RECENT ARTICLES*

ADDISON


Intended for general readers, this essay offers a range of positive comments from eighteenth-century admirers to show Addison’s high reputation as a moralist, stylist, and thinker. Why, then, has Addison more recently received mostly faint or grudging praises? What changed his reputation so radically?

Mr. Miller points an accusing finger at influential twentieth-century critics, particularly T. S. Eliot, who saw Addison as facile and smug, complacent and comfortably middle-class. He goes on to argue recuperatively that Addison deserves to be read and appreciated in the context of his highly politicized and contentious times. He was ahead of his contemporaries in many of his interests, particularly in his understanding of the marketplace economy, and his various writings, especially his Spectator essays, reflected his important role as a polite, reasonable, and calming presence amidst an unsettling and dangerous cacophony of voices. Credit where credit is due, then.

BEHN

ADCOCK, RACHEL. “‘Jack Presbyter in His Proper Habit’: Subverting Whig Rhetoric in Aphra Behn’s Roundheads (1682),” WoWr, 22 (2015), 34–55.

In late 1681 or early 1682, during the political chaos of the Exclusion crisis and the Titus Oates debacle, The Roundheads was part of “a propaganda battle between Whig and Tory sympathizers,” with Behn adapting John Tatham’s The Rump (1660) to make her points. She uses the ghost of Hewson, for example, to introduce the play, mocking the “Presbittery” that he had so strongly supported in the revolt that led to the execution of the king and the founding of the Commonwealth. Behn focuses on the last days of the Commonwealth, as did Tatham, using satire and farce to reveal its leaders as clinging to the wealth extracted from the Tories, along with the lasciviousness with which they sought Tory women—or any women. What may appear to be a contemporizing of an old play is not so simple, as Ms. Adcock illustrates.

It is rare to encounter a study of any of Behn’s plays that covers as much ground so quickly, an intense and concise study of text, context, and subtext. Ms. Adcock

* Unsigned reviews are by the editors.
clarifies the chaotic political scene that provoked the writing of the play, providing illustrations that serve her argument well, such as Stephen College’s infamous “Sol-enn Mock Procession of the Pope, Cardi-
nalls, Jesuits . . . November ye 17th, 1679.” Ms. Adcock contextualizes both Hewson’s prologue and Behn’s dedication to illuminate Behn’s appeal to the dedicatee, Henry Fitzroy, the Duke of Grafton (one of the King’s sons by Barbara Villiers Palmer, Lady Castlemaine) for his protection against the “Legions” that have been “drawn down . . . upon its head, for its Loyalty.”

Turning to the play itself, Ms. Adcock focuses especially on Ananias Gogle, the hypocritical Puritan preacher, who grasps gold and female flesh with equal rapacity. However, establishing that Behn believed the “Whig non-conformists” presented a greater threat to the social fabric than did the Jesuits, Ms. Adcock reads the end of the play as less than a celebration of Tory victory. With chilling ambiguity, Lady Lambert bids farewell to her “dear Mansion” and all “hopes of Royalty,” but she nonetheless accepts Loveless and his newly restored fortunes, whereas Lady Desbro’ accepts only the “Protection” of Freeman. The suggestion that Tory victors are little better than Whig losers, that Tory greed and sexual aggressiveness match that of the Whigs, ends a play that has in its fifth act a parliament of women who, alas, had clearly hoped for a different world. The clarity of Ms. Adcock’s thesis, the cogency of her argument, and the precision of her supporting evidence combine into not just a first-rate study of Behn’s Roundheads but also model scholarship and presentation.


Discussions of Behn’s relationship to Lord Rochester are inherently unsatisfying. Behn is effusive in her praise of him; he, silent on her. Celebrity further clouds the issue. Ms. Ballaster rightfully notes that even Behn’s praise of Rochester must be treated as strategic, full of artful elisions: Rochester’s name “is a charm that is often conjured by Aphra Behn, both to summon his presence but also to dissipate it in pursuit of her own fame.” How can we make sense of this charged relationship, and why is it important that we do so?

Ms. Ballaster suggests what is at stake may in part be prurient. We have ample testimony in Behn’s work of Rochester’s charm; we seem driven to find evidence of Behn’s equal effect on him, that her desire was requited. On the surface, Ms. Ballaster fittingly courts this reading, but coyly. The first section, “Rochester on Behn,” and the second, “Behn on Rochester,” offer sexual innuendo. But if she seems to be asking “who’s on top,” she does so only to draw attention to the limits of that question. As she bluntly notes: “[T]here is no record of Rochester passing comment on either Aphra Behn or her works in manuscript or print.” Rather, she argues, our focus should be on how Behn makes use of Rochester’s image, particularly after his death, and how the creative license she takes constructs a strain of poetic feminism that lived on long after his influence waned.

Indeed, according to Ms. Ballaster, Behn’s “poetic emulation” of Rochester proves most powerful—indeed “charm-[ing]” in its own right—when Rochester is in a disembodied state, when both he and a libertine ethos can be physically disconnected from her deployment of a libertine aesthetics. In this formulation, the charm
of the libertine voice can be replaced by the “special powers of influence and attraction” exercised in poetic verse and made possible through Lucretian atomism. What Rochester claimed in person, she can claim in verse, and here female desires need not be requited. In other words, we do not need to know whether Rochester approved of Behn or even liked her in order to make their relationship satisfying. Ms. Ballaster provocatively notes that Rochester “stimulat[ed] through his ghostly rather than his living presence,” and “the passion-centered writing of Rochester enabled women to pursue the sublime in literature for which they are described as particularly apt.” Liberated from the physicality of Rochester’s libertine ethos, Behn can use Rochester’s seductive speech as “pretext for her image of her own art” and “generate androgynous and bisexual literary performances in her own.” Thus Rochester’s best couplings may have been after his death and in the couplets of women poets inspired by his poetic charm.


Ms. Bowles’s examination of Behn’s “satiric interrogation” of “defect” focuses on The Dumb Virgin; Or, The Force of Imagination, one of two Behn novellas that have become staples in the field of disability studies since the publication of “Defects”: Engendering the Modern Body (2000). Felicity Nussbaum positioned this work—as well as the shorter Unfortunate Bride—as central to an emerging early modern canon of disability studies, while at the same time confirming Behn’s longstanding reputation as a writer who consistently complicated the categories of her period, most notably gendered ones. Ms. Bowles picks up this important thread here, first seeming poised to move the discussion toward the recent focus on the universalizing experience of disability—a reframing of the human body as variable—rather than on particular disabled bodies. Nussbaum’s earlier work had already emphasized the pliability of Behn’s defective categories and the way bodily difference functioned as a synecdoche for the female condition. Readings of Behn, then, are ripe for reframing, and beginning in that vein (asking “who creates defect or disability?”), Ms. Bowles situates Behn’s representation of two disabled sisters—one mute, one deformed in limb—as an interrogation of the medical models of the period and their “broader sense that women’s bodies simply replicated male bodies in a defective, different form.”

At times, Ms. Bowles delivers on the promise of a more universalizing perspective. She notes that the interloper, Dangerfield, finds desirable both of the female characters’ “defective” selves. In both cases, Behn establishes a radical “economy in which women are in fact more valued for their defects,” and desire itself, undisciplined by bodily regularity, becomes heightened through an acknowledgment of human variability. Ms. Bowles observes that the novella is “most instructive in its modification and response to the marginalization of the disabled.”

The use of Judith Butler’s Bodies That Matter takes this argument in a more intriguing and conservative direction than the essay initially suggests or Behn’s novella warrants. Focusing first on “maternal culpability” in the novella and a standard seventeenth-century reading of “fetal defect” emerging from female desire, Ms.
Bowles notes that Behn’s reading of disability is at best a satiric subversion of medical models of female defect. Behind the novella’s organizing, disciplinary structure, she sees the mother’s transgressive female desire as accountable for the sisters’ disabilities. “The defective women are the consequences of the mother’s failure to follow prescribed rules concerning the control of her imagination and her emotions,” and both the sisters are punished, especially the mute Maria, whose death follows unwitting incest with her brother. She rightfully draws attention to how Behn satirizes this regulatory system, and in particular, how silenced, objectified women are harmed by it, but in doing so, she detracts from Behn’s more radical argument, that desire itself remains unregulated by a normative definition of the body. Rather, Behn seems to be asking us to acknowledge that bodily difference itself generates desire and that the binary of the sisters does not reinforce a normative definition but expands it. Unfortunately, Ms. Bowles’s essay remains rooted in a reading that may not do justice to Behn’s enabling imagination.


Much of Ms. Harol’s argument here turns on the words passion and passive, which derive from the same root but have long since diverged in meaning. Oroonoko and the narrator are seen in this analysis as passive characters, “part of the complex Loyalist counter-theorization to emergent Whig orthodoxy about political subjectivity.” Oroonoko’s heroic actions are seen as unimportant to the plot; even the planned escape of the slave families and the death of his wife are considered “not so much actions as withdrawals from the theater of action.” Oroonoko is a passive character—but not completely. The story combines romance and allegory in search of novelistic realism, with star-crossed lovers and blocking senex amans dominating the Coramantien scenes but yielding first to the king’s cruelty and then to the viciousness of Surinam. Ms. Harol posits that there is no cause-and-effect connection between Oroonoko’s betrayal of his king and grandfather and what he suffers in the New World. Instead the novel turns on its “conflict between honor . . . and contract,” with truth and realism part of the latter. Yet, in this conflict the narrator undercuts her hero, her own reliability, and the plot itself. Key to the first part of the story is Oroonoko’s breaching the otan to be with his beloved. The consummation must be read as honoring his de futuro contract, an agreement the two young lovers had already made without the grandfather’s blessing, but binding nonetheless. The narrator calls specific attention to this: “for Imoinda being his lawful Wife, by solemn Contract . . .”

The old king lies to Oroonoko with impunity, and lying becomes the second focus of this essay. Ms. Harol points out that Oroonoko, often seen as the “victim” of the untruthful Christians, is himself a liar—starting with his invasion of the otan, after which he counsels Imoinda to be untruthful to the King, saying she was forced. More telling is Oroonoko’s lying to himself as he abandons his wife to the wrath of the King and retreats like a coward back to his troops. And finally, the old king’s strategic political lie about Imoinda’s supposed death somewhat assuages his grandson, who is cajoled back to the battlefield.

In addition, drawing on “the residual mode of baroque allegory,” Ms. Harol sees
an intersection of romance and realism, finding Oroonoko lacking agency in both. What comes through is a sensuous presentation of the body, usually used in baroque art for religious purposes, entwined with a sensual presentation, almost always used for titillation. In fact, the essay’s title, “The Passion of Oroonoko,” complicates this ambiguity by combining sexual desire with suffering akin to Christ’s.

As Ms. Harol sees it, both narrator and hero are liars and passive figures. Oroonoko’s “passion” derives from his objectification, suffering, and death. The narrator, too, is passive, and she also lies, often through omission. Thus we have a novel in which the author undercuts heroism claimed by the narrator and shows at the end not a Christ-like hero in a Passion, but rather a destroyed prince whose world had shifted without his knowledge—a failure. Behn scholars will be arguing about this deeply researched and tightly argued essay for a while.

HULTQUIST, ALEKSONDRA. “Adapting Desires in Aphra Behn’s The History of the Nun,” ECent, 56 (Winter 2015), 485–506.

Ms. Hultquist juxtaposes Behn’s short 1689 novel with Southerne’s and Garrick’s stage presentations and Jane Barker’s 1726 retelling in “Philinda’s Story out of the Book” in The Lining of the Patch-Work Screen. She also identifies two previously unrecognized iterations of the same plot, a simplified retelling in The Universal Spectator (1726), and an even briefer redaction in The Gentleman’s Magazine (1731), a celebration of “Matrimonial Murders.” She applies adaptation theory (developed in cinema studies to tease out meaning between reinterpretations and originary texts), to locate an event that does not derive from the original, yet presents ideas that cannot be written out of it, thereby revealing an essential theme. Patriarchal repression—in the spousal neglect of later versions, the hateful treatment of Isabella’s father-in-law in Southerne’s version, or the demands of a religious-based virginity forced on an immature girl in Behn’s—is apparent in all the iterations discussed.

Well-written and carefully researched, this essay provides a good survey of scholarship on Behn’s short novel and its influence through the eighteenth century.


Is Isabella, Behn’s “fair vow-breaker,” an evil scheming woman or a victim of her own passions? Ms. Mathews struggles with this dilemma in a weakly argued and insufficiently documented study. The essay does deliver on its subtitle, since almost every breathless moment that Isabella “dies” (only to revive again) is chronicled—from her first encounter with Ville-noys, to her deceptive encounters leading to elopement with Henault, to her sudden miscarriage on his departure to the wars. The abundance of breathless, panting sexual desire along the way suggests this would make good theater, as Southerne recognized several years after Behn’s death.

Is it passion or profit that motivates Behn’s anti-heroine? Lurking behind much of Isabella’s suffering, but unacknowledged in this essay, are economic motivations, from Isabella’s securing her jewelry and some money from her Abbess-aunt to Henault’s becoming a soldier to regain his inheritance. At the end, when Isabella is unhinged by the return of the presumed-dead Henault, she weighs his poverty.
against her current luxury with Villenoys: “She sees Henault poor, and knew, she must fall from all the Glory and Tranquility she had for five happy Years triumph’d in.”

After all the sighs and faintings, Behn gives Isabella a calm final paragraph for her beheading. The novel ends with the “death then of a beautiful woman,” in Edgar Allan Poe’s chilling words, “unquestionably the most poetical topic in the world.” More might have been made of the emotional agonies in this story, both male and female; we may be seeing the “man of feeling” here before his time.


Oroonoko’s much-debated dismemberment and killing by the English colonists must be read for more than just narrative exigency, but through the lens of a history of pain and judicial torture. Ms. Richards asks two questions: does the representation of violence to Oroonoko’s body risk reproducing it, and if so, why does Behn risk it? Ms. Richards reviews previous critical arguments and a history of the novel’s reception in order to answer these questions and pose an alternative view. Previous critics have viewed the torture scene as a warning against rebellion, or (considering the political environment of the 1680s) a warning against the abuse of sovereign power. Southerne’s dramatic adaptation, however, recasts it as a humanitarian text, a perspective that persisted through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, especially for feminist readers. This focus has led in part to the excision of the death scene in adaptations and the prevailing reading of Oroonoko’s demise as martyrdom. Ms. Richards argues that such an approach unintentionally defuses the original violence of dismemberment that Behn intended.

Behn thus deliberately strips Oroonoko of any heroic status, viewing his death as a result of a series of failures; the spectacle of a body in pain as the product of judicial torture systematically employed to represent power. Ms. Richards carefully delineates the history of torture in seventeenth-century England, which culminated in the 1680s, and describes how Behn used details from the executions of William Howard, Viscount Stafford, and the Duke of Monmouth to portray Oroonoko’s death as a metaphoric warning against unbridled sovereign power in an unstable political environment.

Ms. Richards also compares the details of Oroonoko’s torture to that inflicted on West Indian slaves. The more the tortured resisted giving in to pain, as Oroonoko resists, the more they seemed responsible for its prolongation, thus producing “a perverse agency” for the individual being tortured.

Given the history of European judicial torture, Ms. Richards asserts that the spectacle of judicial torture in Oroonoko lends credibility to Behn’s story but also reveals its fictionality. She blends close textual reading with an innovative theoretical framework to arrive at important new insights.

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In the world of scholarship, Open Access (OA) journals are overtaking our commitment to print medium. Such a journal is ABO: Interactive Journal for Women in the Arts, 1640–1830, the journal of the Aphra
Behn Society, edited by Ms. Runge since its launching in 2011. In her article proposing open access, Ms. Runge explores the issues and concerns about such online publication with clarity and precision and without the usual jargon. Challenging the possibly out-of-date responses about the value of web publication, Ms. Runge points out that the quality of online publication can be made commensurate with that of print publication if careful standards are instituted. Online articles also add a potential for reader responses, providing an interactive scholarship now rare except in a review journal like The Scriblerian, which offers post-publication reviews of articles, not just books. This overview will be important to would-be online publishers, as well as those concerned with control of OA publications and their evaluation by tenure-and-promotion committees.


In Oroonoko, The Fair Jilt, or The History of the Nun, the narrator is at the crux of complications that fuel interpretation. What does the narrator know, when did she come to know it, and how do we know she knows? In all three works, the word History in the title or subtitle emphasizes a truth claim further supported by the narrator herself.

Empirical thinking’s rise at the end of the seventeenth century is brought to the forefront in its fictions as well as its reality. When Sir Edmund Bury-Godfrey, shortly after taking depositions in the early stages of the Popish Plot, was found dead in a ditch with signs of strangulation and transfixed by his sword, some sought a verdict of suicide. Ten years later, a year before publishing The History of the Nun, Behn praised L’Estrange’s Third Part of the History of the Times for espousing this conclusion: “Who like a pitying God, does Truth advance, / Rescuing the World from stupid Ignorance.” The word History is again in a title, and Behn’s response suggests that L’Estrange, like an omniscient God, pities mere mortals’ inability to comprehend “reality.”

Ms. Sahni questions “whether detection of crimes requires God’s assistance, empirical observations, or adroit calculations of probability,” ignoring Behn’s take on Bury-Godfrey’s death. Rather, in search of “the problem of knowledge,” she starts with Behn’s dedication to Hortense Mancini, Duchess of Mazarine, and raises the question of what literary historians can know. Can we know that Mancini is one of Behn’s “patrons” simply because Behn dedicates the work to her? Even if Behn knew herself to be close to death at the time, would she have aimed “to provide Mancini with new insights into her own offences,” as Ms. Sahni argues? Mancini’s “offenses” were both public and private, as she herself details in her 1676 Memoirs. Mancini left an abusive marriage and was consigned to a convent for a time before she escaped, thanks to several patrons and lovers. She had been forced to marry at fifteen, so Behn’s warning that “Nunneries and Marriages were not to be enter’d into, till the Maid, so destin’d, were of a mature Age to make her own Choice” is apt, but not necessarily evidence of, or support for, Mancini’s “offenses.”

Ms. Sahni correctly sees that problems of knowledge and selfhood were seeping into the age’s discourses, an oft-discussed paradigm shift unnerving to those who sought certitude. According to Ms. Sahni, Behn entwined the “problem of knowledge” with the “problem of female self-knowledge” when she writes that Isabella
“fails to find a model of conduct or interpretation in the Christian scriptures or tradition, and pursues a transgressive passion that prompts more serious crimes.” Unfortunately, we never see Isabella seeking any “model of conduct” in any scripture, while any religious “model of conduct” would have been her unacceptable Abbess-aunt or her cell mate, Henault’s sister. Ms. Sahni’s statement does not reach the level of cause and effect, yet the implication is there: failing to find what she needs in “Christian scriptures or tradition,” Isabella transgresses to murder. Also suffering from “[e]pistemological uncertainties,” the narrator mixes providentialism with “empirical and probabilistic analyses,” in Ms. Sahni’s view.

Behn uses a providential revelation when the corpse of Villenoys opens its eyes and fixes them on Isabella, a sign from God of her guilt. While probabilistic analysis first suggests that Villenoys killed Henault and then committed suicide, epistemological certainty makes clear (as does Villenoys’s valet) that someone else had sewn to Villenoy’s collar the sack encasing the yet unidentified Henault, but there is no certainty until Henault’s exhumation. There is, then, no answer to the opening questions, and despite several good analyses of character and narrational voice, this essay cannot account for Behn’s oddly constructed story and its attempt to rationalize a woman’s path from pious nun to murderer, much less as one “generally Lamented and Honourably Bury’d.” Either Behn had a back story as she did in The Fair Jilt or she too hastily put together materials for the stage, resulting in a failed novel.

SONG, ERIC B. “Love Against Substitution: John Milton, Aphra Behn, and the Political Theology of Conjugal Narratives.” ELH, 80 (Fall 2013), 681–714.

This singularly insightful essay makes it difficult to imagine a different reading of Oroonoko, and is all the more impressive since its compelling perspective applies to Milton’s Paradise Lost, as well. This key comparison productively couples Oroonoko with its more famous predecessor without the critical strain often accompanying such outsized comparisons. In its simplest and richest form, the argument is that both Paradise Lost and Oroonoko explore one of the more disturbing ideological developments of their time—that people are replaceable or “fungible”—by addressing the profoundness and complexities of conjugal love. It is, as Mr. Song suggests, a rather radical concept—that conjugal love makes a partner irreplaceable when contractual marriage or royal succession does not. Neither Adam nor Oroonoko will accept a substitute for their beloved, even when the price they pay is high. By contrast, their governing systems do: Christ substitutes for man when man proves imperfect, Charles II substitutes for Charles I when his father loses his crown. Oroonoko records that the advent of the transatlantic slave trade signals that these divine or (divinely ordained) substitutions threaten to devolve into impersonal, systemic ones. Conjugal love thus becomes one of the few venues for sacred or noble resistance.

The essay proves less persuasive in its own rhetorical refusal to stay focused on this insight, engaging instead in its own series of substitutions: Milton’s critique of monarchical succession through his exploration of conjugal love in Paradise Lost wanders to readings of Shakespeare’s Richard II, Milton’s regicidal pamphlets, Paradise Regained, and finally the Book of
Job. The contextual scholarship reveals consistent concerns, but these substitutions dilute the original argument. In fact, by the end of this discussion Mr. Song substitutes maternal love for conjugal love in his reading of Milton’s resistance to paternal substitutions and royal succession, without acknowledging the irony.

These substitutions are even more startling in the reading of Oroonoko, especially as the discussion begins by using conjugal love to diminish the differences between Milton’s anti-monarchical sensibilities and Behn’s sympathetic ones: “Behn’s royalist sensibility coincides with Milton’s depiction of conjugal love as an insistence on an irreplaceable object.” Their differences are hard to diminish; the series of examples cited in the essay, including Behn’s The Forc’d Marriage and Shakespeare’s Othello, seem to argue against “the affective appeal of marriage” to stabilize “dynastic kingship and social harmony,” which Mr. Song identifies as the implicit argument of Oroonoko and Imoinda’s “transcend[ent]” conjugal love. When the essay concludes by acknowledging Oroonoko as a “unique testament to the singularity of its female author” and not to the singularity of its protagonist’s conjugal love, the substitutions become overtly contradictory. Still, by identifying the potential of “love against substitution” in the political theology of both Milton and Behn, this essay’s connections are singularly suggestive.

CAVENDISH


Ms. Boyle seeks to build on Henry Turner’s insight that “many of our current understandings about the materiality of form are drawn from contemporary assumptions about the limits of disciplinary practice.” Mostly focused on what digital humanities and historical method may have to say to each other, this essay ends with a section headed “Margaret Cavendish as digital exemplar: renewing obsolescence,” which explores the possibility of attending to Cavendish’s original intention that The Blazing World should be an appendix to Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy. Students of Cavendish will be interested in Ms. Boyle’s observations on the intersection between the two texts, the choice of this conjunction being felicitous for such a thesis, given what she identifies as the interest in Observations on “the impact of techne on human perception.” Whether anyone will take up the challenge of publishing such a dual edition remains to be seen, as does whether anyone will rise to Ms. Boyle’s suggestion that Cavendish would be best served by an “object-oriented database environment.”


Published in a special issue on “flesh,” this essay focuses, appropriately enough, on the oft-repeated story about the parliamentarians’ disinterment and desecration of the corpses of Cavendish’s mother and sister. Linking accounts of this to Cavendish’s own phrase “paper bodies,” Ms. Dolan argues that the bodies of the two women “are made to matter for us, as they were for contemporaries, through textual acts.” She helpfully sets out the story’s original sources, which are not often given, and comments astutely on the question of
their probable reliability. She also speculates on why Cavendish herself does not mention the apparent atrocity (though she might allude to it). This is all very useful and sensible, but it does not, for me, quite acknowledge the visceral horror of the story; it is not, as is usual in literary criticism, words about words, but rather words about things, and it seems, perhaps inevitably, to have something of an absence at its core.

Lisa Hopkins  Sheffield Hallam University

HOPKINS, LISA. “Point, Counterpoint, Needlepoint: The Tapestry in Margaret Cavendish’s The Unnatural Tragedy,” WoWr, 20.4 (November 2013), 555–566.

Ms. Hopkins’s essay uses needlepoint to bring together Cavendish’s writing and personal experience. She rightly notes that while Cavendish once wished that her mother had done more to inculcate this skill in her daughters, the complaint “seems rather a half-hearted one” given her literary treatments of it. Cavendish ranks needlepoint below the work of writing and complains that Penelope’s work allowed her to converse with the suitors, whereas her own art “Employes all the Faculties and Powers of my Soul, Mind, and Spirits.” While most associate tapestry with its elegant outer surface, Cavendish thinks about how the reverse side collects dirt and insects and horrible smells that stifle the brains of children when they hide behind them.

This connection between tapestry and children is illuminating, as Cavendish’s aversion to this art may arise from her painful awareness of her inability to conceive. Tapestries, for Cavendish, “are identified as not only women’s things, but specifically pregnant women’s things.” Despite her personal aversion, Cavendish “makes powerful dramatic use of a set of hangings” in The Unnatural Tragedy. Ms. Hopkins speculates that earlier dramatists such as Ford and Shakespeare had shown Cavendish how “to weave tapestry within the fabric of a play,” though this section is more suggestive than exhaustive.

The crux of the argument is Ms. Hopkins’s reading of the tapestry of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar, which reflects not only events of the play’s plot and subplot but also Cavendish’s preoccupation with childlessness. The consideration of needlepoint expands into a discussion of the overlapping of private and political space. Though the play is a closet drama and not intended for performance, Ms. Hopkins ends by considering some of the political resonances of its use of tapestry, from Henry VIII to Charles II. “[I]nstead of opening into non-space,” the image of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar “thus forms an interface between the private space of the house and the public space of the world outside.”

Stephen Hequembourg  University of Virginia


Ms. Weise offers just what her title suggests, a more or less annotated bibliography of recent work on Cavendish. Her final summary comments provide a judicious assessment of the state of Cavendish studies.

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CENTLIVRE


Ms. Tierney-Hynes addresses three of
Susanna Centlivre’s stage comedies—two early gambling plays, *The Gamester* and *The Basset Table* (both 1705), and her more mature work, *A Bold Stroke for a Wife* (1718)—arguing that these light-hearted vehicles also carry serious social and emotional implications.

All three plays begin with significantly “unbalanced” situations driving principal characters apart. Passionate gaming threatens bankruptcy to individuals—Valere the gamester and Lady Reveller, sponsor of the basset table—but deep play also implies broader dangers associated with a disorderly and unpredictable redistribution of wealth, poverty, and social standing. In *A Bold Stroke*, Colonel Fainwell finds the object of his affections trammeled by impossible conditions of courtship laid down by her father: four guardians of radically different temperaments who must all agree to any match. Obviously this arrangement frustrates romantic aspirations while it also reflects a broader problem, an older patriarchal order imposing on the legitimate hopes of the young.

How to resolve such problems? Ms. Tierney-Hynes argues that in all three plays Centlivre used a variety of plot contrivances to set up and explore situations of equitable exchange, dramatic transactions in which consenting participants both give and receive something vitally needed, to their mutual benefit and satisfaction. Such exchanges involve personal affections, of course, but also monies, social gestures, and mutual submissions of various kinds—and, the plays being comedies, they all tend ultimately toward the compromises necessary to project equitable marriages. Ms. Tierney-Hynes maintains that Centlivre’s model of happy marriage is implicitly political and quintessentially whiggish: it depends on an understanding of the mutual obligations implied in Lockean ideas of contract and on the harmonization of affective, mercantile, and political orders.

**DEFOE**


This essay and its appendix represent the full-blown conspiracy theory concerning the Defoe canon that has been brewing for some time. It belongs with the argument that *Robinson Crusoe* was written by Francis Bacon or Robert Harley and should be recommended only to advanced students with warnings about its falsehoods and half-truths pieced together to provide a semblance of real scholarship. Ms. Marshall argues that there is no real Daniel Defoe of what we now consider the fictional canon. She maintains that, with the exception of the first two volumes of *Robinson Crusoe*, there is no evidence that Defoe was ever interested in fiction, seemingly forgetting his full-length imaginary voyage, *The Consolidator* (1705), his contemporary reputation as a teller of stories, and the many fictional masks he assumed in his pamphlets. One has only to consider her placement of *Serious Reflections . . . of Robinson Crusoe* (1720)—a work so filled with allusions to Defoe’s earlier works that it was sometimes thought to have been thrown together from materials he had in his desk drawer—in a merely probable category (“deduced context”) to see the lack of significance at the root of her classifications. The second and third volumes of *A Tour thro’ the Whole Island of Great Britain* (1724–1726) are given the same doubtful classification, though, by the way, Thomas Amory identified it as by Defoe in
1756. This essay is the worship of external evidence as the basis of ascription run amok. The appendix provides merely a few tidbits to what we know about Defoe’s record of publication, and since she argues that for the most part there was no actual Defoe after 1719, it is hard to see why she bothered including it at all.

In an essay that appeared in *Philological Quarterly* in 2010, Ms. Marshall had argued that there was no basis for believing that Defoe had written either *Moll Flanders* or *Roxana*. It was followed by two other essays that suggested why she was wrong. The late P. N. Furbank and W. R. Owens replied by providing convincing internal evidence for all of the major fictions, knitting them together. In another essay, Robert Griffin pointed out that Defoe’s fiction might be shown to have been sold by some specific booksellers, including Thomas Warner, who was Defoe’s close friend. Griffin argued convincingly that the Noble publishers who first attached Defoe’s name to these two works of fiction in the 1770s had to know who had written them when they first published them in the early 1740s. Anyone who examines the records of sales among eighteenth-century booksellers has to be aware how careful they were. Griffin concludes that knowledge of authorship did not always depend on title page ascriptions. Had Ms. Marshall been willing to learn from these critiques, she might have produced a useful piece of scholarship. As for why Defoe’s name suddenly began to appear on previously anonymous works at the end of the eighteenth century, we may attribute that to increased interest in authorial genius and the reputation of *Robinson Crusoe* as the product of an apparent genius named Daniel Defoe. His name on a title page might suddenly sell books just as, between 1715 and 1731, his name might have discouraged buyers, since it was associated with a writer of supposedly traitorous political allegiances.

The problem with the Furbank-Owens *Critical Bibliography* (and Ms. Marshall is certainly right in suggesting some of its limitations) is that it excluded too many items proposed by earlier bibliographers such as John Robert Moore and William P. Trent on doubtful grounds and limited itself to a critique of Moore’s *Checklist*, refusing to consider some later ascriptions. They did not take into account Defoe’s steady publication with booksellers such as John Baker, William Boreham, and Thomas Warner and focused obsessively on trying to prove the doubtful assertion that Defoe had absolutely no connection to John Applebee. Like Ms. Marshall, they loved external evidence. And they did not want to see Defoe as collaborating on projects, assigning the extensive history of world economics in *Atlas Maritimus* (1728), to a doubtful category, with bits of Defoe in it, when any informed reader of Defoe would recognize Defoe’s authorship throughout these sections. Their decision has led Ms. Marshall to argue that other writers borrowed from Defoe’s writings. Has she actually read *Atlas*? As for the larger conclusions that she draws, they seem to suggest an inability to read narrative with genuine critical intelligence. She finds *Moll Flanders* and *Roxana* “great” even if they are not necessarily by Defoe, but she never provides a critical explanation for such a judgment. James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, and J. M. Coetzee, all extensive readers of Defoe’s fiction, seemed to find a thread between *Robinson Crusoe*, *Moll Flanders*, and *Roxana*. I will go with them any time.

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MARSHALL, ASHLEY. “Fabricating Defoes: From Anonymous Hack to Master of Fic-

Ms. Marshall’s essay reevaluates contemporary criticism’s “construction” of Defoe, with an eye to its differences from past understandings of the author. Defoe’s contemporaries and other eighteenth-century critics thought of Defoe as a political and topical writer. When twentieth-century critics reimagined Defoe as a novelist first and foremost, they broke with more than two hundred years’ worth of critical commentary and biography. Today’s Defoe scholars, Ms. Marshall suggests, attribute to him a self-conscious artistry, especially in his fiction, that earlier generations of critics would have found improbable. Ms. Marshall questions this perspective, pointing to the uncertainties that continue to plague his canon. Defoe’s authorship of many works—even novels almost universally attributed to him, such as *Moll Flanders*—remains, for her, uncertain, and readings based on dubious attributions may thus produce a Defoe who is himself more fictional than historical, as a critical desire to turn Defoe into a “Great Author” leads to wishful, rather than critical, thinking. This same tendency is connected, Ms. Marshall asserts, to questionable biographical efforts to discern aspects of Defoe’s inner life (in the biographies of Maximillian Novak and Paula Backscheider, in particular). The essay offers a useful survey of the history of Defoe criticism and a reminder to some critics to be cautious with their handling of literary biography—and to others, to avoid sweeping generalizations.

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Mr. Paisey’s essay notes that, despite efforts to recover aspects of black British life in the eighteenth century, we know very little about the vernacular English spoken in these communities. Black writers of the eighteenth century such as Olaudah Equiano and Ottobah Cugoano wrote in a standardized, formal English. Mr. Paisey’s essay attempts to capture black British vernaculars of the eighteenth century from an unexplored source: fictional and dramatic representations of the speech of Afro-Britons and others by “non-black” Britons, speech presumably arising in West Indian creoles. The earliest fictional representations of these languages appear in the fictions of Daniel Defoe. Although *Robinson Crusoe*’s Friday is not black, his speech, Mr. Paisey claims, “no doubt” derives from black English creoles that Defoe might have heard spoken in London. Supporting this inference is the fact that Friday’s speech is very similar to that spoken in the second volume of *The Family Instructor* (1718; second edition, 1720) by a young Barbadian character and that of the Virginia slave Mouchat in *Colonel Jack* (1722). Examining these representations of black speech in relation to later dramas and fictional works, Mr. Paisey finds consistencies in usage that underscore his claim that these texts can serve as an archive of black eighteenth-century English.

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**DRYDEN**


In the fall of 1678, Dryden collaborated with Nathaniel Lee to bring to the London stage a reimagined version of Sophocles’s *Oedipus*. Bad timing! England was just
then in a prolonged political panic over Titus Oates and the Popish Plot, the supposed conspiracy by Jesuits and their supporters to murder Charles II, to put the Catholic Duke of York on the throne and thereby reestablish Catholicism in the realm. Still, Ms. Battigelli maintains, the unfortunate timing gave Dryden and Lee a chance to speak up on behalf of a more broadly conceived political moderation.

Ms. Battigelli first emphasizes Dryden’s commitment to an Aristotelian idea of catharsis, that tragedy dramatizes great misfortunes in order to induce fear and pity in its audience; those feelings in their turn might produce a sober calm and the possibility of reconciliation. Her second contention is more complex. She sees in Dryden and Lee’s representation of Oedipus a reflection of Charles II. Both were kings involved in their people’s distress, and both found themselves in paradoxical roles. Oedipus was bound to discover a regicide who turned out to be himself. Charles II was head of the Church of England, but also the chief defender of his Catholic brother’s claim to the throne. In short, each king stood as the locus of the problem he was supposed to resolve.

In their play Dryden and Lee reimagine Creon as a calculating opportunist, a demagogue who uses the plague in Thebes to stir its populace to rebel and thereby advance his own claim to become king. Ms. Battigelli argues that this darkened characterization of Creon deflects some responsibility and blame from Oedipus/Charles II, even as it glances toward the incendiary role of the historical Shaftesbury in anti-Catholic agitation.

The tragedy’s collaborators also played up the role of the blind prophet Tiresias: as in Sophocles, he warns Oedipus against inquiring too deeply into his own past, but he speaks with a different, more political voice when he scolds the Theban people for their inconstancy and warns them against meddling with royal succession. Tiresias finally rises to a higher perspective, which seems meant to broaden and complicate the views of those involved in political and religious contentions: be humble about the limits of your own reason and learn to listen to others; learn further, as Oedipus did, how little human beings can penetrate the designs of fate.

Ms. Battigelli points out that Dryden and Lee used two more expedients to soften the starkness of Sophocles’s play. First, necromancy and the presence of ghosts onstage efface the boundary between the living and the dead and insist on the continuing pertinence of the past. Second, Henry Purcell contributed soothing ritual music to the performance of the tragedy, clearly hoping to enhance its cathartic effect.


Ms. Ernst begins boldly with the assertion that “Marriage is at the heart of the political discourse that compares the state to a family”—as many observers in seventeenth-century England did. Domestic authority can be imagined to mirror civil, particularly royal, rule and vice versa, and harmony in one setting can be emblematically related to harmony in the other. She draws particular attention to four poems from Dryden’s late *Fables* (1700)—“The Wife of Bath Her Tale,” “Ovid XII,” “Cymon and Iphigenia,” and “Theodore and Honoria”—all of which feature a close association of marriage rites with possible disruption of marriage by rape or other forms of violence. Ms. Ernst argues that Dryden’s skillful representation and quiet management of the political
analogies these tales imply reflect his own concern over the precarious balance between the patient persuasion associated with marriage and orderly rule and the possibility of violent disruption paired with rebellion, usurpation, and the breakdown of succession in the state or family.

Such was not an idle concern. Over his long lifetime Dryden had witnessed repeated threats, some successful, some not, to the orderly succession of England’s rulers, and the poet’s knowledge of earlier centuries suggested that usurpation had in fact been recurrent. This broadened historical perspective, important to Ms. Ernst’s case, weakens the supposition that the poet was simply reflecting his own disappointment at the results of the Glorious Revolution. She maintains that close readings of the four disrupted marriage poems reveal Dryden pondering in a measured way the relative roles of persuasion and force, continuity and disruption, in forging the mixed governance of England.

Ms. Ernst singles out for special admiration elderly Nestor, the storyteller in “Ovid XII.” As an old man he is limited to persuasion, but he can shape his tale to suit his own ends. He speaks from a perspective at once sympathetic yet detached, wielding both artistic and moral authority, much as first Ovid and then Dryden were to do in their turn.


Drawing on queer theory and recent histories of Camp, Mr. Horowitz argues that after the Revolution of 1688, the rhetoric of political partisanship developed in a “mutually fortifying” relationship with the discourse of naturalized sexual difference and heteronormativity. The deviance of those outside either binary—Tory-Whig and male-female—was often interchangeable. Mr. Horowitz reminds us, for example, that Catholics were vilified as sodomitical, ingeniously noting that they practiced their faith in devotional closets unless and until they were outed. King James himself was represented as cross-dressing, anatomically unnatural, and the victim of sodomitical rape. Even those who attempted to remain neutral, the Trimners, were identified in terms that implied a violation of naturalized differences: they were “ambidexters,” “amphibians,” “hermaphrodites,” and “neuters.” Despite the mutual support between political and sexual constructions of difference, however, both were vulnerable to parodic exposure as fictional. As Mr. Horowitz observes, “[e]mergent orthodoxies are often best recognized through defamiliarizing acts of mockery . . . ,” and certainly that is what he goes on to demonstrate in prologues and epilogues of late Restoration drama, which expose difference as dependent on performance and subject to manipulation.

The second half of the essay focuses on perhaps the best known Catholic defender of James, John Dryden, whose body was subject to vicious satiric and even literal abuse. But Dryden resists his subjugation with parodic appropriation. In several of the later works, especially publicly performed dramas, the ousted laureate uses his identity as subdued, emasculated, and impotent to construct queer sources of pleasure and power not located within orthodox sexual or political binaries. Mr. Horowitz is particularly interested in “The Fable of Iphis and Ianthe”: in his dramatization of Iphis’s genital transformation, Dryden mimics the naturalized cycle of political victory and defeat, suggesting that partisans within that cycle are no more natural than “deviants” like Dryden.
This stunning essay exemplifies how postmodern theory can provide the conceptual space and discursive tools to enable genuinely new perspectives on conventional historical periods and canonical authors. It also reasserts the importance of studying late seventeenth-century English culture as a crucial source of our restrictive political and sexual choices in the twenty-first century.


Mr. Pivetti asks how the soundscapes of early modern literature encouraged readers to imagine England as a cohesive entity in the wake of regicide and civil war. The first four chapters, in which Mr. Pivetti argues that poets and playwrights embedded “mnemonic cues” in their writing to cultivate the “experience of a collective past,” deal with authors and works before 1660. Chapter 5 analyzes this same prosodic forging of national memory through the work of John Dryden. According to Mr. Pivetti, the heroic couplet helped Dryden recast England’s tumultuous history as a “clean narrative sequence.” Rhyming lines of iambic pentameter, he claims, forced readers to “look backward and forward,” an exercise of eye and ear suggesting how the future both originates and departs from the past.

Analyzing Essay of Dramatic Poetry, Annus Mirabilis, and Absalom and Achitophel, this chapter challenges Stephen Zwicker’s treatment of Dryden’s metrical art as a façade contrived to disguise royalist allegiance. By perceiving the couplet’s capacity to make English history heroic, Mr. Pivetti reveals form itself as a series of political decisions rather than their mere camouflage. This welcome call to find politics ingrained within poetic convention is the chapter’s most important contribution to the study of seventeenth-century verse. Mr. Pivetti reconsiders Dryden’s poems not simply as an outlet for pro-Stuart feelings, but the site at which those sentiments were produced.

More about what made the couplet especially suited to resolve conflict beyond its linking of lines into larger units would have been useful here. How, for instance, does its stabilization of history compare with that of the Miltonic verse James Thomson used to fabricate a coherent national past in The Seasons? Conversely, it goes unremarked that couplets could also be used to illuminate England’s riven heritage in works like Marvell’s “Last Instructions to a Painter” and Defoe’s True-Born Englishman. And for Dryden himself, what does it matter that the Second Anglo-Dutch War, the success of which Annus Mirabilis foresew, wound up a complete debacle? How did the recuperative histories of those couplets sound after De Ruyter entered the Medway? The next big question, it seems, is whether the poetic mediation of old ruptures did anything to improve what for royalists was often a dispiriting Restoration present.

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HOGARTH


Ms. Alspaugh examines some of the literary and artistic contexts for Hogarth’s frontispiece illustrations to Tristram Shandy, in the novel itself and across the painter’s oeuvre. The article is at its best when considering specific analogies and
connections. Ms. Alspaugh nicely captures the mixture of flattery and direction in the letter to Richard Berenger through which Sterne commissioned the first of the frontispieces. “Precedents” for Hogarth’s renderings of Trim and Dr. Slop are helpfully discerned in plates from The Analysis of Beauty and a number of paintings and etchings; unsurprisingly, serpentine lines figure prominently in the analyses of the frontispieces. While the relationship between Sterne and Hogarth is not exactly new ground, the close attention Ms. Alspaugh accords her materials helps to illustrate the “System” of both figures—just as Sterne, in his letter to Berenger, had hoped the frontispieces themselves would do.

Other parts of the discussion are less keenly observed. An overview of Hogarth’s career and reputation contains little that will be unfamiliar to students of the period (and quotes from Hogarth himself only via secondary studies). Ms. Alspaugh’s attempts to move beyond particular details to broader reflections on Sterne and Hogarth’s pictorialism are not always convincing. A comparison between copperplates and marbled pages, on the basis that the former are subject to alterations during transmission from illustrator to print (via the engraver and the press), overlooks the significant differences that remain. A late flourish on the shared “theatrical impulse” in Sterne and Hogarth is broadly conceived and cursory. One noteworthy slip occurs on page 13: a reference to “the original 1759 drawing” of the first of the Hogarth frontispieces.

Nevertheless, this is a solid starting-point for anyone interested in the frontispieces and in connections between Sterne and Hogarth. Evenhandedly, the article registers the “mixture of admiration and critique” in Sterne’s view of Hogarth’s artistic theory while highlighting points of comparison and compatibility. As one would expect from The Shandean, the article also reproduces all of the images from Hogarth that Ms. Alspaugh addresses as backdrops to the Sternean illustrations.

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POPE

The question that Mr. Codr raises is straightforward: whatever happened to Belinda’s lost lock—the actual material lock of hair—at the end of The Rape? Yes, it is true that the Muse, possessed of “quick Poetic Eyes,” saw it carried into the heavens as “A sudden Star [that] . . . / drew behind a radiant Trail of Hair.” But if the basic design of Pope’s satire is contrapuntal, as Mr. Codr maintains, and for every high there is a low, then continuing an earthly search for the lost lock is a meaningful exercise—this, despite the poet’s own assurance that “The Lock, obtain’d with Guilt, and kept with Pain, / In ev’ry place is sought, but sought in vain. . . .”

Mr. Codr privileges the perspective of the poem’s original readers and tries to imagine how they might have understood the ending. Perhaps modern readers have made too much of the lock’s translation to the heavens. Pope’s first audience, particularly those acquainted with Samuel Werkenfels’s 1711 Meteors of Style—“a vain appearance of elevation”—might have recognized the transcendent ending as playful, theatrical, deliberately excessive. If the celestial ending is part of the mock-epic machinery, then it might be read to imply its own contrapuntal bathos.

That interpretation leaves unresolved,
however, the question of the actual lost lock. Mr. Codr argues that an earlier incident deserves special attention, the moment of mock-epic battle when Belinda throws snuff in the Baron’s face and he responds with a resounding sneeze. Sneezing stood both low and high in contemporary lore—low in manners, but high in a traditional association with prophecy—and Mr. Codr sees this brief moment as decisive for the poem’s material ending. He argues on the basis of circumstantial evidence that the Baron muffled his sudden sneeze not with a handkerchief but rather with what he had in his hand at the time—Belinda’s stolen lock. Mr. Codr finds this supposition satisfying on two grounds. First, the Baron’s sneeze into the lock ‘‘dispers’d’’ its hairs into disorder, so it is no longer a ‘‘lock’’ and a potential stain on Belinda’s honor. Second, since Belinda threw the snuff that caused the fateful sneeze, she can be recognized as the agent of her own rescue.

Not all readers will accept the suppositions that Mr. Codr makes to complete his case, but his attention to specific details will send many back to Pope’s text for another critical look.


This essay supplements readings of Pope’s Windsor-Forest (1713) as a Jacobite poem written in the Renaissance tradition of political topographical verse. Mr. Hone draws on his extensive research into contemporary panegyric, a heretofore neglected context, to construct a more topical and nuanced political reading. He focuses on two conceits, the fiat and the metamorphoses of oaks into ships; both draw on contemporary as well as classical sources to rework the myth of a Golden Age in Windsor-Forest. Pope represents Anne’s fiat, “Let Discord cease!” as a command the entire “World” obeys, thus suggesting to Mr. Hone a divine authority that, in turn, gestures toward the authority of the de-throned James. The peace restored by Anne’s fiat is that broken by William the Conqueror’s invasion, which Mr. Hone reads as an allusion to William III’s seizure of the throne. Pope’s poem also grafts the classical metamorphoses of trees into ships to the more contemporary Tory association of naval dominance with Stuart rule, which is itself figured frequently by the oak. Mr. Hone’s reading here is quite complex; it associates the Stuarts with the restorative power of nature and the new prosperity generated by the Treaty of Utrecht, and it associates the “Ships of uncouth Form” coming into England with the future accession of the Hanoverians. This ambivalence is both realistic and prudent for the Catholic poet. Similarly, Pope’s equivocal deployment of the myth of a Golden Age in Windsor-Forest allows him to express both his hope for the Jacobite cause and his anxiety about an impending succession crisis. It also allows him to avoid overt association with Jacobitism.

Mr. Hone has tapped his impressive knowledge of contemporary panegyric and its political valences to identify covert and nuanced meanings in Pope’s classic poem. These, he explains, are latent and would have been “applied” by a subset of educated readers, who, like Pope, would have been aware of the contemporary panegyric milieu. Mr. Hone does not claim a direct influence on Pope, nor does he do more than posit this group of informed readers. Nonetheless, the essay does support his more general point that Windsor-Forest is fruitfully read in light of the “politics and poetics of its own time.”

MCGEARY, THOMAS. “Handel in the Dun-ciad: Pope, Handel, Frederick, Prince of

Why, having castigated opera as “a Harlot form” in Book III of the *Dunciad*, did Pope in 1742 celebrate Handel so fulsomely in Book IV? After disposing of previous speculations based mainly on stories circulated long after Pope’s death—that Pope and Handel had been friends, that he had a taste for Italian opera after all—Mr. McGeary lays out another explanation, still admittedly speculative but more persuasive. Pope was a friend of Frederick, Prince of Wales, on whom the Patriot opposition to Walpole’s administration pinned their hopes, and Frederick was a friend and patron of Handel. When in the 1730s Handel turned from Italian opera to English-language oratorio, it became possible (especially for Opposition writers) to celebrate Handel as among Britain’s Modern Worthies. Mr. McGeary cannot establish all these connections from Pope’s own works and so relies heavily on the words “may,” “perhaps,” and “likely,” but his mountain of circumstantial evidence is more than merely suggestive.


Pope’s mock epic, Mr. Rogers argues, demonstrates a simultaneous “duality” between gravity and frivolousness in relation to “court,” whether the “royal court, courtiers, Hampton Court, courtship, courtly love or court cards.” Using Benoît Mandelbrot’s notion of fractals as a metaphor, Mr. Rogers identifies this duality in “the smallest unit within the poem to its largest constituent part.”

A smaller “unit” that demonstrates duality is Pope’s “odd, and seldom discussed” choice of Hampton Court, which was “the domain of a Protestant monarch,” not “an aristocratic Catholic family.” The action most likely occurred at Ingatestone Hall in Essex, a “private home, not a royal palace.” Other smaller “units” include the sylphs’ duties and how they reflect similar roles as Queen Anne’s “Women of the Bedchamber,” how Ombre occurs “where high matters of state would ordinarily be conducted,” how “the plot of the *Rape* subverts the noble aspirations of courtly love,” and how the Cave of Spleen is identified as a “Palace.”

These smaller “units” echo the larger “part,” the opening line, which “encapsulates not just the theme but also the central action of the poem—the whole tempest in a teacup.” Hazlitt made similar observations on Pope’s multilevel use of irony, according to Mr. Rogers, yet he did not “follow through.” Whether or not the fractals metaphor permits Mr. Rogers to expand Hazlitt’s observations more extensively does not appear as significant as his sensitive political, historical, and literary insights.


Mr. Takaya focuses on one line in *Rape of the Lock*—“‘By Force to ravish, or by Fraud betray’”—in which the Baron meditates how exactly to “rape” Belinda’s lock. Exploring whether his success is by force or fraud, Mr. Takaya searches extensively into classical texts for precedents.

Geoffrey Tillotson had already shown that the same pattern of meditating “by force or fraud” appears in the Trojan horse episode in book II of the *Aeneid*, but Mr. Takaya points to an earlier example in the
Cyclopean episode of *Odyssey* (book IX) where the hero uses both fraud (δόλος) and force (βία). In the case of Coroebus’s proposition in *Aeneid*—“dolus an virtus, quis in hoste requirat?”—the idea of dolus (fraud) is taken as incompatible with virtus (manliness, bravery), and this judgment is verified by Coroebus’s death. Mr. Takaya examines also English translations of Homer and Virgil, where the phrase “force or fraud” appears in Chapman, Hobbes, and John Ogilby. After Ogilby the phrase is popularized as an epic formula.

In *Paradise Lost* the formula “by force or fraud / guile” is repeatedly declared by Satan against “our grand Foe.” In book X, Satan proudly relates his success to the crowd in Pandemonium, “him by fraud I have seduced / From his Creator, and more to increase / Your wonder, with an apple”; obviously his fraudulent victory is destined to fail.

The pair of scissors in *Rape of the Lock* that the Baron uses against Belinda’s hair is characterized by other words, namely “forfex,” “shears,” and “engine.” John Dryden uses the “engine” for the Trojan horse in his translation of *Aeneid*. Mr. Takaya traces this choice in the translators before Dryden: “this engine” (Gawin Douglas); “an Engin” (Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey); “this treacherous engine” (Richard Stanyhurst); and “this Engine” (Sir Thomas Wrothe). After these minute examinations Mr. Takaya concludes that the reader of *Rape of the Lock* would surely associate the two “engines,” the Trojan horse and the forfex, with the idea of fraudulent. Pope’s imagination and his intellectual horizon had been expanded by both the classic poets and their English translators.


Of Belinda’s two ringlets the Baron snips her “fav’rite”—so described in two places but in other places described as a sister or equal lock. In a good catch Ms. Walls points out that although favorite is used as an adjective in the poem, it was also used at the time as a noun “to denominate ‘A curl or lock of hair hanging loose upon the temple.’” The usage was rare but also occurs in a poem by fellow Scriblerian John Gay. “Pope is punning as he could not have done had Belinda regarded her ringlets with equal affection. [The poet] seems to speak to his readers over Belinda’s head . . . in the expectation that they would have enjoyed the sheer absurdity of the tautological notion of a ‘favourite favourite.’” Although Ms. Walls does not do so, it is tempting, in a poem that connects the fall of man with a surreptitious hair-snipping and with crashing china, to see the use of favorite also as an oblique reference to the fall of the favorite angel, but this might be going a hair too far.

**RICHARDSON**


Two arguments guide this essay. The first links the title’s “conjectural history” and “novel.” Building on the influential arguments of Catherine Gallagher and others, Ms. Hershinow associates these two characteristically eighteenth-century genres on the basis of their claim to access truth without recourse to historical fact:

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Clarissa, like Rousseau’s Second Discourse, thus “works to understand society through a comparison to the natural.” The second argument links the title’s “novel” and “novice.” Rejecting critical orthodoxies that associate novelistic character with growth or knowledge, Ms. Hershinow argues that Clarissa is a “novice,” by which she means an ingénue who never gets educated, an innocent who never reaches experience. What kind of Bildung can the reader impute to a character who can live in a brothel for three months without noticing and does not even remember the details of her own rape? Indeed, Clarissa juxtaposes the static novice with the dynamic ingénue in its Clarissa-Anna dyad; Anna gets an education and Clarissa gets the early death she has been wishing for since her first letter.

Both of these arguments make thought-provoking use of recent scholarship, and Ms. Hershinow’s argument contains many local moments of ingenuity and insight. But her second claim in particular will not persuade all critical readers. Literature is full of characters, from the brothers Menacechmus to Lambert Strether, who are slow to perceive what readers have found blindingly obvious, yet the words “anagnorisis” and “Bildung,” which Ms. Hershinow withholds from Clarissa, clearly apply to Plautus’s twins and James’s ambassador. Her intricate synthesis of the conjectural history argument and novice argument, while intriguing, likewise relies on assertions—that Clarissa’s attitude toward her family is a conjectural deduction à la Locke of what filial duty should be, rather than a Filmerian allegiance to scriptural precepts as actually written, to give one example—from which many Richardsonians will demur.

Assume that the modern subject is distinguished from its premodern counterparts by autonomy: the capitalist economic autonomy of choosing its own clothes and consumer goods, the Protestant religious autonomy of following its own conscience, the sentimental affective autonomy of choosing its own marriage partner. What, then, are we to make of a woman who goes into a glove shop and orders a coffin, who accepts with masochistic resignation the judgments and expectations of others, and who refuses all marriage offers in order to withdraw first into monastic isolation and then into death? In Mr. Jackson’s argument, Clarissa is not a premodern holdover, a Quixote clinging to religious convictions that are obsolete in mid-eighteenth-century England. Rather, she is the heroic inventor of an alternate modernity, in which death and writing alike provide liberation from oppressive fathers and officious suitors. In good Lutheran fashion, Clarissa claims for herself the spiritual authority that inhered in premodern times to kings alone, becoming truly sovereign in her ability to choose death and write as if from beyond the grave.

Mr. Jackson honors Clarissa by inserting it into something like the twenty-first-century equivalent to the Great Books canon: Richardson, who could be diffident about his manners around a real noblewoman like Lady Bradshaigh, here enters into the company of Luther, Weber, Schmitt, Heidegger, and Derrida. The resulting prose is sometimes cryptic, as Mr. Jackson mimics the challenging diction of his German and French interlocutors without always attaining their theoretical so-
phistication. Nevertheless, this essay can be read with profit alongside other treatments of theology in *Clarissa* (such as Margaret Anne Doody’s, which Mr. Jackson cites, and David Hensley’s and John Dussinger’s, which he does not), and theoretical-historical accounts of religion and modernity (such as Giorgio Agamben’s *The Highest Poverty*).


The eighteenth century is when Shakespeare becomes Shakespeare: not merely a successful playwright but a national English culture hero, repertory evergreen, touchstone of polite education, and inexhaustible quarry for banal anthology commonplaces and literary allusions alike. It is this last feature of Shakespeare’s eighteenth-century reception—the ability of his language to provoke imaginative engagement in later authors—that concerns Mr. Smith in this essay, which follows the fortunes of Viola’s “like patience on a monument” speech from *Twelfth Night* through two Richardson novels, Con Phillips’s *Apology*, and the manuscripts of Blake.

The imagery of Shakespeare’s original, which compares the “concealment” of love to “a worm i’ th’ bud,” suggests a daring poetic paradox: silence and virginity are associated with deflowerment and violation, as though loneliness were a kind of rape. Richardson, Phillips, and Blake in turn engage with this paradox: Clarissa rebukes Lovelace for being a “canker-worm,” removing silence and patience from the equation and using Shakespeare’s imagery to talk about rape plain and simple. Phillips’s *Apology* and *Sir Charles Grandison*, meanwhile, challenge the idea that a pining virgin must be concealing love, each in its own way ironizing the confident causality of Viola’s fictional case history. Blake at once affirms and reverses Viola’s logic: both telling and concealing love may bring about corruption.

Mr. Smith hypothesizes a conscious intertextual tradition, showing how Richardson read Phillips and Blake read Richardson. The evidence for this is suggestive but not compelling. Nevertheless, whether this article’s authors were responding to each other or merely engaging independently with a ubiquitous commonplace (itself part of a larger metaphoric complex, at least as old as the Song of Songs, linking flowers to female eroticism), Mr. Smith’s perceptive close readings illuminate both Shakespeare and his eighteenth-century followers.


Exotic and titillating, the practice of polygamy (and its spatial embodiment, the seraglio) exerted a persistent fascination on eighteenth-century authors, from clergymen and philosophers to novelists and playwrights. Though polygamy finds occasional defenders in the long eighteenth century, including clerics appealing to the example of the biblical patriarchs, it is almost universally condemned for dividing a husband’s affection and thus weakening the bond of marital friendship, enslaving women, depriving unmarried men of potential brides, and serving as a stalking horse for the even less acceptable practice of polyandry.

With the exuberant Burtonian etcetera-veness that distinguishes his late style, Mr. Weinbrot takes the reader on an entertaining tour of polygamy rhetoric in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Though this article ranges widely, it dwells
at particular length on two authors, Samuel Richardson and Samuel Johnson, who deploy the seraglio theme. In *Pamela Exalted*, Pamela courageously vows to leave Mr. B. rather than compete, as in a seraglio, for his marital attention. In *Irene*, meanwhile, the eponymous tragic heroine chooses life in the seraglio, only to realize her terrible mistake, while Pekuah in *Rasselas* wisely avoids being immured in a seraglio with foolish, uneducated women. In both *Pamela Exalted* and *Rasselas*, the threat of polygamy shows off by contrast the moral integrity and human dignity of an admirable and virtuous woman.

Buttressed with extensive citations, this article will be useful for readers interested in the polygamy motif in English literature and cultural history (scholars should also consult Maia McAleavey’s *The Bigamy Plot: Sensation and Convention in the Victorian Novel*, 2015). But despite its imposing length, this article gives short shrift to two *loci classici* of polygamy in the writings of Richardson and Johnson. Dwelling on *Pamela Exalted*, it dedicates only a few words to *Sir Charles Grandison*, the triangular love plot of which surely contains Richardson’s deepest exploration of the seductive appeal of polygamy. And while emphasizing Johnson’s hostility to the seraglio in *Irene* and *Rasselas*, it does not cite a jaw-dropping remark from later in Johnson’s life, made to Boswell on the Isle of Skye and recorded in the *Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides*: “I have often thought, that if I kept a seraglio, the ladies should all wear linen gowns,—or cotton; I mean stuffs made of vegetable substances.” One wishes to see Mr. Weinbrot’s footnote on that.

**SHADWELL**


In Shadwell’s *The Humorists* (1670, first printed 1671), the syphilitic character Crazy—or Old Pox in the earlier manuscript version—complains to his doctor using a highly technical vocabulary that Ms. Challinor traces, largely convincingly, to specific medical texts of the time. It is a bit tricky to point out verbal echoes when the source texts were probably quite derivative of each other, and Shadwell apparently changed the order of the words “to promote their assonantal qualities,” as Ms. Challinor discovers from the manuscript. Still, the game is worth the candle as we learn the probable inspiration of the name of Crazy’s French quack Pullin (“a botch in the groine”), related as well to the name of Drybob’s mistress, Button: lucky patients might avoid dangerous caruncles but still suffer (in the words of a contemporary source) “a painful little button in their groin, which is named a Poulain.” In sum, the specific texts Shadwell consulted when composing “lend the play a pseudo-scientific authority, and even provided the names of characters.”

**SMOLLETT**

**FELSENSTEIN, Frank.** “From the Typewriter to the Internet: Editing Smollett for the Twenty-First Century,” *ECF*, 28 (Spring 2016), 547–562.

Mr. Felsenstein pleasantly recounts his long career undoing the damage Sterne’s
Smelfungus wrought on Smollett’s *Travels through France and Italy*. While pockets of praise have always existed, it does seem that among Smollett’s many writings, the only one that has risen in stature during the past century is *Travels*, and certainly the editor of the Oxford edition (and later a Broadview textbook edition based on it) deserves praise for that being so. Indeed, so good was his edition that the editors of the Georgia Edition of Smollett’s works decided to forgo their own edition, despite earlier plans to include one.

In reminiscing over five decades of scholarly work, Mr. Felsenstein begins with his tracing the path of *Travels*, and offers as evidence that Smollett has not been utterly despised even by those he most denigrated, a picture of the “Rue Smolett” in Nice—although noting the revenge of misspelling his name. More seriously, he notes the broad sweep of Smollett’s interests, his “acute eye for artistic detail and a marked independence of judgment” when writing about painting and statuary, his delving into economics and social habits, and his scientific inquiries, as befitted his medical degree; together they mark Smollett “as a true child of the Enlightenment” in his editor’s estimation.

Mr. Felsenstein’s archival work recovered many of Smollett’s references, several examples of which he recounts. His work continues to this day, aided now by online resources; recently, for example, he was able to solve the long-standing mystery of Wig-Middleton (*N&Q*, 2010; reviewed in *Scriblerian*, 45.2 [Spring 2013], 202). While perhaps only a fellow editor will fully relish his story of the letter “pi” that his Oxford publisher could not correctly supply, all readers will agree with his conclusion about editing: “academic research in the humanities is a never-ending process, and what remains imperfect may at least spread some clues to spur the detective talents of a future generation of scholars.”


This essay begins with a promising discussion of the obverse side of Addison’s “taste,” namely “distaste”; if the former is the mark of gentlemen, the latter was avoided in their discussions. Only in fiction did truly distasteful subjects and objects receive exposure. Such subjects, it is argued, draw the “gentleman” into complicity with imaginings of evil, thus compromising himself. Ms. Karremann needed to check with *OED* for the much different usage of “disgust” in the eighteenth century than in ours, but her observation of a difference between philosophers (aestheticians) and fiction writers seems valid enough.

Unfortunately this accounts for only the first few pages of her long essay, which becomes a pastiche of other critical voices, one a Smollett scholar but mostly theorists whose axes are used to grind down Smollett’s masterpiece into a humorless, misogynistic, patriarchal, colonialist, paranoid, and generally unpleasant reading assignment; no wonder undergraduate students (particularly male students) are fleeing the English major in droves.

The Smollett critic summarized at some length is David M. Weed, whose fine essay “Sentimental Misogyny . . .” (*SEL*, 1997) was reviewed favorably by this reviewer in *Scriblerian* (1999, p. 188). The difference between the two essays, despite Ms. Karremann’s heavy dependence on it, mea-
sures the gap between illuminating and befogging commentary.

As trade and commerce increased the desire for comfort and luxury, they raised a concomitant fear: that the virtues associated with classical notions of masculinity were disappearing. One finds this amply outlined by “Estimate” Brown and often enough observed by scholars, including Weed, whose thesis is more or less usurped by Ms. Karremann: “A capacity for affection, sympathy and refinement . . . is prised from the context of luxury and consumption and added as a positive attribute to the list of civic virtues. The result is a new model of manliness . . . .” Unfortunately, the essay then deteriorates into an attempt totally to colonize Smollett’s novel by imposing on it Sally Robinson’s *Marked Men: White Masculinity in Crisis* (2000), thus gendering Matt’s disgust at the hodgepodge of life he encounters in Bath and elsewhere; Matt becomes an emblem of the “white male victim” and the “crisis in white masculinity,” a crisis “driven not by an actual loss of the political and cultural power of hegemonic masculinity but rather by a paranoid logic which projects the fear of this loss onto the real world . . . . This is precisely what happens in *Humphry Clinker*.” Beware critics, male or female, who tell one “precisely” what a poem or novel is about.

For Ms. Karremann the novel displays “a misogynist crisis rhetoric” based on “ideologically informed [i.e., misinformed] representations” of the colonial experience, which suggested that the “barbaric other” might actually have power over the “civilized self.” Needless to say, as history continues to teach us, the “ideology” that believes this is not true might be equally misinformed, as might also be the ideology that believes that “the impossibility of controlling female desire is not a ‘fact’ about the nature of woman, but a male anxiety . . . .” Is this not the ideological paranoid logic of a hegemonic feminization that would believe a woman is not “dominated by her sexual and material appetites”? That would certainly make one gender of the human race quite different from the other—angels rather than human beings.


To indulge a personal memory, on the day John Kennedy was assassinated the graduate course in Chaucer I was attending was not canceled; instead, the professor spent two hours discussing just what species of rooster Chauntecleer was; I believe he settled finally on Rhode Island Red. Fifty-five years later, after passing through two generations of mind-bogglingly sophisticated literary theorizing, Ms. Ready spends a considerable amount of time trying to determine Chowder’s breed. We have perhaps not come as far as we thought in demonstrating our commentary’s relevance to our texts, much less to the life around us.

She begins where many others have, with Smollett’s “obviously gendered” attack on luxury. Tabitha is one target of this attack, her lapdog another. That Chowder is not worth Tabitha’s excessive attention and pampering (what dog is?) seems rather obvious, but Ms. Ready spends much effort in explaining that it might have been a Newfoundland, a “dog noted for its large size, strength, and stamina,” thus heightening “the ridiculousness” of his performing the lap-sitting function of a lapdog; it might also, however, heighten the improbability of the identification.

More to the point, Chowder serves as an
emblem of both luxury and misplaced sensibility; unlike other animals, lapdogs were objects of satire, especially satire of female indulgence. Ms. Ready is fair enough to note, however, that there are interesting similarities between Matt Bramble and Chowder, including irascibility, illness, real or imagined, and an acute sense of smell. Thus "Chowder is perhaps subtly calculated to make the point that the male critic of luxury is not exempt from the criticism he directs at commercial society," a point made by John Sekora some forty years ago. Is it possible that Smollett, like every other author and artist of the century, despite the ready satiric attribution of luxury to women, was fully aware that acquisitiveness was rampant among men as well—and that the association of women and luxury was primarily if not wholly a satiric trope (from Juvenal onward) designed to shame men away from their indulgences? Put more broadly, is it possible that Humphry Clinker is effective because its author has the wit and wisdom to see commercial development, men, women, and yes, even lapdogs, as all containing elements of both virtue and vice and wrote his final novel fully determined to celebrate "the glory, jest and riddle of the world" that was his lifelong subject?

STERNE

ALRYYES, ALA. “Uncle Toby and the Bullet’s Story in Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy,” ELH, 82 (Winter 2015), 1109–1134.

This is an outstanding essay. With that in mind, its one serious flaw, careless citation, should be set down first. Mr. Alryyes does not use the scholarly Florida edition of Tristram Shandy, but a textbook edition, the Penguin paperback (based on the Florida edition) and not the latest edition (2003), but one published, with different pagination, in 1997 (misdated 1978 in his note). More culpable, his quotations are filled with errors: on p. 1112, there are eight errors in eight quoted lines, including a misspelling, the lack of italics, and two misquoted words; on p. 1118, Sterne’s “Walloon Officer” becomes “Walloon officer”; on p. 1120, in eight lines there are nine errors, particularly a phrase of six words that was italicized in the original but not here. This pattern runs throughout the handful of quotations checked, including the quoted material from Locke. There was a time when premier journals like ELH would be ashamed of such carelessness, but since we now label such concerns patriarchal nitpicking, we can proceed to the excellence of the content of the essay and allow the new practice of "scholarship" to find its own muddy path.

Mr. Alryyes examines "the effort to fit the immaterial soul to [sic] ‘into an otherwise wholly material world governed by mechanistic laws,’" i.e., the "naturalization of the soul" in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In doing so he returns to Locke’s influence on Sterne and offers a finely tuned and insightful rereading of that often-discussed relationship. At a key moment in his discussion of “Ideas” Locke offers a simile for their succession being like a bullet passing through a victim and the room he stands in, four separate impacts that will happen too quickly to be distinguished as separate ideas, despite being so. Locke’s simile is, Mr. Alryyes convincingly argues, no accident; not only did he live during a time of war, but science and warfare were consistently locked together (the military-scientific complex, perhaps) and nowhere more obviously than in the use of science to track the speed and direction of missiles: “For the Galilean-Cartesian revolution was one in which
motion linked science, technology, and bullets.” For Locke, the person struck by the bullet is part of a scientific explanation, but for Sterne he is Uncle Toby, and it is important to keep the body and its vulnerabilities at the center of his discourse; the failure of scientific dualism to do so, “to represent and encompass life and the human organism,” is Sterne’s conscious engagement with Lockean psychology, wherein ideas are the “objects of certain mental actions and operations.”

The first part of the essay offers some background in eighteenth-century ballistics, the scientist’s interest in the motion of objects as the basis for all explanations of natural phenomena, the questions of trajectory that so baffled Toby. Mr. Alryyes is particularly astute in playing on two words shared by science and Sterne, solution and shock. For military surgeons, solution was the word for the breaking apart of the body (we would use dissolution today), its disintegration. At the same time, its meaning as the solving of a problem was also in play. Sterne’s usage “both lays bare and satirizes the reduction of life into a supplement to the mechanical philosophy’s representation of human beings.” We might also note that Sterne is equally dubious about the solutions that nonmechanical philosophies produce, maintaining the skeptic’s doubt about solving problems, certainly with any one grand scheme: “Tristram Shandy consciously highlights the contrast between the mind’s pretension to certainty and the body’s fragility. . . .”

Mr. Alryyes is equally informative on the word shock, its usual meaning of being rendered aghast or disoriented, and again its military (and scientific) meaning as the collision of forces. Both meanings are brought to bear on Sterne’s usage. That Uncle Toby’s love life is affected by the shock of the falling stone on his groin—and the shock of the widow Wadman’s interest in the exact location of the damage—is yet another way in which Sterne “meshes the moral and the physical realms and returns human beings to scientific orders built upon excluding them.” As indicated at the start, this is an outstanding essay, filled with perceptive and important insights into Sterne’s genius; one may feel certain that in his future work Mr. Alryyes will find a solution to the accurate use of sources and avoid shocking his persnickety readers.


Sterne experiments with “a new way of preaching,” Ms. Bellman contends, but rather than pointing to Shandean banter in the sermons, which is the usual line of argument, she discovers an “innovative” approach to biblical interpretation. “Sterne does not demur from modifying the biblical text,” we are told, when it fits his rhetorical purposes, and neither does he hesitate “to make additions to the [Bible],” often inventing motives and facts to support his vibrant character sketches (e.g., Hezekiah, Shimei, The Prodigal Son). In essence, Sterne writes a kind of fan fiction from the pulpit; departing from traditional exegesis, which is “too fettered by the sacred text,” he transgresses orthodoxy.

All of this, I think, overstates Sterne’s rebel spirit. Perhaps Ms. Bellman describes Emanuel Swedenborg, or William Blake, but not Sterne, who—dull as it might seem—is an orthodox Anglican clergyman. Nor is it quite right to say that Sterne “dons the mask” and “mounts the pulpit,” while “spectators” sit “spell-bound” by his rhetorical pyrotechnics. Such is the stage, not the church, though I readily agree with Ms. Bellman on the literary
merit of Sterne’s sermons, just as I laud her broader connection between Sterne and Shahrazad from *A Thousand and One Nights*. Indeed, great literature has always been a means of survival, personal and cultural, an idea expertly illustrated in *A Sentimental Journey*, where, in the “Fragment,” Yorick recalls how Perseus’s love speech from *Andromeda* utterly converted the violent town of Abdera: “in every street of Abdera, in every house, ‘O Cupid! Cupid!’”

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At one point in her essay, Ms. Dale says, “I hope to demonstrate how *Tristram Shandy* picks apart eighteenth-century metaphors about reading by taking them to their absolute extreme.” Unfortunately, I think most of the extremes are Ms. Dale’s own. In the first paragraph, for example, she “picks apart” Tristram’s wish “to convey the same impressions to every other brain, which the occurrences themselves excite” in his own, and ends with the astonishing conclusion that he wants to “birth his readers so that ‘every other brain’ becomes like his own.” True, writing and reproduction are linked in Tristram’s vocabulary. But what he says here actually comes from quite a common eighteenth-century trope about the difficulties of description: how can we convey our perceptions to someone else? He certainly does not want his readers to become duplicate copies or clones of himself.

Many such examples follow. Ms. Dale links her discussion of Dolly’s seal-wax to discourse about impressionable female readers and the common Aristotelian belief (apparently shared by both Walter and Tristram Shandy) that the woman really had no essential part in the creation of a child. But the scene she analyzes is not, as far as I can see, about conception or reproduction at all, but rather about slyly suggested masturbation. And her comments about “hobby-horsical intercourse”—while making the most of implied homosexual activity—fail to show anything but rhetorical failure itself. Her essay never reveals a glimmering of the ways Tristram’s discourse does in fact still “impress” his readers, despite its apparent inadequacy and fragmentary form.

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Yorick’s failure to procure a passport before traveling to France—an oversight he shared with his author—provides the starting-point for Ms. DeGooyer’s finely wrought consideration of identity, legality, and sentimentality in *A Sentimental Journey*. In France, Ms. DeGooyer argues, Yorick lacks his accustomed rights as an Englishman, the “social and political identity associated with his nationality.” In support of this reading, Ms. DeGooyer dwells on the importance of the droit d’aubaine, the notorious French law that both symbolizes and effects Yorick’s movement from “the rights and privileges of a gentleman to the empty status of the stranger.” From this foundation, the essay considers how Yorick attempts to overcome his foreign predicament, taking in the nature of eighteenth-century passports, Yorick’s em-
blematic crest of arms ("the only pictorial image on display in A Sentimental Journey"), and the implications of Yorick’s passport identifying him as "the king’s jester."

The slightly technical emphasis of the essay’s approach to Yorick’s legal identity (or lack thereof) in France occasionally leads to overstatement. Ms. DeGooyer asserts, for example, that "Yorick’s statusless status is on a par with many of the pathetic victims whose suffering he seeks to represent and identify throughout the novel." Such a contention surely underplays Yorick’s remaining degree of social privilege, his perceived professional status as a clergyman (a status that encourages various young French women to trust him) and the fact that—unlike the beggars and grisettes—he has the financial means to leave France. In the main, though, Ms. DeGooyer offers insights about the relationship between Yorick’s legal position and his appeal to sentimental feeling. In this reading, Yorick invokes a "universal principle of sentimentality" largely in order to counter narrowly conceived concepts of nation-specific (and selectively applied) legal "rights."

In her engagement with previous critics of sentimentality, Ms. DeGooyer has big fish to fry. While noting that a passport is a "sociopolitical document," Ms. DeGooyer contests the politicized criticism of the 1980s that positioned Yorick as a bourgeois "propagandist" (Robert Markley’s term) whose feelings constituted a mechanism of status-signaling and social control. The essay also takes aim at recent criticism that regards sensibility as self-indulgent and self-regarding—notably Terry Eagleton’s various critiques of its "luxurious ethics." Against these approaches, Ms. DeGooyer argues that Yorick’s sentimentalism is "an imaginative strategy to evade the interpellating mechanisms of the state." Crucially, the "state" here is France, not England. Rather than exerting an authority he already possesses by dint of his gentlemanly status, Yorick in France needs to affirm his political rights while simultaneously avoiding a restrictively "legal" identity.

At times, the discussion appears to meander, losing sight of the passport and its "poetics" (itself a somewhat imprecise term for the issues at hand). Yet overall this is a probing and well argued essay, which pushes beyond critical debates about whether Yorick’s sentimentalism is sincere or satiric. As Ms. DeGooyer reminds us, the ironic mode is not necessarily satiric: one can have one’s feelings and laugh at them too. Ms. DeGooyer’s essay is to be commended both for its careful analysis of Sterne’s less studied novel and for opening up new avenues for interpreting it.

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This short, thin discussion contests an article of 1982 by Roger Moss on the debatable grounds that, prior to the present multimedia age, the "unusual textuality" of Tristram Shandy "could not be fully understood." The thrust of Ms. Eckman’s argument is that Sterne’s text forces readers to use their imagination: "compelled" to fill in the gaps, the reader becomes "a kind of co-author." There is little here that is new, and Ms. Eckman demonstrates scant familiarity with the many treatments of this topic by Sterne scholars, or with the broader field of reception theory. In evangelizing the role of the reader, the essay fails to acknowledge what Sterne’s text also, wryly, demonstrates: the limitations
to the reader’s creative imagining, not least when the narrator most overtly appears to cede control (Tristram’s precise description of Dr. Slop being a case in point).

The second half turns to recent digitization projects, such as the 2010 version of *Tristram Shandy* by Visual Editions, which Ms. Eckman relates to Sterne’s own “interactive literary experiments.” The bridge between these worlds is Sterne’s “visual textuality,” as in *Tristram Shandy*’s marbled page, which is regarded as “another example of the freedom of interpretation Sterne allows his reader.” Here and elsewhere, Ms. Eckman is unfortunate that her essay immediately follows that by Nicholas Nace (reviewed below), which offers a more sophisticated account of some similar material. Ms. Eckman, for instance, confidently declares that “marbled pages were used as end papers in the eighteenth century,” but Mr. Nace has just summarized the critical debate on the matter in an informed endnote. Ms. Eckman’s discussion of reader response and textual materiality is lamentably unacquainted with the many previous twistings and untwistings of the same rope.

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**Haggerty, George E.** “‘Alas Poor Yorick!’: Elegiac Friendship in *Tristram Shandy*,” *PMLA* 130.5 (2015), 1450–1456.

Mr. Haggerty’s brief essay looks with great care and sensitivity at Yorick’s death scene, in which Eugenius attends his dying friend. That Sterne places this scene within pages of the beginning of his work is said to be typical of a book that returns again and again to death as one of its “most salient features.” For Mr. Haggerty, however, the importance of the scene is its representation of “male intimacy,” the hope that these friends can spend “eternity together.” This hope puts the scene in the “elegiac tradition,” which is surely obvious (the “apologia tradition” of satire is, however, more obvious), although the next statement, that Sterne is suggesting “that the only form of elegiac mourning he understands, in keeping with the elegiac tradition, is between men,” seems less so. Dismissing any suggestion that the deathbed description is other than a display of eighteenth-century “sensibility” (and, implicitly, that the language of sentiment in that century is fully transparent to the twenty-first), he opts instead to invoke Montaigne and Derrida on friendship as a condition beyond this world because it is inexpressible. How this differs from loss between man and woman, parent and child, is not sufficiently explained, but one might suggest that the spiritual concepts of soul and afterlife have something to do with elegiac compensation across gender.

The discussion of the black page reinforces what has often been said before, that it is an important “emblem of the work”; but that term is actually Sterne’s own description of the marbled page; and others have found the blank page equally emblematic. Still, Mr. Haggerty reads *Tristram Shandy* with the due seriousness it requires: “Thus, the novel sits on the knife-edge between the culturally symbolic—family friendship, society, and love—and the hideous reality [death] of human experience.” One might only add that the “same-sex” bent of the elegiac tradition that Mr. Haggerty seems intent on discovering is perhaps only a result of time, place, and predilection: Jenny (“Friend!—My friend.—Surely, Madam, a friendship between the two sexes may subsist . . .”) would probably have mourned as well as Eugenius had Tristram been dying; look at her sensitivity when confronted
with his impotence, surely another “hideous reality” of life.


In the wake of W. G. Day’s refuting claims by Lewis Perry Curtis, Cedric Collyer, and Kenneth Monkman of Sterne’s deep involvement in York church politics, Mr. Havard revises the old paradigm of a discontented journalistic writer withdrawing from the fray to create escapist fiction. A more sophisticated narrative, building on insights by Pat Rogers, problematizes Sterne’s “personal development” as a parallel to the “incoherence of party lines” resulting after the fall of Walpole and brings forth a variety of parodic guises. Consequently, Tristram Shandy can be understood as a “satire on the very premise of taking sides.” If Sterne is a radical nihilist who rejects even Locke’s system of ideas as a means of communication, Walter Shandy’s confused exchanges with others in his dysfunctional household reflect this basic cognitive disorder. Previous scholarship by Carol Kay, Carol Watts, Jonathan Lamb, and Thomas Keymer is carefully assimilated in this fresh interpretation of Sterne as political writer.

As an illustration of the current political instability surrounding Sterne’s defection from his uncle’s partisan politics Mr. Havard educes an anonymous poem, “Epistle from Lord Lovel to Lord Chesterfield” (1740), describing William Pulteney, once a prominent Whig opponent to Walpole who subsequently became Earl of Bath and retired to the country. When announcing his abandonment of political journalism in the York Courant, Sterne deliberately chose the opposition paper “to beg pardon for his ‘abusive’ writings” in his uncle’s York Gazetteer. Mr. Havard observes: “Sterne’s discovery that he was no ‘party-man’ was of a piece with a larger national realization.”

In another anonymous poem, which appeared in the York Courant, “L—Y’s Reasons for writing no more Gazetteers,” what at first seems like a squib attack on Sterne’s (nicknamed “Lorry” in the press) recantation and disloyalty may be open to a more subtle possibility: “We know that intermediaries had placed items in the York Courant that could be traced back to his pen.” So Mr. Havard raises the possibility of how this young journalist might have found his fictive voice from his political conflict: “Sterne’s possible penning of this disguised self-portrait might be considered a muted act of revenge on both parties, as well as a proto-Shandean form of self-critique.”

When Sterne boldly dedicates the first London edition of Tristram Shandy (1760) to William Pitt the Elder, this statesman was at the height of his popularity and credited with the string of victories over the French in North America. By Sterne’s inviting Pitt to take this book into the country with him, Mr. Havard observes that besides the general classical idea of “idyllic Horatian retreat,” the gesture is open to further readings: “In political terms, the Country—most closely identified with Bolingbroke and other prominent opponents of Walpole—was associated with an antigovernment, anticorruption stance. In the period of Sterne’s own fleeting political activity, however, this Country ideology had burgeoned into a far more expansive ‘Patriot’ coalition, the shifting contours of which would have been very familiar to the young writer.”

During his London stay in the winter of 1761, Sterne’s letter to Stephen Croft (Feb-
ruary 17) exudes a fan’s unstinted enthusiasm for Pitt’s legendary oratory in Parliament and his enormous disappointment when illness prevented the secretary’s appearance to speak “in defence of the German war”: “There never was so full a house—the gallery full to the top—I was there all the day—when, lo! a political fit of the gout seized the great combattant—he entered not the lists.” By contrast to the Shandean playing of war games in the novel, this letter seems to reveal unequivocal imperialistic fervor of the moment. It is almost embarrassing to find Sterne so nakedly straightforward for a change. But hold! The phrase “political fit of the gout” needs interpretation and perhaps is already glossed by Tristram’s observation that “the bilious and more saturnine passions, by creating disorders in the blood and humours, have as bad an influence, I see, upon the body politic as body natural” (TS 4.32.402). Sterne may have anticipated J. H. Plumb’s final judgment (1953): “From time to time Pitt was mad. In technical terms he was a manic-depressive.”

Alas, poor Yorick!

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Sterne’s fiction is notoriously structured by what Jonathan Lamb has called “the double principle.” Doubleness permeates Sterne’s writings at all levels—its language mobilizes opposing figural and literal meanings; its genre draws on principles of both satire and novel; and its ideological allegiances rely on the sometimes incompatible precepts of reason and sensibility. Mr. Henke proposes to explain tensions at the latter two levels—of genre and of ideology—by situating Sterne’s work within the eighteenth-century discourse of common sense.

To begin with, common sense should not be taken as simply synonymous with reason, but rather it “draws much of its strength from anti-intellectual as well as antirational forces in Augustan culture,” Mr. Henke explains. The discourse of common sense develops not only in philosophy, he points out, but also in religious and nationalist writings. It plays a key role in accounts of Anglican religious moderation, as well as in formulations of English national character. And, thus, Mr. Henke contextualizes his brief discussion of Tristram Shandy within a reading of Sterne’s sermon “On Enthusiasm” and within an account of a political factional debate that involved Sterne in the early 1740s. The sermon uses common sense discourse to make the case for the superiority of Anglican beliefs over the extreme rationalism of deism, on the one hand, and the enthusiasm of Methodism on the other. The factional debate taking place within the pages of the periodicals Common Sense, the York Gazetteer, and the York Courant shows that “Common sense, by then, had been sanctified as a noble political ideal, despite the fact that it was claimed by Walpole’s enemies and his supporters alike, and was easily manipulated as a powerful partisan weapon.” Mr. Henke looks at one of the passages that satirizes Walter’s learning, suggesting that Sterne uses common sense to expose Walter’s absurdities, but then destabilizes his critique by eliciting the reader’s sympathy. Where neither reason nor its critique can be relied on, common feeling becomes privileged.

Over the last two decades scholars have amply demonstrated the complexity and
pervasiveness of sensibility in eighteenth-century culture as well as its operations in Sterne’s work. While Mr. Henke does not reference this research, he contributes to it by illuminating the intersection of sentiment with the discourse of common sense. But much more could be examined at this intersection. One might wonder, for example, how the negative definition of common sense that Mr. Henke identifies—one without specific content, but operating as “a corrective principle” to expose unreasonableness—stands in relation to sensibility’s procedural ethic, which diminishes the authority of singular substantive positions precisely in order to privilege a protocol of positional exchanges (incorporating others’ points of view). Overlooking some important new work on sensibility, Mr. Henke does not venture into these inquiries. But his essay inspires such questions and thus provides fertile grounds for future studies.

Amit Yahav University of Minnesota, Twin Cities


Just as Melvyn New showed us that reading Proust can inform our reading of Sterne, Thomas Keymer shows us that a page in Tom Phillips’s “treated” Victorian novel A Humument (1980–2012) can bring out things in Sterne we may have missed or misunderstood. These belated collaborations, centuries apart, take intertextuality and influence in a new direction.

One page in A Humument (p. 196 in the 2012 edition) explicitly refers to Sterne and his role as a clergyman. The name “Sterne” runs across the bottom of the page in large greenish capital letters; the upper part is constructed as a large red and yellow cross against a green background, framed in purple. The meandering words, as in many of Phillips’s other pages, appear in cartoon-like bubbles against the cross and in the margins: for example, “I knew the feelings, the sentiment, of my genuine self.” Mr. Keymer takes this page not only as evidence of Sterne’s vocation as a clergyman, but also “as a writer about, and a performer of, self-conscious personal identity.”

This is probably true, and Mr. Keymer deftly shows the connections of Sterne’s explorations of subjectivity to those of contemporaries like Locke, Rousseau, and Hume. He also shows the relevance of Sterne’s persistent pursuit of fame through the contradictory alter egos of Tristram and Yorick. (Mr. Keymer includes an anonymous etching of about 1760, “Sterne in Ranelagh Gardens soliciting Subscriptions for Yorick’s Sermons,” that brings out some of the paradoxes involved.) Sterne may have believed that he had a “genuine self,” but he performed that self through a bewildering collection of personae, attitudes, and masks. Mr. Keymer’s essay is the first in the collection, and is an excellent introduction to the essays that follow.

Elizabeth Wanning Harries Smith College


Ms. Kraft shines some additional light on the enigmatic “Bohemian episode.” In or around the year 1759, Sterne’s wife, Elizabeth, was said to have fancied herself the Queen of Bohemia. Laurence played along with the temporary madness, supposedly, and later may have alluded to it in
Tristram Shandy, where Trim attempts but fails to tell the King of Bohemia’s story. The scenario proves odd, eccentric, and weirdly imaginative. In a word, the Bohemian episode is “Bohemian,” in what Ms. Kraft identifies as one of the earliest uses of the term as such, if not the first. Ms. Kraft also rightly postulates that Elizabeth’s story should not be taken at face value, in part because it appears in exactly one belated source, John Croft’s Scrapiana (1792), and in part because little evidence of genuine delusion exists in her biography. Ergo, Ms. Kraft sets out to determine what the Queen of Bohemia anecdote might truly suggest.

Perhaps it is an inside joke. Laurence was not above using his troubled marriage as an opening gambit to garner sympathy (and more) from female admirers. Croft’s tale about Elizabeth might be a wry commentary on Laurence’s distasteful behavior in the realm of romance. Or maybe the story revisits (with a certain poetic license) the Sterne’s involvement in the Sutton land enclosure, one field of which was called “Bohemia”—that is, maybe the tale masks an argument about money in the marriage. Or, finally, the anecdote might be a political allegory: Elizabeth Sterne may have associated herself with Elizabeth Palatine, who had been the Queen of Bohemia and through whom the Hanoverian succession proceeded. These are possible starting points for interpretation, Ms. Kraft determines, in what remains a decidedly “murky” scenario.

Ryan J. Stark  Corban University


Mr. Lipski argues that “sentimentalism and the masquerade are contradictory patterns of behavior.” They are “mutually exclusive discourses” in A Sentimental Journey and, more broadly, in Sterne: “Every thing in this world seems in Masquerade, but thee dear Woman,” Sterne writes to Eliza, “and therefore I am sick of all the world but thee.” Near the essay’s end, however, and contrarily, Mr. Lipski argues that in “Sterne’s realm,” “the masquerade can be both contrasted and combined with sentimentalism,” and when combined, the masquerade and real sentiment produce “ambivalence.” I recommend Mr. Lipski’s first argument, not his second.

There is such a thing as a “sentimental mask,” of course. And one might falsely believe that one’s affected sentiment is authentic. Enter self-deception, about which Sterne says much in his sermon on conscience. And, too, one might be conflicted, or hesitant, or in the case of Reverend Dimmesdale, befuddled: “no man, for any considerable period, can wear one face to himself, and another to the multitude, without finally getting bewildered as to which may be the true.” Also, unsurprisingly, we cannot always distinguish between authenticity and fraud. Even a blush might be faked, but a distinction nonetheless exists between a real and a fake blush. The extent to which Mr. Lipski departs from the issue of truth and falsity in matters of personhood is the extent to which he gives too much credence to Hume, Nietzsche, and others who would have the self be little more than a series of masquerades, behind which stands nothing. Sterne’s theology protects him from such a viewpoint.

Ryan J. Stark  Corban University

Mr. McDermott’s essay proposes to open a new interdisciplinary vista in Sterne studies by considering connections between “ethnographies and novels.” Sterne’s fictions are compared with the “ethnography of encounters” that developed in the late 1950s and 1960s, which moved beyond the “behaviorist concern for robotic input and output” to focus instead on “live people organizing to do things together.” Regrettably, the links Mr. McDermott makes between Sterne and ethnography are too generalized to illuminate either topic. Suggesting that “Sterne and the ethnographers of the 1960s were dealing with similar issues,” the essay offers two broad “findings”: that both were concerned with “the temporality of experience,” and that “because Sterne carefully observed social encounters, his insights can be aligned with what ethnographers have learned about such encounters in the last half-century.” This latter finding is termed a “playful add-on to Shandean studies.”

While the chapter’s endnotes demonstrate an impressive familiarity with both ethnography and critical studies of Sterne, the discussion itself proceeds at a level of abstraction that is unlikely to generate insight. Alarm bells start ringing on the opening page, which quotes Swift to the effect that “it is manifest what mighty advantages fiction has over the truth” (the quotation is from A Tale of a Tub). Mr. McDermott is sketchy on the eighteenth century and Sterne’s place within it. “Sterne lived,” we are informed, “in a world without guarantees” (as opposed to—when?). Inter alia: “Intuitively, Sterne knew context as a temporal arrangement”; “Sterne looked carefully enough to offer thick descriptions”; “A Sentimental Journey is rich with encounters scene after scene.” Analytical specificity is not, certainly, a strength of the piece. Sterne, we are assured, was “a master of milking social encounters for insights into all they might be, and yet rarely become.” In sum: some developments in ethnography during the 1960s were a bit Sterne-like—if we approach Sterne in a sufficiently fuzzy (or milky) way.

This is all quite disappointing. Discussions of literature from other disciplinary perspectives are to be encouraged, but despite his evident enthusiasm for Sterne, Mr. McDermott’s chapter is far too impressionistic. The essay quotes liberally from Sterne’s texts, but these quotations are offered as the analysis itself, rather than as a focus for analysis. From the essay’s title, the reader might have hoped for a fresh account of Yorick as an ethnographer of French society during the 1760s, illuminated with insights from the field of anthropology. That essay waits to be written. Mr. McDermott’s chapter, to paraphrase Yorick, performs less than its title promises.

Yet nothing in this world is entirely unmixed. Toward the end, the essay is partially redeemed by a few sharper paragraphs that consider Yorick’s play of hands with Madame de L***. Taking place across nine chapters, this scene involves “nothing less than fourteen different hand arrangements.” Mr. McDermott’s minute analysis of these tactile maneuvers reveals that, rather than being simply a passive object of Yorick’s advances, Madame de L*** is a “significant player” in the
scenario. Readers interested in Yorick’s encounters with women, in bodily gestures and the representational minutiae of sensibility, are directed to these paragraphs.

Shaun Regan  Queen’s University Belfast


How much further is it possible to stretch Sterne’s typographical jokes? A considerable distance, judging by the evidence presented in this article. Somewhat hobby-horically, Mr. Nace expends twenty-five pages exploring implications and ironies of Tristram Shandy’s “missing” chapter in the novel itself and in two recent works that take the chapter, or its absence, as their occasion and inspiration. How absorbing readers find this material will likely depend on how willing they are to indulge the formal flourishes of postmodern experimentation and the kind of ornate exegesis it tends to attract.

In Sterne’s novel, it will be recalled, the inscribed removal of volume 4, chapter 24, leaves a “chasm of ten pages” that elicits narratorial reflections on printing and authorship, absence and literary value. Because the missing pages actually number nine rather than ten, the omission also causes what Peter de Voogd has termed “typographical alienation”: when recto pages display even numbers and verso pages display odd numbers, printing conventions are subverted and the typography is out of joint. Citing de Voogd’s suggestive phrase, Mr. Nace elaborates intelligently on the material effect and the conceptual resonances of the missing chapter, furnishing some fascinating examples of the difficulties that this material conceit has caused printers over the centuries. The conceptual responses to the missing chapter under scrutiny here are Craig Dworkin’s Chapter XXIV and Nick Thurston’s The Visitations at **** (both 2013). Both men are members of the artistic collective “Information as Material,” which, as Mr. Nace explains, draws extensively on Sterne and places as much emphasis on process as product and on “the container of new information as on the information itself.” Thurston’s work, which comprises twenty-five “marbled imposition spreads” of the missing pages, is visually striking but less conceptually engaging. Dworkin’s ploy is to waylay the reader through copious and often comic use of the antiquated long “s.” The effect is uncanny: while Chapter XXIV’s pages convincingly mimic the visual style of Tristram Shandy, Dworkin’s artful exploitation of the long “s” creates confusion between the eye and the understanding—a whimsical experience of cognitive dissonance.

Overall, this is a smart discussion of some clever artistic-textual creations. Both the article and its subjects extend the current focus on adaptations and appropriations of Sterne about as far as it can, and perhaps should, go. To Mr. Nace’s credit, the article generally avoids verbal self-indulgence: the complex ideas it explores are conveyed with sufficient lucidity. The piece can be recommended especially for its explication of Dworkin’s ludic typographical experiments and for the illustrative example it provides of Thurston’s marbled imposition spreads, one of which handsomely adorns the cover of volume 24 of The Shandean.

Shaun Regan  Queen’s University Belfast

NORTON, BRIAN MICHAEL. “Laurence Sterne and the Aesthetics of Everyday Life,” Sterne, Tristram, Yorick: Tercenten-

How did Sterne understand the word “aesthetic”? Did he even know it? (In his time the word was chiefly found in translations from the German.) These are questions Mr. Norton does not ask in his chapter, and perhaps he does not need to. He concentrates on Yorick’s experiences in A Sentimental Journey, emphasizing their sensuous, often tactile nature. Far from insisting on what we now call “aesthetic distance,” Sterne seems to believe that perceiving something as beautiful depends on our intimate involvement with it.

Mr. Norton also points out that Yorick tends to avoid the art found in museums and palaces. Rather he focuses on everyday beauties: the dazzling view from a window, women’s faces, dancing peasants. Unlike “Mr. Spectator,” he does not separate himself from what he sees, but rather continually finds and is absorbed into meaningful scenes and moments in his daily life. As Mr. Norton says, “Aesthetic attention for Yorick is not only a polite and decorous state of mind; his whole body vibrates with it.” These vibrations lead to a sympathetic, even sacred, communication with the world and the people in it.

Mr. Norton places Yorick’s experiences in the context of both eighteenth- and late twentieth-century aesthetic theories, arguing that we have tended to read formalist positions back into earlier ones. Sterne’s emphasis on the importance of the lack of separation between the viewer and the viewed should lead us to reread and reconsider all of them.

Elizabeth W. Harries Smith College


Because Sterne, a Cambridge-educated cleric, needed to prove he was not a provincial, he offered a character in his fiction tied to Shakespeare and Cervantes, namely Yorick (his Rosinante-like nag, his “cervantick tone”). To prove that he was not totally suppressing his provinciality, however, he chose the name Yorick, recalling Jorvik, the Viking name for York. One can of course think of other reasons for Sterne’s Yorick and his quixotic personality, but that these two authors would prove the author’s “sophistication” seems highly doubtful, if only because they were, as Ms. Santana notes, so commonplace. Rabelais, Montaigne, and Burton (to mention three actually “sophisticated” sources) would have answered this purpose far more effectively—if such a purpose were governing Sterne’s intentions, which almost certainly they were not. And it has long been noted that Yorick was probably a pun on York, with or without Jorvik’s intervention; Kenneth Monkman, cited herein to support that likelihood, was hardly the first to make the point.

Yorick was not married to the parish midwife as Ms. Santana states, and he does not die as a “direct consequence of a misunderstood prank.”


Mr. Serebrennikov revisits the oft-traveled territory of Tristram Shandy’s intertextual connections with its precursors to explore hitherto neglected corners. He
takes as his starting-point an overlooked passage in John Ferriar’s *Illustrations of Sterne* (1798), which cites a Spanish novel contemporaneous with *Tristram Shandy* as evidence of yet another unacknowledged source: “Padre Isla’s” *Fray Gerundio de Campazas* (1758–1768), a comical history of its eponymous hero’s rise to “fame and renown thanks to his inane but crowd-pleasing sermons.” Mr. Serebrennikov immediately rejects a Ferriar-like expose of Sternean pilferings, acknowledging that “the chances of [Fray Gerundio] having been somehow read by Sterne in the original Spanish and influencing the conception and style of his work are next to nil”: its English translation did not appear until 1772. Instead, Mr. Serebrennikov establishes several links between both texts’ compositional methods and narrative details, a comparative analysis rarely attempted beyond a couple of studies relegated to the endnotes, to enrich a presently under-sketched picture of Anglo-Spanish relations in this period. Sterne and Isla both satirize scholastic pedantry by parodying numerous “interpolated texts,” including the digressions that facetiously comment on them. Both *Tristram Shandy* and *Fray Gerundio* give their heroes “bizarre baptisms” that demonstrate their fathers’ conjoined belief “that nomen est omen,” although each baptism differs in its telling. Whilst *Fray Gerundio* adopts a linear narrative, its conclusion is “suddenly interrupted” to create a surprising rupture of expectation likened to the “cock and bull story” more consonant with *Tristram Shandy*’s trajectory. Such shared features are, for Mr. Serebrennikov, inherently linked through these texts’ professed allegiance and evident indebtedness to *Don Quixote*, although these parallels are outlined rather than fully delineated. This positions both *Tristram Shandy* and *Fray Gerundio* in the broader context of “the novel” as a heterogeneous form in this period, and challenges existing assumptions about how prose fiction in the Spanish Enlightenment primarily “champion[ed] moral improvement”: a Shandean “anti-novel” apparently had no place here. Mr. Serebrennikov does not fully explain the “potential implications for literary theory” that Isla’s text may share with Sterne’s within the scope of the similarly perplexing “reductive label of novel.” Nor does he firmly establish, except for Ferriar, whether in fact “the English public of the later eighteenth century” perceived the two works as kindred, so his essay does little to enhance our understanding of Sterne’s posthumous reception. Nevertheless, Mr. Serebrennikov provides an engaging and thoughtful beginning for further pursuing these convergences.

M-C. Newbould  
*Wolfson College, Cambridge*


Beginning from the premise that Laurence Sterne’s sermons contain only a small amount of humor, the general scholarly consensus, Mr. Stark takes another look in order to test this opinion. He examines the forty-five sermons from several different angles—content, scriptural references, the contemporary context of sermon publication, borrowings, and the continuing role of readers. Through this careful survey, he uncovers several new and important moments of humor in the sermons, especially in some intertextual play between Sterne’s texts and the Old Testament. In a key example, he provides a close reading of Sterne’s discussion of Jacob and Leah’s wedding night.

The central and most ingenious contri-
bution that Mr. Stark makes is to argue that the sermons often work with readers’ “own rogue imaginations” to plant bawdy or comical thoughts within the seemingly innocent contents of a sermon. As Mr. Stark notes, this playfulness is supported by the same maneuver in Sterne’s satirical work; the infamous blank page in *Tristram Shandy* functions in much the same way as the suggestion in a sermon that the congregation imagine biblical concubines or the potentially bawdy notion that those who are charitable should act as husbands to widows.

The arguments that the plagiarisms in the sermons become more humorous the more scholars reveal it, and that the sermons provide comedy by playing the straight man to his fictions are, however, neither as successful nor as developed as is that concerning the use of biblical references to instill rogue thoughts. Overall, the article is a contribution for scholars who want to argue the rhetorical use of humor to further the moral potential of the sermons, though in the end, it seems primarily to confirm that the sermons are still, for Sterne, a quite serious affair.

Sarah B. Stein  Arkansas Tech University

WASHINGTON, GENE. “Proper Function and the Comedy of *Tristram Shandy*,”  *Shandean*, 26 (2015), 61–73.

Mr. Washington argues that some of *Tristram Shandy*’s best humor is organized around the idea of “improper function,” but his main examples do not prove his claims. Walter’s “sperm cells” function improperly thanks to Mrs. Shandy’s untimely query, we are told, and the lead weights from Tristram’s nursery window also function improperly because Trim recasts them into miniature cannons. Neither of these seems entirely correct, however. Walter’s crackpot theory of reproduction is the big problem, not Mrs. Shandy’s query, and while Trim and Toby certainly repurpose the lead weights, they do not— I think— misuse them. In a shipwreck, a wooden trunk makes a great flotation device, though it is not designed as such. Context often determines function, and in the context of a soldier’s attempt to cope with trauma, the lead weights serve a good purpose, if not their original one.

This essay raises important philosophical questions. What is the proper function of a satire, a novel, a priest, a person? People are made for heaven, by Sterne’s logic, which is not to answer the question about personhood but rather to highlight their inherently improper function in the world, or what some theologians call “original sin.” On the matter of the priesthood, Mr. Washington doubts that Sterne performed properly, given his various indiscretions, but who better than Sterne to deliver a sermon on Hezekiah to the likes of David Hume and Denis Diderot? I would rather suggest that he performed imperfectly as a priest, not improperly, which is to say that Sterne needed a lot of grace. Do not we all?

Ryan J. Stark  Corban University


Sterne’s satires generally make doctrinaire theologians nervous. Mr. Wehrs explains why. It has mostly to do with grace, which cannot be manufactured—at least not the cosmic grace at issue here. It comes on its own terms. Unexpected. Sometimes unwanted. And it comes from outside the self, often through “interruptions” and “apparent non sequiturs” that “coalesce of
their own volition” and “override all the plots our wounds, willfulness, and cupidity set in motion.” That is, divine grace disrupts worldly schemes, including our own, and brings us to the deepest of all self-revelations: we cannot save ourselves. Indeed, it is worse than that, as Mr. Wehrs discerns: we must be saved from ourselves, which Sterne aims to demonstrate, but not through the clanging cymbals of systematic theology or “Pelagian” self-confidence. Such are the structures from which we need rescue. Rather, Sterne—who goes “beyond Swift”—invokes a positive “sensibility” that “displaces the self from intentionality” and so leaves room for grace. Or, as Mr. Wehrs later suggests: “Tristram’s inability to tell his story, or to make his story about himself, is, aesthetically and theologically, his narrative’s saving grace.”

But how much of the human will does Mr. Wehrs cede to cosmic grace? Are we talking about prevenient or irresistible grace? If the latter, then too much Calvinism has been smuggled into the argument. Sterne would readily concede that grace takes us where we could not have imagined. This is his point, I think, but that grace might take us past the will, that it is irresistible, is a more difficult matter. God never ravishes but only woos, the demon Screwtape once observed, and though demons are wrong even when they are right, because they have no love, Screwtape understood.

Ryan J. Stark Corban University

SWIFT


The intensity of Swift’s attacks on the Earl of Wharton reflects a philosophical difference within the Whig party that developed in the decades after 1688 regarding one’s attitude toward poverty. “Old” Whigs embraced a neo-Stoic view of poverty as virtuous resistance to the baser passions, whereas “New” Whigs thought of poverty as lack within a new commercial culture. The views of Joseph Addison, Wharton’s private secretary and protégé in Ireland from 1709 until the Whig defeat of 1710, usefully contrast with Swift’s: “For Addison the ‘commercial’ man was polite, tolerant, urbane, and civilized; to Swift, he was acquisitive, contemptuous of the needs of others, false, and deceitful. Addison’s hero repulsed Swift.” In this context, Mr. Brown connects the personal animus of Swift’s attacks on Wharton, whose character “is consequent on his rejection of neo-Stoic restraint,” with Wharton’s unwelcome religious, political, and economic innovations. Mr. Brown thus demonstrates how Swift’s “attack had necessarily become ad hominem.”

Despite relying heavily on previous scholarship, particularly J. G. A. Pocock’s 1985 essay on “Varieties of Whiggism,” Mr. Brown at times surprises in his claims. For example, the Battle of the Books allegorizes “old and new concepts of Whiggery.” Such a statement seems to subordinate the literary differences between the Ancients and Moderns to Swift’s concern about the new whiggism. Of course, allegory can work in more complex and reciprocal ways, but Mr. Brown does not explore them here; his reference to the Battle of the Books is brief and relatively unimportant. But it raises questions about focus, priority, and importance that the essay also provokes with its more explicit and overarching claim: that a philosophical difference “splintered” the party. Is it adequate to identify political and economic differences as consequences of a philo-
sophical cause? Did men such as Wharton and Addison start with a definition of poverty and only then formulate the policies of a “new” whiggism? How can we determine what motivates or rationalizes what within the fraught web of ideas, art, profit, and power?


“Death and Daphne: To an Agreeable Young Lady, but Extremely Lean” (1730) is a deliberately anticonventional poem that describes a grotesquely comic lovequest by the gentleman Death, tricked out as a beau, followed by a brief, unsuccessful courtship between him and the lady Daphne. The piece can easily be read as a jeu d’esprit, a bit of affectionate teasing directed by Swift to its “extremely lean” addressee Lady Acheson. Ms. Ferguson prefers, however, to see it in terms of its artistic genealogy and to emphasize the poet’s comic ingenuity in reimagining romantic conventions.

Swift excelled in the witty, most often ironic, appropriation of elevated artistic resources and their cheery redeployment in new down-to-earth contexts. Ms. Ferguson points out some of the poet’s small borrowings in “Death and Daphne,” phrases or metaphors or conventions lifted from Garth, Pope, Dryden, and Milton. But the main thrust of her argument identifies three larger “presences” that stand out in the poem’s genealogy.

The first and most obvious is John Gay’s Fable XLVII, titled “The Court of Death,” published only three years before Swift’s poem: in it Death appears as a demanding ruler over allegorical courtiers, all ambitious to expand the claims of mortality. A second presence is more subtle but pervasive. Ms. Ferguson argues that Swift borrowed names, mythologies, and most important, serious themes of pursuit, transformation, and repudiation from Ovid’s Metamorphoses, thereby giving emotional complexity to his social comedy. The final presence stems from the ghastly formality of Death’s pursuit and courtship of the lady: Ms. Ferguson associates such solemnity and formality with iconographic traditions representing Death and the Maiden and the Dance of Death, both of which connect death with hints of eroticism. No exact source for this influence can be identified, but such imagery circulated widely in texts readily available to Swift.


This essay traces with clarity the transformation of Swift’s provocative travelogue into a book for children and young people, beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century. Unsurprisingly, it occurred at the expense of satirical pungency and political content. Thus, the third and fourth voyages were left out; Swift’s pref- aces often met the same fate, as did references to bodily functions, despite their appeal to children. For example, editors expurgated the famous scene in which Gulliver urinates on the fire in the royal palace. In some versions, the whole episode is omitted, or innocuous illustrations show Gulliver scooping water with his hat from a nearby pond. The essay usefully concludes by surveying cinematic adaptations of Gulliver’s Travels.

During the seventeenth century, scientists including Evangelista Torricelli, Robert Boyle, and Swift’s Trinity College tutor, St. George Ashe, devised instruments and pioneered experiments to pursue an intense interest in ordinary air. At the time, air also retained traditional associations ranging from a spiritual essence to an expression of insubstantiality, from complaints about the weather to old jokes about breaking wind. The availability of such rich sets of possible meanings gave Swift a valuable source of airy metaphors for satiric expression. Mr. Lynall examines these, particularly in *A Tale of a Tub* and the *Discourse Concerning the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit*.

Again and again, Swift used strategies that mixed high and low, literal and figurative properties of air in order to create satiric juxtapositions and often dissonance. For example, Mr. Lynall draws attention to Swift’s presentation of pulpit oratory in the *Tale*: an abstract idea, intangible as air, gains “Weight and Gravity” as it descends to make an “Impression” on listeners. This downward progression mirrors the collapse of an elevated, perhaps spiritual world into a faded, merely material one. Similarly Swift offers a satirical vision of the “Learned Aeolists,” an enthusiastic sect of wind-worshipers, whose aspirations toward the spiritual world somehow miscarry, leaving them mired in the service of their bodily winds and earthy passions.

If the trajectory of spirituality was generally downward, the pretensions of the Moderns reached ever upward—and again an awareness of pneumatics served Swift. As Mr. Lynall explains, the investigation of air initiated a parallel interest in vacuum, and Swift repeatedly deployed figures of vacuity to satirize not just the self-delusions of the Moderns—their ability, say, to write on nothing—but also the ways in which their material-minded investigations of the world impoverished it by ignoring its possible spiritual dimension.

MAZELLA, DAVID. “Husbandry, Pedagogy, and Improvement in Swift’s *Gulliver’s Travels*,” *SECC*, 45 (2016), 239–266.

Mr. Mazella sketches the social and economic contexts that gave ideas of improvement a special—and significantly different—resonance in eighteenth-century England and Ireland. In England, schemes for improvement implied a general social amelioration: purposeful development in agriculture and elsewhere, continuous and cumulative over time, reflected a shared hope for prosperity and perhaps moral betterment. Improvement in Ireland had instead an ironically hollow ring, thanks partly to its long record of unsuccess, more urgently because such plans mostly grew out of the needs and interests of English Protestants colonizing a supposedly backward territory inhabited by defeated and desperately poor Catholic tenants.

Swift’s improvement tracts of the 1720s urged fellow Protestants to do better by their Irish neighbors, mostly by supporting local economic development. Satiric fictions, however, provided Swift with more strategies for representing (and often doubting) supposed improvements. The King of Brobdingnag provides, of course, a shining example of improvers’ best hopes: self-restrained and thoughtful, he serves as “a cultivator-in-chief,” advancing the development of individuals while also tending to the general welfare. His example, however, makes the shortcomings of other would-be improvers more glaring. From Laputa to Glubbdub-
drib, Mr. Mazella adduces example after example of improvement-gone-wrong, and the unhappy Strudbruggs, doomed to endless senility, starkly confirm that all hopes for human betterment are likely to end in tears. He views Gulliver’s account of his visit to Houyhnhnmland as yet more devastating. These rational horses have improved their situation at the cost of degrading and enslaving the despised, “unteachable” Yahoos, and Gulliver’s attempt to “improve” himself into a Houyhnhnm culminates in self-abasement and self-loathing.

Mr. Ormsby-Lennon concludes with a short history of snuff and snuff-boxes in Britain, followed by two extended speculations: first, that Swift read Kaempfer’s History soon after its publication in April 1727, and that it provided the inspiration for a unfinished satire on Robert Walpole titled An Account of the Court and Empire of Japan, written in 1727 or 1728 but not published until 1765. However, the links Mr. Williams cites between the two works are often flimsy or labored.

Some scholars have argued that Kaempfer’s work, in manuscript, influenced the brief episode set in Japan in Part III of Gulliver’s Travels. Mr. Williams finds that argument weak, instead offering the theory that Swift read Kaempfer’s History soon after its publication in April 1727, and that it provided the inspiration for a unfinished satire on Robert Walpole titled An Account of the Court and Empire of Japan, written in 1727 or 1728 but not published until 1765. However, the links Mr. Williams cites between the two works are often flimsy or labored.

Swift’s opening (“REGOGE was the thirty-fourth Emperor of Japan, and began his reign in the year 341 of the Christian aera”) Mr. Williams sees as a parody of “the dry imperial chronicles in the first volume of Kaempfer . . . . As in each of Kaempfer’s entries for Japanese emperors, the name is capitalized, the number in the imperial line is noted, and the date of accession is given according to the Christian system.” Surely this puts too much weight
on nonstandardized eighteenth-century typography; moreover, by this type of evidence one could claim that Kaempfer also influenced Samuel Johnson—we recall Rasselas was “the fourth son of the mighty emperor.” The cart is placed before the horse when we are told that Swift had a “general sense of Great Britain and Japan as fellow ‘island nations’ which might be turned into satirical analogues,” a statement supported by a note that quotes Kaempfer making this suggestion in his work. If Mr. Williams has cited the strongest possible evidence that Swift knew and used Kaempfer, we may safely ignore the connection.

**MISCELLANEOUS**

**Atwood, Emma Katherine.** “Fashionably Late: Queer Temporality and the Restoration Fop,” *CompD*, 47.1 (2013), 85–111.

This essay highlights the popular phrase “fashionably late” while closely examining the role of the fop in comedies by Etherege and Vanbrugh. The term serves Ms. Atwood well, given its portmanteau susceptibility to bifurcation into “fashionable,” aptly correlating with the fop as man of fashion, and lateness or temporality, as in “queer time.” As she shows, queerness has been the portal through which many critics have recently seen and discussed foppishness. Ms. Atwood establishes a critical nexus by complicating this prism of gender with that of time.

What is “queer time”? Issuing from the work of Judith Halberstam, Elizabeth Freeman, and Adrienne Skye Roberts, it seems to suggest a temporal order that challenges linear time, the time of traditional institutional structures such as the heterosexual family and the biological categories of male and female. As Ms. Atwood argues, “the Restoration fop’s temporal disengagement is queer in the sense that it throws otherwise normative attitudes toward clock time, which regulates social interaction, into question.” This disengagement manifests itself, for example, in the disruption fabricated by the fop when he appears in a scene late, fracturing normative time. Ms. Atwood establishes two versions of temporality, “rake time” and “fop time.” Rake time consists of linear clock time, essential to the success of the rake’s predatory machinations. Fop time, on the other hand, evades the chronological precision necessary to the rake: The fop’s self-absorption collapses into a solipsistic evasion of normative time, and Ms. Atwood usefully distinguishes between the dressing habits of Dorimant and Fopling in *The Man of Mode*, separating two characters other critics have seen as comparable. Similarly, her analysis of Foppington’s extended dressing scene in *The Relapse* enables us better to appreciate his immersion in the “perpetual stream of pleasure” of an “expansive now.” Ms. Atwood concludes, “fop time queers the temporal momentum of theatrical performance in order to challenge the value of productivity, usefulness, and obligatory normative social participation.”

The essay is not free from flaws. For example, Ms. Atwood minimizes the political impetus that underlies the theoretical construct intended by the theorists of “queer time.” More damaging to her argument, the challenges mounted by the fop to “productivity, usefulness, and [the] obligatory,” are not sufficiently integrated into the larger social or historical perspectives at which the essay barely hints. Structural weaknesses also subvert her efforts. The long introductory section both illuminates and frustrates. Presenting a rich mélange of ideas and insights, it fails to organize them. Moreover, toward the end of the essay, Ms.
Atwood’s abrupt excursion from the theatrical to the political results in a strained conclusion. These missteps bedim an otherwise bright performance.


Eighteenth-century scholars aware of Gaspare Tagliacozzi (1545–1597) will have encountered him most likely in either Butler’s oft-repeated comic lines in Hudibras, Steele’s equally satiric treatment in Tatler No. 260, or Sterne’s extended comedy on noses in Tristram Shandy, III.38. Ms. Cock is familiar with the first two sources and also cites Sterne, namely Yorick’s Meditations upon Various Interesting and Important Subjects (1760). The immediate problem is that it is not Sterne’s work, but a shabby imitation; the second problem is that she seems oblivious to Sterne’s extended discussion of Taglia-cozzi, and Ambrose Paré, not to mention the great Slawkenbergius.

The “sympathetic snout” is a term from Hudibras. Ms. Cock considers “sympathetic” in both its social and medical frames, but primarily the latter, where the word connotes for the era the inadequacy of skin grafts from others because when the donor becomes ill or dies, so will the recipient. For the satirist, this opened many avenues of ridicule, especially because the primary purpose of the operation was to replace noses disintegrated by syphilis (or its treatment by mercury). At the same time, the procedure for ensuring lasting compatibility between the donor and recipient by making them one and the same (Taglia-cozzi’s practice) was entangled with medical theories of sympathy on the one hand, notions of black magic on the other. Thus, while Taglia-cozzi actually propounded taking skin from the patient, a promising mode of plastic surgery, the satirists were intent on ridicule, probably contributing to the suspension of the procedure during the eighteenth century. And some surgeons, intent on their own investment in ideas of sympathy, also provided “case studies” of patients victimized by the fate of their donors—years later and miles apart.

The last section of the essay deals with an unpublished poem by Lady Hester Pulter (1607–1678), who wrote to Sir William Davenant on the loss of his nose, offering sympathy and skin from her own leg to replace it. The excerpts provided by Ms. Cock make it difficult to ascertain whether her reading of the poem as sympathetic rather than satiric is correct, but her failure to pay any heed at all to Tristram Shandy, along with the obscurity of Pulter and her poem, contributed to this reviewer’s failure to pursue the issue further. The author, her editors, and the publisher’s “expert” readers of the manuscript did not do their job.


In his Bibliographical Analysis: A Historical Introduction, G. Thomas Tanselle reviews the rise of the New Bibliography a century ago and the more recent move to history of the book studies and the sociology of texts. He concludes that “the artifacts carrying verbal texts constitute an enormous reservoir of information about the past, quite apart from the meanings of the words themselves; and those who are interested in learning about the past will persist in exploring every conceivable way
of extracting that information.” The frequently discrete investigations of the words and the printed artifacts that carry them, and the extent to which each approach relies on and contributes to the other, is the challenge addressed by Mr. Gavin in his essay examining the analogous, entangled historiographies of English literary criticism and bibliography’s pursuit of textual authorial integrity.

While the claim that the histories of criticism and of bibliography are complementary may not startle, the careful teasing out of the myriad ways they are interwoven and reciprocally illuminating offers a perspective that enriches our understanding of both. Mr. Gavin’s terminus a quo is the English Restoration, and the prefaces, dedications, and separate prose works that sketched out what would come to be called literary criticism. This same paratextual matter provided bibliographers and historians of the book with evidence about printing, selling, and reading practices, author-printer relations, and the patronage and venality that marked the era. Citing as evidence both micro- and macrohistories of reading, he suggests that literary reviews, and letters and diaries, engage in and respond to the critical analysis of literature, while providing evidence for reading practices and the public engagement they participate in and document.

Mr. Gavin’s focus on Restoration readers results in short shrift to other critics, apart from his observations on the critical shudders evoked by Dryden’s obvious immersion in the politics and patronage of the day. And he reimagines D. W. McKenzie’s memorable exfoliation of Wimsatt and Beardsley’s account of Congreve as rather putting the three in dialogue as “competing critics,” where the value is not the analysis of the artifact but the misprision’s contribution to that critical analysis. In what he calls McKenzie’s “bibliographic humanism” he sees the search for meaning in the words and in the pages that carry the distributed agency (of which the author is a part) responsible for bringing a book into being where, as Mr. Gavin nicely puts it, the author “reemerges . . . as one component within a narrative of dispersed intent.”

To test his claims, Mr. Gavin offers to us the output of Restoration bookseller Henry Herringman, whose imprints include works by many leading playwrights (and whose dedications and prefaces hold much of the period’s critical writing) along with works of criticism by Dryden and Rapin. By reading Dryden’s public critical discourse in the dedication for Rival Ladies (1664) against Elkanah Settle’s dismissal of the practice of including critical commentary in dedications a dozen years later (The Empress of Morocco (1673)), Mr. Gavin suggests that his discussions’ contribution to our understanding of the world of print, patrons, booksellers, and authors would have had little role in the traditional discourse of literary criticism. Understanding early criticism means understanding who wrote, and who read, where, and when. Understanding chain lines, accidentals, and print runs can likewise contribute to our making of meaning.


Lady Mary Wortley Montagu’s contributions to letters are well established, but her work in smallpox inoculation has, Mr. Grey reports, received less than due attention from scholars. With meticulous re-
search and a broad view of cultural and historical context, Mr. Grey’s essay attempts to fill that gap.

The developing science of inoculation against smallpox in the long eighteenth century was controversial, not only for medical and scientific reasons but because the practice was associated with early modern Islamic science, folk medicine, and women’s lore. Some also objected to inoculation on religious grounds as diabolical, unnatural, and immoral. Against all this, however, loomed harsh experience. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, up to 25 percent of those who contracted smallpox died, and of those who survived, half were left visibly marked. Montagu herself survived, but barely. Introduced to the practice of inoculation through her ambassador husband’s work in Turkey, Montagu arranged for her young son, then her daughter, to be inoculated.

Mr. Grey engagingly traces how the success of the procedure on Montagu’s children, Montagu’s publication of an anonymous essay promoting inoculation, and her word-of-mouth testimony encouraged acceptance of inoculation in Britain, and ultimately across the globe.

Karen Swallow Prior Liberty University


Henry Every (often renamed Captain Avery in print) was a well-known eighteenth-century pirate; notable for establishing pirate outposts on Madagascar, he also appears as a character in several eighteenth-century novels, including Defoe’s Captain Singleton. While Defoe’s version of Avery has been widely discussed, Ms. Jones attends instead to an earlier work, The Life and Adventures of Captain John Avery (1709). This, the first published work focused on Every, provided source material for Defoe’s novel and for A General History of the Robberies and Murders of the Most Notorious Pirates (1724–1726; sometimes attributed to Defoe). As Ms. Jones notes, while it is tempting to read this tract as a call for Britain to control and incorporate the piratical communities of Madagascar into the formal structures of the British Empire, the truth is more complex. The tract draws parallels between pirate communities and nonstate merchant actors such as the East India Company; it can be read allegorically as questioning distinctions between merchant, pirate, and king. But Ms. Jones most significantly and originally suggests that this work’s literary features teach readers how to read more critically: the ambiguities and formal complexities of this pirate narrative transform passive readers into active critics, in turn promoting more politicized forms of engagement. Rather than reading pirate narratives as critiques of the state, with its political and social hierarchies, this essay argues that the reader is the only “morally certain holder of property.”

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The seventeen essays in this volume and Mr. New’s introductory essay insist on a richly religious eighteenth century and a scholarship that acknowledges the importance of the Christian frame of meaning shared by its authors and readers. While
the Christian understanding of the goodly creation of (wo)man in the image of God, with an affective aesthetic and with thinking of the faithful as saints. But the just cause and magisterial sweep of such an introduction really should inspire quibbles!

Madeleine Forell Marshall California State University, San Marcos


In this interesting collection’s only essay germane to Scriblerian interests, Mr. Nicholson offers curious anecdotes for horse enthusiasts with a passing interest in belle lettres, but his analysis will disappoint serious readers. Statements such as “Swift had a soft spot for [the] equine genus” and “Swift wasn’t the only one to value horses above humans” elide the sophistication and nuance of the satire. The discussion passes quickly over writers as diverse as Chaucer, Sterne, Cleland, D’Urfey, Fielding, Smollett, and Burns. In each case, Mr. Nicholson finds an equine-philiac, if not an eager sportsman.

For his claim that the Jockey Club predates its recognized establishment in 1752, Mr. Nicholson calls attention to brief notices in the Daily Post, the Daily Journal, and the Daily Advertiser from 1729, 1735, and 1743, respectively. These texts demonstrate that a group, or groups, referred to as the Jockey Club existed, but Mr. Nicholson does not show that any of these groups became the famous institution in Newcastle that serves as the official governing body for horseracing. Examining the frontispiece to Ned Ward’s 1709 pamphlet The History of the London Clubs, Mr. Nicholson
finds a compelling antecedent to the sixth plate of Hogarth’s A Rake’s Progress, but his assertion that the images “suggest that there may well have been a Jockey Club in operation more than 40 years before” 1752 is unpersuasive. Mr. Nichol’s discussion of horseracing in John Almon’s satiric miscellany, The New Foundling Hospital for Wit (1768–1773), is more convincing and will introduce readers to an overlooked midcentury satirical text. Otherwise, the essay, however entertaining, provides little for the specialist.

Christopher D. Johnson   Francis Marion University

Winn, James A. “‘Like Her Britannia’s Self’: Mythology and Politics in the Life of Queen Anne,” SStud, 30 (2015), 31–70.

Queen Anne has often fared poorly in the hands of historians: she was timid, limited in her abilities, obese, out of her depth in most political matters, and, despite her best efforts, she failed to produce a royal heir. Mr. Winn’s aim in this essay is frankly recuperative. Yes, the Queen became overweight and her health declined after her many pregnancies, but she still managed to defend her royal prerogatives amid growing political challenges and encouraged early feminists and a variety of people in the arts. More important, her dozen years on the throne saw a satisfactory conclusion to the War of the Spanish Succession and allowed the various pieces—military, diplomatic, economic, and domestic—to fall into place in support of an extended British Empire. These latter accomplishments allowed Anne to be much lauded by contemporaries.

Mr. Winn’s second purpose is to describe and analyze the mythologies used particularly by Tories to frame public celebrations of her reign. The Queen was happy to cooperate with writers, painters, composers, and sculptors eager to associate her with honored female antecedents—biblical Deborah, historical Elizabeth I, classical Venus and Pallas Athena—and eventually the idealized goddess Britannia herself. Mr. Winn brings together many examples to show how such a range of past worthies allowed the Queen to appear alternately in different artistic settings as distant and serene, “awful” and warlike, warmly motherly and approachable, or richly blessed and near divine. By the accumulation of such mythologies ye shall know her.

This essay serves, in effect, as a fitting invitation to look into Mr. Winn’s comprehensive and even more copiously illustrated study, Queen Anne: Patroness of Arts (2014).

REFLECTIONS ON SWIFT’S JOURNAL TO STELLA

Margaret Anne Doody

The recently published Journal to Stella in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Jonathan Swift (Journal to Stella: Letters to Esther Johnson and Rebecca Dingley 1710–1713), edited by Abigail Williams, is an exciting presentation of a work well-known, yet incompletely known—perhaps not completely knowable. Splendidly produced, this volume makes enormous amounts of information accessible to the reader, who can also turn to helpful appendices on political debates, other letters, and the “little language.” Reproductions of epistles deal with complex questions of excision, obliteration, and revision.