuscript for a ciphered letter of treason. But although this scene has a happy ending—when the local parson recognizes the Greek—in the next scene, with the kind of deflection typical of Fielding’s adaptation of his models, the manuscript suffers the undeserved punishment it just seemed to escape. The narrative sacrifice of the Aeschylus manuscript offers another example of the kind of unintended consequences that dog both Don Quixote’s pursuit of his chivalric calling and Adams’s pursuit of his.

The particular shape of Adams’s quixotic virtue is, of course, Christian, and Mr. Rand also associates the burning of the manuscript with Fielding’s brief for active charity. Earlier Adams has been distracted by his reading, indeed his contemplation, of Aeschylus, and this scene calls him from that kind of passive contemplation to vigorous action, a vindication of his virtue but one that comes at the cost of sacrificing the book he loves overmuch. Both Quixotes are subjected to comic punishments as the cost of pursuing their ideals, whether chivalric or Christian. (For Cervantes and Fielding alike, those ideals are laughably out of place, which says as much about their benighted contemporary worlds as it does about their anachronistic knights.) For Mr. Rand, the scene “brilliantly expresses the essence of Adams’s character.” It certainly does, but I wonder if it also ironically salvages the pleasures it devoutly sacrifices? Adams is rewarded for helping Fanny by the joy of watching her reunion with Joseph, and that worldly rapture is shared with Fielding’s readers, who seem to be asked to recognize the dangers of books precisely by losing themselves in the pleasures of this one.


Fielding’s last days in his native land were full of bile and outrage. Sick and dying, he left for Lisbon in June 1754, but was temporarily stranded in Ryde on the Isle of Wight. In his posthumously published Journal of a Voyage to Lisbon, Fielding paints a memorably vicious portrait of his landlady, Ann Francis, a creature so crass and cruel that she exceeds, he suggests, even his ability to render her, except by referring readers to classical accounts of the Furies. Apparently Fielding took some poetic license in his description. An unsigned letter sent to Samuel Richardson from Ryde eight months after Field-
ing’s stay returns the favor and reports that the innkeeper and his wife remembered Fielding as “a great deal of trouble” and “the strangest man in the world,” who covered the mirror in his room “that he might not be struck with his own figure, while he was exaggerating that of others.” A transcription of this letter was published by J. Paul De Castro in 1917, but the original has been lost until now. Mr. Ribble has discovered it in the Bristol Reference Library, and here presents a new transcription of it, along with a full account of its context and history.

Mr. Ribble notes that De Castro’s transcription “is not seriously flawed, but there are many variants from the original, mainly in accidentals.” In revisiting the letter, though, he offers a new and compelling argument that the writer was Richardson’s nephew, James Leake Jr. The letter is ascribed to Peggy Collier on its back, but this cannot have been so. (She was with Fielding in Ryde, and the letter writer was not.) Collier’s sister has also been suggested as the author, but it has been discovered that she died just after (or possibly just before) the letter was written. Mr. Ribble says that the handwriting of the letter is quite close to the single extant letter in Leake’s hand and does not match that of any other of Richardson’s major correspondents still alive in 1755. And the letter demonstrates a familiarity with the writer that suggests a family member. (Mr. Ribble also explores and discounts the possibility that the letter is a copy.) The letter shines light on Fielding’s final days, on the way he transforms experience into art, and on his relationship with Richardson. It also provides evidence about the publication history of the Journal’s two editions, one with Mrs. Francis’s real name, and one that calls her Mrs. Humphrys. The letter suggests that its writer had read the “Francis” edition, which then must have been available by March 1755, and it may be impossible to determine which edition came first.

Finally, the letter is interesting for reasons that Fielding’s novels train us to notice. The letter draws a different picture of the woman Fielding savages: “as to the old woman, I believe she was naturally afflicted with too much gall, and now indeed was plainly dying under the over flowing of it, and consequently demanded great allowances on that score.” Fielding did not make such allowances: “indeed our author appears under as great infirmities as the old woman, or any old woman whatever, and lays great claims from others of that charitable allowance, which a man of sound mind & body would have made for this poor c[r]eature.” Ironically, the accusatory letter fails to make allowances for Fielding’s own infirmities. But Fielding’s novels go beyond the letter and recognize their own implication in such ironies. Perhaps the letter inadvertently suggests something more than—that Fielding’s account of his landlady at Ryde might be as much an ironic self-portrait as a last bitterly satiric screed against the selfish shrillness of English innkeepers. If so, perhaps Fielding wrote into his final work what he could not or would not look at in the covered mirror.


Mr. Schechter reproduces a series of letters dating from 1740 he says he found on a website (geocities.com/~lostfielding) which “seems to have fallen off the worldwide web,” including letters purporting to be to and from “Hercules Vinegar”—the pseudonym Fielding adopted when writing for The Champion—and which, if authentic, would have a bearing on the authorship of An Apology for the Life of Mr. T........ C......, Comedian. Being a Proper Sequel to
the Apology for the Life of Mr. Colley Cibber, Comedian (1740). Although external evidence has always been lacking, Fielding’s involvement in the writing of this spurious autobiography has long been suspected. The “newly discovered letters” printed by Mr. Schechter purport to explain, from inception to publication, the way in which the spurious Apology was conceived and written.

Readers will have to judge the letters’ authenticity for themselves, but both their tone and their content strike me as spurious. Mr. Schechter “admit[s] to some doubts about their authenticity” himself, but that does not stop him suggesting that “the newly discovered letters . . . confirm” that Fielding had “ample motive to co-author” the pamphlet. Why? “Prevented from continuing to stage satire at the Haymarket,” Mr. Schechter asserts, “Fielding moved more actively into the medium of print, not yet controlled by the government.” That “not yet” is puzzling, but Fielding, after the passing of the theatrical Licensing Act in 1737, was almost certainly “bought off” by Walpole; he turned to the study of law, and Mr. Schechter’s suggestion that Fielding and Ralph felt an overwhelming need to attack Walpole in a spoof Apology fails to take into account the fact that they had The Champion at their disposal in 1740. Innocent of reference not only to Thomas Lockwood’s essay, “Fielding and the Licensing Act” (HLQ, 1997), but also his Weselian edition of Fielding’s plays, let alone Robert D. Hume’s magisterial book on Fielding and the Little Theater in the Haymarket, Mr. Schechter’s essay is not in full command of relevant secondary literature.

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Tom Jones may offer something to the study of cognitive psychology, but on the evidence of this essay, cognitive psychology offers little to the study of Tom Jones. Mr. Shank explains how the narrator of Tom Jones solicits our cognitive empathy, our thinking with him. For instance, through his direct address to his audience, the narrator shows he cares about that relationship and solicits our “mind-reading” and indeed our mind-reading of his mind-reading of us as he attributes thoughts to us in his often ironic direct address. Mr. Shank’s points of critical reference are Iser, Empson, Watt, and Alter—almost all of whom are compelling readers of Fielding, of course, and worth recalling, but not in lieu of current criticism.

To explore the opening chapter of the novel, Mr. Shank cites early Iser and translates: “In the contemporary terminology of cognitive psychology, we might specify Iser’s statement to mean that Fielding’s narrator uses whatever means he can to encourage cognitive empathy and makes the best possible attempt to duplicate his mental states into the reader’s.” Fielding is not trying to duplicate his thoughts in the readers but to stimulate the reader’s thoughts, on the model of conversation, not empathy. Mr. Shank suggests that double irony is a vehicle of empathy, turning readers into insiders who laugh with the narrator and so empathize cognitively with his values—all of which is true, but not new, and not especially refreshed for being dressed in these new clothes.

UŚCİŃSKI, PRZEMYSŁAW. “The Mocking Theatre: Parody in John Gay’s Achilles and Henry Fielding’s Tom Thumb.” From Queen Anne to Queen Victoria: Readings
Mr. Uściński offers an overview of Gay’s third mock-opera, *Achilles*, on which he was working until his death and which was produced posthumously in 1733. The play is based on an episode of Achilles’s story that is not part of the Homeric tradition: the young man hiding on Scyros disguised as a maid in an attempt to evade his fate at Troy, which his mother, Thetis, heard from an oracle. Mr. Uściński provides a full summary of the play. Mistaken identity and cross-dressing drive the action, which climaxes in an attempted rape, as the characters break into parodic balladry.

Beneath the mock-tragedy, Mr. Uściński argues, Gay holds up “a mirror to bourgeois cultural aspirations by comically exposing the heroes of bourgeois genres as bad-tempered, narrow-minded rogues and wenches.” Heroic and modern values, as well as classical and popular entertainments, are subject to critical parody. Fielding’s *Tom Thumb* works in a similar way, though where Gay burlesques Achilles, Fielding gives us a mock-heroic Tom Thumb: “Fielding makes tragedy absurd and grotesque, Gay makes it trivial and comic.” In both plays, parody infuses the weary genre of tragedy with the energy of the laughter of the popular theater.


Pamela’s audacious assertion of her own value as an inviolable person in the face of Mr. B’s chasing her as prey is one of the defining moments in the development of the eighteenth-century novel. For critics eager to identify tremors of the tectonic shifting of cultural change, it is an inaugural moment of modernity: Pamela’s claim to self-possession and self-assertion has often been read as a harbinger of the secular terms that are said to replace the theological ones Richardson so blatantly uses. In this dense, precise, and illuminating essay, Mr. Wehrs reads Richardson’s salvo and Fielding’s response in terms of their initial theological articulations. These defining novels, he demonstrates, are grounded in religious debate, which is not an inaugural chapter in the emergence of a secular culture (which would neither be recognized nor endorsed by either Richardson or Fielding), but the defining, and fully sufficient, ground of understanding. The eighteenth-century novel is not groping its way to secular modernity but debating “our” problems in Christian terms that do not need to be translated to make sense or be interesting—or speak to us.

The problem Pamela presents is that her liberating individualism is accompanied by an imperialistic ego. In one of Mr. Wehrs’s typically striking formulations: “The same audacious self-importance that empowers us to challenge slander and stare down would-be rapists encourages us to view the world’s reformation in terms of its coming around to our way of thinking.” Pamela’s rewriting of Psalm 137 makes a claim for the sanctity of her soul but also, Mr. Wehrs notes, makes an idol of herself. In another of the essay’s pithy phrases, flirting with idolatry is the price of ethical universalism: for Fielding this smacks of the antinomianism of Methodist self-absorption, its ob-
session with grace and its denial of works. In response, Fielding’s narrative mocks the hypocritical pretenses of self-assertion and demonstrates to readers the primacy of ethical perception.

Mr. Wehrs discusses the stagecoach scene in Joseph Andrews as requiring readers “to simulate within our own minds how the imprint of ethical significance and obligation upon consciousness feels.” When we laugh at the satirically exposed ridiculousness of the passengers’ self-serving excuses and cringe at the punishment promised the generous postilion, Fielding makes the novel—the reading of the novel—an education in (or a recognition of) the ethical ground beneath, or emeshed in, claims of subjectivity. “Fielding’s prose becomes novelistic as he discovers means of making the actuality of the ethical sensible to readers in ways that work against co-options of the moral by the moralistic and interested.” The theological problem raised, in turn, by this position, a Socinianism that denies divine sovereignty by making natural law self-authorizing, is figured by Adams. But Adams’s doctrines are happily undermined: “We see grace operative in Adams precisely to the extent that his conduct transgresses his ideas and his ideas become sound or not to the degree that they reflect his actual practice and moral feelings.”

Both Adams’s and Joseph’s good nature dislodges the self from its privileged position, and makes active concern for another, not oneself, the condition of grace. “Erotic love saves Joseph from being the male analogue of Pamela by opening him to concern for another that displaces and disrupts egoistic intentionality.”

While Mr. Wehrs demonstrates how Fielding’s path between antinomianism and Socinianism defines his novelistic practice, he also suggests how current work in cognitive psychology (in particular the mirror neurons) and in Levinasian ethics illuminates these eighteenth-century debates. Indeed, it is interesting that Levinas’s deeply Jewish meditations on the ethical ground of self and understanding unlock this strand of Christianity, one concerned with offering a counterargument to the primacy of self and doctrine that defines our Richardsonian modernity.

FIELDING, SARAH


See the entry under Henry Fielding, p. 33.


The title suggests an investigation of the taint attached to all the unfortunate characters in Sarah Fielding’s David Simple too burdened by self-interest to acquire the capacity for sentiment and sensibility that distinguishes David and his three companions. In fact, the discussion focuses on the thicker description of daily life provided by the narratives of disappointment and failure. Fielding’s analysis of the economic self-interest of characters that David meets establishes a counternarrative. Readers then better understand the blinkered vision that prevents David from apprehending the limits and pressures in others’ lives, which limits his own capacity for sociability. It is through their stories—“narratives that resist the stereotypes they at first seem to re-
inforce”—that the narrator deftly draws together opportunities for the reader to see what David cannot.

The heteroglossic text offers lessons about “how to accept others’ economic self-interest as part of, not a threat to, community.” Mr. Genovese draws on philosopher Ted Cohen’s discussion of metaphors of personal identity to propose a model whereby readers are invited repeatedly to exercise their own capacity for entering into the identity of the other. He likewise applies considerations of an intersectional analysis of the class, gender, and economic issues at play among the apparently venal and vain characters, women in particular. By this means, Fielding “imagines how characterization itself might be used to hold together a society accommodating of difference.” Mr. Genovese reads the narrator employing the new discourse of landscape gardening to endorse variety, where the lowly hedge and humble shrub contribute equally with the oak and pine to create the attractive prospect. Yet the narrator’s concomitant endorsement of the social order, where happiness could prevail if only every member would perform his part allotted by nature or his station in life, sets clear limits on that newfound accommodation of difference.


Because Sarah Fielding’s The Countess of Dellwyn has received little attention, Mr. Johnson’s discussion of her appropriation of the epic in defense of the novel is welcome. The novel’s remarkable preface and her inclusions of passages from Virgil’s Aeneid and le Bossu’s Traité de poème épique bolster her bold contention that the novel, like the epic before it, was concerned with the workings of the human mind and the control of the passions.

The argument assumes that Fielding’s readers are familiar with historical interpretations of the Aeneid. Her procrustean deployment of sources was addressed to readers who would have no trouble appreciating the unconventional uses of epic allusion. Mr. Johnson also acknowledges that her readings of epic (including Paradise Lost) go against critical practice in the eighteenth century. Suggesting that Fielding’s privileging of the individual mind was already evident in David Simple, Mr. Johnson proposes that it was her brother who in his later fiction followed her lead. This impulse was all the more daring in the 1750s, when the genre appeared to have lost some of its momentum. Fielding’s preface, and her novel, could be read within a richer context, and a modern edition would permit more readers to join that discussion.


Cautious about reading too much into “scant biographical information,” Ms. Rooks outlines what we do know about religion in the Fielding family: a latitudinarian grandfather who received preferment as a result of the Revolution, a father who controversially married a Roman Catholic (losing custody of his children to his mother as a result), and exposure to Anglican intellectuals during a childhood spent in ecclesiastical circles.

The interaction between Sarah Fielding
and her more famous brother is addressed, although Ms. Rooks does not (and need not) enter into the debate about the precise nature of Henry’s religious beliefs. She notes that both writers shared a preference for good works over faith, an adherence to a rational brand of broad-church Anglicanism, and a belief in the necessity of prudence, benevolence, and humility.

The other major influence on Sarah Fielding’s writing was Richardson. Ms. Rooks situates Sarah Fielding’s literary output—in its confessional aspect at least—somewhere between her brother and Richardson. Fielding was neither entirely rationalist nor purely sentimental in approach, more conventionally pious than her brother but also less doctrinally specific than Richardson. This may have been a conscious attempt to avoid “the kind of religious controversy and tension with which her family was so familiar” as a result of the child-custody battle. The result is a kind of “theological minimalism” that makes it possible for Fielding to refer to Locke and Shaftesbury, as well as classical authors, without losing sight of her underlying Christian message and her desire both to “entertain and instruct.”

This useful essay illuminates a neglected area of Sarah Fielding’s work.

**GAY**


See the entry under Henry Fielding, p. 41.

**HOGARTH**


Hogarth’s engravings of *A Harlot’s Progress* (based on earlier paintings) were “an instant sensation” when they appeared in 1732. As George Vertue put it, the prints “captivated the Minds of most People . . . of all ranks & conditions from the greatest Quality to the meanest.” The three series that followed (*A Rake’s Progress* [1735], *Marriage A-la-Mode* [1745], and *Industry and Idleness* [1747]) were also hugely successful.

Mr. Dabhoiwala asks why. He doubts that Hogarth simply invented a “novel mode” and capitalized on it, which is “essentially the view” of the leading modern scholar of the artist, Ronald Paulson. (Mr. Dabhoiwala also rightly questions some of Paulson’s “more extreme suggestions” about the meaning and context of Hogarth’s work; more on this might be said elsewhere.) He suggests that Hogarth encapsulated themes and motifs already very much in the public’s mind; Horace Walpole, for example, commented on “the familiarity of the subject” of the *Harlot’s Progress.* Second—and this is the focus of the essay—the proliferation of copies, quotations, adaptations, and parodies of the prints in a wide variety of media was as important to Hogarth’s success as the originals themselves. Paulson has dismissed the engraved copies in particular as unworthy and merely parasitical, but for Mr. Dabhoiwala “it was precisely through second- and third-hand copies and allusions that Hogarth’s work achieved its
greatest popular impression.’ The success of the prints was “a mass-media event as much as an artistic triumph” that was attributable to Hogarth alone, in the same way that the *Pamela* phenomenon resulted both from the original work and the marketplace that received it.

Mr. Dabhoiwala points out that the literary and pictorial appropriations of the prints have largely been ignored; the pictorial ones are now actually rarer than the originals. The remainder of his short essay provides an overview of the derivative graphic works, many of them in the “almost entirely unstudied” J. R. Joly collection in the Fitzwilliam Museum at Cambridge. This is followed by an appendix listing copies of the *Harlot’s Progress* from 1732 to 1768, with illustrations.

This essay usefully contributes to our understanding of the production and consumption of eighteenth-century texts and images.

LENNOX


See the entry under Henry Fielding, p. 33.

POPE


See the entry under Addison, p. 1–2.


Mr. Bernard gives us “a footnote in the strategy of advertising and a shift in the methods of the book trade in using it [from] 1665–1781.” He has discovered in the *Daily Courant* for August 20, 1715, a publication announcement for a print of a Pope portrait, “used as the frontispiece for the folio *Works of . . . Pope* (1717). . . .

What seems like a decorous, distinguished, and formal depiction of the poet in the *Works*, had, in fact, been available as a ‘poster’ for the delectation of Pope’s fans for two years.”

Two additional items, including a letter from Pope to Samuel Buckley, are added to lengthen the note. Mr. Bernard writes that “advertising had come a long way since Pope wrote to Buckley,” but how long is not apparent since he does not date the letter.


As an example of the capacity of the “Augustan genre of imitation to reshape and retell” Chaucer’s *Merchant’s Tale*, Pope’s *January and May* lies somewhere between “narrowly defined translation” and “imaginative intertextual remodeling.” This approach was also conditioned by an ambiguous attitude toward the Middle Ages: though regarded as an important figure in the formation of English literary tradition, Chaucer suffered from the “essentially negative view of medieval culture” in the early eighteenth century. As a result, it was worth revisiting Chaucer but necessary to modernize the original “so
that it met contemporary standards of taste and decorum.”

Pope’s audience was probably unaware of the genre of the fabliau, of which the Merchant’s Tale is an example, and of the conventions of medieval romance. The “differing cultural context” of the two poems required toning down of the bawdy passages; eight lines of Chaucer’s description of January’s lustful advances are distilled into Pope’s prim “What next ensued beseems not me to say.” The fairies of the Merchant’s Tale are retained, performing the same function as witnesses to May’s infidelity to her aged husband and agents of January’s discovery of it, but in Pope they are physically diminished from the human scale they enjoy in Chaucer and relegated to “the low comic register.” The “strong satirical edge” of the Chaucerian original did translate well into the modern idiom, albeit filtered through “classical models.” Intricately related, the two poems also reflect their authors’ respective personalities and cultural “values and tastes.”


The title of this essay suggests that much of it is out of the purview of the Scriblerian. However, to exemplify shifting understandings of genius, Mr. Cook traces changing attitudes toward Pope.

Objecting to a single notion of genius as originality, which has been “[b]uttressed by the legal recognition of authorial property,” he traces traditional discussions of genius and related concepts such as inspiration, imitation, learning, individuality, correctness, and literary indebtedness. Addison neither originated these debates nor unequivocally championed correctness. Like Pope, Mr. Cook argues, Addison is uncertain and conflicted about neoclassical ideas of authorship that identify genius as both destructive and creative, natural and cultivated, original and shared. Both authors thus “punctuate” a literary tradition “in which genius and learning were joined in a sort of discordant harmony,” a tradition with a long history; Mr. Cook cites, among others, Sidney, Johnson, and Reynolds. Joseph Warton’s dismissal of Pope as lacking genius does not signal widespread acceptance of Warton’s opposition between genius as originality and invention, on the one hand, and such qualities as learning and judgment, on the other.

Mr. Cook’s essay valuably argues that Pope is “an entirely plausible model of modern genius” well into the nineteenth century. More generally, the essay subverts commonplace generalizations about later eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century poets allegedly working to free themselves from the restraints of early eighteenth-century poetics.


This essay is a fine example of what Pope called “The gen’rous Pleasure to be charm’d with Wit.” Rhyme is a potential wealth too easily squandered: in the so-called “Age of Authors,” an anonymous writer, possibly Samuel Johnson, complained, “the inclosures of literature are thrown open to every man whom idleness disposes to loiter, or pride inclines to set himself in view.” Rhyming is better saved for more capable hands, and none have been more deft and able than those of Pope. Mr. Douglas-Fairhurst’s essay stands as an extended meditation on and celebra-
tion of Pope’s extraordinary creativity with this poetic resource.

To look at rhyme critically naturally requires close reading of particular texts, so this discussion initially develops by small increments. Mr. Douglas-Fairhurst directs attention to rhymes that Pope used often—"name" and "fame," "song" and "long," "rhyme" and "chime" and "time"—to demonstrate the controlled vigor and witty compression as well as the seemingly effortless variety of his poetic practices. Flat and easy rhymes were for the Ambrose Philipses of this world.

The first appeal of rhyme is of course aural, but like others before him, Mr. Douglas-Fairhurst is eager to emphasize its conceptual properties, the ways in which the resonance of rhyme can situate one idea in relation to another. Passages from a wide range of Pope’s poetry show ways in which the aural snap of a rhymed couplet can underline kinship or disconnection, paradox or causality, approval or disapproval, and many other possible shadings of meaning. Rhyme’s ability to connect ideas in satisfying ways can also give it ethical force, an intimation of order achieved and the possibility of resting on the stability of truth—a useful device across the whole range of poetic kinds embraced by Pope.

Mr. Douglas-Fairhurst broadens his discussion. Rhyme is not a personal possession, even for a poet as talented as Pope. Rather, it is an artistic resource held in trust, to be used, augmented, passed on. Pope learned skills of poetic presentation by studying Spenser, Milton, and Dryden, and he left the example of his own practices as a legacy to Byron, Tennyson, Hopkins, and others. By definition, rhyme words do not stand alone, and neither do the poets who deploy them.
ridicule and a sense of threat, the potency of which becomes an object of sublime ironic celebration—not as an achievement of the dunces, but as a result of Pope’s “delightfully horrified” satiric vision. In its climax, The Dunciad enables Pope to “transcend the polarities of contempt and solidarity, appeal and opposition” that otherwise characterize and complicate the relationship between the satirist and the crowd.


As Pope himself explained in the “Advertisement” posted at the beginning of An Epistle from Mr. Pope, to Dr. Arbuthnot, he drew up the poem “by snatches” over several years. The survival of considerable “snatches” in manuscript drafts allows Mr. Ferraro to offer a detailed and thoughtful account of the evolution of the poem. Beyond that, he conveys a clear impression of how hard Pope worked over his drafts to make them appear effortless and inevitable; it is a great privilege to see genius—in this case, satirical genius—devising and reworking the forms of its own creative expression.

The earliest draft of what became An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, here printed as an appendix, shows clearly that Pope conceived it as “a Sort of Bill of Complaint” directed against adversaries in the scribbling trades well before it was addressed specifically to the poet’s longtime physician and friend. That draft is defensive, exasperated, and confrontational, and it provides a useful baseline against which to measure Pope’s subtle (or not-so-subtle) reshaping of his satiric attacks—expanding couplets, refining diction and imagery, rearranging whole segments—in successive drafts. The cumulative effect of such changes, Mr. Ferraro suggests, is a less aggressive and more likeable self-presentation.

Pope paired such warming with a more resonant and strategically significant change in the use of context. The context of the earliest draft is basically literary combat: Pope dramatized his artistic abilities and personal virtues by contrasting himself with that ragged company of sworn enemies and unworthy aspirants at the fringe of the literary world. In the finished draft, Pope pictured himself initially at home in Twickenham, besieged by favor seekers, flatterers, and needy others—and he did his best to shut the door against them. This change in context helped to modulate the tone and temper of the satire into something more domestic, more conversational, more restrained, and implicitly more thoughtful. Here was the satirist, still critical of the public world, but now in the company of family and friends like Arbuthnot, who knew him to be a reasonable and upright man. This was a pose assumed to win reader sympathies, of course, which it successfully does.


Mr. Knox-Shaw notes previous discussions among Pope’s editors since Warburton about the degree of Mandeville’s influence on Pope’s Essay and believes it has been underrated. Mandeville’s observation that Humility is not “so ponderous a Virtue, that it requires six Horses to draw it” may well have inspired Pope to “give Humility a coach and six.” Whether a maxim by La Rochefoucauld comes to
Pope directly or, as Mr. Knox-Shaw would have it, via Mandeville, is arguable but worth arguing.


See the entry under Swift, p. 84.


Mr. McGeary’s basic point is that in the Grand Session passage in book four of Pope’s Dunciad, “opera figures prominently as a symbol of the false taste in the arts pervading Britain, and more specifically as one of the preoccupations of the Grand Tourists returned from Italy.” The sons (or in one case grandson) of peers named by Pope as “Great C * *, H * *, P * *, R * *, K *” aspire to the favor of Dulness. These peers traditionally have been identified as Cowper, Harcourt, Parker, Raymond, and King, an identification that Mr. McGeary further confirms by documenting their (grand)sons’ presence on the Grand Tour and their engagement with opera, both in Italy and back home. While the Twickenham editor found the young men “undistinguished,” Mr. McGeary finds “that Pope must have chosen these five . . . quite deliberately for their well-known passion for operas but that some had distinguished careers.”


Recent historiographical investigations contend that the fashionable late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century West End of London was more class-integrated than traditionally allowed by scholars. Why does so little of this class diversity turn up in The Dunciad? Mr. Pritchard’s initial pages present a thumbnail historical primer on the four sections of Westminster County that constitute “London.”

The essay’s energizing and lucid discussion offers an important corrective to such recent Swift and Pope critics as Nicholas Hudson, Brean Hammond, and Erik Bond by issuing a healthy reminder that study of the socially imbued literature of the eighteenth century needs the latest developments of historical inquiry.

Had Pope more realistically described St. James, he would have inconveniently vitiated the structural integrity of his satiric masterpiece, which, parodying Aeneas’s epic sojourns, traces the corruption of the Town through its progressive penetration by the cultural vulgarities of the City. Mr. Pritchard concludes: “Only in the margins of the Variorum could such material be entertained.”


Alexander Pope may have owed his slumbering dunces to Richard Blackmore’s The Kit-Cats: A Poem (1708), but Blackmore’s Albion is about to wake up. Pope’s is doomed. This careful analysis of Pope’s treatment of sleep from his translations of Homer through his modifications in The Dunciad from 1728 to 1743 shows Pope catching the animus against sleep from Garth’s Dispensary and Boileau’s Lutrin, even Blackmore’s Kit-Cats, and passing it on to Shelley in the yawn that goes round in Peter Bell the Third. Pope renders
Homer’s “all-subduing sleep” as “all-composing,” as if to save Achilles from subjugation, but “all-subduing” returns in the Dunciad. Sleep attends food, as in Homer: aldermen and custards, abbots and vines. The initially almost benign dream-filled slumbers of the dunce king undergo subtle but significant changes in Pope’s move from the stupor of fools in the 1728–29 Dunciads to the comatose culture of The New Dunciad (Book 4, 1742) and the complete Dunciad (1743). In 1742, the final couplet sent Britannia to sleep, but in 1743 that couplet moved to Book I and other references to sleep were added, even while sleep was excised from the final catastrophe. Wide awake, the reader is left darkling.

The essay might have observed that the first Dunciads were Pope’s following after Swift’s and Gay’s cultural critiques via Gulliver and the Peachums, with the literary world’s heads served on a platter, in rhyme and with footnotes. That project was more playful than the final indictment the poem grew into. Here the poem is Pope’s “Waste Land” from the outset, which makes for an interesting observation of the difference between their disturbing visions. The Dunciad’s “tubers” of whole, fat, happy dunces contrast with Eliot’s fragments of grandeur in his poem. Shelley’s Peter Bell, borrowing ideas and imagery from Pope, sounds the shriveled, shrunked note of trivialized modernity. Pope, too, condemns the “gnat-like painness of the quotidian particulars, which . . . are the paradoxical components of large-scale cultural dysfunction.” Yet when the poet’s hand drops the curtain on the apocalypse introduced in the final revision of Book 4, the threatened cultural monuments, Homer, Virgil, Milton, Pope, somehow remain intact. Unlike Eliot’s ruinous Dante and Ovid, the great frame of culture remains unbroken. Some eyes stay open in the dark, like the lynx in Goya’s Sleep of Reason.


See the entry under Bolingbroke, pp. 14–15.


As might perhaps be expected of an essay that cites as “recent Pope criticism” work published in the 1950s and ’60s, and as an important “recent” book on demonic possession one translated into English in 1930, this essay summarizes much of Mr. Rousseau’s own earlier work on eighteenth-century theories of the passions (including “rapture” and its product, poetry) as rooted in the physical body, specifically in the nerves. Pope’s own ill health perhaps first led him to the ideas of physicians such as George Cheyne and Thomas Willis, ideas clearly visible in Pope’s poetry and in his understanding of his own identity.


From its appearance in 1712, Pope’s readers have savored the classical borrowings and parodies shaping The Rape of the Lock, but one, according to Ms. Schaefer, has gone unnoticed: Antenor’s description of Ulysses in Iliad book 3 reworked in the description of Sir Plume. The parallelisms
are carefully and convincingly parsed in extended close readings of both passages. Thus, Ulysses stood as “one unskilled,” “Nor raised his head, nor stretch’d his sceptered hand,” but when he speaks “what elocution flows! . . . with easy Art.” Sir Plume, with “Earnest Eyes, and round unthinking Face,” managing the “nice Conduct of a clouded Cane,” can only bluster in half sentences, prompting the Peer’s regret that one “Who speaks so well shou’d ever speak in vain.”


This reconsideration of Pope’s ChauREFERerian adaptation (written circa 1704 and published in the sixth part of Tonson’s Miscellanies, 1709) begins with promise but underdelivers. Mr. Smallwood suggests that the accession of Anne in 1702 had a “political correlate” in the “new poetical leaf” that turned with the death of Dryden and the emergence of Pope. January and May’s “tale of marital reconciliation,” for Mr. Smallwood, “echoes wider hopes for settlement following Anne’s enthronement,” but the bulk of the essay deals with other matters.

The first of these is the poem’s reputation, which has never been great. Most readers have tended to agree with Geoffrey Tillotson that Pope’s modernization of Chaucer diminishes the punch of the source material, although Maynard Mack praised both Pope’s versification and his discussion of social and gender roles. Mr. Smallwood wants us to see the poem as “a cultural barometer of the early days of Queen Anne,” a contribution to “important debates on gender roles, monarchy, and sexual and marital sovereignty” at a time of growing female readership of poetry. January and May, in dealing with “the politics of marital relations,” “ask[s] to be understood” in the context of a new era of “male anxiety” in which a female monarch may be the “architect of settlement in an unsettled kingdom.”

Introducing interesting themes, Mr. Smallwood nicely synopsizes the poem and its reception. This occupies more than half of the essay. At the end, he returns to “the historical correlate” of the poem in two rather cursory paragraphs. While Pope’s poem may have offered the “imaginative overlap between the mending of disrupted familial relations and the healing diplomacies of Queen Anne’s nation state,” many of these diplomacies had yet to occur when the poem was written. Compare Windsor-Forest (published in 1713), when it really was possible to say that “great ANNA” had “let Discord cease.” Howard Erskine-Hill has suggested that Pope intended poems like The Rape of the Lock to “have a bearing on affairs of state,” but Mr. Smallwood is merely telling us that January and May seems, in retrospect, to anticipate themes of discord and reconciliation more evident in a period of rapprochement that lay some years ahead. This may all have been inchoate—indeed hoped for—in the early days of the queen’s reign, which to many seemed a refreshing change after years of Dutch Wil-liam. Mr. Smallwood needs to make more of a direct link between the themes of January and May and the larger developments of the period.

SOLOVYOA, NATALIA. “Byron: A Disciple of Pope in a World of Mutability,” From Queen Anne to Queen Victoria: Readings in 18th and 19th Century British Literature and Culture, volume 3, ed. Grażyna Bystydzieńska and Emma Harris.

This essay is slender; there are no footnotes to speak of, and only three works are cited in a brief bibliography: the 1863 edition of Byron’s Poetical Works, the fifth volume of Marchand’s edition of the letters, and David Ellis’s Byron in Geneva (2011). And there are factual points with which to disagree (Dryden’s plays “were not numerous”).

Ms. Solovyova tells us nothing we do not already know. Byron admired Pope. Byron was a classicist. Byron was also a Romantic. Byron did not always see eye to eye with his contemporaries. The Romantics never actually called themselves that. Ms. Solovyova wants to portray Byron as “enigmatic” and unclassifiable, but the result is somehow reductive: the poet “took the opportunity to combine the old classical frame and lineal plot, with the deviations of the new hero created by Byron-the-Romantic, still claiming to be a Popean disciple, while exploiting Romantic myths.” This ignores much in Pope with “Romantic” qualities (the Cave of Spleen and the Dunciad come to mind). The reality was probably more subtle but, as Ms. Solovyova herself acknowledges, we live in an “age of simplification.”


The ellipsis in Ms. Walls’s title may more create than identify an allusion. Pope wrote, “we repair / From earthly Vehicles to these of Air” while Dryden wrote, “Such scattered ears as are not worth your care, / Your charity for alms may safely spare, / And alms are but the vehicles of prayer.” Previous scholarly explications of the use of “vehicle” in these passages—cited by Ms. Walls—are more compelling and not dependent on a questionable echo.

RICHARDSON

ALEXANDER, JAMES R. “Richardson and Copyright,” N&Q, 59 (June 2012), 219–224.

Richardson’s battles with imitators and pirates are well known to literary history, particularly his haste to anticipate an unauthorized sequel to Pamela with his own continuation, and his denunciation of the Irish printers who stole the text of Sir Charles Grandison. Mr. Alexander has discovered a valuable new document that illuminates this side of Richardson: a parenthetical notation from Chancery Court proceedings that records an injunction, first temporary and then permanent, “in the Case of Richardson, author of Pamela, against publishing and selling part of that book.”

Evidently Richardson went to court to stop someone from printing Pamela. The question is: whom? By reconstructing both the timeline of authorized and unauthorized Pamela publications and the legal copyright regime of the time, Mr. Alexander rules out several possibilities, including Richard Chandler’s continuation Pamela’s Conduct in High Life. Though proof is lacking, the most likely suspect is Mary Kingman’s serial republication of Pamela, which legal action may have forced her to repurpose as a sequel.


Rather than considering the long history of idealized female characters as part of a powerful current that helped to outline the
contours of today’s “Mary-Sues,” Ms. Barner instead takes the terminology of the present, applies it to the past, and then registers proud wonder at how relevant our current moment has always been. “Though the term ‘Mary-Sue’ has not yet transferred from fandom to literary criticism,” she writes with puzzlement, “the characteristics of the trope provide a fruitful framework for scholarly analysis of the similarities between works of popular literature in widely divergent periods.”

It is hard not to appreciate the genuine interest Ms. Barner affords Richardson’s text, but her approach frequently devolves into something resembling self-parody. Consider the following memorable passage: “All of these characteristics might well lead a reader familiar with fan fiction terminology to label [Pamela] a ‘Mary-Sue story.’ To explore these similarities, I have applied Mary-Sue ‘litmus tests,’ lists of Mary-Sue characteristics posted on the internet in order to help fan- or original fiction writers to avoid the Mary-Sue trope. In this analysis, I will be quoting from two of the most famous tests, compiled by fans ‘Merlin Missy’ and ‘Falstaff and Grayswandir.’”

Why review such material in Scriblerian? Because the online journal in which it was published is included in the MLA database of scholarly journals as “peer-reviewed”—and library search engines respond accordingly. For undergraduates attempting to locate substantive secondary sources, for overworked deans vetting faculty CVs, such publications, one suspects, will do just fine. If only I could end this review on the appropriate emoji.


Why is Clarissa so compelling? The usual answer, supplied by critics, readers, and even the author himself, has to do with the novel’s formal commitment to epistolarity—each “to the moment” letter takes yet another small step toward revealing the joys, horrors, deceptions, self-deceptions, and ironies of characters who, for over a thousand increasingly distressing pages, somehow believe a comic conclusion is forthcoming. Ms. Bowers proposes an addendum to this explanation, one having to do with that most nebulous of artistic qualities, “tone.” Clarissa’s tonal “darkness,” Ms. Bowers argues, derives from “a quality of the language, a steady undertow of implication that allows the narrative endlessly to postpone,” but never to dispel, the reader’s suspicion “that injustice might remain unrectified at last.” Richardson’s attempt to produce a “Christian Tragedy,” in other words, results in “troubling remainders” (a beautiful mathematics metaphor if ever there was one). Of particular note in this regard is the “demise” of the heroine, whose inexplicable death defers “hope to its vanishing point.”

“What if,” Ms. Bowers pointedly wonders with an eye to John 1:5, “the darkness should, after all, comprehend the light?” But the answer to this ostensibly rhetorical question for Richardson was simple: “it does not”—hence his ability to push the shattering possibility that it could to the “vanishing point.” In other words, Richardson read the Book of Job very differently than Ms. Bowers; where she sees “a godly subject” who is “tested and emerges triumphant,” Richardson recalled an innocent, furious man surrounded by “darkness” who nevertheless heeds the voice from the storm, however little (human) sense it makes.
Richardson the artist, Ms. Bowers usefully reminds us, frequently grapples with Richardson the moralist. Each is better for the contest.

DETERS, ANNA. “‘Glorious Perverseness’: Stoic Pride and Domestic Heroism in Richardson’s Novels,” *ECF*, 26 (Fall 2013), 67–92.

Equal parts probing, learned, and stylish, this essay tackles an old problem—Richardson’s simultaneously humble and proud protagonists—in novel and convincing fashion. Ms. Deters demonstrates that, like many in his age (including friend and translator of Epictetus, Elizabeth Carter), Richardson both embraced and resisted stoicism as an appropriate model of “heroic exemplarity.” Logically, a paragon of virtue cannot at once embody both stoic self-sufficiency and Christian kenosis—yet this is precisely the square Richardson attempts to circle in each of his works of fiction.

As Ms. Deters sees it, Richardson’s awareness of the intractability of this ethical (and artistic) conundrum becomes more acute with each novel, his response more sophisticated. Already in *Pamela*, the heroine’s self-satisfied protestations of humility suggest “Richardson’s own underlying suspicion that the self cannot be overcome.” By the time he arrives at *Grandison*, the author has come to accept, if reluctantly, that pride is “an inexpugnable component of human nature”—hence the genius of producing a character (Lady G.) to comment skeptically on those exemplary characters (Sir Charles, Harriet, and Clementina) who proceed as if “stoic pride and Christian virtue [are] two sides of the same coin.”

Ms. Deters’s essay won the *ECF* Graduate Essay Prize in 2012. It is easy to see why. A picky reviewer might note that “autogenetic” and “Mandevillian” are the sorts of words one ought to use sparingly and certainly not in proximity. But Ms. Deters’s writing is generally sharp and always humane, especially encouraging tendencies in a beginning scholar. I wish I had thought to describe Clarissa’s and Sir Charles’s expectations of pride in their own decency as “the briars that line their paths to righteousness” (note the ringing iambics). And if there is a more apt and concise description of Clarissa’s death than “that strange quasi-suicide,” I have yet to read it.

HEFFERNAN, JULIAN J. “Pamela’s Hands: Political Intangibility and the Production of Manners,” *Novel*, 46 (Spring 2013), 26–49.

“Keep your hands to yourself!” “Use your words!” Mr. Heffernan does not cite these clichés of modern parenting in his lucid and compelling study of the hand as the “central symbol” of *Pamela*. But they do capture the story he wants to tell, according to which “*Pamela* is a tale of cultural chiropraxis, a story of domestication in which the civilized girl teaches her barbarized master, through the gracious contact of her words and hands, to refrain from touch in favor of words.” Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny: when we teach manners (derived, as this article points out, from *L. manuarius*, “of the hand”) to our toddlers, we impart the same lesson that Pamela taught to Mr. B and hence that *Pamela* presented as a new norm of modern civility to the eighteenth century.

Though he denies the charge that he has been guided by “sheer etymological gusto,” Mr. Heffernan develops this argument through five handy categories: “maintenance, manufacture, command, manumission, and manners.” Each section contains both thorough close readings and intertextual engagement. “Maintenance”
names the economic and political relationship between master and servant, which Mr. B imagines in Hobbesian and Filmerian terms. “Manufacture” refers to Pamela’s embroidery and then to her writing, which is the only use to which her hands are put when she is removed from manual labor. “Command” indexes the power that Mr. B, Mrs. Jewkes, and Lady Danvers attempt to exert over Pamela after she falls into their hostile hands; when she civilizes them, she replicates the stadial progressive history imagined by Hume, Smith, and Ferguson. “Manumission” takes place when Mr. B elevates Pamela from household slave to wife—though he also “manipulates” her in a wedding ceremony that retains the understanding of marriage as transfer of property from father to son-in-law. And, of course, Pamela teaches Mr. B “manners.”


Mr. Holloway is a distinguished and prolific English composer who adapted Clarissa into an opera in 1976 (the work premiered at the English National Opera in 1990). His engaging yet learned reflection sets Clarissa in two senses: the first half, a wide-ranging overview of the plots and stories that have been adapted into operas, locates Mr. Holloway’s own adaptation in this broad context. The second, autobiographical, recounts Mr. Holloway’s composition process—the work was largely written on a mosquito-ridden Venetian island—and places the work in the context of his life and milieu in the 1970s.

The main argument of the first half is that operatic adaptations of full-length novels, in any language, are in fact rare. Most successful operas are instead based on folklore, classical myth, history, plays, and short stories or novellas. The second half argues that Clarissa nevertheless lends itself to adaptation, despite its great length, because of the mythic simplicity of its plot and the fact that its epistolary form means that readers and adapters have direct access to its characters’ language.

HOWARD, JEFFREY. “‘As If I Had Beheld a Ghost’: Ghost Belief in Richardson’s England,” ANQ, 27 (Summer 2014), 63–68.

Mr. Howard wishes to inform us that some of Richardson’s contemporaries believed in ghosts. Others did not. They argued about this, sometimes in print. And ghosts are mentioned in Clarissa.


The story of Richardson’s unauthorized interweaving of Elizabeth Carter’s “Ode to Wisdom” into the text of his second novel has been explored in several places, all of them duly referenced by Mr. McGeary. While his study may not change the broad outlines of that story, it admirably refines—and corrects—some important details.

Though many of the findings here are subtle and technical, they nevertheless intrigue. For example, through a careful collation of the text of the poem as published in different editions of Clarissa and in other venues (both authorized and otherwise), Mr. McGeary arrives at a fascinating discovery: “Richardson—for reasons not clear—never reproduced the text of the ‘Ode to Wisdom’ supposedly authorized by its author.”

But the most sustained and important point deals not with the text of Carter’s poem (which Clarissa notes is not her
own), but with the musical setting Richardson commissioned for it (and which, within the world of the novel, Clarissa herself composed). Where Barchas has linked this score to the “genteel songs of the Vauxhall pleasure-garden tradition,” Mr. McGeary demonstrates the various ways (including “using the oblong format for the engraved music sheet”) by which Richardson signaled to his audience that Clarissa’s effort amounts to “a serious musical composition.”

While he cannot quite bring himself to posit Handel as the actual composer, the seriousness with which he considers this possibility is telling (“I have canvassed all the major Anglo and American Handel scholars, and none detect[s] in the setting any hint of Handel’s style”). And thus we are left with yet another carefully constructed mark of Clarissa’s perfection—all, at nineteen years of age, she is the “musical equivalent to the gifted polymath Elizabeth Carter.”


The “rise of the novel” is an eighteenth-century commonplace. Ms. Michals proposes an ingenious corollary: novels such as Richardson’s *Pamela*, Burney’s *Evelina*, and Edgeworth’s *Belinda* depict “not merely the rise of the novel, but the fall of the theatre”—at least as far as ideals of womanhood are concerned. Novels present themselves and their heroines as natural, domestic, sincere, and authentic, while coding theatrical femininity as unnatural and false. Characters such as Mrs. Jewkes in *Pamela* and Madame Duval in *Evelina* are repulsive because their physique, affectations, and makeup recall the theatrical convention of the “stage dame,” a comic female part played by a man. In a particularly strong close reading, Ms. Michals shows that when Mr. B praises Pamela he describes her as a novelist, writing a “pretty novel” with him as the romantic lead. But when he accuses her of “mimick[ing] a fit” or “act[ing] a part,” he abuses her as an actress/prostitute.

Moreover, Richardson, Burney, and Edgeworth are hunting bigger game than the actresses and stage dames of the literal eighteenth-century theater. Their novels are an indictment of public performances of femininity tout court, condemning the “society lady” and celebrating instead the “domestic ideal.” For Edgeworth, in fact, not only women but also men belong in the private sphere of intimate home life. “Feminization is good for everyone,” as Ms. Michals wittily puts it—not least because, in contrast to the prodigality of public sumptuary display, it connotes probity and creditworthiness.

**Roxburgh, Natalie.** “Rethinking Gender and Virtue through Richardson’s Domestic Accounting,” *ECF*, 24 (Spring 2012), 403–429.

Among the landmarks of England’s seventeenth- and eighteenth-century financial revolution, few are more important than the foundation of the Bank of England in 1694: the Bank helped finance the anti-French wars of William and Anne through loans to the government, established a “monied interest” of rentiers among the English elite, and paved the way for the wide circulation of paper currency. All of this was possible, as Daniel Abramson and others have argued, because the Bank used publicly visible account books and an open architectural layout to demonstrate its credibility to the English public. The Bank’s most profitable product, in other words, was trust.

By means of homologies that will be fa-
miliar to readers of Mary Poovey (whom Ms. Roxburgh cites) and Deidre Lynch (whom she does not), this suggestive article argues that Pamela and Clarissa behave like tellers or bookkeepers in the Bank of England, accounting for their possessions and their time in order to demonstrate their trustworthiness to readers both inside and outside the text. Pamela’s three bundles of clothes and her point-by-point answer to Mr. B’s proposals allow her to escape indebtedness to her master and maintain a “zero balance,” while Clarissa demonstrates her virtue by accounting for her time—though she cannot account for the time during which she was raped. We also learn that “Richardson uses the word ‘account’ 83 times” in Pamela.


Critics have long debated the significance of Clarissa’s otherworldly orientation, but very few if any have paused to consider what exactly the otherworldly means in Richardson’s novel. Mr. Taylor precisely answers this question. He finds three definitions of heaven at work in Clarissa: the theocentric model of Aquinas, in which paradise exists as a state of pure inhuman stasis, a nascent and more modern conception of heaven as a social space of human fulfillment, and finally Augustine’s mediating idea of heaven as a realm of indifferent and hence noncommunal sociality. For Mr. Taylor, Clarissa is a fundamentally ambivalent novel, and rather than attempting to resolve this uncertainty, he affirms it as integral to “the type of truth-telling available only in works of human artistry.”

Mr. Taylor’s argument is important: Clarissa reflects both the continuing force of Christian orthodoxy in eighteenth-century Britain and the emergence of a new society centered on the friendships, feelings, and stories of individuals. Has Mr. Taylor gone far enough? In an era when a war on terror is fought in the name of a crypto-Christianity and a new Islamic State spreads through the Middle East, it seems insufficient to read Clarissa as a “snapshot” of the eighteenth century alone. By making the heavenly a problem for this world, Clarissa does more than mark a rising empire’s transition to modernity; she illuminates the secular fundamentalism that will come to be its ideological foundation.

Spencer Jackson A.R.C. Centre for the History of Emotions, University of Queensland


For more than 200 years, scholars have been examining and debating Richardson’s unique relationship (as author, printer, and inveterate reviser) to his literary productions. Mr. Wandless here provides a compendium of a few studies; he is fair to his several sources, but does not open new ground. For nonspecialists, such an essay may be valuable, but readers of this journal should move along.

ROCHESTER


Mr. Baker offers an alternative annota-
tion to a phrase from Tunbridge Wells that describes a puzzling gift from the Gallant to the Damsell: after dragging her to the “Pedlars Stall” and providing her with “foolish Toys,” the Gallant “then more smartly to Expound the Riddle / Of all his Prattle gives her a Scotch Fiddle.” Working from “fiddle” as slang for “to take liberties with a woman,” he suggests that “had earlier editors focused on Fiddle as a verb rather than Scotch Fiddle as a noun phrase, the nature of this early morning encounter would have become evident sooner.”

Like Shadwell’s Epsom Wells, Rochester’s poem satirizes the unbridled lechery and debauchery at Court and, an incident in 1662, in which James, Duke of York, was discovered, and interrupted, while providing manual stimulation to Elizabeth, Countess of Chesterfield, may be the inspiration of the lines. In this case a proper reading is “scotched fiddle,” or as Mr. Baker puts it, voluptas carnalis interrupta. Mr. Baker provides useful background in a playful way, as when he discusses plackets “without delving too deeply into . . . women’s costume[s].”

FISHER, NICHOLAS. “Rochester’s Original ‘Dear Mistress’?” N&Q, 59 (June 2012), 186–188.

Shortly before his death in 2007, Harold Love reported the presence of a previously unnoticed version of Rochester’s lyric in Latine Songs with their English, and Poems by Henry Bold (1685), which he argued was closer to the lost original than the one in Behn’s Miscellany. Being a Collection of Poems by Several Hands (1685). Mr. Fisher extends Love’s argument and implements Love’s suggestion that “a future editor . . . might well wish to reinstate” into Behn’s version some of Bold’s readings.

Mr. Fisher’s is a smoother lyric, but, unless further texts are discovered, we cannot be sure that the change introduced in l. 14 and the choices made elsewhere between the two versions have resulted in a poem closer to Rochester’s original.


This short, model note will be interesting to students of Rochester, deism, and intellectual history. Ms. Paul’s focus is a famous letter from deist Charles Blount to Rochester discussing the immortality of the soul. The letter has been used “to place Blount as an original thinker at the nexus of English deism and [eighteenth-century] continental philosophy.” Since the letter refers to the legend of the Three Imposters—“that Moses, Jesus, and Mohammad were impostors who fabricated evidence of divine appointment for political ends”—a further assumption has been that Blount had a manuscript of the Three Imposters (first published in 1719) “at his elbow” when he composed his letter in 1680. The key passage in Blount reads, “it is absolutely necessary to grant, either that the whole World is deceiv’d, or at least the great part of it; for supposing that there be but three Laws, viz. that of Moses, that of Christ, and that of Mahomet; either all are false, and so the whole World is deceiv’d; or only two of them, and so the greater part is deceived.”

Ms. Paul establishes that Blount “is quoting directly from a 1516 treatise by Pietro Pomponazzi . . . Tractatus de immortalitate animae.” In summary, “the letter can be neither evidence of Blount’s originality of argument nor of his access to a manuscript edition of De Tribus Impostoribus, because the words are not his own.” The letter, moreover, now seems not
a precursor of continental Enlightenment thought so much as a reflection of Renaissance argument.


The Thorncome edition of John Wilmot’s poems (1685), unlike the anonymous 1680 edition and Jacob Tonson’s 1691 collection, is relatively ignored by critics and editors. Messrs. Robertson and Libhart demonstrate that the Thorncome edition “castrates” Rochester by “omitting nine poems as being irredeemably innocuous” and rewriting “numerous indecent passages” to render them equally innocuous.

More interestingly, the authors, exploring the political circumstances behind the various editions, conclude that, while the 1691 edition finds Thomas Rhymer associating Rochester with the corrupt court of Charles II, the two earlier ones in fact present Rochester as a Whiggish writer. The 1680 edition does so as part of the polemics surrounding the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis; the 1685 edition tones this aspect down, without abandoning it, perhaps in response to the emergence of a third, middle alternative, defined by George Savile’s 1684 *Character of a Trimmer.*

Shadwell

Mora, María José. “Shadwell’s Prologue for *Anna Bullen* (1682),” *MP*, 109 (February 2012), 408–423.

The prologue and epilogue to John Banks’s *Virtue Betrayed; or Anna Bullen*, first performed in March 1682 (at the height of the Exclusion Crisis), claim that the play is innocent of all political reference—that it simply tells the story of a hapless woman betrayed by the scheming of Cardinal Wolsey and the tyranny of Henry VIII. An alternative prologue to the play by Thomas Shadwell (not used in the theater) suggests otherwise, however.

At first Shadwell’s prologue itself seems apolitical, telling merely of how times are hard for actors—though happily women still come to the theater to advertise their rich daughters to suitable husbands; the speaker hopes that the same women who recently paid to see “three Swedes” executed will also come to cry over the fate of Anne Boleyn.

Ms. Mora persuasively finds a timely Whig meaning in all this, arguing that the three foreigners in question were the notorious murderers of Thomas Thynne, prominent Whig, ally of the Duke of Monmouth, and recently married to the heiress Elizabeth Percy (at the instigation of her grasping grandmother and guardian, the Countess of Newcastle). It turned out that the murder was planned by a Count Königsmark, previously a suitor to Elizabeth Percy (who may herself have known of his plans); Königsmark’s three henchmen were tried and executed, but he himself was (to widespread surprise) acquitted.

Whigs saw Thynne’s murder as politically motivated; perhaps the plot had also been to assassinate Monmouth, who had alighted from Thynne’s carriage only moments before the murder. Equally, Whig propagandists scented connivance by the Court and various unnamed “papists” in Königsmark’s acquittal. In so clearly referring to the Thynne affair, Shadwell was inviting Banks’s audience to see a parallel between the corrupt courts and suspect religious allegiances of Henry VIII and Charles II; perhaps his prologue was not used because it was too politically dangerous.

Prieto Pablos, Juan A. “Women in Breeches and Modes of Masculinity in
Mr. Prieto Pablos directs attention to three Restoration comedies with prominent “breeches roles” for actresses. They emphasize the rise of female agency onstage, and they suggest that the presence of such assertive and attractive women served to unsettle and critique traditional male roles, particularly more rakish ones. Taken together, these changes both induced and reflected masculine anxiety about the growing malleability of gender roles.

In the anonymous comedy The Woman Turned Bully (1675), young Betty Goodfield rejects marriage to a country bumpkin and flees to London in male costume to find a better match; once there, she sustains her male role by imitating the manners of the city gallants she has read about in plays. Her exaggerated performance of this gallant-bully role satirizes theatrical stereotypes of masculinity even as it eventually steers her toward a more equitable marriage to the aptly named Truman. In Thomas Shadwell’s farcical The Woman Captain (1680), the female lead Mrs. Gripe assumes a military disguise in order to escape from an abusive husband; her ostensible rank as a captain allows her to confront and humiliate her husband and other disreputable men and to arrive at a suitable moral: “Ne’er dare be Tyrants o’er your Lawful Wives.” Mr. Prieto Pablos finds special interest in the fact that Mrs. Gripe does not seek marriage at the end of the play, but rather personal and financial independence. In Thomas Southerne’s Sir Anthony Love (1691), the female lead has a difficult double role as Lucia, who must immerse herself convincingly in the identity of a young rake, Sir Anthony, as she schemes to gain her own independence.

All three of these breeches roles clearly required and found talented actresses to bring them off, and in Mr. Prieto Pablos’s reading their success resonates beyond the individual comedies. He differentiates sharply between patriarchy and masculinity, pointing out that patriarchy is not endangered in these plays; after all, a female player is empowered by assuming the role of a gallant. Masculinity, however, is more at risk and therefore anxious. Rakes being rakish overplay their parts, while the quick-witted assertiveness of the breeches heroine and the softening of the gallant’s role in characters like Truman together gesture toward a reimagining of gender relations as something more mutual and companionable. Such was not the new way of the world, but at least momentarily, the option seemed available and dramatically appealing.

SMOLLETT


Ms. Bernard reminds us that Nice was part of Italy rather than France during the period of Smollett’s travels and that it is not actually in Provence, but neither fact alters Smollett’s perception of his stay there for several winters in an effort to recover his health. As all readers of Travels know, Smollett was at times an “ugly Brit” abroad (Smelfungus, to Sterne), a portrait of himself he solidified in Humphry Clinker, but with ironic humor; he sometimes laughs at his persona in Travels as well.

For Ms. Bernard, however, his voice is harshly nationalistic, “subordinated to a satirical intention which contributes to forging Great Britain’s image as a nation.” She notes his reverence for the antiquities of the area (had she read additional travel
books she would have known that providing classical sources of place names was standard practice and not indicative of Smollett’s unique interest) and their use to criticize modern architecture, the ornaments of “French foppery.” It is Smollett on the French indifference to cleanliness that seems to rankle Ms. Bernard most, perhaps because she misses the humor of Smollett’s comment that French dirtiness would “appear detestable even in the capital of North Britain.” That he attributes the poverty of the area to growing grapes rather than grain and drinking wine instead of ale is again seen as nationalistic, although in both instances Smollett is merely reflecting the agricultural and medical certainties of his era: strong ale was considered a nourishing beverage.

Ms. Bernard somewhat redeems her grim reading of Travels by noting Smollett’s praise of the landscape of Provence and, toward the end, his humane encounter with his coachman. Perhaps, like Bramble, Smollett’s Provence traveler learns something from the journey; perhaps, like Smollett, it was a lesson he knew all along.


There are actually two brief essays here, one successfully establishing the importance and popularity of Fénelon’s Les aventures de Télémèque (1699) in the eighteenth century, the other less successfully arguing that Smollett’s translation of it in 1767–1768 influenced Humphry Clinker.

Fénelon wrote his work as an educational manual for the Duc de Burgogne, Louis XIV’s grandson. Throughout, the hero is tutored in the duties of kingship by Mentor (Athena in disguise), visiting many different places but all, Ms. Chilton suggests, embodying lessons that virtue is doing one’s duty to those below and those above: in the perfect kingdom, the king “should seek the good of the people and devote himself entirely to their service—and this service is expressed largely by prohibiting, limiting, and regulating.” No wonder Louis XIV was displeased with the work—and especially when it also preached against “luxury and effeminacy.” Still, the idea that the entire thrust of Telemachus is to preserve “natural hierarchy,” the strict observance of social order, seems to ignore what others have read as a more subtle work. More to the point, Ms. Chilton never comments on the accuracy of Smollett’s translation—did he, for example, impose any of his own politics onto Fénelon’s work? Translation is never a literal enterprise, and it is difficult to see Smollett endorsing a notion of kingship that celebrates the “great chain of being,” including happy laborers in the fields. Nor did Fénelon for that matter.

Matt’s diatribes against luxury and the disorder and random mingling of society are read by Ms. Chilton as lessons of virtue taught by Fénelon, a reading that perhaps slights Matt’s need to be reeducated on his journey. His charity, which she sees as connected to the duty of a king, seems more closely aligned with eighteenth-century sensibility, the soft heart that assures us from the very early pages onward of Matt’s virtue despite his “brambly” nature.


“Plato equated health with the good and
disease with the debased”; moreover, “a homology between human and political bodies . . . has a rich and ancient history.” Mr. Duhaime ably refines these hoary analogies with his useful survey of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century idea that health is dependent on the proper circulation of fluids. As Marx noted, “Originally political economy was studied . . . with the greatest success, by medical men.” Mr. Duhaime explains why this was indeed the case. If money is the blood of the state, those who understood their curative role as regulating the flow of bodily fluids might naturally apply their insights to political and moral conditions as well.

It is well known that Smollett trained and practiced as a doctor, but less known, perhaps, that his primary model was Boerhaave’s notion that all treatment was a matter of controlling the body’s vital fluids, allowing neither excessive accumulation in one region nor dearth in another. Hence, “blisters, purges, emetics, and diuretics” to rid the body of excess and, most often, of course, “bloodletting.” Mr. Duhaime notes the many characters in Smollett’s novels who undergo one or another of these “cures” and those doctors who maltreat their patients with the same “cures”; Fathom is “blooded, vomited, purged and blistered” and brought to the brink of death. Whether all this opens a new way to read the novels is dubious. If, as Mr. Duhaime concludes this section, “in the end, health is to be found in the delicate balance between paucity and plethora, in the precious middle ground between inanition and excess,” we have to agree with him that the result of his study is “innocuous or merely pedantic.”

Thus he returns to the argument from which he digressed, the extent to which the human body becomes a metaphor for the political. Here again, it is proper circulation—of money (the “economic lifeblood” by which the state flourishes)—that must be brought about. In particular, if all the money flows from Scotland to London (as is suggested to be the case in Humphry Clinker), the “over-accumulation of vital fluids” in one place will lead to bad health in the body politic. One solution is the “‘bloodletting’ of war” to “drain . . . off this dangerous excess.” Too much war, however, can destroy the state; for Smollett, this is what happened when Britain got involved in Europe’s (Hanover’s) affairs. But again, after an interesting account of François Quesnay’s application of his hydraulic experiments to economic theory, we come no further than the need to ensure against excess on the one hand, dearth on the other. For some economists this suggests the need for unrestricted capitalism, for Smollett, the need to regulate the flow of market forces, usually conceived in his fiction as luxury items. We are thus back to the same “middle ground,” wherein physiology can support opposing economic theories, indicating what one hopes even Smollett understood, that analogy is still only analogous. We certainly need not share Mr. Duhaime’s horror at discovering that “while others of his age mobilized medical metaphors to justify the constant circulation of commodities within the commercial sphere, Smollett developed a medical model of the state with which he could advance a reactionary agenda.” Smollett and Elizabeth Warren as reactionaries: what an appealing idea.


Mr. Fung has provided a useful catalogue of illustrations for Smollett’s novels, reprinting thirteen of them in the body of his essay. Book illustration can be a significant source of information about the reception and publishing history of a
particular text and, more generally, about the history of book production and illustration. Whether it can also inform us about the meaning of the work being illustrated is perhaps the same question we ask about critical commentary, and the answer is the same: all commentary helps keep a title alive, but only some is meaningful.

Mr. Fung divides the illustrations into four categories: negative (satiric), comic, action, and sentiment. He admits that some examples will be “borderline cases,” and indeed many are, especially when the decision between negative and comic depends on whether a smile is “wry” or “cruel,” or whether the curvature of a back is sufficiently stooped or only partly so (Smollett does not help the artist here since the character is described as “stooped mortally” but also “tall, raw-boned, hard-favoured”). Many of the readings are similarly questionable, and while Mr. Fung’s primary point seems valid—that there is more sentiment and humor in Smollett than some critics have recognized—it is doubtful that the prints alone can sustain this insight.

Mr. Fung also runs into difficulty because he fails sufficiently to acknowledge the artists as individuals. He notes that Cruikshank’s illustrations in 1836 are full of grotesque caricatures, and so he must have considered Smollett “an author who delighted in misanthropic cruelty”; Rowlandson’s illustrations of Humphry Clinker (1793) are also mainly negative (satiric). That Cruikshank and Rowlandson had a particular style of illustration and a list of other books they illustrated is never brought to bear on the topic, although a comparative analysis seems called for.

Even more telling is chronology. The illustrations are called “contemporary,” but almost all were produced between 1780 and 1800. During this “sentimental era,” illustrators were probably told to highlight sentiment and downplay cruelty and satire. Publishers solicited these illustrations, not Smollett; their goal was more sales. Cruikshank’s reaction to sentimentalism is obvious throughout his canon, but it would be instructive here to have discussed illustrations of gothic novels to see how such works were being marketed—whether women in distress, for example, were more often pictured in a negative (sadistic) or sentimental (tearful) mode. Finally, in our own era, when Smollett is being replaced in the canon by Haywood and Burney, it would have been useful to discuss Scott’s role in Smollett’s nineteenth-century canonization: did Scott highlight the satiric or the sentimental in making his case for the genius of Smollett? In brief, Mr. Fung’s cataloguing efforts alert us to the ways illustrations of Smollett’s fictions may be put to use; he is well positioned to work further with them.


We learn very little that is not self-evident from Ms. Schmid’s essay on Joseph Andrews, Roderick Random, Launcelot Greaves, and Humphry Clinker. Inns were both good and bad. They were places where different levels of society interacted and for which Fielding and Smollett could both draw on Cervantes for inspiration. What is perhaps noteworthy is Ms. Schmid’s suggestion that Habermas missed the social nature of country inns in his “cult book of Enlightenment history.” Perhaps it will soon be time to rehabilitate
Habermas. There is also an interesting account, apropos of a description of Hogarth’s *The Stage Coach or Country Inn Yard*, of a London exhibit in 1762 of “around 110 inn, tavern and shop signs in what presumably was a sarcastic comment on the fashion of high art.” Ms. Schmid believes this exhibit reflects both a rejection of luxury (and French ways) and an endorsement of the “Englishness” of inns and taverns.

The discussion of the novels is mundane. Surely we do not need to be told that Fielding’s inns in *Joseph Andrews* are “settings for social order as well as disorder”—so are all the other places, indoors and outdoors, where the novel’s actions take place. Nor will most scholars be informed by the observation that in *Humphry Clinker*, “Smollett, himself Scottish, made Scotland one of his settings.” The discussion of *Greaves* seems to indicate that the work is about an “intricate love plot” and that without “the institution of the inn” Launcelot and Crabshaw would not be able to “pursue their Quixotic ideals, their code of honour, in the world, yet since different social groups meet, the knights in armour are not restricted to their own social class.” There is no recognition of the satire in the work. Given her inadequate discussion of all four novels, perhaps this essay is for social historians only.


This is the fourth wearying installment of Ms. Wainwright’s attributions in *N&Q*, all of which lack sufficient evidence. What perhaps separates these latest suggestions is a recognition of difference; hence, the attributions are made despite variety, reworked themes, and the avoidance of being simply repetitive. In fact, Smollett introduces “innovative stylistic features” and “verbal flexibility,” indeed, in one case, “a fairly radical transformation” and an “elaborate variation.” In short, although her evidence (the reappearance of words and phrases) is the same as before, she can now claim an attribution even when repetitions do not occur. Even more useful, having previously “established” an attribution, she can now use it to prove a new claim: thus error tends to compound itself.

It is possible that Smollett wrote some of the works Ms. Wainwright assiduously attributes to him. Just as possibly, he edited someone else’s writing or someone at the *Critical Review* was influenced by its most important writer. Until we learn more about the editorial process at the *Review*, all the attributions remain questionable because the stylistic evidence does not convince.

**Steele**


This curiously unconvincing essay claims at the start that Steele’s famous play has the political aim of fostering specifically Hanoverian and Whig interests but then presents for most of its length a familiar reading of *The Conscious Lovers* as a vehicle of sentimental moral reform. Mr. Wilson returns to his claims about its political content only in the essay’s final pages and even there confesses that such political aims come clear only in the play’s “paratextual material” (preface, prologue, and epilogue), not in the play itself. Those paratextual materials indeed refer to Joco-
bite rebels and George I’s generosity, but Mr. Wilson never quite manages to find anything in the play itself that, as he claims, militates against Stuart “absolutism” or in favor of the new Whig regime.

STERNE


Rather than arguing for a highly focused claim on the one hand or offering us “an exhaustive study” on the other, Ms. Bellman chooses to present us with “a series of suggestions,” all pirouetting around the imaginative and narrative potential of dance as a tool in Sterne’s fiction. Like writing or traveling, dancing allows our narrators to escape the finality of death. To move, Sterne seems to suggest, is to live—and so to stop is to succumb to one’s inevitable end. In effect, Ms. Bellman posits that dance is one important way in which Sterne reveals the “performative, interactive character” of his fiction to his reader, a reader who is then expected to “transform . . . into a listener and a viewer,” a reader and a writer. Sterne’s interest in dance—its rhythm, its movement, its stylized gesture—then becomes more than simply thematic.

Ms. Bellman concludes with the idea that Dance “stages” a kind of “metaphorical performance” in the text, “a collective dance” that focuses our attention toward what she terms the “process/content relation.” Introduced in the very last sentence of the essay, what this is exactly remains uncertain. The body of the essay reads more like a series of disconnected close readings than a sustained argument—to Ms. Bellman’s abrupt and vague, “provisional ending.”

Celia Barnes


That Sterne and Topham Beauclerk (1739–1780), the friend of Boswell and Johnson, were acquainted has long been suspected. Mr. Goring establishes the connection beyond any reasonable doubt, first by demonstrating how their paths and mutual acquaintances (especially Lord Ossory) crossed in both London and on the continent, and, second, by a careful inspection of London’s terrain, to demonstrate that when Sterne wrote in the winter of 1768 about having breakfast with “Mr. Beauclerc” he was arranging it alongside a meeting with Ossory and that, given Sterne’s fragile health at the time, the homes must have been very close together—as was indeed the case.

Mr. Goring adds that while the Beauclerk who subscribed to A Sentimental Journey was almost certainly Topham, it is less certain that he was the Beauclerk who subscribed to Sermons in 1766, since he was “known for infidel views.” It is nice to believe that only the devout would subscribe to Sterne’s sermons, but Voltaire subscribed in 1766, and Sterne clearly carried a subscription pad across Europe, where he secured Ossory’s subscription after meeting him in Paris in October 1765. Beauclerk arrived shortly after Sterne departed, but since Sterne’s practice was to ask those who subscribed to corral others, Ossory may well have done so, believers and nonbelievers alike.


Every collector of Sterne knows Sammer’s English-language editions because they almost always survive in excellent condition, demonstrating the care with
which they were manufactured. What will surprise these collectors is that Sammer printed his books in a “cheap, small format,” imitating Cooke’s famous series being printed in England at the same time; perhaps English readers were harder on books than German readers, but Cooke’s editions seem not to wear as well as Sammer’s.

Publishing in Vienna, Sammer issued nine volumes of Sterne’s works between 1795 and 1798, everything but the sermons, and including some forgeries as well, most notably The Posthumous Works of a Late Celebrated Genius (The Koran) (1770), now known to be by Richard Griffith, the continuation of A Sentimental Journey (1769), and numerous letters forged by William Combe, including supposed letters from Eliza to Sterne (1775, 1788). Put otherwise, two of the nine volumes were not Sterne’s work and the two volumes of letters must be read with great caution. It is clear that the appetite for Sterne in late eighteenth-century Europe was keen and what passed in Britain as the author’s work also passed on the continent, perhaps for a somewhat longer time. Indeed Sammer seems to have worked hard to assemble his edition from whatever he could find attributed to Sterne—and to Eliza—it being clear that while the black-frocked parson’s sermons tempted no one, the affair with Eliza was a different shade of gray.


Mr. Ingram’s analysis focuses on two moments of snuff-taking in Sterne’s novels: Yorick’s offer of his snuff box to Father Lorenzo in A Sentimental Journey and Mrs. Shandy’s “pinch of snuff” in response to Walter’s polyamorous speculations to Uncle Toby (Tristram Shandy, Vol. 8, chap. 33). The emphasis here is on the wider context in which these rather short mentions of snuff occur: while some of Sterne’s contemporaries celebrated the moral and social virtue of taking snuff in both pamphlet and poem, others warned of the medical and moral dangers of the powder, which might be “superficially attractive,” but actually signified the “self in the process of satisfying only self.” Mr. Ingram concludes that Sterne capitalizes on snuff’s “ambiguous role,” using it to comment on the self-interested underpinnings of the sentimental project more generally. Such ambiguity, he argues, serves as “the perfect expression” of snuff’s “double nature.”

Mr. Ingram himself confesses that he finds the powder “disgusting” and that trying it “once is quite enough!” (We are all too often afraid of appearing as though we have any personal stake in our research—when of course we all too often do have a personal stake.) I found it difficult, given such pronouncements, to see this essay as remarking on the ambiguity of snuff. Moreover, since Mr. Ingram’s sources are mostly historical, he fails to enter into conversation with others who have written about one or both of these scenes. Admittedly, the one in Tristram Shandy is relatively short and obscure, but the snuff-box scene in A Sentimental Journey has been frequently considered. I am still curious to know what his work contributes to that conversation.

Celia Barnes Lawrence University


By way of much plot summary, Mr. Ingram indicates that Tristram qualifies as a traditional, if “accidental” or unwilling, hero—like Don Juan or Hamlet. His name has Arthurian connotations (and his story
flirts with the unfulfillment of a Grail quest); he suffers under a family curse (Walter’s frustrations); he is an Everyman figure (in his wrestling with everyday frustrations). Ultimately, in Tristram’s “doing justice” to the complexity of human existence, “we can see Tristram’s struggles with language and literary form not as marks of perpetual failure to deliver, but as the very stuff of a successfully accomplished heroic enterprise.”

Christopher Fanning  Queen’s University


It is never too late to call attention to a fine essay. Death knocks on the door in Tristram Shandy (vol. 7), and Mr. Josipovici asks, as too few have done, “how can Death with a capital D coexist with the realism of the narrative, with Tristram’s wholly secular and novelistic tone?” It is the question he pursues throughout, noting, for example, the echo of Romans 5:12 (“probably the central passage in all scripture for Protestants, as the title of Bunyan’s spiritual autobiography attests”); the significance of the invocation of Joppa (the story of Jonah and his flight); and, finally, Tristram’s failure to visit Canterbury: “Tristram’s attitude to St Thomas is just the same as his attitude to St Paul and Jonah: he mentions or alludes to them, but only to reveal their lack of significance for him. . . . (P)ilgrimage has been replaced by tourism, praesentia by the gawping gaze.”

At best, the objects that have replaced relics (and, more important, the presence they represent) are asked to embody sentiment, but “sentiment is a weak, subjective thing. The notion of praesentia, like God’s call to Jonah, has a public, social dimension, but sentiment is only to be found in the recesses of our subjectivity.” Still, as Mr. Josipovici notes, Sterne plays with sentiment, but also half accepts it, especially when it involves sexuality: “like Swift before him, he is well aware . . . that we cannot get out of our bodies and will never be able to think well unless we do acknowledge that.” Because the final bodily fact is death, volume 7 ends with a “dance with death, a dance which accepts death, time and the body”—one might wish Tristram had danced with Nannette and her cursed slit, but Mr. Josipovici is very convincing in explaining why Sterne knew he could not.


Mr. Josipovici is literate, able to put the eighteenth-century author into convincing proximity with Rabelais and Cervantes as well as Beckett and Kafka—genius talking to genius; second, as we know from reading his prose over many years, Mr. Josipovici is a brilliant wordsmith, and his essay itself is a work of art, beginning with a thirteenth-century religious lyric and ending, as the title indicates, with Stevie Smith’s famous poem. In between, he generously quotes passages from Tristram Shandy that bolster his precise argument, neither twisting nor tormenting the text, but letting it speak for itself as evidence that his understanding of the work is profound.

For Mr. Josipovici, Tristram Shandy is an exploration of the predicament of modernity, which did not begin in the twentieth century, but rather in the sixteenth; hence he finds in Rabelais, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Burton, Swift in A Tale of a Tub, the same exploration, rewriting D. W. Jefferson’s tradition of “learned wit” into
a “tradition of learned anxiety.” Comparing Moses and the burning bush to Kafka’s Land Surveyor, one called to a vocation, the other uncalled, he argues that the “modern” artist, bereft of calling (authorization), must seek not only new subjects, but a new justification for art as well. The task takes the artist through the slough of despond to the brink of Yorick’s grave. The questions of “How to write? What to write?” in the absence of an authorizing Muse seem answerable only by accident and whim. Tristram notoriously embraces both with seeming abandon but, as Mr. Josipovici carefully observes, by raising questions of paternity, impotence, and death, Sterne foreshadows the modernist anxiety of Kafka, where birth and death are both without meaning, and the present is hopeless: “Of course Sterne is no Kafka . . . Sterne was a deeply rooted Yorkshireman, a clergyman of the Church of England, whose grandfather had been Archbishop of York . . .”

Perhaps, after all, Mr. Josipovici concludes, “not waving but drowning” is insufficient for Sterne because Shandy, although built on similar “dark foundations . . . is so wholesome. . . . Sterne’s story of Tristram’s accidents and misfortunes . . . remind[s] us that we are not independent beings, free to mould our own destinies, as a long tradition of Western philosophy since Descartes, and of fiction since Defoe, has suggested. On the contrary, we are, from first to last, dependent on others and grow into ourselves through our reciprocal relations to others.” And further, chance and accident are to be seen as what makes us human, that despite dreams of “purity and independence, we are creatures embodied and in this world.” If this sounds very much like Augustine, Aquinas, and company, perhaps T. S. Eliot said it best: “The end of all our exploring / Will be to arrive where we started / And know the place for the first time.”


Eighteenth-century travelers “negotiated their connections and differences” with various countries and cultures by means of “gendering and gendered behavior.” Sterne built on this by “fus[ing] together a surprising number of tour traditions,” Ms. Lamb contends, creating a new approach: a “(largely successful) attempt at chastity . . . in a tour narrative” through Yorick’s interaction with Maria in A Sentimental Journey.

The persuasiveness of the text’s connection to these tour traditions varies. Rome’s Weeping Dacia, a contemporary attraction for English tourists, is an inspiration for the prevalent visual imagery of Maria, representing a cultural touchstone, “an embodiment of the classical ethos”; while this likely affected the perception of the character, missing is the link to Sterne’s intent.

Sterne inverts the tradition of “contemporary sex tourism” with his trademark ambiguity, Ms. Lamb suggests, managing “his narrative so that the erotic content of the episodes involving women is simultaneously stressed and denied.” In contrast with an assumed “connection between tourism as practiced by men and ‘lewdness,’” Sterne’s text suggests an alternative approach toward interaction with foreign women, a “publicly acceptable erotic” that allowed some to read his text “innocently.” Sentimental Journey may have been Sterne’s “work of redemption,” but it is difficult to believe widespread ignorance of his many innuendoes, although
perhaps he did introduce subtlety to a blunt genre.

The Maria episode usefully is connected to the tradition of madhouse tourism, particularly since “excessive or misfired love” was “widely thought to induce madness.” Assessing Maria within the context of contemporary views toward mental illness, Ms. Lamb pursues a lengthy and problematic parallel with Shakespeare’s Ophelia; lost loves (and fathers) drive both women mad. The name Yorick hints, of course, at other Shakespearean undertones, here largely unexplored.

Other problems arise. Ms. Lamb notes flatly that “given contemporary ideas about the purposes of touring, Sterne could have reasonably expected that his readers would find Maria frivolous, and he wanted to signal his agreement with them” in *Tristram Shandy*. However, too many critics have read Maria as sympathetic for Ms. Lamb not to have engaged with them. She is also less than current with scholarly work being done on the illustrations of both Maria and *Sentimental Journey*, and inaccurate, unless her 1817 dating for the first painting of Maria is merely an inversion of 1781, the date of Wright’s depiction that she later mentions. Unsupported generalizations are also a problem. For example: “Before Sterne, Bedlam tour accounts rarely described madwomen.” How many accounts were considered, and what were their titles? Or, similarly, in the following chapter, regarding continuations of *A Sentimental Journey*, where “many” are posited, although only one title is cited.

After an early experience on a race track, my instructor told me, shaking his head, “You did well on the straights.” Ms. Lamb sharply observes and reconceptualizes Sterne’s scenes; her conclusions, however, are shaky.

**W. B. Gerard**

*Auburn University at Montgomery*

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**Mr. Large adds a few tidbits of conjecture for Sterne’s possible influence on some well-known composers, beginning with C. P. E. Bach, who developed a “sentimental style” that expressed “varying emotions through sudden, often turbulent contrasts of mood”; he was a friend of Johann Bode, Sterne’s major German translator, and Mr. Large posits this as a possible conduit for influence. Haydn and Sterne have been amply discussed by Howard Irving and Mark Evans Bond among others, and Mr. Large contents himself with quoting Bond’s conclusion that both distanced self-revelation by irony.

Beethoven also was possibly influenced by Sterne, as discussed by William Kinderman, who concedes there is no evidence that the composer read the writer, but nonetheless suggests that both “could revel in the unexpected, the incongruous, and the grotesque, and . . . exhibit a coyish, good-natured capacity for just getting lost.” The sentence applies specifically to the opening allegro of piano sonata no. 6, op.10 no. 2, but surely the description is vague enough to be applied to many of Beethoven’s works—or, for that matter, to Mozart’s.

Mendelssohn read *Sentimental Journey* on Goethe’s recommendation; Brahms also had a copy. And the Wagners began reading *Tristram Shandy* in 1869, probably, Mr. Large suggests, at Nietzsche’s instigation. They grew bored with it, however, and never finished; one wonders, in turn, how many hours of the Ring Cycle Sterne would have endured.


Any postmodern performance piece
worth its salt will have its share of *mises-en-abîme*, and it is good to hear of one that directly engages with Sterne’s narrative challenges, a “lecture-format solo performance” by William Kentridge, *I am not me, the horse is not mine* (2008). This performance piece derives from the artist’s work on a production of Shostakovich’s operatic setting of Gogol’s *The Nose*, itself inspired by Sterne’s “Slawkenburgius’s Tale.”

In the sections of this performance piece that draw on Sterne, Ms. Laudando asserts that the artist, focusing on uses of the nose, has found a kindred spirit of the absurd. This is unquestionably so, despite this article’s struggle to present the form and structure of the multimedia performance with clarity and the muddle of random information on offer, very little of which has any explanatory force. Shallow dips into Sterne scholarship (especially to the notes to the Florida Edition) offer information that has no clear connection to the ostensible subject, Kentridge, and very little connection to other parts of the article. For example, it is clear that Sterne knew about the harlequin tradition; it is also known that Kentridge studied mime and drama. There is no evidence presented that Kentridge is at all interested in, or aware of, this coincidence. Kentridge’s own writings, especially the print publication of the piece in question (in *October* 134, 2010), would be much more fruitfully consulted than the present article.

Christopher Fanning  
Queen’s University


Every Sterne scholar is familiar with Hume’s assertion that *Tristram Shandy* is “the best book that has been writ by any Englishman these thirty years.” For some, it has been the springboard for claiming philosophical or psychological affinity between them, but Mr. Maioli splendidly unravels these claims by reading the “praise” with greater care and context than previously, concluding that Hume had “a much lower opinion of *Tristram Shandy* than these critics have assumed.” He notes first that Sterneans tend to ignore the conclusion to Hume’s statement, namely, “... bad as it is.” He then concentrates on “Englishman,” bringing to bear Hume’s consistently negative context. For example, in January 1773, two weeks before the comment on Sterne, Hume had opined, after grudging praise for Addison and Pope, that he was “sorry to see, that the great Decline, if we ought not rather say, the total Extinction of Literature in England... threatens a new and sudden Inroad of Ignorance, Superstition and Barbarism.” This establishes context for the introductory sentence to his comment on Sterne, which occurs in a letter suggesting to William Strahan possible authors to continue his *History of England*; Hume names several Scots, but “as to any Englishman, that Nation is so sunk in Stupidity and Barbarism and Faction that you may as well think of Lapland for an Author. The best book, etc.”

Hume had a low opinion of Swift’s prose: his style “has no harmony, no eloquence, no ornament, and not much correctness, whatever the English may imagine. Were not their literature still in a somewhat barbarous state, that author’s place would not be so high among their classics.” Clearly something in the writing of both authors bothered Hume, perhaps revealed by what he said to Boswell about Sterne in 1762: “With all his drollery there is a sameness of extravagance which tires us. We have just a succession of Surprise, surprise, surprise.” With superb balance, Mr. Maioli concludes that while it remains possible for Hume to have influenced
Sterne, that argument cannot be founded on Hume’s admiration of *Tristram Shandy*; “best Book” was, for Hume, damning the “Englishman” with faint praise.


Sterne’s work features an “inherently ambiguous treatment of sentimentalism” reflected in Richard Newton’s “double series” of illustrations, which, like the text, “refuse to follow a coherent pattern or promote one particular reading”; Ms. Newbould perceptively describes these useful doublings. Brief, cogent discussions on sentimental culture and depictions of Sterne’s work establish backgrounds for the series, published in 1795 and revised in 1797. Central are paired images of “Maria Entering Moulins,” “The Wig,” and “Le Fleur and the Dead Ass,” representing “naturalistic,” “caricatured,” or “merged” styles, the last a response to a text that “cannot be definitively read as either sentimental or humorous.” Ms. Newbould clearly and carefully connects Newton’s enhanced caricature with flagging popular interest in sentimentalism.

While the identification of sentimentalism with a naturalistic mode seems risky, Ms. Newbould offers solid analyses of an overlooked illustrator of Sterne’s work, and her discovery of links between Smollett’s and Sterne’s descriptions of deformity is a pleasant lagniappe.

W. B. Gerard  
*Auburn University at Montgomery*


Attending to the earliest generation of annotated editions of *A Sentimental Journey*, both English and French, that began appearing at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Ms. Newbould is interested particularly in those moments when editors become critics—and when the annotations “become creative interactions” with Sterne’s novel that “shaped its early reception.” With their translation glossaries, prefatory biographies, and editorial commentary, these early annotated editions modeled both ways of reading the text and ways of appreciating Sterne as a now-canonical author and man of “genius” of the last century.

In her survey of these early editions, Ms. Newbould circles back repeatedly to particular concerns: nation and nationalism, translation and its limits, cultural literacy and travel, and familiarity and novelty were some of the “fresh lines of thought” that she addresses for many of these editions. Her essay is, by choice one assumes, an annotated bibliography rather than a traditional literary-critical argument; it goes from edition to edition, sketching out and remarking on each one’s particularities. While each volume gets long overdue reverence, it is easy for the inattentive reader to become lost in the details.

*Celia Barnes*  
*Lawrence University*

Oakley, Warren. “Physical Encounters as a Point of Contact between Sterne’s *Journey* and De Quincey’s *Confessions*,” Romanticism, 18 (July 2012), 182–190.

That Sterne’s *Sentimental Journey* could have influenced *Confessions of an English Opium-Eater* (1821) might seem a pipe dream, but Mr. Oakley persuasively argues that the earlier work shaped De Quincey’s search for human contact under the influence of opium. Wary of suggesting any direct borrowing, he argues instead a possible childhood influence, a remem-
bered reading that shapes De Quincey’s adult experience; the caution seems unnecessary, given that Journey could easily be reread in two or three hours by anyone who was drawn to think about the work when writing his own “journey.” Still, the idea of putting texts into proximity with one another rather than searching for parallel passages is certainly worthy, and Mr. Oakley’s lightness of touch serves him well.

As with Yorick, De Quincey’s rambles are designed to encounter people, not for enhancing one’s permanent list of “friends” (alas, the plague of social media), but to seek, find, and move on. The essence of this encounter for Yorick, as has often been noted, is touch, a physicality that has been interpreted, in one direction, as blatant and hypocritical sexual appetite, and in another, as a desire to connect with the Other by the simple gesture of extending the ironic hand. Christopher Nagle has argued the first position, and Mr. Oakley takes issue with him to the extent of allowing for Sterne’s “waggish combination of the sentimental and the sexual”; if one can never take Sterne’s sentimentalism at face value because of the sexual, it seems equally true that his so-called promiscuity is always conditioned by feelings of charity, sympathy, and humor; laughter and eroticism, as has often been noted, make uneasy bedfellows.

Sterne’s notion of human connectedness is paralleled by a similar notion in De Quincey, perhaps the result of opium, which both encourages and discourages social intercourse. At times both, looking at a scene they are afraid to disturb with their uninvited presence or, more suspect, their self-centered insularity, they become spectators rather than participants. Mr. Oakley’s illustrations also demonstrate that these are “complementary texts.”


Mr. Ogée is interested in nonverbal communication, in those small gestures and moments in Sterne’s work that “say” big things. Specifically, he argues that the eroticism of A Sentimental Journey serves as a tool that allows Sterne to go beyond language and linguistic communication. In the erotic “vibration” of feeling beings represented on the page, we as readers are encouraged also “to vibrate and imagine,” not a thing or succession of things, but a transmission that is beyond or after language.

Elucidating Virginia Woolf’s claim that A Sentimental Journey transports us to a “world in which anything may happen,” Mr. Ogée deduces that Sterne’s narrative—with its interruptions, fragments, and digressions—is “composed as the flowing juxtaposition of contrasted and contiguous pieces.” Sterne artfully attempts to mimic the jerkiness and unpredictability of a psyche afloat on the waters of time, creating a text that appears spontaneous, even artless. And yet this is not so much a narrative of stops and starts, but rather a fluid gliding, a narrative technique Mr. Ogée describes as something approaching the slow fade in and out we see in film.

For him, then, our narrator’s being in the world mimics the intimate reading experience we are supposed to be enjoying: just as Yorick serves as “the translator, the mediator of the vibrations of the world,” the book itself models a kind of “outside-inside movement,” an immersive reading that “teases” the reader both sentimentally and erotically. In other words, just as Yorick and the fille de chambre achieve a synchronicity but do not consummate their erotic desires, so do we have to resist our “narrative urge . . . to reach consumma-
tion.” Sexual (or narrative) tension, and not its resolution, is what counts for Sterne, and so we are invited to vibrate, in harmony with his characters, in perpetuity. In his conclusion, Mr. Ogée connects this narrative and sentimental suspension with “the whirl of modern history,” including burgeoning capitalism and its emphasis on economic exchange, but this move outside the text, coming in the essay’s last paragraph, feels abrupt—hardly as persuasive as his careful, close readings.

Celia Barnes  Lawrence University


If one mind-numbingly accepts Uncle Toby as suffering from PTSD, this essay is coherent, even if it does not convince. Ms. Sagal’s argument is hermetically sealed, closing down not only Sterne’s text, but more generally literature’s complexity. One can certainly read Moby Dick as a study of Ahab’s PTSD—but at what cost to Melville’s enormous canvas? Medical or psychological diagnoses cannot “solve” literature’s problems.

That said, one result of battlefield trauma is the loss of language to express it; pain is “unrelatable [sic], linguistically and empathetically.” On the one hand, this mirrors Sterne’s belief that language fails fully to comprehend the world; on the other, Toby’s special status makes this inability part of his larger disability, a “crisis of insufficiency” and beyond “the comic” because his recovery depends on his being able to “speak” his injury. The bowling green allows Toby to fill the void of language with objects. Ms. Sagal bends Sterne’s text by attributing Toby’s shyness to the location of his traumatic wound, ignoring Sterne’s specific indication that the widow Wadman’s concupiscence (as finally explained to him by Trim in vol. 9) is the cause. Moreover, she repeats the widow’s error in suggesting that the trauma is based on locating “the spot” where the stone fell on him; she too believes the “geographical details are, strictly speaking, unnecessary,” although for Toby “ichnography” is what the bowling green is all about.

Setting these problems aside, there is little question that Toby is frustrated in his attempt fully to articulate the occasion of his being wounded, but this seems not quite the inarticulateness of trauma; rather, Sterne offers us the comedy of professional jargon, an age-old source of humor as witnessed by the New York Times’s annual report of MLA meetings. Toby and the reader alike are unable to master the difference between a half-moon and a ravelin not because they are wounded but because it seems a distinction without a difference to all but the initiated. The objectifications of maps and the bowling green help Toby describe the situation (not to himself, it might be noted, but to visitors who kindly drop by to hear his war stories—as Henry V knew would be the case). However, he soon moves on to other battles, so the notion that the bowling green is specific to his wound is not quite true.

Ms. Sagal is correct in refusing to read Toby as a soft and sentimental object of affection, or, far worse, an effeminate fool. However, he has not been read in that simplistic light since the nineteenth century, and while many still emphasize his good sense and sensibility (particularly in contrast to Walter), many now recognize as well the paradox at the heart of his love of warfare (see his “Apologetical Oration”).
It is bothersome that Ms. Sagal fails to acknowledge this aspect of Sterne’s portrait. The essay would have profited from an additional proofreading; one also wishes that Bucknell University Press would adopt the recommendation of most style manuals for internal citation; this essay has 108 backnotes, at least half of which should be citations within the text. And is there a reason for consistently spelling Toby’s amours as amors?


Italo Calvino joins the very long list of modernist and postmodernist fiction writers influenced by Sterne. That the author of If on a winter’s night a traveller (1979) found inspiration in the digressiveness of Tristram Shandy need hardly be pointed out, but what is particularly captivating in this essay are Calvino’s opinions about Sterne. For example, he admires “writers [like Sterne] who succeed in being purely ironic, or purely parodistic”; in doing so “they demonstrate a sort of philosophical consistency. Perhaps even a state of total despair, an unlimited availability to nihilism which amounts to a philosophical earnestness.” Unlike most modern admirers of Sterne, Calvino even read A Political Romance, and opined that it was a forerunner of Shandy, the “first example of literary invention which led him to construct his texts like jack-in-the boxes or traps, or spider’s webs hanging in a void.” And a third pertinent observation: “Here in Italy they all say that the French tradition of the conte philosophique had a great influence on me, but they always forget Swift and Sterne.”

Calvino’s growing interest in digression both in his fiction and his essays culminates in his best-known work, If on a winter’s night, a work that Ms. Santovetti argues uncovers three features of Sternean digressiveness: it prolongs “the preliminaries to maintain the potentialities of the beginning”; it parallels in its text “the discontinuity and multifariousness of life”; and, finally, it offers, real or imagined, a collaborative effort with the reader. As Calvino put it, including Diderot’s Shandean effort in the mix, Shandy and Jacques le fataliste are the first novels that “let the reader see himself while he reads the novel.” One suspects Calvino—or Ms. Santovetti—might have included Cervantes, Swift, and Fielding as well, but that would have entailed another digression.


For Mr. Uchida, the semiprivate writing of Sterne’s last flirtation with Elizabeth Draper, his Continuation of the Bramine’s Journal (also known as The Journal to Eliza), is a record of Sterne’s autistic sentimentality. Sterne’s unvarnished confession of love to Eliza is an unrequited, fictionalized private letter. Sterne’s flirtation was consistent with his desire to write a literary work that would transform Eliza into a delusion. Transfigured, Eliza becomes a “little picture” in A Sentimental Journey.

What matters for Sterne is not Eliza’s being always by his side, but her becoming the miniature itself. Thus, Eliza becomes a mechanical doll manipulated at Sterne’s will. In this perverted style of love, Sterne’s sexuality is substituted for a more “refined and elevated” writing of “nice sensibility” (Letter 189). But the sphere of this sensibility is narrow and limited to “the man of feeling” readers. In Sterne’s
island universe, others are excluded, and Sterne stays infatuated with the illusory Eliza. Mr. Uchida, following Michel de Certeau, foretells the fatality of living in a “bachelor machines” universe.

Takeshi Sakamoto  Kansai University


Mr. Walsh approaches once again the topic of Sterne and satiric encyclopedism, summarizing the usual suspects: Rabelais (especially), Burton, and Swift. Although he claims “new and significant parallels,” this is not so much a source study as an examination of the encyclopedic ethos. In treating Sterne’s examples of failed attempts at systematizing knowledge, Mr. Walsh takes us to such Shandean texts as Ernulphus’s anathema, Slawkenbergius’s Tale(s), and Homenas’s Kerukopaedia.

The strongest insight about these compendia is that Walter Shandy treats them as scripture, very much as Rabelais’s Homenas treats the Decretals on the island of Papiamny: they promise both completeness and inexhaustibility. This is, of course, juxtaposed to Sterne’s own preference for incompletion, and the triumph of Rabelaisian experiential particulars over abstract systematizing.

Christopher Fanning  Queen’s University


Ms. Zimpfer continues her exploration of Sterne’s “Fragment Inédit” begun in Shandean 23 (2012), where she concentrated on the language of the “Fragment.” Now she turns to Paul Stapfer, the French academic who first published it in his 1870 doctoral dissertation on Sterne. There he told the story of having been shown a manuscript, definitely in Sterne’s hand, in 1868 while teaching in Guernsey and writing his dissertation; he copied and returned it, after which it was—and remains—lost. As the editors of the Miscellanies volume (Works of Sterne, vol. 9) note concerning their reluctant inclusion of the “Fragment Inédit,” they could not disprove Stapfer’s suspect account. Ms. Zimpfer’s exploration of Stapfer does not increase one’s confidence.

Most important, she uncovers an alternative version of the manuscript’s discovery in Stapfer’s Victor Hugo in Guernsey (1905), where the date of access is 1866 not 1868, and where it is received from a different source, not the principal of Elizabeth College, but the bailiff of Guernsey; both were recognized with separate dedication pages in the thesis, but only the dedication to the latter remains in several subsequent printings. Needless to say it is a small lapse of memory after thirty-five years, but consistency would have bolstered his story, whereas the two versions cast an unwelcome shadow.

Ms. Zimpfer momentarily loses her thread by considering Percy Fitzgerald’s inclusion of the “Fragment” in later editions of his 1864 biography of Sterne as somehow relevant to the question of authenticity, but Fitzgerald seems only to have bought into Stapfer’s account; there is no evidence that he ever saw the manuscript himself. Quite possibly the bailiff or principal did pass on to Stapfer a manuscript given to them by a “Yorkshire lady,” but it was only Stapfer, as a Sterne “expert,” who authenticated it before the manuscript disappeared.

Ms. Zimpfer returns to her target by piecing together Stapfer’s career from his correspondence and other writings. He was
a nineteenth-century literary scholar with “fierce ambition and the desire to ingratiate himself with the literati of the day,” and a “desire for recognition.” It seems to be the portrait of a man quite capable of passing off a forgery (if not creating it himself). On the other hand, his scholarly persona is all too familiar in the twenty-first century as well, and so the question remains: if we could establish our career by authenticating a manuscript that we could conveniently afterward misplace forever, would we do so? If we answer with a resounding NO, perhaps we have not read Sterne carefully enough, because he well understood that annoying itch to publish, “not to be fed, but to be famous.”

SWIFT

CALLANDER, JULIA K. “Cannibalism and Communion in Swift’s ‘Receipt to Restore Stella’s Youth,’” SEL, 54 (Summer 2014), 585–604.

“A Receipt to Restore Stella’s Youth” begins with a playful extended comparison between Stella and a cow. “Why, Stella, should you knit your brow, / If I compare you to the cow?” Just as a lean cow renews her vitality in green seasons, so Stella may renew youth, or at least, good health, by summering in the country. Ms. Callander notes that Swift’s joking often enables his seriousness and argues that this deliberately silly comparison serves as a vehicle to broach troubling issues. One is, of course, genuine worry over Stella’s failing health (she died within two years), but there is also concern over the continuity of personal identity—on which selfhood and friendship depend—along with a hope to achieve some level of communion, both interpersonal and Eucharistic. The poem ends with another jest, an invitation to Stella to share a hearty dinner of beef and claret, at once a parodic version of Christian communion and a sadly ironical ending for a revitalized cow.

Ms. Callander analyzes Swift’s witty and quite seamless mixing of genres—occasional poem, lyric, georgic—to fill out this “receipt.” She also draws attention to the poet’s quiet borrowing and recycling of phrases and strategies of presentation from honored predecessors—Jonson, Donne, Dryden—who give the serious a comic turn. Then there is Stella: feminist critics have in the past enumerated ways in which Swift imposed ideas, tastes, and a literary identity on her, but in this case, at least, the poem respectfully imagines a happy recuperation as it moves toward a warm mutuality.

Ms. Callander argues finally that Swift’s “Receipt” takes seriously its own central question: “For what was ever understood / By human kind, but flesh and blood?”—or, to put it another way, is human identity lodged only in the continually changing and perishable material body? What, then, of the spirit? Ms. Callander’s answer is that Swift and this poem in particular belong in a long tradition of “unknowingness”: humans can only know the material world, and aspects of human existence outside material being can be felt, but never fully understood.


Mr. Carpenter notes correctly that eco-poetry explores relationships between humans and their natural (or sometimes built) environment, and he uses that general idea
to bring together a miscellaneous overview of that verse in the 1720s and ’30s. Poems featured in his discussion include Laetitia Pilkington’s witty “Petition of the BIRDS” (1725), Matthew Pilkington’s perverse and disturbing “The Bee” (1731) (describing the dismemberment of a bee that annoyed him), and a country estate poem (1741) by clergyman and minor poet Wetenhall Wilkes. Although Mr. Carpenter sketches in environmental implications of each poem, he is more interested in their biographical circumstances.

The value of this article to Swiftians is its extended discussion of Swift’s unusual poem in Latin hexameters, “Carberiae Rupes” (1723; 1735), most often read in an English translation by William Dunkin, “Carbery Rocks in the County of Cork, Ireland.” The poem evokes the power and grandeur of a stormy seascape, inviting the reader to share the poet’s evident melancholy and “a sense of horror at the sublime.” For Mr. Carpenter, this effort is an artful combination of a chaotic subject matter with a carefully controlled verse structure, and, in its Latinity, Swift’s bid to please a European audience beyond Ireland with a piece of serious poetry.


“The problem with the Discourse lies in the fact that it prevents the reader from sympathizing with the speaker,” Mr. Freiburg observes. Swift’s manic narrator is too “cantankerous” and “arrogant” to function as “a normative character.” In fact, he falls into his own form of enthusiasm, or, as Mr. Freiburg puts it, the mad narrator is “hoisted [sic] with his own petard” but not before he excoriates enthusiasts everywhere. The haughty rationalist, the fervent hedonist, the myopic atheist—they all find themselves in a ditch next to the self-assured religious fanatic, who punctuates his faith with ogling and sniffing, not the fear and trembling advised by Paul and, implicitly, by Swift. The Discourse leaves us to wonder finally if the proverbial ditch can be avoided. Maybe not. We all get caught in our own spells at one time or another. When this happens, perhaps we do well to remember that original sin, as G. K. Chesterton once quipped, is the only provable part of Christian doctrine.

The title of Mr. Freiburg’s excellent essay, “But the Root is in the Earth,” is taken from the Discourse’s conclusion and functions as a counterstatement to the Gnostic’s dream of immateriality. It also echoes Christ’s parable of the sower but with a decidedly libidinous twist. Indeed, Mr. Freiburg usefully explains much of the Discourse’s dirty sense, down to the etymology of “mechanical.” Its Latin root—moechus—means “adulterer” and finds expression also in the neologism moechocinaedus, a man abandoned to lewd behavior. Of course, we are hard-pressed to discover a writer more meticulously (and biblically) bawdy than Swift, unless we go to Sterne, who famously claimed not to have gone as far as Swift. This is a disputable point. But to the question at hand: where did Swift go the farthest? Mr. Freiburg makes a good case for the Discourse.

Ryan J. Stark Corban University


Mr. Gadd calls our attention to “the
only documentary evidence to date supporting the attribution to Swift of *A Discourse on Hereditary Right,* namely, its listing without qualification in an advertisement for an edition of Swift’s works in the November 12, 1763, issue of *Jackson’s Oxford Journal.* This edition was never published, and the next edition of Swift’s works in 1765 omitted the *Discourse.* It was published finally and alone, “probably in 1775” and “by a celebrated clergyman,” so the case for the attribution made on stylistic grounds in 1985 by Daniel Eilon is greatly fortified.


Although Swift often distanced himself from his own writings for strategic reasons, at the same time he maintained close and sometimes cordial working relationships with his publishers. Mr. Gadd examines in particular his reliance on bookseller Benjamin Tooke Jr. between 1701 and 1710 and printer John Barber, who took over publishing responsibilities after Swift was recruited by Harley to write for the Tory ministry. Between them these men handled nearly all that Swift published from 1701 to 1714, when the Tories fell from power.

Mr. Gadd explains that survival in the publishing business in this period required continual adjustment: the market for print was growing, presses were multiplying, and regulation by the government and the Stationers’ Company was generally on the wane. At the same time publishers could be called to account more easily than individual authors, particularly those who wrote anonymously as Swift and many others did. For this reason publishers had to be especially mindful of such traditional constraints as the laws against blasphemy, obscenity, libel, and sedition, while adjusting to new constraints imposed by changing taxation policies, new copyright laws, the awarding (or not) of government printing contracts, partisan political bickering, and increased competition. As a satirist and polemicist, Swift could mostly ignore a changing market; publishers dared not.


This is a comprehensive attempt to deal with Swift’s scatology. Mr. Gurr agrees with critics who see no misogynistic predisposition on Swift’s part. However, the Dean’s highly personal dislike of the female body, physical misogyny if you wish, cannot be argued away; even in poems like *Strephon and Chloe* and *Cassinus and Peter,* cited as counterexamples, the main thrust is clearly directed against the female sex. Because the deplorable state of public hygiene is exposed to Swift’s unvarnished observation of contemporary reality at the end of *A Description of a City Shower,* Mr. Gurr attributes a political slant to this good-natured and playful poem, reinforcing his reading by pointing to the Cloacina passage from Gay’s *Trivia* as supposedly voicing serious criticism of society or political censure. The reading of both poems is unconvincing.

Mr. Gurr’s valiant undertaking to establish Swift’s preoccupation with scatology as a counterblast to facile Enlightenment optimism lacks conviction. In particular, Mr. Gurr’s most ambitious effort, namely
to embed scatological writing in a social and intellectual ambience and in this way to account for its comparative frequency in the eighteenth century, is weak. By reducing Swift’s urban poetry, his scatological poems, *Gulliver’s Travels*, Gay’s *Trivia*, Pope’s *Dunciad*, and even Sterne’s *A Sentimental Journey*—which all belong to quite distinctive contexts—to a common temporal denominator, Mr. Gurr decontextualizes rather than contextualizes the literary material.

*Heinz-Joachim Müllenbrock  University of Göttingen*


How women once read Swift, how women should read Swift, and whether they should read Swift at all—such questions still vex. Advised by Fordyce to confine their days and nights to the *Spectator*, bluestockings disobeyed and opened their Swifts, eagerly, fondly, or cautiously. Burney knew the scatological poems. Montagu—no fan of *Evelina*—predictably preferred Arbuthnot to Swift in her weighty Johnsonian way. Talbot’s enthusiasm for the *Journal to Stella* vindicates Carter’s affection; Carter hands off Swift’s “strange improprieties” to “physical infirmity, which at last ended in complete imbecility of mind.” Echoing the “Satirical Elegy,” Chapone picks up a simile “out of the dirt, that is, out of Swift.” Chapone’s is a cautionary tale: the volatile liberating spirits in Swift’s satires evaporate, and the lady licks up the sour dregs of repressive advice.

Swift’s *Letter to a Young Lady on her Marriage* (1723) gave deep offense to its recipient for advising her to cultivate her mind, pay less attention to clothes and more to cleanliness, enjoy her learning in private, and earn a place by her conversation, so that the lady’s enforced departure at the end of dinner will be felt as a loss. Why Swift should make such good advice sound so offensive is laid to a badgering-mentor persona he often put on, especially with young women. Self-consciously rewriting Swift in her *Letter to a New-Married Lady* (1777), Chapone marks the radical transformation in women’s status and education in the fifty years that separate her from Swift even as she reveals the absence of any new ideology to accommodate those changes. Before the French revolution enabled Wollstonecraft’s bricolage, it is easy to overlook, as I once did, the seismic shift that had already occurred when women’s literacy enabled them to give the same repressive advice they had long received from men. Chapone’s letter may be “the more depressing read of the two,” but it participates in that dialectic of sexualities engendering the “Angel in the House” and feminist resistance.

*Regina Janes  Skidmore College*


This tantalizing essay looks in two directions: to what Swift knew about Japan for *Gulliver’s* third voyage and how Japan has responded to Swift, creatively and critically. Sōseki Natsume, whose *I Am A Cat* every Scriblerian should cherish, inspired the first complete translation of the *Travels* in 1927, but *Gulliver’s* history is complex.
Before Gulliver landed in 1709, William Adams, an English navigator adrift with a Dutch crew in 1600, advised the first Shōgun on building western ships. The East India Company’s John Saris procured in 1613, with Adams’s help and a letter from James I, a license to trade. Swift owned Richard Hakluyt’s Principal Navigations and Purchas’s Pilgrimes (1625), in which Saris and Adams appear. By 1726, when Gulliver published his trip overland from Edo to Nagasaki, the Tokugawa shogunate had confined Japan’s trade since 1639 to China, Korea, and the Dutch. Giving Gulliver access to a country closed for almost a century, Swift teases his travels-loving readers. About the one real place they hunger for information, he provides none. Swift was just in time: the next year, Engelbert Kaempfer would spoil the joke in The History of Japan (1727).

Whether eighteenth-century Japan knew Gulliver remains mysterious. Gennai Hiraga’s Surprising Life and Adventures of Shikoden, A Man of Taste appeared in 1763, followed by Yukokushi’s Surprising Life and Adventures of Wasobyoe in 1774, and Bakin Takizawa’s Tales of the Life and Adventures of Musobyoe in 1810. Hiraga’s professional storyteller visits countries of giants, midgets, long-footed people, and prostitutes; Wasobyoe tells of a land of giants and perpetual youth. Takizawa’s lands of lechers and gluttons suggest Buddhist hells, already satirized in Hiraga’s Rootless Weeds. Were these writers responding to Swift via some unattested Dutch translation, or were they reworking such fifteenth-century Japanese tales as Onzōshi shimawatari (Yoshitsune’s Island Hopping), in which Yoshitsune visits lands of midgets, naked people, tall people, man-horse people, and cannibal women? Perhaps Swift had his story “from the Dutch traders themselves, while he was secretary to Sir William Temple,” a suggestion first made in 1923. When Gulliver advises asking the Japanese about the Struldbruggs, is he gesturing toward Daoist immortals? There are still no certainties here.

Natsume’s Commentary on Literature (1909, including essays on Addison and Steele, Pope, Defoe, and Swift) observed that the better the satire, the less pleasure we take in retelling episodes. Tamiki Hara adapted the Travels shortly before his suicide in 1951 and left behind “Gulliver’s Song.” In desperate, hopeless flight under the murderous clouds of atomic bombs, Gulliver can only neigh and swoon.

Regina Janes Skidmore College


The lapse of the Licensing Act in 1695, ostensibly a step toward greater press freedom, in fact made way for a new and more diverse array of constraints on authors and publishers. In the years that followed, the age-old laws against libel were extended and refined, Mr. Higgins explains, particularly in the areas of treasonable and seditious libel; thus augmented, these laws, working in combination with new taxes and revised copyright procedures, had much the same chilling effect on public discourse as the old Licensing Act. These new constraints were matters of special concern to publishers and printers; they were more easily identified and called to account than anonymous or pseudonymous authors.

Swift’s attitudes toward press censorship were complex and divided. Threats of legal proceedings against him and his writings for blasphemy and libel made him cautious and defensive: he published anonymously,
deliberately distanced himself from his own writings, and learned to maintain a degree of self-censorship, even in his dealings with friends. At the same time, Swift urged that the very laws that constrained him should be strictly enforced against others who held heterodox or radical opinions; the public had a legal right to be protected from those who wrote against revealed religion and episcopacy. Mr. Higgins argues that *A Project for the Advancement of Religion, and the Reformation of Manners* (1709), in particular, lays out a regulatory regime that would be “a censor’s paradise.” Finally, there are the many writing strategies that Swift learned and practiced to skirt the censors: Mr. Higgins offers an appreciative survey of the satirist’s calculated use of ambiguity, irony, generality, fantasy, typography, and other devices to imply devastating criticism without opening a door for legal prosecution. As others have argued earlier, the threat of censorship helped to make Swift the writer he became.

Mr. Higgins also urges greater critical appreciation of the satirist’s artful hand in the neglected *Memoirs of Capt. John Creichton. Written by Himself* (1731), attributed to Swift posthumously by his printer George Faulkner.


Nearly half—twelve—of Swift’s print-directed poems were, unsurprisingly, written between 1708 and 1713, when Swift participated actively in London’s political and literary circles. Once settled in Ireland, he chose rarely to print his verse, except when roused to defend friends or attack political foes. Although Swift’s literary compositions were chiefly in verse after 1728, he composed mostly for the amusement of particular friendship circles. In other cases, political considerations most likely influenced his decision to refrain from print publication. Mr. Karian explains how themes and allusions in poems composed for the Acheson family at Market Hill confirm Peter Schakel’s hypothesis that “The Lady’s Dressing Room” originated in Swift’s Market Hill verse. If, as seems likely, Schakel and Mr. Karian are correct, “The Lady’s Dressing Room” might have originally extended Swift’s tutelage of Lady Acheson into the realm of hygiene, although Mr. Karian believes Swift composed the poem with a larger potential audience in mind.

Mr. Karian considers Swift’s manuscript poems printed during Swift’s lifetime, often by devious routes. Although Swift’s collusion with George Faulkner, his Dublin printer, is often suspected, Mr. Karian thinks plausible many of Swift’s protestations of ignorance. Swift often permitted friends to borrow his manuscripts on condition that they refrain from making copies. Under those circumstances, it was not unlikely that some opportunistic admirers copied and arranged for print publication of Swift’s poems. Despite Swift’s efforts to retain his work in manuscript, however, Mr. Karian emphasizes his devotion to the poetic craft and the extent to which Swift and Pope mutually influenced each other’s writing. If some overzealous friends surreptitiously conveyed Swift’s poems to the press, those same friends preserved many manuscript poems that would otherwise have been lost. Mr. Karian’s essay convincingly argues the importance of acknowledging Swift as chiefly a manuscript poet. His approach is not only valuable as a way of understanding Swift, his friendships, motives, and craft, but will also be
applied usefully to Rochester, Finch, and other contemporaries whose poems were primarily composed for manuscript circulation.


Max Beerbohm’s pro-paint manifesto of 1894, “mad over masks,” raises hopes that here will be found a new understanding of the uniform rouging, male and female, that pervades portraiture and provokes satire in the eighteenth century. There must be some defenders of a seemingly universal practice immortalized at full, quarter, and half length.

The Ladies Dictionary (1694) favors ladies’ “beautifying,” but it attacks “painting” with the authority of St. Cyprian and describes a beautiful face ambiguously natural or painted with “each colour . . . truly placed.” Lady Mary Wortley Montagu laments finding all the French ladies identical—red lips, black hair, white faces, red cheeks—and wishes a little more variety in the exhibition of beauty. Belinda’s transparent cosmetic arts—the purer blush and keener glance still achieved by brush and liner—abut Lady Wishfort’s cracked, peeling whitened wall. That dialogue with painting is started, but not pursued, in this genial survey of Swift’s epistemological and aesthetic aversion to paint.

Other than Vanessa and Stella, women paradoxically please only when painted. An unpainted forty-three-year-old, having just given birth, disgusts: “pale, dead, old and yellow. . . . She has turned my stomach. But she will soon be painted, and a beauty again.” The heroine of “The Progress of Beauty” resembles Lucian’s Helen, “neither Cheeks, nor Lips be left.” Stella to Swift, on his birthday in 1721, shares his oft-stated preference for inner, moral, and mental beauty over fading externals. The essay affirms that for Swift, “Art must give way to nature,” but as to why he persisted in ironically asserting that “Nature must give way to art,” we are no better informed at the end than at the beginning. Surely “nature” is a fraught term for Swift? Nor does the author inquire why painting never appears when Gulliver travels. Was Max Beerbohm equally sincerely insincere?


This essay on poetic allusion is highly allusive itself, quoting from numerous poems that precede or are contemporary with Swift’s verse. Combined with Mr. Lynall’s superb close reading, this practice yields a subtle analysis of Swift’s varied uses of alchemical ideas.

Mr. Lynall distinguishes Swift’s Tale of a Tub, which assumes the perspective of the alchemist, from his poems, in which Swift views the alchemist from a detached point of view. Although the essay generally links alchemy with the self-delusion, corruption, and futility of Modern writing, it less predictably argues that Swift’s allusions also comment sadly on the limitations of all writers, including Swift himself.

For example, in “To Mr. Congreve” (1693), hacks who attack yet imitate Congreve are compared to alchemists who fail to bring their compositions to “perfection,” but Swift’s poem itself is implicated in the Moderns’ fate to be derivative. Similarly, Swift’s ironic country house poem,
“Vanbrugh’s House” (composed and revised c. 1703–1708) effectively uses the alchemical idea of palingenesis to mock Vanbrugh’s attempt to build out of ruins, but more generally Swift implies that the idea of plant regeneration also symbolizes the futile efforts of contemporary poets to produce something original. (One wishes Mr. Lynall had further discussed originality as a poetic value for Swift, given its standard association with the Moderns.)

Alchemical allusions in Swift’s early poems especially “demonstrate a satiric intricacy not previously thought to have been achieved at this stage of his poetic career.” Intriguingly, Swift’s own attempts to establish a poetic identity are implicated in those intricacies.


The “1736” edition is rarely noted, and when it is mentioned, it is considered merely a reprint, but Ms. Marshall maintains it is important because it is the only time Swift’s name appears on the title page; he is named as dedicatee only in a few lines at the beginning of the 1743 poem, not on the title page. She notes that the Twickenham edition does not include either these lines or the title page dedication, but argues that the dedication is significant in light of Swift’s active canvassing for the recognition as dedicatee from Pope for many years.

This essay draws on the revisionary history of the relationship between Pope and Swift begun by Philip Harth and Dustin Griffin, both of whom believe that Pope sought to distance himself from Swift in this period because the Dean was “politically toxic.” This view contravenes the traditional image of the happy and collaborative Scriblerians, working together in their shared mission to unmask the Works of the Unlearned. Ms. Marshall asserts that the dedication, coming at the most contentious period of the fraught friendship, is “almost certainly not meant as a tribute.” She notes that in 1736 Pope was attempting to get his letters back from a very uncooperative Swift.

The problems in this essay can be summed up in the “almost certainly” of the above quotation. There is certainly ample proof in the correspondence quoted here that Swift persisted in demanding a dedication, both to The Dunciad and to one of the epistles in the Moral Essays; Pope never provided the latter and apparently only applied the dedication to a reprint as a quid pro quo for the letters. But motivation is much harder to prove; there is much use of qualifiers like “probably,” “plausible,” “and/or,” and “I suspect.” And while it is conceivable that the collaborative work of the Scriblerians, especially Pope and Swift, may have been over by the 1730s, to say that there was never a sense of shared mission among them flies in the face of texts like Three Hours after Marriage and The Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus. What is more, Pope’s poems in response to Gulliver’s Travels are some of the most brilliant commentaries ever made on that work.

Martha F. Bowden Kennesaw State University

MARSHALL, ASHLEY. “Swift on ‘Swift’: From The Author upon Himself to The Life and Genuine Character,” HLQ, 75 (Autumn 2012), 327–363.

This rich, full, and deeply satisfying essay contends, at the most general level, that
Swift’s autobiographical works, both in prose and poetry, have less to do with the way they have been traditionally read, as works in which Swift configures himself as a literary figure concerned with his final legacy, and more to do with contemporary controversies in which Swift was embroiled. Hence, these works need to be contextualized within “very particular times and places.” Surveying lesser-known self-characterizations such as Swift’s April 1730 satirical retaliation against Lord Allen, Traulus, Ms. Marshall makes “clear just how little the popular Drapier looms in most of Swift’s apologia.” Her reading of Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift considers the poem not as “a final summation or capstone of a career but as one in a series of highly politicized, topical, occasional, satirical self-defenses . . . functioning primarily as a polemical, anti-Whig vehicle.”

The larger point emerging from her readings is that Swift’s ostensibly autobiographical texts are significantly misread if his personal life elements are favored over topical political context—one example of such a blunder is noted by Ms. Marshall in The Norton Anthology of English Literature’s “infuriating” deletion of thirty of Swift’s thirty-one notes from its presentation of the Verses. Though lengthy and repetitive, this compendious essay should be read by all students of Swift.


Ms. Marshall argues that the conventional critical description of Swift’s text (1758, posthumously) as failed history is based on a misunderstanding of his authorial intentions. She acknowledges its messiness and frequent longueurs, but claims that it was always intended as an apologia for the Treaty of Utrecht and a satire of its opponents, not historiography; the title, for publication, was not his own. She also underlines that its audience was not the Whigs but the High Church Tories, who already inclined to his position on the Treaty.

Arguing for its importance in our understanding of Swift, she demonstrates Swift’s high opinion of the text, the publication of which he hoped would result in his appointment as Historiographer Royal. This expectation has no doubt led many critics astray, but she is careful to explain that the position was not as a historian as we understand the term but as an apologist for the regime, whose role was to write propaganda.

While it is a salutary reminder that all texts, especially apologia, polemics, and propaganda, originate in a particular rhetorical moment and are aimed at a specific audience, the essay has problems. It is sometimes repetitious and not always persuasive. When confronted with the spurious nature of Swift’s account of the negotiations that led up to the Treaty, can we actually set aside the question of whether he was naïve or dishonest? Surely our discomfort with propaganda lies in part with its rhetorical assumption that the end justifies the means. Ms. Marshall presents a clear case for the History’s significance, but does not encourage us to read it.

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Yeats, it is argued, grew entranced with Swift and the Anglo-Irish eighteenth century as he became disillusioned with newly independent Ireland. In the 1890s, Swift did not make Yeats’s “best Irish books” list: he was not Irish enough, and he lacked “mysterious power.” When in the 1920s nationalists such as Daniel Corkery repudiated as not-Irish the Anglo-Irish Protestant tradition in favor of Gaelic Catholicism, Yeats reconsidered. His own Anglo-Irish Protestant background and English-language poetry made him vulnerable.

Marked by the increasing stringency of the penal laws, the eighteenth century makes a humiliating “hiatus” between the resistance of the seventeenth century and the struggles of the nineteenth, between the violent markers of 1690 and 1798. Those laws, Swift, friend to Ireland in the Draper’s Letters and allegorist of Irish-British relations in Gulliver’s Travels, did not address. He also regularly and repeatedly expressed his hatred of Ireland, even while spending more years there than the impeccably Irish Joyce, Yeats, O’Casey, and Beckett. Perhaps Swift should be set beside Flann O’Brien.

More attention might have been paid to the oddity that Swift’s hatred of Ireland is provoked by what Burke would label “Protestant Ascendancy.” So the Protestant Irish dean complains to an English Roman Catholic about the state of Irish revenues, trade, and manufactures, imposed by Britain, enjoyed by his own class in Ireland.

Evident also are the divisions within the Anglo-Irish tradition that Yeats idealized, such as Burke’s opposition to the absentee tax Swift agitated for. Now, nationalist passions settling, Ireland can give Johnson the lie: “The Irish are a fair people; they never speak well of one another.”


The third Earl of Shaftesbury’s ferocious attack on Swift’s A Tale of a Tub has been mostly ascribed to their different notions of wit as a weapon of satire and in its relation to the concepts of humor and ridicule. Well-researched and argued using archival material, Mr. Müller’s essay points out the political differences between these two men.

Although only one direct reference (by name) to Swift seems to exist in the Earl’s writings, Mr. Müller emphasizes that Shaftesbury, with his republican leanings and toleration of Low Church Dissent, objected to Swift’s balancing act between constitutional Whiggism and High Church Toryism, which the Earl regarded as reprehensible. In contrast to Swift’s authoritarianism and disparagement of dissenters, Shaftesbury urged religious moderation in his Miscellaneous Reflections. This essay supplies further evidence of the party-political contention in early eighteenth-century England.


See the entry under Congreve, p. 15–16.
Mr. Rawson also compares the mad astronomers in *Gulliver’s Travels* and *Rasselas*. The delusions of Swift’s astronomers result in political enslavement of others whereas Johnson’s astronomer is tyrannized by his own condition. Swift assumes a position of superior castigation, whereas Johnson conveys a more intimate and inward anxiety; both convey a need for regulation that may or may not be effective in harnessing subversive impulses. Such linkages, qualified as they may be, are the grounds for Mr. Rawson’s argument that Johnson’s *Life of Swift* is animated by more than outwardly directed dislike. Nonetheless, he notes, Swift never strove to be liked by his readers. Perhaps that is why Johnson, who cannot like him, understands him so well.


In this superb essay Mr. Rawson uses the Preface to *A Tale of a Tub* as a lens through which to enlarge on the entire work as a mock edition, one at once having antecedents in Rabelais and Cervantes, while exhibiting features that anticipate later satirists. For example, Mr. Rawson finds Swift’s “‘will tell/won’t tell’ tease” to be “short-cut Shandean.”

The essay examines how Fielding and Sterne exploited the *Tale’s* innovative use of lacunae, marginal scholia, and footnotes. It ends with a brilliant meditation on Swift’s *Tub* and Norman Mailer’s 1959 *Advertisements for Myself*. Mr. Rawson notes similarities between the anonymous author of the *Tale* and Mailer’s persona as “a starved revolutionary in a garret” who is “an actor, a quick-change artist,” not un-
like “the Tale-teller’s affinity with the mountebanks of the Stage Itinerant.” This suggestion extends to Mailer’s use of ellipsis, “a modest . . . mini-gap” that nonetheless “makes vast claims of a personality in awe of its own being” in ways redolent of Swift and Sterne. In his recognizably vigorous stylistic voice, Mr. Rawson convincingly demonstrates that, in Swift, as well as later authors that he preapeutically prefigures, paratextual and typographical form educes and enunciates meaning as forcefully and subtly as does semantic content.


This essay pulls together a great deal of previous Swift scholarship to make a coherent argument about the ways in which Swift and his publisher identified Gulliver’s Travels as travel literature rather than fiction. Perhaps to avoid responsibility for Swift’s satire and to capitalize on the popularity of English travel books, publisher Benjamin Motte made the first edition physically resemble such books. Quoting J. C. Ross, Mr. Rogers points to “the layout of the titlepage, the use of subsidiary titlepages where a volume includes more than one voyage, the style of the detailed list of contents, extended chapter heads, the style of running titles, the use and placing of sketch-maps, and modes of presentation of preliminary material.” Swift himself contributed to the impression the book was a contemporary travel account by choosing an understated typographical style, devoid of italics and capitals for emphasis. He also borrowed specific details from earlier travel books. And, like philosophers such as Locke, Swift used the travel narrative to delve into human behavior.

But Travels differs significantly from contemporaneous travel books in its emphasis on physicality, including scatology, rather than on spiritual development as we see, for example, in Robinson Crusoe. Swift used this emphasis to help establish an adversarial relationship with his readers, who, therefore, have always read the work as satire, in spite of its similarities with travel literature. Simultaneously exploiting and transgressing the conventions of genre, Swift ushers his readers into an uncomfortable and unfamiliar world and provokes insights that, as Pat Rogers says of references to sight within Travels, bring “either pain or unwelcome news.” In short, the essay successfully illuminates the financial, legal, and especially satiric reasons why and how Swift (and his publisher) “colonized earlier travel writers’ techniques.”


Mr. Thorson makes the interesting—and certainly plausible—suggestion that Swift’s beliefs about the afterlife and its attendant rewards or punishments were “exoteric.” That is, as a priest of the Church of Ireland, he publicly endorsed the doctrine of heaven and hell in order to promote social stability and public order, while privately doubting or even denying the existence of life after death. The idea that Swift may have been a heterodox Christian is not shocking (David Nokes has argued that he was an atheist), but Mr. Thorson’s evidence does not prove his case.

He points out that hell tended not to be
emphasized by Tory divines in the early eighteenth century because it had a whiff, not of sulfur, but of Whiggishness and Dissent. But his argument begins to wobble after this. Heaven and hell are mentioned in the sermons but without “the ring of positive assertion.” The absence of references to future rewards and punishments in Swift’s poetry is elevated by Mr. Thorson into “negative proof” of a belief in their nonexistence, although he acknowledges that this foundation is weak. On occasion, Mr. Thorson simply seems to misinterpret the evidence. For him, there is no reason to interpret Swift’s wish that the dying Stella will find herself in “a better state” as a reference to heaven. To what else is it likely to refer?

Mr. Thorson himself identifies good arguments against his thesis. He would like to see the lone mention of the afterlife in Swift’s accounts of attending funerals as evidence for his argument, but has to admit, “This does not mean that Swift denies the possibility of heaven or hell, but simply that he does not believe that its particularity is consoling to him in moments of extreme emotion. . . .” It is not a stretch to say that Swift found funerals, and Stella’s in particular, too hard to bear because of the personal loss. Swift did not condemn the Duke of Marlborough and Colonel Francis Charteris to eternal damnation. This does not necessarily mean for him that the flames of hell did not exist; he may just have decided to judge not, lest he be judged. Until there is more solid proof to the contrary, we must assume Swift’s beliefs about the afterlife were conventional, not “maybe not.”


It is not clear why this chapter was written. Mr. Walsh states his intention early, focusing on A Tale of a Tub (for which he is also the editor in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Jonathan Swift) to the exclusion of other parodic pieces such as the “Meditation on a Broomstick” and the Bickerstaff papers: “I shall discuss some of those parodies [of various seventeenth-century scientific, literary, historical, and social genres] in which Swift interrogates the ways in which modern books present evidence, and organize and make claims to knowledge.”

He then spends the next five pages discussing the seventeenth-century shift from marginalia to footnotes and retailing the Phalarian controversy between the Bentley and Boyle factions. The latter has been retold many times; the former, Mr. Walsh suggests, informs the composition of A Tale of a Tub, occurring as it did at “just the historical moment at which Swift was writing” it. Yet a few pages later he admits, “it is not the move in works of scholarship to footnotes as such that is consequential to Swift.” Why then spend time discussing it?

Further confusion arises in this undisguised early part of the essay when Mr. Walsh refers to various scholarly apparatus as “more or less Ramist.” A footnote to this remark directs the reader to pages 23–24 of Anthony Grafton’s The Footnote: A Curious History. The pages cited, however, say nothing of Ramist scholarship. My edition of Grafton was published by Harvard University Press in 1999; the one Mr. Walsh cites is from Faber and Faber, 1997, so the pagination may be different. However, I see no reference to the French logician and humanist Petrus Ramus in
Grafton’s index. The final half of the essay eventually moves to deliver more of what was initially promised, but a not inconsiderable amount of this may be found in the Cambridge edition of the Tale and one of Mr. Walsh’s articles published elsewhere. This essay renders a small yield.


Eighteenth-century paper was a recycled product made from discarded linen rags, and the wide circulation of paper allowed it to become a versatile and resonant metaphor to express different kinds of social connection. So, for example, yesterday’s dinner napkin might become today’s scandalous news sheet, only to be consigned tomorrow to use as toilet paper in a privy. Or more intimately, a lady’s underclothes might someday become the medium of love letters addressed to her, or alternatively, of satirical squibs directed against her. The fragility of paper and its connection with authorship also made it a convenient vehicle to express writers’ vulnerabilities or the transience of literary fame.

Not surprisingly, Swift’s ready wit allowed him to ring many figurative variations related to the circulation and economy of paper, a fact demonstrated here with a variety of his “Stella” poems from the early 1720s. Mr. Ward had hoped for something more, however: “Swift’s writing exploits paper’s poetic potentialities, but underplays its material and economic significance.” His point is that paper is more than a writerly tool; it is also a commodity, and in this case, a commodity capable of Irish manufacture. Mr. Ward concedes that paper, due to its recycled nature, sometimes carried meanings and memories that might escape an author’s notice. Still, he argues, the writer who penned the Proposal for the Universal Use of Irish Manufacture (1720) ought to have devoted more attention and care to the material of his craft, the paper on which he wrote. And the fact that he did not raises in Mr. Ward’s mind the question whether Swift’s commitment to Irish manufacture was more rhetorical than real: perhaps Swift was only a “paper patriot.”

These conclusions are consistent with Mr. Ward’s emphasis on the material basis of both politics and culture but, all the same, seem unduly harsh. It seems presumptuous and unfair to criticize writers for what they did not write.


Pope persuaded Swift to allow a handful of his letters to be published, but Swift was quite explicit in his correspondence that he neither wanted nor expected his letters to see print: he understood them to be private (though that term is somewhat elastic), unstudied outpourings of friendship. Tracing these attitudes and the fortunes of the letters as they appeared in various smaller collections before the first effort at a complete edition in 1784, Ms. Williams suggests that these smaller projects provided an important venue for fashioning Swift’s posthumous reputation, not least in George Faulkner’s purpose specifically of exonerating Swift of the charge of Jacobitism. She also finds that eighteenth-century editors and readers faced the same ethical
questions we do today about making public what was intended to be private.


A hogshead of red wine cost £9, Graves wine £9.10s., but two hogsheads, one white and one claret cost £21: was it the white or was it the claret that jacked up Lord Berkeley’s expenses as one of the lords justices at Dublin, when Swift was his chaplain (1699–1701)? Modeling how to open an archive for students and scholars alike, this essential article illuminates the moments before Swift became Swift (and Shaftesbury’s bête noire) through the unexploited archive of the second earl at Berkeley Castle, Gloucestershire.

A previously unpublished letter in the Berkeley archive addressed to Humphrey May, secretary of the Lords Justices at the Castle, confirms Swift’s late autobiographical fragment “The Family of Swift” which records that in the autumn of 1699 he accompanied Berkeley as his secretary when the Earl was returning from England to Ireland—and for several years thereafter.

The story of Swift’s loss of the deanery of Derry turns out to be less about Swift and more about William King. Contrary to Ehrenpreis’s and Land’s plausible accounts, Berkeley takes full credit for the appointment. Boasting of “my care for the church” to John, Lord Somers, in London, Berkeley claims to have secured a dean, John Bolton, not only able to mollify dissenters but also both acceptable to and willing to oppose William King. Then bishop of Derry, King was embroiled in hostilities with the City of London and English House of Lords. Swift collected the livings that John Bolton wished to keep, but was forced to vacate on taking up the richer deanship—Agher, Laracor, Rathbeggan, and the prebend of Dunlavin in St. Patrick’s. When Swift complained in “The Family of Swift” that he had been fobbed off with lesser livings and told he was “too young,” he was in the right, but there was more to the story than he knew.

“The Humble Petition of Frances Harris” is modeled on actual petitions for losses sustained to the Lords Justices and firmly grounded in the detailed account books of Berkeley Castle Muniments. Names, positions, salaries, dates of employment confirm the identifications in Faulkner’s notes. Swift frequently witnessed payments within the household and outside; payees included Mary Barber’s husband Rupert the draper and Swift’s cousin, the Lisbon merchant Willoughby Swift.

Reproduced are the 1892 listing of Berkeley’s papers by Isaac Herbert Jeayes, considerations relative to the still unfixed dating of “A Meditation upon a Broomstick,” a calendar of the Berkeley letter book, and the location of the Government Lodge in Dublin. For Berkeley, the Irish interval was a bit of a disappointment. It was very expensive, and though he would have been glad to stay on, he was not invited to do so. The Earl of Drogheda replaced him.

MISCELLANEOUS


The novel rises in the eighteenth century. The novel is realistic. The novel de-
picts individual characters. The novel is interested in interior life. The novel is a feminine genre. The novel prominently features quixotic characters. This article takes these half-dozen strands of received critical wisdom and splices them together into a sinuous, strong whole. Ms. Alliston argues that gender and realism are connected because our sense of the realistic is derived from conventions of character, which from the seventeenth century tend to be conventions of gender. Verisimilitude consists of writing women characters who resemble what we all know women are really like (even if actual historical women, such as Elizabeth I, are not actually like that).

Thus the realism of the novel is continuous with the realistic decorum of the neoclassical drama, and its characters are tried and proven by plots just as characters were tried and proven by ancient romances. But there is nevertheless something novel about the novel: it replaces the medieval and early modern obsession with women’s honesty (that is sexual chastity) with fidelity (that is, emotional faithfulness and loyalty). It thus turns representation from outward dramatic action to the interior and psychological. The novel also privileges the figure of the quixote, who draws attention to the tension between the actual (associated with history), the ideal (associated with romance), and the probable (associated with the novel itself). An important implication is that features that we tend to associate with the eighteenth-century British novel in fact appear earlier, in seventeenth-century French and Spanish texts.

Ms. Alliston’s argument is sophisticated and suggestive, drawing on both a redoubtable comparative range and a roster of important recent critics (Watt, Foucault, Doody, McKeon, Armstrong, Laqueur, Wahrman). Unfortunately, Ms. Alliston’s substantial discussion of the novel as trial narrative was unable to profit from Vivas-van Soni’s *Mourning Happiness* (2010), whose own extensive and learned discussion of trial narratives would have greatly enriched her account.


Many observers of clerical life in the West Indies complained that the Church of England was represented there by a disproportionate number of Scots, Irishmen, and Swiss or French refugees, many of them ordained through Trinity College, Dublin. Scottish priests, in particular, attracted opprobrium merely because they were Scots with dour attitudes and uncouth accents. Ms. Barber’s statistics bear out the demographic contention (although she acknowledges that it can sometimes be difficult to tell if someone was Scot, Irish, or Sassenach).

Her essay then goes on to describe the “Scottish or Irish ministerial presence” in the Caribbean colonies by way of colorful examples, such as John Mitchell and Atkins Williamson, both of whom faked the evidence of their ordination in order to obtain livings in Jamaica, or the bigamist and gambler William Dunn. Appointments to livings depended to a great extent on the political and confessional predilections of colonial governors, who turned the “murky politics” of Britain into a “dismal swamp across the Atlantic” in order to bolster their own position and authority within their little realms. These patrons were often in conflict with the ecclesiastical au-
authorities back home and did not always select the best candidates.

Ms. Barber provides context and detail but lacks a central thesis beyond the assertion (not entirely borne out by the anecdotal evidence she presents) that “the disproportionate prominence of Irish and Scottish ministers is best explained by the Caribbean Church’s need for its hardest-working and dedicated promoters.” Other possible explanations might be the lack of preferment available to Anglican/Episcopal priests in Ireland or Scotland, the persecution of Episcopalians in Scotland, the need for nonjurors and Jacobites to absent themselves from the British Isles, and the reluctance of those with better prospects to leave their native England.

BREWER, CHARLOTTE. “‘Happy Copiousness’? OED’s Recording of Female Authors of the Eighteenth Century,” RES, 63 (2012), 86–117.

“Happy Copiousness” comes from Lord Chesterfield’s tongue-in-cheek letter advising Johnson how to deal with women’s language in his Dictionary. Copiousness is a dubious tribute, especially as part of an ancient tradition of attributing women with unruly tongues. This essay, part of a larger project on “Examining the OED,” provides an illuminating and well-documented study of how the composition of the OED assumed and implied that women’s use of language is not a significant part of the development of the English language.

One of the essay’s strengths is its methodological clarity. Ms. Brewer carefully distinguishes the OED1 (completed in 1928) from the OED2 (which incorporates an update of only twentieth-century English [1972–1986]) from the OED3 (begun in the 1990s). She hails the research now made possible by the OED Online, but cautions us that one will find there, not simply a history of the English language, but “the culturally determined choices of Victorian and Edwardian lexicographers and their volunteer readers.” The essay proceeds to address the significant gap in the OED’s documentation for the eighteenth century, especially for women writers.

Despite its determination to be comprehensive and objective, a bias toward “great writers” is apparent. Ironically, the essay observes, the OED assumes the importance of context in its inclusion of five million quotations, yet pretends that words are independent of such historical and cultural phenomena as the roles of women, the history of print, and the construction of a literary canon. Ms. Brewer notes that when eighteenth-century women are quoted, it is for the domesticity or eccentricity of their usage rather than their contributions to the development of the language. Comparing extracts from a range of women authors against the dictionary reveals their printed texts are full of typical usages for which the OED needs more quotations. Women are particularly underrepresented in the case of conventional poetic diction; Anna Seward’s poetry, for example, is never quoted although several more idiosyncratic usages from her letters are included. Ms. Brewer calls for an intentional effort by lexicographers to cite from female-authored texts (and laments that one still cannot search the OED electronically by gender). Her goal is to recognize women’s contributions to linguistic and literary culture.


“In recent times, the Enlightenment has become very polite; very refined; very decent.” Highlighting vicious personal at-
tacks traded between James Arbuckle and Swift, Mr. Brown seeks to remind us that “antagonism, irritation, invective, abuse, and animosity were just as prevalent as rational debate”; indeed, he suggests that irony and ad hominem attack are a predictable, logical outgrowth of the Enlightenment ideology of civil discourse. Mr. Brown initially represents himself as contributing to our understanding of a distinctively Irish Enlightenment but generalizes about Europe as a whole.


The death of Mary II in 1694 occasioned a royal funeral on a scale not seen since that of James I and VI and perhaps not afterwards equaled. It also saw an outpouring of both genuine grief and polemical funeral sermons. Claiming little for the “frigid bombast” of these sermons, Ms. Brownley focuses instead on what they say about English attitudes toward women and power in the late seventeenth century.

In the sermons, Queen Mary is routinely depoliticized in spite of her real role in the government of Great Britain—in particular as regent during the frequent absences of her husband, William III. The late queen’s strength, action, and leadership are “sweetened,” feminized, rendered passive; she is made into an unwilling ruler, the odd woman out on what was seen (by Bishop Burnet and others) as the roll call of bad female queens from the Old Testament to Mary I. Recent British experience with women in or close to political power had associated them (negatively) with Roman Catholicism, immorality, or both, making it necessary to “rewrite” Mary’s positive exercise of power as both exceptional and within the confines of traditional sexual stereotypes. If Mary II was a good queen, she was a better wife and Christian (of an obedient and “feminine” variety), relegated as much to the private sphere as her public role would permit.

As Ms. Brownley observes, this characterization of Mary II in the sermons reveals some of the tensions and uncertainties of the Revolution settlement. Her claim to the British thrones was stronger than that of her husband (a Calvinist foreigner who had displaced his father-in-law and uncle, James II and VII, by conquest), her hold on public affection much firmer than her consort’s, her wifely and domestic virtues at odds with the persistent rumors about the irregularities of William’s private life. The “depoliticization and feminization [of the queen] in the sermons were deployed in part to assuage some of the popular anxieties about how the government would function without her.” Ms. Brownley argues convincingly that it was necessary to deemphasize any “manly” heroic virtues in Mary in order to defend—or at least not undermine—her widower. She could perhaps make more of this point in relation to Mary’s elaborate obsequies, which may have been calculated to shore up the legitimacy and popularity of the Williamite regime at a time of stress.

For Ms. Brownley, the queen’s funeral sermons illustrate “the increasingly restrictive cultural constructions of women’s roles after the Restoration.” This move to the general from the specifics of Mary II and her treatment in death is made only briefly in the final pages, however. It would have been interesting to have seen more to connect the representation of a sin-
gular woman at the apogee of British life with the experience of her unexceptional female contemporaries.


Literary works take on meaning in part through how and where they are published. Works printed in a miscellany can comment on one another; therefore electronic editions should allow readers to see how and where works have variously appeared and provide links to the other works that may have surrounded them. Readers may even wish to assemble miscellanies of their own. It should not have taken twenty-three pages to establish these elementary points.


Despite its general title, Ms. Bystydzien´ ska’s essay does not aspire to be comprehensive. On the contrary, it discusses “several characteristic tendencies,” and it emphasizes Pope and Sterne (especially *The Rape of the Lock* and *A Sentimental Journey*), with a cursory glance at Dryden and Gray.

Ms. Bystydzien´ ska’s main focus is—unsurprisingly—free imitation and faithful translation; the strength of her analysis lies in illustrating the techniques adopted by late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Polish translators of the English canon. As she demonstrates, the political situation of the then partitioned Poland demanded that suspicious content had to be toned down or eliminated. The 1853 translation of Sterne’s *Journey* by W. Noakowski lacks the celebrated apostrophe to Liberty. The sociopolitical context was also the reason for stylistic modifications. *The Rape of the Lock*—Ms. Bystydzien´ ska writes—was fashioned into a sentimental or a didactic poem (featuring an idealized or a satirically foolish Belinda respectively), largely deprived of its Rococo charm. As such, it would have been much more to the liking of the implied Polish reader, who at the turn of the nineteenth century still believed in the institutional role of literature. This would also explain the tendency to moderate frivolous and erotic passages, such as the ending of Sterne’s *Journey*. The translations were also “polonized,” or endowed with specifically Polish realities and cultural allusions, which made them more readable and understandable for the Polish audience, as a rule unacquainted with English language and culture. Ms. Bystydzien´ ska’s essay offers well-written, insightful, and aptly contextualized remarks on this unexplored field.


Ms. Cahill offers a guide through a complex network of political and economic considerations, which form a backdrop for Jane Barker’s second and third “Galesia” novels, *A Patch-Work Screen for the Ladies* (1723) and *The Lining of the Patch-Work Screen* (1726). Both novels used the notion of “patch work” (akin to quilting) to express the inclusion of heterogeneous pieces in either a work of art or a diverse society. Both were also significantly shaped by
Barker’s Jacobite commitments. She looked back nostalgically to the reign of Charles II and particularly to the benefits that attended his marriage to Catharine of Braganza: the rise of tea as a fashionable drink and British access to the Portuguese trading empire, which extended all the way to India.

On the other hand, Barker looked askance at developments since the Glorious Revolution, new politics, and financial arrangements and vices (gin), all of which she considered “Dutch,” foreign to traditional British ways. She continued to hope, however, that a “patch work” nation that included both Jacobites and Hanoverians might emerge in the future.

She successfully connects large and small, linking tea table conversation among ladies with more general social and moral issues. So, for example, chatting about calico cottons and “Indian Goods” opens a perspective on a trading empire, and remarks about the arrogance of elite London society reflect on the post-Revolutionary political powers there. These linkages of small and large make Ms. Cahill’s strategies of elaboration particularly useful as she examines such large issues as the trade in Indian calicoes or the relative economic claims of imported cotton and domestic wool. Such useful backgrounds cost something, however, as Barker’s storytelling disappears.


In this clearly structured essay Mr. Domsch outlines the consequences of the flood of reading material and the concomitant professionalization of the book market for eighteenth-century authors and readers. Although his observation that growing book market competition was not tied to consumers’ spending power but instead to readers’ attention is not new, he offers insights into the literary scene’s gradual transformation.

In particular, he describes the emergence of professional literary criticism (with the Monthly and Critical reviews in the vanguard). Occasionally his analysis is intellectually pretentious, as when, for instance, he differentiates primary (direct attention on the part of the reader) and secondary attention (effected through a mediating agency).

One might add that, when respectable periodicals such as the Gentleman’s Magazine practically ceased to notice novels at all by the close of the eighteenth century, this was less due to overproduction than to the genre’s bad repute. This study is useful, but hardly innovative.

GIEGER, JASON CURTIS. “Susanna Centlivre, Sir George Etherege, and the Invention of the Restoration Comedy of Manners, 1880–1940,” RECTR, 27 (Summer 2012), 75–95.

In his study of genre formation, Mr. Gieger traces the changing popular receptions and critical reputations of Centlivre and Etherege to demonstrate that the comedy of manners (a term, he notes, coined by Lamb in 1823) is largely an invention of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Early twentieth-century scholars of late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century comedy usually positioned themselves opposite Macaulay’s moralistic condemna-
tion. Relatively neglected for 150 years, Etherege was recovered and championed, whereas Centlivre, whose popularity on stage through most of the nineteenth century seemed to ally her to the Victorians, ironically was neglected in the early twentieth century.

English literature at the university also helped crystallize the comedy of manners as a genre and cement Etherege’s place in it—to the exclusion of Centlivre. For Mr. Gieger, this development was part of the larger movement between 1880 and the 1920s, outlined by Brian Doyle, to institutionalize an English national culture. Modeled after Spanish intrigue plays, Centlivre’s comedies were not absorbed into the universities’ nationalist and masculinist rhetoric. Also working against Centlivre’s reputation was her identification with popular rather than high culture; she had stage success, but lacked Etherege’s brilliant language.

Mr. Gieger contrasts Behn’s elevation to canonical status with Centlivre’s continuing neglect “in our own moment.” Here this engaging essay falls short, for “our own moment” includes significant attention to Centlivre in such works as Misty G. Anderson’s important book Female Playwrights and Eighteenth-Century Comedy (2012) and the late J. Douglas Canfield’s anthology The Broadview Anthology of Restoration and Early Eighteenth Century Drama (2003). Many additional studies could be cited; nonetheless, the essay is valuable as a richly documented effort to demonstrate the “historical contingency of canon formation and genre definition.”


Examining letters by Damaris Cudworth (later Masham), Mary Pierrepont (later Wortley Montagu) and Mary Pendarves (later Delany), Ms. Grundy considers the “shifting fashions” in the “construction of the English female letter-writing subject,” arguing that the earlier two writers used the letter to resist “fashion”—or “women’s clothes culture”—whereas the later Delany takes a more enthusiastic interest in things sartorial. So far, so apparently simple: but Ms. Grundy insinuates some finely spun interpretive threads into this plain-cloth thesis, and what she concludes poses a challenge to our assumptions about eighteenth-century women and fashion.

In letters to Locke, the young and unmarried Cudworth, Ms. Grundy notes, uses the subject of fashion as a playful tool allowing her to take the upper hand in their esoteric disputes—teasing him with talk of petticoats not because she cares about such frippery, but because this allows her to “construct herself as that unusual species, the philosopher as eligible young woman”—perfectly knowledgeable about matters feminine but too intelligent to care about them. Young Mary Pierrepont, some years later, is less playful and more contemptuous toward fashion, mocking dress and dress-obsessed fools; in early letters writing like a sage poised above the fashionable world and later like a “former fashionista” sickened by what she knows of the emptiness of it all. This too, Ms. Grundy explains, is a pose designed to establish Pierrepont’s distance from typically “feminine” subjects, any signs of interest in which would possibly compromise her status as an intellectual. Ms. Grundy concludes that “for both these writers, a strong interest in dress is the mark of a presumptively feminine frivolity that they are determined to disavow.”

She contrasts such dismissive attitudes with Mary Delany’s confident fascination
with fashion—her exuberant interest in this or that gown shown off at a party or ball. Why such a change in attitudes toward fashion? The answer is that Delany, at midcentury, had less anxiety about male disapproval of “feminine” subject matter than did early-century women due to the emergence of a “discourse of female community.” She had “less need to dazzle by her ‘wit’” and greater freedom to include in her letters “the details of [a] female popular culture.” This suggestive essay invites scholars to rethink the assumption that early-century women were freer in self-construction practices than their mid-century sisters. 

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Mr. Hamm’s title would seem to discuss a lawsuit between Robert Walker and Jacob Tonson over their respective rights (or lack of them) to print Shakespeare’s plays. There was no case of *Walker v. Tonson*. Walker, generally characterized as an upstart and a troublemaker, “lacked legal standing” to mount a challenge to Tonson’s apparent monopoly to print the plays, although Mr. Hamm does not say precisely why. (It was presumably because Walker had no demonstrable proprietary interest in the texts that formed the basis of Tonson’s—and his own—editions.)

Claiming the right to reprint Shakespeare, the two printers “blended legal arguments with moral ones.” Walker maintained (correctly) that Tonson’s rights to the plays had expired in 1731, under the term limits imposed by the relatively new Statute of Anne (1710). Tonson seems to have acknowledged this in his initial failure to bring legal action to protect the rights he otherwise claimed vociferously on title pages and in the literary press, on the basis of a chain of assignments of copyholdings. When Tonson eventually sued his competitor, he exposed his proprietary claims to further scrutiny and weakened rather than strengthened his case. (The lawsuit did not proceed to trial.)

Mr. Hamm’s well-taken point is that the rhetoric of the exchange between Walker and Tonson is couched in terms that reflect the shift from an “older system in which permission to print was decided on moral issues such as correctness, custom, and decorum (as regulated through censorship)” to a new regime predicated on property rights. The connection of the new property and the old propriety is also indicative of transition. Seen in this light (and as depicted in a print of 1735 titled *The Rival Printers*), Walker seems less the troublesome upstart and more the “well-matched rival of Tonson’s.” The latter’s decision to carry on the contest outside the courtroom suggests that Tonson himself harbored doubts about the strength of his case. This may also explain the eventual cooling of the “vigorous back-and-forth” vilification.


This essay addresses two eighteenth-century attempts to extend Shakespeare’s canon. One is the history play *Vortigern* (1796), later acknowledged as a forgery by its author William Henry Ireland. The more intriguing instance is Theobald’s romantic tragicomedy *Double Falsehood; or, The Distrest Lovers*, staged in 1727 and printed in 1728. Theobald claimed that he purchased, then “Revised and Adapted to the Stage,” no fewer than three manuscript
copies of the play “Written Originally by W. SHAKESPEARE.” No one at the time demanded to inspect the underlying documents, and those manuscripts, if they existed, have not surfaced since; thus the extent of Theobald’s revisions and adaptations—or indeed, of his forged inventions—cannot now be known.

Mr. Hammond nonetheless provides useful contexts for Theobald’s claims. Modern scholars now know that Shakespeare collaborated with John Fletcher in 1612–1613 to produce The History of Cardenio, based on a story borrowed from Cervantes’s Don Quixote. Copies of that unpublished play could have found their way to Theobald, perhaps recovered among the literary properties of actor Thomas Betterton; Double Falsehood also dramatizes the story of Cardenio, and it seems unlikely that there should be two independent plays on exactly the same story. Examining closely both the expression and dramatic structure of Theobald’s play, Mr. Hammond finds them at least consonant with the later writing styles of Shakespeare and Fletcher. It is possible, then, that Theobald had somehow gotten his hands on the real thing.

Given the bold claim, however, why were so few skeptical questions asked about the authenticity of Theobald’s play, and why in particular did no one call forth the manuscripts? The cultural politics of that time, it seems, precluded anyone from having the undoubted authority to raise such inquiries; Mr. Hammond explains many factors. Antagonisms between Whigs and Tories, Ancients and Moderns, were predictable constraints, as Theobald had already run afoul of Pope by publishing Shakespeare Restored in response to Pope’s edition of Shakespeare and was about to appear as “piddling Tibbald,” the epitome of modern dullness, in The Dun-


Like other contributors to this volume, Mr. Jonsson believes that the dynamics of mercantilism need to be better understood. “Once we consider ‘mercantilism’ as an orientation toward a common set of problems rather than a clear and precise doctrine, we are also in a better position to appreciate the heterogeneity and controversy that marked the character of early modern natural history and agricultural improvement.” In short, commerce—in this case, the commerce in tobacco—is too important and complex to be considered only in commercial terms. Mr. Jonsson lays out the many further considerations that shaped and constrained the production of tobacco in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

From a planter’s point of view growing tobacco was largely a matter of practicalities: where to plant, how to secure necessary labor, whether and how to practice crop rotation, and so on—and there were many proponents of agricultural improve-
ments who hoped that production could be both rationalized and harmonized with natural conditions. As Mr. Jonsson explains and documents, government oversight brought a quite different set of interests and concerns into play. A few commentators had health concerns or moral qualms about tobacco use. Some wondered if growing tobacco was the best use of limited arable land: could the design of empire somehow be “rationalized” by growing vital agricultural products in the home country and more peripheral ones like tobacco in the colonies? Then there were questions about tax policies: was it more efficient to tax imported tobacco at the dock rather than to pursue scattered growers at home? And over time observers became concerned about the relationship between tobacco plantations and the slave trade.

Mr. Jonsson’s point is that none of these concerns (and there were others) stood alone, and there were two or more sides to every question. As a result, all matters of policy and many matters of practice were inevitably embroiled in a ceaseless competition of interested parties and divergent perspectives; the operation of mercantilism in this instance was thus fundamentally political. However, even politics had to accommodate some environmental concerns and the gradual advance of more scientifically informed agricultural methods.


Starting from Samuel Johnson’s well-known evaluation of Watts—“Happy will be that reader whose mind is disposed by his verses, or his prose, to imitate him in all but his non-conformity”—Ms. Lewis yokes politics, religion, and aesthetics in the early eighteenth century: “With its rule of twice-yearly communion in an Anglican church for those who wished to hold public office, the controversial practice of occasional conformity epitomized the uncertainty of formal expression between 1702 and 1714.” If dissent separated Watts from Anne, illness brought them together, both seemingly having as much right as Pope to speak of “this long disease, my life.”

More suggestive than probative, the essay is always pertinent. For example, in lyrics like “Happy Frailty” Watts treats his nonconforming (ill) body by positing its reconciliation with God’s perfect plan via poetic vision. He begins by complaining, “this Flesh [is] a tott’ring Wall / With frightful Breaches gaping wide” but ends with the poet, “a social and spiritual healer,” looking “through the lens of illness.” Here is a fine distinction between Watts and more typical poetic treatments of illness: “With the figure of the ‘Wall’ itself in peril, [Watts spurns] conventional religious petitions for divine healing along with equally conventional interpretations of illness as either divine punishment or saintly sanction. Instead . . . Watts conforms the ‘Breaches’ themselves with a stable spiritual reality, one that becomes visible through the very holes that ‘Frailty’ opens in the physical frame.”

Ms. Lewis is on point, also, in her evaluation of Watts’s place in literary history: “Watts’s disappointing critical destiny reflects his status as exemplary background within a long-standing reading practice that much prefers to look at the exceptional figures in the foreground.” His “oft-announced project was to simplify, Christianize, and thereby elucidate” an obscure (to him) Hebraic poetic tradition. His overtly logical method “has thus incurred an automatic penalty in the tournaments of
literary taste whose rules favor ironic contradiction over iringic self-consistency.” Even his choice of genre seems to put Watts out of step, as this hymn-writing advocate of “collective voicing” produced lyrics, traditionally the most individual of poetic forms.

If Ms. Lewis’s critical instincts are sound, her scholarship is not. Some errors are simply typos, like the date of Thomas Gibbons’s Memoirs being given as 1789 in the text and, correctly, as 1780 in the note, but the number and range of misquotations are shocking. Ms. Lewis indicates that she used a 1792 edition of Watts’s Logick, but does not quote from it; why she did not use the first edition is never explained. In fact I could not determine which edition she used, because her careless treatment of capitalization, spelling, contractions, and italics makes any determination impossible.

The same carelessness occurs in at least four other texts quoting Watts. For example: “when I shut my eyes to seek sleep and repose, and had not their aid to fence against the disorderly ferments of nature spirits” should read: “when I shut my Eyes to seek Sleep and Repose, and had not their Aid to fence against the disorderly Ferments of Natural Spirits.” (Ms. Lewis several times introduces italics within quotations without notice.) Page numbers placed parenthetically within the body of the essay are sometimes correct, sometimes close (100 for 101, 116 for 115, v for iii), sometimes way off (122 for 72), and sometimes just sloppy (19 for xix).

Within quotations words are transmuted (“Disturbances” becomes “distresses,” “Heart” becomes “Thoughts,” “who” becomes “that,” “old” becomes “odd”), and in one quotation ten words disappear without an ellipsis.

I will allow Watts the final comment on Ms. Lewis’s carelessness. She quotes from “A Hurry of Spirits in a Fever”: “Who can describe them? . . . / Abrupt, ill-sorted and if I but close my eyes, strange images / In thousand forms and thousand colours rise.” Here is what appears in the edition Ms. Lewis cites: “. . . Abrupt, ill-sorted. O ’tis all Confusion! / If I but close my Eyes, strange Images / In thousand Forms and thousand Colours rise.”


Mr. McInally examines the Scots colleges in Douai, Rome, Paris, and Madrid, as well as the three Schottenklöster (Benedictine monasteries taken over by Scottish abbots) in southern Germany. They were originally intended to educate Scots gentlemen and to train Roman Catholic priests.

With the imposition of penal laws against Roman Catholics in Scotland, these institutions took on a missionary role and, depending on the fortunes of the house of Stuart, a political purpose in aiding the cause of Charles I against parliament or effecting a restoration of one or other of his male descendants.

The role of the Scots colleges and abbeys was a mixed one and one that shifted over time. With the demise of the Jacobite cause in the eighteenth century, the personnel of the Scots colleges came to the realization that their efforts on behalf of the Stuart dynasty had hampered their ability to support their coreligionists at home—to the point where this “nearly led to the ex-
tinction of Catholicism in Scotland.” Indeed it was the association of the Scottish mission with Jacobitism that brought the full force of the penal laws against the Roman Catholics in Scotland.

There is, then, no clear answer to the question posed by Mr. McInally’s title: the Scots colleges and abbeys furnished both missionaries and soldiers (of a nonmilitary sort) whose loyalties were often involved in conflicts that may have been difficult at the time to perceive.


Mr. McKeon adapts Ronald Paulson’s concept of breaking and remaking the forms of art: later artists break the icons of idealized and exclusionary art forms and use their shards to fabricate quotidian and utilitarian forms. Something like that, Mr. McKeon argues, happens with Protestant iconoclasm. Tudor and (pre-Anne) Stuart absolutism used the civil sphere benignly to order the religious sphere. Dissatisfaction with political and religious absolutism encouraged discontent with the notion “that the civil and religious were an ideal unity.” That union indeed was often thought idolatrous and a block to an individual’s access to God’s word. After the Reformation, the English civil war, and the Restoration, the model of religious life changed from “a vision of privileged human access to the otherworldly” to “the place of ethical behavior in daily experience here below.” This is part of the culture’s “historical movement from premodern to modern.”

Mr. McKeon twice alludes to the very large body of scholarship for and against the secularization hypothesis, but neither cites nor considers its arguments or evidence. Instead, he proceeds as if there is, and therefore can be “documented,” a linear ascent from absolutism in church and state to liberal secularism in church and state as a “fundamental historical phenomenon” that detaches the civil from the religious. This densely written version of Whig historiography included “a mental habit of empirical skepticism in all spheres,” an “evisceration of . . . [the Church of England’s] episcopal government,” the “widespread local adoption of Puritan ecclesiastical reforms,” and the melding of arguments on trade, dissent, and freedom of the press. For Mr. McKeon, though, secularization may be seen “not as an antagonist of religion but as its enabling condition of possibility.”

There is much to be said for these concepts and much to be said against them and against Mr. McKeon’s mode of proceeding. He cites relatively few sources to support his argument, avoids countervailing evidence and points of view, and too easily insists that the civil and the religious blended into liberal institutions by the end of the seventeenth century. Secularism, however defined, advanced in an erratic rather than continuous line, met far more resistance than Mr. McKeon acknowledges, and left powerful remnants of religious authority both in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The High Church did not go gentle into what they thought a dark night. The Church of England was instrumental in bringing down James II. The Revolution Church joined in royal needs: William III influenced religious toleration by preferring Cambridge and lower church bishops to Oxford and higher church bishops. Bishops sat, and twenty-six still sit, in the
House of Lords. The Church retained and used its power to excommunicate those who violated its laws. It controlled the marriage ceremony and what constituted a legal marriage. Within fifteen days of admission to Oxford a young man of at least sixteen was required to subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles. Popular polemics by Charles Leslie, Henry Sacheverell, and many others made strong cases against liberalizing religion: Dissenters’ wealth was not a reason to tolerate them; it was a sign of their moral corruption. Early in the eighteenth century Church-backed Tory Members of Parliament passed Occasional Conformity bills three times and were blocked only by Whigs in the Lords, 1702–1703, and by the court, 1704. For many both in and out of the church, the civil and the religious were and should be cognate. George Ridpath stated a commonplace in Considerations upon the Union of the Two Kingdoms (1706): “the Church of England is so considerable a part of the State, and has such a mighty influence upon it, that she has her Bishops in the House of Lords, and near 1000 Clergy-mens (sic) Votes for Members in the House of Commons.” John Groome’s The Dignity and Honour of the Clergy (1710) also repeated another commonplace, that “Bishops have been, and are now, of Her Majesty’s Privy Council.” The Lords Spiritual must join the Lords Temporal because they are intimately connected; injuring one injures the other and weakens the state. The Sacheverell trial hinged in part on his insistence that the Church was in danger. To do so implies that the church and state were not as one and makes such a person an enemy of the crown, the church, and the kingdom. Fundamental historical phenomena are fundamentally complex.

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It was natural for Covenanting Scots to seek out their Dutch coreligionists in the sixteenth century. There were educational ties as well, with large numbers of Scots studying medicine and law in particular at Leiden, Franeker, Groningen, and Utrecht—to the point that the Dutch universities were “effectively a sixth Scottish university.” There was obviously a commercial dimension, both in trade and the presence of many Scots merchants in the Republic. The Dutch also “provided Scotland with the model of a successful, small Protestant nation with a vibrant economy and a vast trading empire.” When measures to revive the Scottish economy were introduced after the Restoration, Scottish mercantile-imperial ventures in Nova Scotia and elsewhere in the Americas followed the Dutch example, and many Scots also gravitated to the Dutch colonies.

The parliamentary union of England and Scotland in 1707 altered relations between the Dutch and the Scots, but other forces were present, including Dutch imperial failures, such as the loss of New Netherland and Brazil. The relationship nevertheless survived, contributing to the commerce and cosmopolitanism of both.


A document Mr. Miyoshi has discovered in the Birmingham Archdiocesan Archives further emphasizes the impecunious state of the King’s Company, one of the two major London Restoration theaters and the
theater from which Dryden, its leading playwright, defected, “foreseeing the company’s bankruptcy.” The company’s financial condition and that of its principals, like veteran actor Michael Mohun, were identical, so even a five-shilling poll tax imposed on Mohun in May 1678 by the hitherto unpublished document, would have been onerous. Rubbing salt in the wound for the Catholic actor would have been the purpose of the levy, “to raise money for a war against the French king.”


Ms. Murphy points out what seems a striking contradiction in the public culture of those decades. On one hand, there were many denunciations of dishonest stock jobbers, greedy “monied men,” and new financial instruments in the press, together with urgent calls for tighter government regulation of the securities market. The new class of investment operatives included speculators, social upstarts, and foreigners who threatened established social order and might over time undercut national sovereignty. On the other hand, despite regular hand-wringing in Parliament, only two substantive regulatory acts were passed (1697, 1734) and even those lacked adequate mechanisms for enforcement.

What accounts for this evident discrepancy? Certainly the new financiers found able defenders who praised free markets and stressed the social utility of capital formation to advance constructive enterprises. However, Ms. Murphy argues, it is necessary to recognize the ambivalent role of the government itself in the new financial marketplace. The institutionalization of national debt from the 1690s onward and the government’s increasing dependence on debt-financing to conduct foreign wars in effect made the government a partner in the new arrangements. Over time buying government bonds would become a respectable form of investment and even patriotic. It was difficult then (as it is now) for government to regulate stringently financial players and monetary instruments on which it depended as a beneficiary.
the sugar plantations not wedded to Scottish connections and of limited social and economic impact when they returned to Scotland (in contrast to the extensive Scottish mercantile network that arose later in the eighteenth century).

This essay fills a modest gap in Scottish mercantile and imperial history.


This article is at once a scholarly exploration and a detective story. It begins with a unique octavo notebook, now in the Winchester College Fellows’ Library, which contains a miscellaneous collection of handwritten poems, all dating from around 1719. Ms. Quinault is able to conclude quickly that the collection, earlier ascribed to “F. Cross,” possibly a clergyman, in fact belonged to a woman, one Frances Cross. This only deepens the mystery: who was the previously unnoticed Frances Cross?

Surviving life records of Cross are almost nonexistent. However, a pattern of circumstantial evidence connects her with Warwickshire and more particularly with Lady Anne Coventry, a woman who was known for assisting female servants, spinsters, and needy others to receive schooling. Cross was likely a protégée of Lady Anne, but whether as a servant, a schoolmistress, someone’s poor relation, or whatever, is unknown.

The other source of knowledge about Cross is of course the notebook itself: there she copied out verses she admired and also included a variety of her own compositions. Ms. Quinault uses her considerable acquaintance with manuscript culture to provide context for Cross’s accomplishments. Some of the poet’s efforts are conventional for the period—a caution against melancholy, verse celebrations of friendships, marriages, religious faith. More distinctive are her friendly exchanges of verse with minor poet William Somervile. Ms. Quinault argues that Cross’s satires also deserve special regard for both their political awareness and their asperity. Her ballad exposing the contentions between George I and the Prince of Wales dramatizes her fierce disapproval of the Hanoverians and reveals her own status as a nonjuror. In another piece she unleashed her contempt on a Whiggish clergyman named Robert Pearce, condemning him to hell.

Ms. Quinault makes a persuasive case, even though it rests on unprovable suppositions. And if the mystery of Frances Cross’s identity cannot finally be solved, still her notebook in itself demonstrates the vitality of manuscript culture and the fact that women could enjoy more latitude of expression in manuscripts than they customarily could in print.


Mr. Rawson significantly places the English mock-heroic in the context of national sensibilities. Boileau’s French poem Le Lutrin (1674) offered English poets a powerful model for avoiding the glorification of military carnage associated with the epic. But Mr. Rawson points out their very different national preoccupations. Boileau was not concerned primarily with violence in the epic tradition, but with deeply flawed modern attempts to write epics. Despite his claim that one can be a hero without ravaging the earth, Boileau exhibits what Mr. Rawson calls a “heated triumphalism of French arms” in other
works such as “Ode Against the English” (1656). Where he mocks the carnage of modern epics in Brébeuf’s translation of Lucan, for example, he finds fault not with the gore, but with the extravagant writing.

In contrast, Mr. Rawson traces a strong antimilitary strain in English poets, including Milton. He points out that where Boileau uses the terms “Hero” and “Great” without irony, Pope and Fielding famously use them sarcastically. Matthew Prior’s *An English Ballad* (1695) confronted the French poet by printing his *Ode Sur la Prise de Namur, Par les Armes du Roy, L’Année 1692* on the facing page. Prior’s “Ballad” deheroizes the English victory without irony, Mr. Rawson argues, losing its celebrative force. The effect is to make Boileau seem excessive with his pompous diction. In yet another irony, then, he is implicitly accused of the same windy rhetoric that he castigates in other modern writers. Prior goes on to stress, not French corpses, but the survival of English soldiers. Mr. Rawson identifies Prior’s poem as an early example of a series of paeans to Stuart peace, culminating in Pope’s *Windsor Forest*.

Mr. Rawson reminds us that the “reciprocities of national insult” between English and French writers are complex, as are the slippery distinctions between the epic and mock-heroic poetry.

Read, Sophie. “Rhetoric and Rethinking in Bentley’s *Paradise Lost*,” *CQ*, 41 (June 2012), 209–228.

Nearly three hundred years after the publication of his notorious *Paradise Lost*, Bentley continues to fascinate. Until recently scholars had based their assessment of his labors on his annotations to a copy of the two-volume Tonson edition of 1720 and accepted his assertion that work on his own edition of 1732 had been carried out in some haste. The recent discovery of Bentley’s annotated copy of the 1674 edition of the poem, with annotations predating those of the later edition, suggests instead that his own resulted from a much longer period of revision and “correction.”

With acute sensitivity, Ms. Read explores the cognitive unfolding process, as Bentley wrestled with the poem and its imagined editor, amanuenses, and oral readers, whose carelessness and inattention had apparently introduced so many errors into Milton’s text. She adopts recent studies on rhetoric and cognition to narrate first the thinking that unfolds in the poem and then what Ms. Read calls, with admirable restraint, Bentley’s “profoundly active reading” of the poem. The result is an intriguing and often sympathetic illumination of the edition’s “provocatively antagonistic dynamic and its air of strange immediacy.” Many have observed Bentley’s resistance to rhetorical figure and his incapacity to follow Milton’s mind into the ineffable, but Ms. Read takes us skillfully into that engagement, observing closely as Bentley attempts to imagine “that an error or a lapse might be caught and corrected on its way from the poet’s mouth to the scribe’s pen.” In pained recognition, we watch as the scholar, in the presence of a work that pushes into “the boundaries of conception, thinks itself, in fact, into an entirely new metaphorical space,” privileges instead syntax, propriety, literalism, and learning—and is defeated. Ms. Read invites us, while contemplating the fun-house-mirror version of editorial judgment run amok, to watch for any signs of our own reflections.


After a long and informative survey of eighteenth-century critics’ and dramatists’ uneasiness with gore on stage (especially the Shakespearean stage), Mr. Shapira finds that Horace Walpole’s deliberate deflection of attention in *Otranto* away from young Conrad’s corpse toward the armor that has crushed him embodies the period’s unease with the physicality of death, evidenced also in the decline of grisly public executions and new funerary practices.

Readers will thus find here little new insight into Walpole’s gothic story—the supposed subject of this essay—but much useful information about changing attitudes to death and its literary representation.


“He curses like a sailor” encapsulates the proverbial notion that seamen are an unsavory lot. From 1661 onward, with the introduction into the *Book of Common Prayer* of “Forms of Prayer to be used at Sea,” the Anglican church undertook to interlace the growing importance of a mercantile navy (and the military navy that supported it) with religious instruction. While Christian and mercantile values might seem to clash, Mr. Siroti’s substantial evidence shows that Anglican clerics saw the situation differently; as efforts were made to reform society at home, they were mirrored by efforts to ensure that all those involved in the mercantile industry—seamen and soldiers, but also those civilians who established and then lived in the trading factories abroad—were instructed in Anglican morality. Moreover, and most tellingly, the “nationalist objectives . . . readily opened up onto a more capacious humanitarianism. The eighteenth-century ‘age of benevolence,’ it might be said, originated in the attempt to render the insular notions of English national identity somewhat more seaworthy.”

Mr. Siroti catalogues some of the many books, pamphlets, and sermons specifically directed toward seamen; at least on Sundays, ships became sailing churches. Perhaps most poignant is the reminder in most of these tracts of the perils of seafaring, the necessity for relying on providence so much more at sea than on dry land. Because the church defined its mission as the reform of those who were the trading representatives of England, missionary or evangelical activity with native inhabitants was negligible: quoting Gilbert Burnet in 1704, “Our designs upon aliens and infidels must begin in the instructing and reforming of our own people.” The most important point of Mr. Siroti’s well-documented argument is that the Anglican clergy in no way suggested an “alternative imperialism. Despite their ostentatiously confessional ideals, these figures did not seek to displace the commercial and geopolitical logic of English expansion. . . .” They reaffirmed, rather, “the overwhelmingly public interest in promoting trade and navigation.” What they also did, however, was to translate to the oceanic empire the increasing benevolence that was a hallmark of the century. While one might suspect any compromise between God and mammon, it may also be that an Anglican-sponsored mercantilism actually improved the moral lives of many; as Brecht would argue, “first feed the belly, then teach right from wrong.” Or, as Mr. Siroti concludes:
“An empire at once Protestant, maritime, and commercial was always, if not quite a contradiction in terms, at least a work in progress.”

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Mr. James Greenshields, a Scot who was ordained an Anglican priest by the deprived Bishop of Ross in 1694, served as a curate in Ireland before returning to Scotland in 1709. He provocatively celebrated the Church of England liturgy in Edinburgh, prompting the suppression of Episcopalian meeting houses by the city magistrates. Greenshields argued that he was a Church of England clergyman ministering to English people in Edinburgh according to the rites of their own church, beyond the reach of the Presbyterian Church that had been established in Scotland under the settlement of 1689–1690. He took his case as far as the House of Lords, and won—in spite of the fact that it was not clear that he was, in fact, a priest of the English church (or indeed of any church, if the Bishop of Ross’s deprivation had stripped him of all authority).

Greenshields’s prosecution reveals a number of tensions, primarily the sensitivity of Scottish Presbyterians to any perceived attempt to anglicize their country in matters religious or cultural. Presbyterianism was an integral part of Scottish national identity and arose from the sense that Scotland’s Reformation had been the purest and most complete in Europe. Mr. Stephens suggests that the common Protestantism of Scotland and England did not help to forge “a common British identity in the eighteenth century” (as some have argued), but rather to emphasize national differences. The Kirk of Scotland saw the use of English rites as part of a Jacobite assault on the Revolution settlement, made worse by the fact that most of the papist Pretender’s supporters were not actually his coreligionists. The Union of Parliaments in 1707 (just two years before Greenshields arrived in Edinburgh) heightened fears that Scottish identity (cultural, religious, national) was under threat from alien forces, whether English or Jacobite or both.

Many Scottish Episcopalians preferred the Scottish Prayer Book of 1637 (notwithstanding the troubles that had accompanied the initial attempt to impose it in Scotland). Greenshields was vindicated in court and also by the Scottish Toleration Act of 1712, which ended the Kirk’s monopoly on religious practice in Scotland. The legislation gave religious freedom only to those willing to swear the oaths and follow the English liturgy, however. This did not comfort the majority of Scottish Episcopalians, who were nonjurors and supporters of the 1637 liturgy. Continued “divisions over liturgical usages” among Scottish Episcopalians inflicted “long-term losses” in preventing the forging of a common Anglican/Episcopalian identity.

Mr. Stephen navigates the confessional and cultural divides with aplomb, fleshing out the otherwise “sparse” historiography of the Greenshields case and its context.


The Old Pretender (King James III and
VIII, if you prefer) has never had good press. His life and long ‘reign’ lacked much of the drama and incident of his father’s; his personality, the tragic glamour of his son, Bonnie Prince Charlie, for example. Cautious and dull, James Francis Edward Stuart nevertheless was, in the end, more accomplished than he is generally given credit for.

Although Jacobitism was “a fundamentally military phenomenon,” James’s military record has unsurprisingly been judged on the basis of its failures. Contemporary observers were divided on his merits. James’s opponents saw him as an unmanly coward, weeping almost from the beginning of the aborted Jacobite rising in 1715–1716, while his supporters viewed him as brave, handsome, and full of mettle. Historians (until recently Mr. Szechi included, he admits) have tended to take the former view, largely on the basis of A True Account of the Proceedings at Perth (1716), probably by Defoe and almost certainly a polemical, pro-Hanoverian fabrication. A more objective look is required.

James’s military failures in 1708 and 1715, Mr. Szechi points out, were as much the product of bad luck and the unhelpfulness of Louis XIV as anything. The Old Pretender’s record in the military service of France in the years between 1708 and 1715 shows him to have been intrepid and courageous, especially at the battle of Malplaquet. Mr. Szechi concludes that while James was not a military hero, he had sufficient experience to make him a competent commander. Thus, his conduct of the campaign in 1715–1716, while not above criticism, was based on a realistic assessment of the realities of the situation. The retreat of his forces from Perth, then, was not an act of cowardice, but a dispassionate and strategically sound decision. After the collapse of the ’15, James’s attention turned—of necessity—to the political and the diplomatic front. Even the “dash” of 1727, when he rushed from exile in Bologna to Lorraine to see if the death of George I created an opportunity for a Stuart restoration, was rational, if desperate.

Mr. Szechi salutarily corrects the usual view of James as useless. We are also reminded of the dangers of determinism: the Hanoverian hold on the thrones of their new realms was probably shakier in the early years of the century than we have often been led to believe, and the potential “military effectiveness” of the Jacobite cause stronger. Even after the supposedly terminal defeat of James’s son at Culloden in 1746, the victorious Duke of Cumberland expressed the view that the Highlands could yet be the cause of “the ruin of this island and our family.”


Once “portrayed as a sentimentalized cause with little or no hope of success,” Jacobitism is now recognized as a “serious political and cultural force” in Scotland, the rest of Britain, and mainland Europe. It is, in fact, necessary now to turn to the “serious study” of the “mentalités of anti-Jacobitism” in order to reconstruct it—something unthinkable to a Macaulay or even a Trevor-Roper. Mr. Whatley also notes the need to overcome the “determination” of some historians to minimize “the support there was in early eighteenth-century Scotland for the Hanoverians.” Mindful of the risks of using case studies to establish “the ideological basis on which many of Scotland’s anti-Jacobites
mobilized in support” of the Hanoverian regime, he nonetheless convinces us that his two examples are “representative of large segments of Scotland’s anti-Jacobite constituency.”

In the Revd. George Ogilvy, a Presbyterian minister, Mr. Whatley identifies the religious tradition that underpinned Whiggism in Scotland. Presbyterian preachers had been ejected from their manses with the restoration of episcopacy in 1662 and were the subject of repression during the reigns of Charles II and James VII. Even after the establishment of their church at the Revolution, they suffered from harassment at the hands of their Episcopalian (and Jacobite) opponents, whose meeting houses remained open in breach of the law but with the blessing of landowners and magistrates. For clerics like Ogilvy and for many more secular Whigs, Jacobitism meant not only arbitrary government, but also popery (or at least its “sister in malignancy,” the Episcopal Church).

If religion was one aspect of Scottish Whig ideology, another was “landed leadership.” Many of the great magnates were Jacobites, but there was a small group of Presbyterian Whig nobles centered on the Campbell clan, as well as a larger group of minor nobility, untitled landowners, and town merchants. Typical of these, Mr. Whatley suggests, was William Bennet of Grubbet, a Borders laird and MP, whose commitment to “political liberty,” commerce and the Union made him support the post-1688 order. It would be worth expanding this study’s range.

**BOOK REVIEWS**


Swiftians have long admired Mr. Rawson. From *Gulliver and the Gentle Reader* of 1973 through dozens of essays, introductions, full-length books and reviews, we have seen him applying a formidable intellect and impressive forensic powers to Swift’s texts and to the work of those who write about or edit them. More recently, of course, he is the presiding spirit behind the new eighteen-volume *Cambridge Edition of the Works of Jonathan Swift*. Acute critical discernment and wide range of reference lie behind everything he has written—which, of course, extends well beyond Swift into Augustan literature and politics as a whole, and into the work of many modern writers. *Swift’s Angers* is just one in a long line of influential assessments of satirists, novelists, and poets.

Though eight of its eleven chapters are reworked versions of material that has appeared elsewhere, *Swift’s Angers* is intended to be more than a reprise of Mr. Rawson’s work on Swift and to show a consistency in his thinking on Swift and anger. Thus the book explores not just what made Swift angry at various times in his life but also the rhetorical strategies he employed to manipulate his readers and so make them feel his hate or anger or dislike or contempt—even if these emotions were self-implicating. Mr. Rawson is particularly interested in what we used to call “tone”—that is, the nuances and registers of Swift’s language. We all know Swift was often an angry man, but Mr. Rawson’s emphasis on how he paraded or hid his animosities, on what it means to say his indignation was