Beyond Remittances
Knowledge Transfer among Highly Educated Latvian Youth Abroad

ABSTRACT Young, tertiary-educated emigrants see themselves, and are seen by their home country's government, as agents of economic and social change, especially if they can be incentivized to return home. In this paper we examine the barriers that prevent this positive impact from being fully realized, taking the case of Latvia, formerly part of the Soviet Union but since 2004 a member state of the European Union. We build our analysis on data from an online questionnaire (N = 307) and from narrative interviews (N = 30) with foreign-educated Latvian students and graduates. In moving beyond remittances, we examine knowledge transfer to the home country as a form of "social remittance" and break down knowledge into two types—that which can be transferred fully and that which can be transferred only partially. We find that students and graduates do indeed see themselves as agents of change in their home country, but that the changes they want to make, and the broader imaginaries of development that they may have, are constrained by the limited scale of the market, ethnic privileging of "Latvianess," and the often nontransparent recruitment practices in Latvia. Policy should recognize and respond to various barriers that exist to knowledge transfer and return migration.

KEYWORDS Social Remittances, Knowledge Transfer, Migration and Development, Highly Educated Migrants, Latvia

INTRODUCTION
For a small, peripheral European country like Latvia, young, highly educated migrants are potential agents of economic and social change in their home country. Their contribution to change and development is conventionally thought of as taking place via three mechanisms—the "two Rs" of remittances and return, plus other contributions from the diaspora in terms of investment and the channeling of new ideas. This is how most scholars operationalize the link between migration and home-country development in what has come to be known as the migration-development nexus (for a selection of relevant literature, see de Haas 2010; Faist, Fauser, and Kivisto 2011; Lucas 2005; Van Hear and Sørensen 2003).

Within the migration-development nexus, remittances have taken center stage, consistent with the neoliberal philosophy of individual initiative and the concomitant retreat from state planning. Defined as "current private transfers from migrant workers who are considered residents of the host country to residents in the workers’ country of origin"
(World Bank 2011:xvi), remittances are usually conceived of as financial flows transmitted via banks or money transfer operators or conveyed cash-in-hand by migrants on return visits to their family members. Compared to overseas aid packages, foreign investment, or state-managed development plans, remittances are thought to be a more effective means of "bottom-up" development, directing resources to those who are most needy and deserving. Remittances are a central plank of the so-called "new economics of migration," providing both the resources for survival and the means for investment in a more prosperous future (Lucas 2005:145–206; Taylor 1999).

Remittances constituted 3 percent of Latvia’s GDP in 2013. Financial remittances are not, however, our main focus in this paper. Our first step in moving “beyond remittances” is to revisit Peggy Levitt’s (1998) important concept of social remittances, defined by her as "the ideas, behaviors, identities and social capital that flow from [migrant] receiving- to sending-country communities" (p. 927). Despite the seminal status of Levitt’s 1998 paper, reinforced by recent refinements (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011, 2013), there have been rather few empirical studies of how this important concept plays out in practice.

In this paper we are particularly interested in knowledge transfer (Williams 2007b) from tertiary-educated migrants, specifically from Latvian graduates who still study or have already undertaken some or all of their higher education abroad. Our guiding research questions are the following. How do young, tertiary-educated Latvian migrants imagine and practice knowledge transfer across international borders that correspond to economic, social, and cultural boundaries? What are their diagnoses of Latvia’s development needs and opportunities, and how do they envision their own contribution? To better understand migrants’ relationships with their country of origin, we focus particularly on how migrants imagine their return back to Latvia and on their practices with respect to development ideas.

Our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we provide a conceptual literature review, followed by further context to the case study of Latvia. We put forward the notion of an evolving Latvian student and graduate diaspora, we comment on the country’s recent political history and its peripherality within the European Union, and we summarize recent migration trends. A section on data and methods then follows. Two surveys underpin our empirical analysis: an online questionnaire survey of Latvian graduates who have studied abroad (N = 307), and a series of in-depth interviews (N = 30) with the same category of research participants. Drawing on findings of this dual research design, we present empirical results under three headings: imaginaries of development; return and knowledge transfer; and the social, cultural, and ethnic barriers that have to be confronted. In the conclusion we return to the original research questions, evaluate the extent to which they have been answered, and draw out the wider lessons of our case study.

CONCEPTUALIZING BARRIERS TO KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER

In this section we provide an overview of some conceptual tools for moving beyond remittances in the analysis of development ideas and ideals of young and educated migrants. First, we provide definitions of different types of knowledge and discuss recent advancements in analysis of social remittances. We then explain how student migration is woven into a more global idealization of knowledge transfer and explore the implications for a small country
with large-scale emigration and brain drain and the political understanding of an evolving diaspora.

Williams (2006, 2007a, 2007b) approaches the concept of knowledge transfer by positioning migrants as knowledgeable and constantly learning individuals. From this perspective there are four main analytically distinct types of knowledge. Embrained knowledge, briefly, is cognitive abilities that are usually improved and made more sophisticated through formal education. Embodied knowledge is acquired through physical presence, learning by doing, observation, and reflective practical thinking (Williams 2007b:364). These types of knowledge, although not without effort, are transferable across borders. The two remaining types of knowledge can be transferred only partially. Enculturated knowledge involves shared meanings as a result of socialization and acculturation, while embedded knowledge is generated in particular complex systems such as politics, societal norms, language, and work culture. If migrants are perceived as carriers of distinctive knowledge and thus act as potential innovators and invigorators of their home state’s businesses and other institutions (Williams 2007b), the transfer of embrained and embodied knowledge can be achieved fully. Also, the transfer of other types of knowledge can be better facilitated.

This typology adds nuance to Levitt’s (1998:933–36) initial conceptualization of social remittances. She argued that, first, social remittances affect normative structures of ideas, values, and beliefs. Second, these normative structures are translated into specific acts and behaviors in what she referred to as systems of practice. And third, social remittances involve social capital, which can increase or decline through migration and return. By knowing that enculturated and embedded knowledge cannot be fully transferred, we can further understand how social remittances are constrained and cause disillusionment about the functionality of the migration-development nexus. For instance, Jones (2011) has implicitly picked up the problem of embedded knowledge and has argued that, since return migrants are more locally embedded, return migrant households invest more into their home communities in Bolivia.

Furthermore, with respect to return migrants, timing is crucial. Levitt and Rajaram (2013) have recently advanced discussion of this temporal dimension of social remittances. They argue that “when primary socialization occurs outside the country-of-origin, they [return migrants] will have more difficulty adjusting and/or giving back” their knowledge (p. 503).

Given the developmental potential of foreign-educated graduates, what Michael Collyer (2013) calls “emigration nations” have responded by paying more attention to their “extra-territorial” populations. In addition to the “two Rs” mentioned earlier (remittances and return), the third aspect of the migration-development nexus—“mobilizing the diaspora”—becomes a key focus for policy, especially when the “diaspora” contains a high proportion of highly educated and therefore potentially creative and wealthy individuals. It is also interesting that states are increasingly deploying the term diaspora to denote their emigrant populations, even those who, like students, are recently emigrated and who therefore do not fulfill the prototypical definition of a diaspora as a long-standing, multigenerational, and rather settled population (cf. Cohen 2008:2–4). While some would say the phrase student diaspora is an oxymoron because students are likely to be recently departed, onwardly mobile, and lacking a true diasporic identity, the flexible use
of the word *diaspora* chimes with its modern-day extended meaning, in which it is used more as a metaphor than as a specific historical-geographical formation.

To some purists, this use of the term *diaspora* violates its classic meaning of a historically embedded ethnic population scattering characterized by trauma, exile, and desire for return to a common ancestral homeland (Cohen 2008:1–19). Rather, we follow Brubaker’s conceptualization of diaspora as a “community of practice” (2005:12), including the notion of a “young” diaspora or a “diaspora-in-the-making” (cf. Mai 2005). Or, to be more categorical, we quote Esman (2009), who, wishing to transcend the classical concept heavily influenced by the Jewish case, defines *diaspora* as “a migrant community that maintains material and sentimental linkages with its home country, while adapting to the environment and institutions of the host country” (p. 14).

Finally, we have to take into account that political slogans about an evolving diaspora as development agents remain empty if there is a lack of structural opportunities for return migrants (Strunk 2013). Policy makers in countries with short or more sudden migration experience still need to make a first step and recognize migrants’ agency: this is vital in order to empower migrants as agents of development (Hasalová 2011). Lamont and Molnar (2002) propose the notion of “boundary work” as an intrinsic capacity of human agency. Boundary drawing—social, economic, cultural, political—is a crucial process in how a person constitutes and understands “self” in society. Therefore we structure our later empirical analysis around three main subsections. First, we contrast political incentives and discourses with the structural boundaries of a peripheral, emigration-depleted country. Second, we analyze boundary-drawing practices, where our respondents talk about ideals and obstacles to the transfer of embrained and embodied knowledge, which theoretically can be transferred fully. Finally, we analyze the obstacles to the transfer of embedded and enculturated knowledge.

**LATVIAN STUDENTS AND GRADUATES ABROAD: A RESOURCE FOR DEVELOPMENT?**

The growth in the number of Latvian students getting their qualifications abroad mirrors global and European trends in international student migration. This form of migration grows at a quicker pace than total global migration does, and this is reflected in the appearance of several major studies on the international mobility of students (see Alberts and Hazen 2013; Bilicen 2014; Brooks and Waters 2011; Byram and Dervin 2008; Gérard and Uebelmesser 2014). According to the International Institute for Education (2015), international student numbers rose from 2.1 million in 2001 to 4.5 million in 2014. The common interpretation of international student migration is that it is a “win” situation for students in that they are able to expand both their academic knowledge and their practical experience, which may, in turn, increase their opportunities for better careers. The question then arises as to the location of their subsequent careers: abroad or back in the country of origin? Surprisingly little is known about the career outcomes of foreign-educated graduates who return to their home countries, particularly within the European context. Evidence may, indeed, be contradictory. A study by Di Pietro (2013) on Italian graduates found that studying abroad increased the possibility of being employed three years after graduation. Conti and King (2015), on the other hand, found that Italian graduates who had studied or worked...
abroad were fearful of returning to Italy because of the high likelihood of unemployment and their loss of the networks and personal contacts thought necessary to get a graduate-level job.

Like the other so-called A8 countries that joined the European Union in its major eastern enlargement in 2004 (Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia), Latvia has experienced significant emigration of young people in the last decade. According to the most recent census, more than 220,000 people emigrated from Latvia during 2001–11, a significant share of the total population of 2 million. Three events in the country’s recent political history have shaped the evolution of this migration: independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, accession to the EU in 2004, and the 2008 economic crisis. The most important of these events was EU accession, which opened up a new migratory space of free movement. The post-accession boom years were, however, abruptly halted by the global and European economic crisis, which hit Latvia severely, with the result that the government had to seek financial support from the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission. It is true that there has been a strong recovery of the Latvian economy since 2010, but some attribute this to the combination of austerity and emigration, rather than seeing it as reflecting true, output-driven growth (Sommers and Woolfson 2014).

A growing number of migrants are university graduates, as well as emigrating students who move abroad to obtain a degree. There are concerns in Latvia about the loss of such a significant share of the key developmental resource of human capital, especially at a time when Latvia is experiencing absolute demographic decline—the population fell from 2.3 million in 2001 to 2.0 million in 2011. Students, too, are a diminishing national total, dropping from around 130,000 students in universities and other third-level institutions in the boom years of 2004–8 to 86,000 in 2014 (MoES 2015:31).

Latvia is one of several central and eastern European countries (see Barcevičius 2015 on Lithuania and Williams and Baláž 2005 on Slovakia) that are anxious to attract back highly educated migrants and are concerned about the scale of the brain drain in a context of future economic planning with a shrinking supply of qualified graduates. The main policy document produced by the Ministry of Economics of the Latvian government is its Return Migration Support Plan for 2013–16 (MoE 2012b), which highlighted the priority of attracting back the highly skilled.

Alongside the policy plan were key statements by government officials. Daniels Pavluts, minister of economics at the time, put it like this in a 2012 statement: “We want to give a clear message to Latvian nationals around the world that their future is in Latvia. We have to develop a return migration plan with clearly defined activities, funding for such activities, and a timetable” (MoE 2012a). The minister announced his “dream . . . that half of all emigrants would return,” but this target was then adjusted to 100,000 in 20 years.

At first sight, the timing of the plan was opportune, coming when the economic recovery from the crisis was well under way. And there was a democratic ring to the policy process, which was open to any citizen to submit suggestions. But, inevitably, the policy was harshly criticized for its elitist and ethnocentric nature in a country where Russophones constitute a one-third minority of the total population. The Return Migration Support Plan specifically stipulated that state companies cannot ask for the Russian language as a prerequisite for job
hiring (MoE 2012b). Moreover, the numerical targets were unrealistic, and less than a year after the launch of the plan the government changed the rhetoric to a more individualistic, neoliberal emphasis, as Pavluts subsequently stated in a 2013 interview:

The aim for the plan was never to persuade anybody to come back; not in a direct way, at least. That would be criminal . . . to ask people to come back if there are no real grounds for that. The plan was oriented towards people who had already made their decision to return; who know what they will do upon return and how they will make their living. The aim of the plan was to put pressure on the government institutions to collaborate and provide the necessary educational, social and employment services for those who do return. (“Pavluts” 2013)

One of the few concrete activities that have been implemented to promote return of the highly skilled is a work placement program for graduates to work in Latvian government departments and institutions. The program received 1,433 applications from 20 countries, and six people have been selected to work in Latvia in summer 2015.

Latvian president Raimonds Vejonis also put his weight behind the general policy of mobilizing the Latvian diaspora, portraying emigrant professionals as a resource that should be tapped into to help the country to flourish, especially from an entrepreneurial perspective. Addressing the World Latvians Economics and Innovation Forum in 2015, he said:

Your location abroad should be seen as an opportunity for development which allows Latvian entrepreneurs to use your experience and knowledge, opening up a better cooperation with Latvia. . . . Perhaps a good part of those of you who are here are the first representatives of Latvian entrepreneurs in your countries of residence. . . . Nobody can know the market and its opportunities better than you. In the meantime, you understand Latvian traditions and the business environment in Latvia. But you can also see Latvia from outside, and therefore you can sometimes detect needs and problems even more clearly and what is needed for the economic development of our country. Therefore I ask you to build ties and collaboration with Latvia-based entrepreneurs which will give an impetus to them to develop as important players in the world (Vejonis 2015).

This appeal to patriotic feelings also represented an elitist selection, this time targeting only entrepreneurs. Latvia’s selective diaspora mobilization strategy reflects broader concerns about the way such policies, if uncritically celebrated, can perpetuate or even exacerbate inequalities—as has been demonstrated in other geographic contexts (Larner 2015; Smith and Gergan 2015). And rather than patriotic fervor, a recent large-scale survey found a starkly different mood among the broader Latvian emigrant population. This Internet survey of 14,000 Latvian emigrants worldwide carried out by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the University of Latvia in 2015 revealed that trust in the government was “cat- astrophically low” (IPS 2015). On a scale from 0 to 10 (most negative to most positive), the average assessment of the Latvian government was 1.5, with 56 percent of respondents awarding the lowest rating of 0. By comparison, the respondents’ assessments of the government of the countries where they were residing was 5.9.

No quantitative research exists on return trends of Latvian students and graduates from abroad. We do know that from all emigrants who left during 2001–8, 40 percent returned
(Hazans 2011). But of course some, possibly many, could have re-emigrated—as many Polish returnees from Britain did when they found that conditions were still tough in Poland (White 2014). In Kahanec and Fabo’s (2013) study on the migration of young people from the new (i.e., post-2004) EU states, one of the key findings was that younger migrants tend to stay for a shorter time abroad. In the rest of this paper we will therefore treat Latvia as a rather typical example of knowledge transfer and return migration, not only for other central and East European countries, but also in other global contexts where countries have, relative to their size, large cohorts of young and highly educated people living abroad.

DATA

Our target population for this study was composed of Latvian university students and graduates who had completed (or were still undergoing) their tertiary-level studies abroad. The sample included both those who were still studying or working abroad and those who had returned to Latvia. This target-population definition was kept deliberately broad in order to capture the variety of experiences of young university-educated Latvians with an age range from 18 to 35 years.

Rather than follow conventional definitions of “international students” as those who have crossed an international border for the purpose of study following prior education in another country, or of “foreign students” as defined on the basis of citizenship, we adopted a more flexible approach based on the notion of diaspora. We see Latvian students and recent graduates who live abroad as a form of highly educated diasporic youth. At different ends of this flexible spectrum we find the Latvian graduate who goes abroad in his or her mid-20s to research a Ph.D., and the child of Latvian labor migrants who is taken abroad by migrating parents at a young age and then pursues third-level studies abroad.

The primary data examined in this paper come from two sources. The first is an Internet-based questionnaire survey carried out in February–March 2015 and distributed via the webpage of the Centre for Diaspora and Migration Studies of the University of Latvia. We posted advertisements on Web-based social networks—Facebook, the Latvian networking site Draugiem.lv, LinkedIn, and Twitter1—inviting those who currently study in full degree programs, or have completed a degree abroad in the past five years, to fill out the questionnaire. Twenty-two questions were formed in blocks about sociodemography, migration trajectories, study funding, work, extracurricular activities during studies, contacts with the Latvian diaspora, and plans for return to Latvia; there were also open questions designed to generate self-written longer responses. Here we analyze written responses to three open questions that were formulated as follows: “What are your plans for the future?” “I want to use my knowledge . . . ,” and “I want to emphasize. . . .” The idea was that, outside of the simple quantitative and factual data collected by the questionnaire, respondents (who numbered 307) would have space to express their plans, thoughts, and ideas freely. This approach yielded abundant and highly reflective and opinionated responses. Respondents provided recommendations about Latvia’s future development and engaged in a dialogue concerning their personal experiences and views of both the foreign countries in which they had lived and, more particularly, their home country and its development needs.
Altogether the respondents represented 26 countries as their current place of residence. This geographical diversity is a significant advantage of Web-based social networks, as students and graduates accessed the survey via their acquaintances and friends on the Web and could respond to the questionnaire from virtually any place where they had an Internet access. The largest group were those who had already returned to Latvia (63). Of the remainder, 55 responded from the United Kingdom, 26 from Sweden, 24 from the Netherlands, 23 from Denmark, 17 from Germany, 13 from Finland, 12 from the United States, and smaller numbers from several other countries.

An Internet-based survey can never claim to be truly representative if the total potential survey population is unknown, so the way that we recruited respondents may have an impact on the responses. The survey respondents were disproportionately made up of women (75 percent)—at first sight, a rather marked deviation from the gender balance that we ideally sought. But actually there is a female majority among graduating students both in the EU as a whole (60 percent in 2012; Eurostat 2015) and in Latvia (65 percent in 2014; MoES 2015:33), so the bias is less serious. In terms of age distribution, 70 percent of respondents were aged 18 to 29, and the remainder were over 30 years of age.

The second source of primary data consists of 30 semistructured interviews with Latvian students and graduates who were studying, or had studied, abroad. Interviews were conducted either face to face or via Skype and lasted one hour on average. They were carried out in the interviewee’s language of choice—Latvian, Russian, or English—and were tape-recorded subject to informed consent. The interview phase of the research immediately followed the online questionnaire and took place between March and July 2015. Interviewees were partly recruited from the database of surveyed respondents from the questionnaire (who were asked to indicate their willingness to be available for in-depth interviewing); additional interviewees were reached by a snowballing method. For the latter, no more than two contacts given by one interviewee were used in order to ensure access to different social networks.

Compared to the online survey, the interview sample was more gender balanced: 16 females and 14 males. Included in the interview survey were students and graduates at bachelor’s, master’s and doctorate level, in order to trace different levels of embrained knowledge and different educational life transitions. We excluded, however, those who had been abroad only as exchange students, since this form of student mobility does not result in a final degree qualification from abroad.

The interviews were designed to elicit qualitative biographical data from the participants, who were encouraged to “tell their stories” in a roughly chronological sequence: their background and early education in Latvia; their experiences of study and (if relevant) work abroad; and their experiences since return to Latvia (or, for those still abroad, their attitudes toward and plans for return). A key purpose of the interview was to elicit their own diagnosis of the problems and potentialities of development in Latvia and to see how they envisioned their possible contribution to the development process. Obviously we did not, in the interview dialogues, use terms like social remittances or embrained and enculturated knowledge; but we found that interviewees’ narratives, based on both their experiences and their opinions, could be easily framed within this conceptual terminology.
According to our preferred theoretical optic, we distinguished which type of knowledge our respondents were giving meaning to. We also identified different types of boundaries (economic, social, and cultural) that had to be crossed for the knowledge transfer to take place. These boundary categories will structure some of our empirical analysis below. Any names are pseudonyms. Data from the online survey (S) and the interviews (I) are indicated thus, together with gender (F or M) and the country or countries of current and past residence as a student or worker.

**IDEALIZED IMAGINARIES OF DEVELOPMENT AND ASCRIPTIONS OF BEING “OTHER”**

Respondents often expressed idealized imaginaries of their return and the knowledge contribution that they envisaged themselves making to the home country. In doing so they articulated, either explicitly or implicitly, a particular model for Latvia’s development, and they usually saw themselves as agents of a positive impact of migration. This framework reveals that development is not purely an economic process but is also socially and culturally inscribed. In a paper in an earlier issue of this journal, Thornton, Dorius, and Swindle (2015) stated that “developmental idealism is a cultural model—a set of beliefs and values—that identifies the appropriate goals of development and the ends for achieving these goals” (p. 69). In post-socialist Latvia these “beliefs, values and goals” are no longer socialist but neoliberal. As we shall see in this section, while the research participants were able to identify the goals and means for Latvia’s development, they were not always “allowed” to achieve these ambitions, partly because of what they perceived as their externally ascribed identity as “returnees” and as “foreign educated.”

Some respondents optimistically described their potential impact on their country’s development and stressed the necessity for the Latvian government to “know its diaspora” in order to govern it better as a potentially valuable resource (Dzenovska 2015).

I would like to emphasize that these kinds of efforts [for the state to communicate with the student diaspora] should be welcomed, because knowledge gained from outside can be very effectively integrated into the labor market in Latvia, bringing in new ideas and, probably, giving benefits to business in Latvia. (S, F, UK)

However, such optimistic assumptions are weak if they are not based on an understanding of the aims and normative transitions in diaspora members’ lives (Dzenovska 2015).

Other respondents idealistically emphasized that the Latvian state should “use” them as valuable developmental resources, not so much for investment purposes as in the field of knowledge transfer. Latvian students abroad could be asked “to take part in voluntary research work, or giving guest lectures, and other forms of collaboration with partner organizations in Latvia” (S, F, Sweden). In the words of another student:

It is important for the Latvian government to know its people who study abroad or who have recently graduated. Then the state could find professionals with a specific educational profile or specialization which is not available in Latvia. (S, F, UK and Denmark)

In the final quote in this series, which expresses an unproblematized version of highly educated emigrants as development agents for their countries or origin, we find a succinct argument for
the normalcy and desirability of emigration, challenging the notion of “sedentary normativity,” by which people who emigrate are seen as somehow “deviant”:

In every developed country there should be a layer of people who want to explore the world and gain the best and what it gives them, and then return with that experience and new thoughts. (S, M, UK)

Contrasting these positive imaginaries of Latvian development are some harsher and more complex realities. First, there are barriers related to ascription—who you are and how you are perceived and categorized—that apply to both migrants and return migrants in their respective locational contexts of social and organizational emplacement (Williams 2007b:369–70).

Nagel (2005:208) emphasizes that criteria for ascription are usually built around the migrants’ status as “strangers” or “newcomers” or their specific (visible) ethnicity and “difference.” For Latvian students and workers, their ascribed characteristics—often implied rather than asked outright—relate to their generic “eastern European-ness.” Kuus (2004) has written of the “broadly orientalist discourse” that assumes and reifies essentialized differences between Europe (meaning “western Europe” or the “old EU” of before 2004) and eastern Europe, with the latter being portrayed as still rather backward and not yet “fully European.”

The real surprise comes, however, when the highly educated migrants return to Latvia and discover that yet again they are the victims of certain types of ascription. This surprise arises not only because they have assumed it will be easier to overcome any prejudice toward returnees because they already possess, as a result of their pre-emigration upbringing and earlier lives in Latvia, at least some of the embedded and encultured knowledge of their home country. Participants become aware of these ascriptive barriers on visits home, or when they start to look for a job, or from the stories of others who have returned and faced difficulties. They discover that time spent abroad and the possession of “foreign” credentials are often obstacles rather than assets for getting a decent job in Latvia. Respondents expressed a worry that the ascriptive categorization of their “foreign” experience and time away was a major obstacle preventing their successful return:

Those who studied abroad are usually treated with suspicion, and not fully accepted after his or her return. . . . I think we need to have an expanding horizon about what a person gains when they study abroad. (S, F, Netherlands)

The final sentence in the previous quote hints at a prescription for what the home country ought to do to broaden its welcome and appreciation of returning students with their “foreign” (but often very useful and relevant) qualifications. At the same time, there is an awareness that a (foreign) university degree is not a simple passport to a good job or an indicator of the requisite skills. Waters (2009) has argued that the value of foreign diplomas can be interpreted differently in specific places; they do not always open doors to better careers. However, this not only means that young and highly skilled returnees can face extra difficulties because they are seen as not fully belonging to the country but also implies some serious problems on a societal level. Inward-oriented systems of behavior and accreditation, from education to the workplace, where even return migrants who are citizens of the country face problems of acceptance, significantly hinder knowledge transfer and economic success.
To sum up, we find that respondents and interviewees are aware of the ascriptive criteria that are assigned to them, both abroad and at home. Some see these ascriptions largely in positive terms. Students and graduates with foreign qualifications and experiences imagine themselves as individuals who would broaden cultural horizons and be a resource as a result of their foreign education and experience. However, negativity also features strongly in some participants’ responses and narratives, which express pessimism about the possibility of surmounting obstacles to knowledge transfer.

**TRANSFERRING EMBRAINED AND EMBODIED KNOWLEDGE**

According to Williams’s (2007b) framework, return migrants already possess some encultured knowledge about their home country, and this should make it easier for them to transfer embrained knowledge gained during their foreign studies, as well as embodied knowledge built on any work experience abroad. And indeed the question of return, either actual or possible, featured prominently in our respondents’ written and oral reflections. Virtually all of these paid homage to the general neoliberal economic discourse that is now hegemonic in Latvia, as it is in the other postsocialist countries of the EU. Return is associated with terminologies of progress that, it is claimed, will change the “rusty” thinking in Latvia with its heritage of Soviet-era relationships and ways of doing things. Respondents’ answers give particular attention to the introduction of new social norms and modern “western” standards in education, public administration, and business, with the returnees casting themselves in the role of key agents of change. The following quote exemplifies the idealistic, almost revolutionary, youthful stance of a recent returnee railing against the deadening influence of the “embrained USSR” on older people’s minds and attitudes:

[I returned] to develop this country. Who else, if not young people? Older people have the USSR in their minds, and these blocking mentalities don’t allow them to develop progressive thinking on things which have been developed long ago in Europe and other places of the world. (S, F, Latvia, returned from UK)

This quote is interesting in that it draws a triple boundary: a geographical one between “Europe” (meaning western Europe) and Latvia, still afflicted by the heritage of its membership of the USSR; a generational one between “youth” and “older people,” the former progressive and “European,” the latter the repository of Soviet-style mentalities; and a historical one between the socialist era, when Latvia was part of the Soviet Union, and the postsocialist era of democratization, independence, and market-led economics. Let us explore these multiple boundaries further with the help of our informants and some references to key literature.

As Stenning et al. (2010) point out, the “transition” from communism to capitalism in central and eastern Europe “represents perhaps one of the boldest experiments with neoliberal ideas in the world today, demonstrating vividly the policies and practices associated with this market-led ideology” (p. 2). Neoliberalization is a social project too—predicated on rejection of the “communist” society and on promotion of the individual, especially as an *enterprising* individual. Once again, in the words of Stenning et al. (2010), “The project of neo-liberalism rests on the cultivation of neo-liberal subjectivities which seek to promote
an individualizing ethics of autonomous self-improvement and to erode communal and social relationships” (p. 227).

It seems that both the Latvian state and its economic planners on the one side, and the young graduates with experience of emigration on the other, subscribe to this neoliberal imaginary. The young people, in any case, have lived most, even all in some cases, of their lives in the postsocialist period and have little or no direct memory of the Soviet era. Certainly we have multiple instances of our respondents aspiring to contribute their accumulated knowledge, expertise, and initiative to the market-economy style of development in Latvia. Sometimes this works out, sometimes not.

As theory suggests (Williams 2007b), embraided knowledge in terms of cognitive abilities and skills that are formally recognized in diplomas, as well as the more embodied practical knowledge, can be transferred fully. Let us consider respondents’ actual experiences in knowledge transfer through getting a job. The respondent below describes how she anticipated a “penalty” for her foreign experience and therefore attributes her success to “luck”:

I returned to Latvia because I found a job in my field: it was pure luck. I would have moved elsewhere if I had found a job [in another country], because in principle I did not expect that any employer in Latvia would be interested in giving a job to a Latvian who was studying abroad. (S, F, UK, returned to Latvia)

Faced with the combination of economic, social, and cultural barriers between Latvia and other countries, especially in the context of return, many of our informants saw a possible solution in living transnationally. The main salary-earning country would be elsewhere, ideally in Europe with good and cheap transportation connections to Latvia, allowing frequent visits and back-and-forth travel. One common idea was to combine the security of work and study abroad with the launching of small-scale projects in Latvia. A good example of this approach was revealed in the interview with Martins, who did his bachelor’s degree in Canada and was gathering work experience in both Latvia and Canada. Here is an extract from his interview:

I want to return to Latvia; that is my ultimate goal. . . . I decided to obtain some work experience and build my specific portfolio as a combination of my undergraduate diploma and some experience of creative work. Already during my undergraduate studies I carried out a project related to Latvia. I made a renovation project for a small farm in the countryside; how to restore an old stable block into a guesthouse for tourists. I spent all of my free time researching this project. . . . I do like all the things I can get in North America and western Europe. Then I meet people like me, when I am visiting Latvia during the summer, and I think—What if all of them would return back to Latvia? Could we not make Latvia a much better place? (I, M, Canada, visiting Latvia)

Martins’s life plan reflects a careful assessment of his chances both to further his own career prospects and to set out his vision for Latvia’s future—an optimistic future for the country based on return migration, although the questions at the end of his quote are posed rhetorically as if they might never happen. In a way, his example encapsulates all the knowledge types outlined earlier. His studies in architecture involve both theory and practice, hence
both embrained and embodied knowledge, while his assessment of his own life trajectory—in Canada, Latvia, and possibly the United States or elsewhere in the future—and his “hands-on” work on rural tourism development illustrate the flexible resources that he has been building up and hence contain elements of embedded and enculturated knowledge.

In practice, we found only rather rare cases where the idealized vision of return migration and knowledge transfer came true fully, as in this quote from a respondent below:

I work in a new enterprise in Riga. I use my knowledge here in a very direct way. Honestly, I believe that my [specific] knowledge and training was the only reason why I was asked to join this specific team. The company I am working for is developing technological solutions for education, and my diploma is specifically in information technologies for education. (S, M, Latvia, returned from Sweden)

Here, then, we have an example of how a company in Latvia and a student trained abroad made a matching exercise, where distinctive embrained and embodied knowledge (i.e., both theoretical and practical) was transferred as an innovation. But more common are experiences of frustration, where barriers are erected before a potential candidate with a foreign degree can even demonstrate his or her knowledge, and the knowledge transfer is interrupted because of rigid recruitment systems.

I applied for a job to several ministries in Latvia and I was short-listed. But I never received any slightest sign that they would understand my situation and could be a bit more flexible with interviews. A notice about the job interview came just a few days before the interview. And there are three rounds of such interviews in some ministries. I asked to give me a notice ten days before the interview so I can buy flight tickets for a reasonable price, or to do some Skype interviews. No, I never received such understanding. . . . So I gave up with Latvia and got a job in Brussels. (I, F, Denmark)

This example shows how knowledge transfer to the public sector is especially difficult, since within systems of recruitment it is presumed that a candidate must be in the country and must respond in the context of a non-negotiable order of power relations. This absence of dialogue with migrants who are ready to return is in stark contrast with the political promises presented earlier in this paper. Another survey respondent, this time a returnee, describes how those who have returned and who, because of their absence abroad, lack local contacts tend to stick together as a group.

I have observed that young graduates with foreign diplomas, they sometimes socialize together. . . . The knowledge that they share remains within the circle of these people. At a national level—in business and in politics—a local education and experience is often more valued. This is due to the fact that a return migrant, irrespective of the quality of his or her education, lacks local contacts. A person with a foreign diploma is a “suspicious” outsider—you never know how he or she will use his or her knowledge. “Our” people with “our” education are preferred. (S, F, Latvia)

Here we observe another boundary-drawing phenomenon and group dynamics—foreign-earned knowledge tends to remain in more or less closed circles after people have returned to Latvia.
Social remittances, as envisaged by Levitt (1998), are often traced at the levels of the household or an immediate community. However, there are also exceptions, which involve knowledge transfer in broader systems (see, e.g., Barrett, Gibbons, and Peláez Ponce 2014; Montefrio et al. 2014). These authors’ findings show that some new ideas, such as gender-related norms, are first transmitted to families while, for example, labor relations and citizenship-related norms are communicated to a wider section of society. Our respondents did try to transfer their knowledge to the wider public by using social media and blogging. These are the easiest ways to cross the boundary, but as soon as power relations play a role—for instance, an editor can decide not to publish what foreign-educated Latvians want to communicate—respondents are faced again with perceptions that they are “others” and that they do not understand how things are done in Latvia. In other words, they possess insufficient enculturated and embedded knowledge. Let us consider one such unsuccessful attempt of a group of London-educated graduates to publish their analysis of Greece’s economic crisis:

We did an analysis, wrote an opinion paper, very professional, or so we thought. We believe that there is a lack of high-level economic analysis in Latvia, something like the world could read in the Economist. We submitted to a Latvian newspaper, but then the blast came. I got an e-mail response from the editor, saying that the paper is boring and lacking our own feelings as Latvian migrants in Europe. Then we sent our paper to another newspaper and got rejected again because this paper too wanted personal interviews with us on being migrants and not our economic analysis. (I, F, UK)

In sum: even for types of knowledge that, in theory, can be transferred fully because return migrants and those who live transnationally possess important cultural knowledge such as the ability to communicate in fluent Latvian, there is a barrier that prevents this transfer. Therefore, we finally turn to those types of knowledge that in theory are even more difficult to transfer—enculturated and embedded knowledge.

CULTURAL AND EMBEDDED CONSTRAINTS FOR KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER

Since a successful return to Latvia is mainly related to employment, the ability of the educated returnee to navigate the home country’s recruitment practices is crucial for knowledge transfer and career development. The returnee should have an understanding of, and a willingness to accept or work within, the constraints set by local ways of doing things. This is highly relevant to the Latvian case, where the socially situated, enculturated knowledge of “how things are done” in Latvia is a challenging obstacle for those who have studied abroad and aspire to return. Returning graduates seeking jobs have to contend with entrenched power relations and so risk losing out to those with local knowledge and personal connections.

Here a respondent expresses a negative reaction to these sociocultural barriers and, at the same time, an almost heroic resolution to change the public sector from within:

I want to change the work culture in the state sector. In many offices the systems are outdated, inefficient, and corrupt. I understand that perhaps I am a bit naive, but I really hope that those of us who have been abroad could start changing this system bit by
bit. Frankly . . . this is the only motive for me to stay in Latvia and not to emigrate again. (S, F, Latvia, returned from Sweden)

Note how the respondent implicitly aligns her future plans according to the need to become “an insider” again so that she can facilitate the transfer of her foreign-learned knowledge into the development ideals she envisages—a more efficient, modern, and transparent public sector.

Other respondents were explicit in drawing a distinction between the public sector, where some of the old Soviet-era work cultures—and personnel—survive, and the private sector, which they saw as more “open” but still beset by too many regulatory constraints. The next two quotes illustrate this.

I am very skeptical about working for the public sector. This is what I am currently doing after my return to Latvia, but I certainly do not intend to stay here. Maybe I’ll get a job in the private sector, in fields such as information technology—this referring to the work culture—is different. (S, F, Latvia, returned from UK)

There are no attractive regulations for businesses, particularly for small businesses in Latvia. One can dream about investments from the young and talented, but the reality is that there is a small market, inefficient bureaucracy, and lack of support and incentives from the state if a person wants to launch a business. (S, F, Latvia, returned from Germany)

Particularly the second quote explicitly refers to another aspect of the economic boundary between Latvia and the stronger and larger “western” economies, that of the small size of the market in Latvia—not just the market for products but also the opportunities for profitable investment and for specialized jobs. This is part of the syndrome of economic and geographic peripherality in Europe. From the three Baltic states round to Ireland, Portugal, and Greece, all small countries on the “edge” of Europe, the small size of their economies leads to restrictive opportunities for internationally educated returnees. In an earlier study on the emigration of Irish graduates, King and Shuttleworth (1995) wrote about the “truncated” nature of the Irish labor market, especially for specialized graduates, who simply could not find jobs in their field. Academia is a good example of this truncation of opportunities. There are very few openings available in universities and higher-level research institutions in small, peripheral countries; and those that there are often get taken by “insider” candidates who have stayed close to their “patrons” and networks of power and decision making. This not only blocks the chances of the “outsiders” who are better qualified and have international experience but also runs the risk of fossilizing the intellectual capital of the institution, since those who are trained “in house” tend to replicate the limited horizons of their inward-looking patron-professors. The following quote sums up this situation: the informant would like to return to Latvia, but there are very few work opportunities for the very highly educated—those with a Ph.D.:

I will finish my Ph.D. and then a postdoc, but then I will look for a job abroad. In Latvia it is virtually impossible to get academic positions from outside. There is a lack of job opportunities. Besides, universities in Latvia have their own insider trading and do not want to change this system. But I would love to live and work in Latvia. (S, M, USA)
The economic barrier between Latvia and the major economies of the EU—to which its young, aspiring migrants have migrated for study and work purposes—remains insurmountable, at least for the time being. Certain basic facts of geography—the country’s location and small size—cannot be changed, and these elements are shared with Latvia’s Baltic neighbors, Estonia to the north and Lithuania to the south. In these countries there are similar public debates, and some research, on issues of graduate emigration, the brain drain, and the experiences and desirability of return migration (King et al. 2015; Parutis 2014:162). By contrast the following quote reflects a different view, which is that of those who have returned and who feel so fundamentally changed by their experience abroad that they end up sticking together with those of similar migratory background—a syndrome noted briefly in the previous section of this paper.

To return is quite complicated. When I visit Riga from time to time, I feel that I think and see things differently from those who have been living in Latvia all their lives. I have changed and I feel I no longer fit into this society. I guess if I return for good one day, I may find a common language only with others who have lived and obtained their education abroad. (S, F, Canada)

The social remittances (Levitt 1998; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011) that occur when these changed attitudes are conveyed to relatives, close friends, and the immediate community are more related to gender values, race, and ethnic tolerance. Latvia is a very “white” country (Rhodes 2012). As a result, most informants spoke about their experiences of encountering diversity abroad very positively; they could not imagine anything like this in Latvia. Interviewee Laura describes how, as a result of studying and working in the United Kingdom, “I had to learn about issues I was not interested in before, such as how Latvia treats its minorities, or about politics in Latvia.” Liene, who had studied at a British university and was now, at the time of the interview, working for an advertising firm in London, described visiting Latvia with her British boyfriend, whose father is from the Middle East: “For elderly aunties in Riga, this was like the end of the world” (to have a boyfriend of a “different” ethnicity).

Within broader society in Latvia, the most important and sensitive cultural boundary is the one between “true” Latvians and the largest ethno-linguistic minority group, the Russians, a third of the population. Russophones who have emigrated face additional barriers when they contemplate return, since this group, formerly well placed during the Soviet era, now sees itself as disadvantaged in the more nationalistic post-Soviet years. Even if, in most cases, such highly educated Russian speakers do not identify strongly with Russia but see themselves as a “particular kind of Latvian” (Cheskin 2013), they still face ascribed identity markers as “Russians.”

I want to highlight that I come from a Russian-speaking family. Despite the fact that I studied in a Latvian[-speaking] school and lived in a Latvian environment, I have never been “one of us” [literally “an our person”]. I must admit that I really doubt whether Latvia wants me back, whatever qualifications I might have obtained. I do not comply with the [Latvian] norm, and I simply do not fit into the [standardized Latvian] environment. (S, F, UK)
CONCLUSION

Taking the case of Latvia, this article has moved “beyond remittances,” conceived as simple financial flows, to explore an aspect of social remittances, namely knowledge transfer. We have probed how highly educated students and graduates think of themselves as potential agents of development and change for their home country. Following Williams (2007b), we drew a distinction between *embrained* and *embodied* knowledge, which are fully transferable, and *enculturated* and *embedded* knowledge, which face more obstacles to transfer.

We posed two main questions. How do young, highly educated Latvian migrants imagine, and engage in, knowledge transfer and development activities across international borders? And how do they see their own contribution in terms of their country’s needs and opportunities?

Both migrants and return migrants face similar challenges to transfer knowledge and, as a result, what they transfer is necessarily selective and distinctive. In this paper, what we have been most interested in is, first, how our informants perceive their *potential roles* in transferring knowledge; and second, where this potentiality hits a barrier or results in disillusionment. Certainly both international borders and their associated sociocultural boundaries constitute significant barriers to knowledge transfer (Williams 2007b), but these barriers are by no means insurmountable. Both the Latvian state, through its Return Migration Support Plan, and many of our informants in their questionnaire and interview statements apparently see great potential for Latvia’s student and graduate diaspora to contribute to the modernization and development of the country, in the public sector and more particularly in the business sector. Concrete results, however, fall some way short of this rhetoric. The lofty ambitions of the state plan—that half of all emigrants would return, and that especially the highly educated would return—have had to be revised downwards to more modest outcomes, including a small-scale work placement scheme. The emphasis on entrepreneurial initiative and collaboration is consistent both with the neoliberal vision of the country’s economic future and with the international policy literature on “mobilizing the diaspora” for development (see, e.g., Brinkerhoff 2009; de Haas 2006; Newland and Tanaka 2010). But this strategy needs to be confronted with three important caveats. First, it is morally questionable to make migrants somehow “responsible” for developing their home country (Gamlen 2014:589). Second, any attempt by the government to encourage a sense of patriotic duty is out of touch with the emigrants’ profound mistrust of the Latvian government. And third, the government appears reluctant to recognize the agency of its emigrants.

The empirical data from questionnaire responses and interview narratives likewise articulated a variety of perspectives, oscillating between optimistic scenarios built around the participants’ self-declared contribution to Latvia’s development and a more negative, even cynical interpretation stressing the barriers that would need to be overcome. These barriers—economic, political, social, and cultural—were both “real” and psychological. Some questionnaire respondents kept portraying Latvia as not fully developed and implied that Latvia’s “eastern Europeanness” was backward (Kuus 2004). We also see these discourses of alterity embedded in the interview narratives of several of our participants, a finding that poses further challenges of interpretation. Do these remarks by the interviewees represent a sharp and insightful critique of the “systems of practice” in their home country, or do they reflect...
an internalization of the wider “othering” of eastern Europe and hence risk the reproduction of stereotypes? Certainly there are elements of both, even within the same participants who are ambivalent about their potential to return and effect real change. They are proud of being Latvian but also highly critical of the way the country still struggles to free itself from its post-Soviet identity and ways of doing things.

To sum up: the notion that foreign-educated graduates can be an exogenous force for Latvian development is tempered by the persistence of structural forces and mentalities deriving from the Soviet era, which serve to stifle certain types of independent initiative, especially in the public sector. In other sectors, more dependent on markets, or in the academic sector, small scale and “insider trading” make it difficult for graduates and student emigrants to envisage a productive return. In our analysis, we conceptualized this problem in several ways: by realizing the extent to which certain types of knowledge were embedded within the social, linguistic, and cultural norms of the country or system in which they were produced; by looking at the ways that some migrants, especially returnees, had played the role of boundary spanners between different encultured systems; and by appreciating therefore the strategic role played by context-specific and flexible knowledge.

We feel that the Latvian case is by no means unique. Emigration trends are rather similar across other countries in the A8 group, particularly neighboring Estonia and Lithuania, but also Slovakia and Poland (less so the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia, where emigration rates are lower). And the questions we posed to frame our analysis are surely relevant across a much wider spectrum of countries globally that have “exported” significant shares of their student and graduate young people to study and work abroad.

REFERENCES


NOTE

1. Of course, we have to also take in mind that not all students and graduates actively use these Web-based networking sites.