

Every Move You Make: Bodies, Surveillance, and Media

Every move you make, every vow you take, I'll be watching you.
—The Police

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The Shibboleth

Historically, the forms of surveillance attending episodes of militarization, warring violence, and internal surveillance are part of a more general biopolitics. They are articulated with other political functions aimed at accepting, rejecting, or managing bodies. The concept of biopolitics, which is increasingly invoked in critical political analyses, originates with Michel Foucault's discussion of the "biopolitics of the population," an exercise of governance that "brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations" in the nineteenth century.¹ Whereas previously states contained a "people" who were subject to the sovereign's prerogatives, by the mid-nineteenth century, governance involved more than merely extracting obedience from its subjects. It became involved in managing a "population," understood in terms of the energy and cooperation that could be expected from bodies that work, serve in the army, or, at a minimum, maintain the coherence and positive functioning of the family.

Foucault's emphasis in his treatment of the biopolitics of the population is on the usefulness of bodies, the calculation of their performance capabilities. However, the contemporary problem of governance—after 9/11—has been on dangerous bodies, not only those that constitute threats from the outside but also those on the inside who collaborate with or serve as vehicles for enemies of the state. Addressing the global context of "the war on terrorism," Giorgio Agamben revises the familiar Foucauldian notion of disciplinary power. He notes that the old forms of power that involved defense of territories is being displaced by an aggressive, outreaching securitization: "While disciplinary power isolates and closes off territories, measures of security lead to an opening and globalization; while the law wants to prevent and prescribe, security wants to intervene in ongoing processes to direct them."² Nevertheless, the law, whose function Agamben

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sees as being transcended, has been complicit with the hypersecuritization, with its increasingly global reach.

Under the Patriot Act of 2001, levels of surveillance have been intensified, and the surveilled body's danger-related identity has been greatly extended. Its corporal boundaries constitute a mere core of a system of acts with considerable territorial extension, acts constituted with attention to the surveilled body's money trail (e.g., purchases and donations), its library borrowing, its telephone conversations, its Internet travels, and its patterns of consumption, among other things. Two political issues are involved in those historical moments of securitization and militarization when bodies become subject to increased tracking and coercive management. The most manifest one is a process of distinguishing friends and enemies, the primary function of "the political," as politics is famously theorized by Carl Schmitt.

However, there is another, more complex way of constituting the identities evoked during intense periods of violent political contention. We can view the politics of identity as, among other things, a struggle between those seeking to control, eliminate, or impose meanings on bodies and the bodies themselves, understood as active agents impelled by their own willed and unconscious determinations. What is involved in such struggles is nothing less than the intersection of physical bodies, applied technologies of surveillance, and episodes of altered political will deployed by governments and alternatively assisted and resisted by the governed. For example, in reaction to FBI surveillance of Internet searches and book borrowing at libraries under the Patriot Act: "Librarians have taken a lead in speaking out on the issue . . . [and] in January [2003] the American Library Association passed a resolution calling sections of the law 'a present danger to the constitutional rights and privacy rights of library users' and asking Congress to step up oversight of its implementation."³

To appreciate the finite historical forces at work within the present intensification of surveillance and the technological and political contexts within which that intensification is enacted, one needs to look at past instances against which the peculiarities of the present circumstances can be highlighted. Accordingly, I begin with one of the earliest recorded circumstances, reported by the scribes of the book of Judges, a high-stakes moment of surveillance that involved oral conversations. In chapter 12, verses 4–6 of Judges, there is an encounter between Gileadites and Ephraimites. Shortly after Jephthah, "a mighty man of valor" (albeit an exiled son of Israel because he was the "son of a harlot"), was recruited as a captain of Israel in a war against the Ammonites, he and his army got into a quarrel with the Ephraimites. Angry about not having been called

to serve in the war against the Ammonites, the Ephraimites attacked Jephthah and his Gileadite army, only to be soundly defeated and thence to be regarded as enemies of Israel.

After the battle the Ephraimite survivors tried to cross the Jordan and blend in with the rest of the people of Israel. Although they were apparently visually undistinguishable, they had a distinctive style of speech, which gave them away. As is noted in verses 5 and 6, “When those Ephraimites which were escaped said, let me go over; . . . the men of Gilead said unto him, art thou an Ephraimite? If he say Nay; Then said they unto him, Say now Shibboleth: and he said Sibboleth: for he could not frame to pronounce it right. Then they took him and slew him at the passages of Jordan: and there fell that time of the Ephraimites forty and two thousand.”

Ever since, *shibboleth* has been a term applied to passwords, especially to words used for voice-based surveillance. For example, during World War II, the Dutch underground resistance made suspected German spies pronounce the name of Sceveningen, a coastal city near Den Hague. This was a shibboleth that even the most Dutch-fluent Germans could not say correctly. Like the unfortunate Ephraimites, they could not “frame to pronounce it right.”

The “frame” expression can be given a more abstract and technical specification in order to locate the pronunciation difficulty within a historical trajectory of relationships between surveillance technology and bodies. The Ephraimites who engaged in the unsuccessful phonatory acts were trying to manage what the linguist Roman Jakobson refers to as the “two sides” of the sign: the sound, which is “the material side,” and the meaning, which is “the intelligible side.”²⁴ It was the first side that proved fatal. While the Ephraimite participation in the conversations worked as mutual intelligibility, their inability to make the precisely correct sounds doomed them. Anatomically speaking, in shaping the acoustics of the word, their tongues failed to divide “the resonator . . . of the mouth cavity” correctly. To locate this finite historical episode within a general conceptual frame, we see an encounter between two levels of the social order—bodies, which are materially specified in terms of the phonatory capacities, and a politically evinced and administratively coordinated model of identity-difference. With this initial framing of the politics of surveillance in view, we can turn to a much later historical episode of militarization and surveillance to move toward a more historically acute elaboration, one sensitive to a genealogy of surveillance technologies.

The Case of Elizabethan England

In the sixteenth century, Elizabethan England experienced a reign of state terror provoked in part by its “decisive break from Roman Catholicism” and implemented by a Cecilian regime. Sir William Cecil (aka Lord Burghley) and his progeny were involved in the “construction of a Protestant State Church as a precondition for both domestic repression and external aggression.”⁵ In creating a tightly controlled, surveillant, and militarized Protestant state, the Cecilian regime established an early modern version of the national security state both by expanding its military adventures and by developing an internal security network of clients and informants. England’s external militance under the Cecilian regime was directed primarily against Spain and Portugal, a project that involved episodes of plunder at sea, primarily by government-approved merchant privateers, rather than full-scale clashes of fleets or land armies.

Although the Cecilian regime’s reliance on privateering merchant adventurers would seem to distance its militarization from the contemporary case, a version of privateering is being entertained as a contemporary option. For example, two writers (one a “think tank” security analyst and the other a journalist), pondering the ways to prosecute the “war on terrorism,” have advocated a return to privateering.⁶ They recognize that (as was the case with powerful merchants in earlier historical periods) large corporations have the requisite power to, and interest in, lending considerable resources to the pursuit of the state’s enemies. For example, although they are not directly involved in hot-war privateering, Halliburton, a large oil-service company, “bedeviled lately by an array of accounting and business issues,” is profiting significantly from the “war on terrorism.” Their participation has included building cells for detainees at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, feeding troops in Uzbekistan, and serving as a logistics supplier for the U.S. Navy.⁷

The relevance of the Elizabethan case to the present is also evident at the level of domestic oppression. Given the religious cleavage involved in its battle for European hegemony, the Cecilian regime regarded Protestantism as synonymous with patriotism.⁸ Although there was no significant standing army, the militias, formed through levies and used primarily for service abroad, were also employed for domestic pacification.⁹ At the same time a growing intelligence system had developed, using “human resources.” A vast network of informants was employed to identify those involved in subversive acts. And laws were in place to provide the required judicial leverage: “The scope of treason was extended by Acts of 1534 and 1536, principally to encompass treason by word as well as overt deed.”¹⁰ Because of what was increasingly seen as a Catholic threat, anyone asso-

ciated with that threat was surveilled by the network of spies recruited to curtail domestic subversion. Many English Catholics and many associated with Spain were turned into traitors.

As is the case with the contemporary intensification of military adventurism and domestic surveillance, the Cecilian regime was concerned with legitimating its imperial sovereignty. The primary genres used to evince ideological support for the extensive militarization taking place were the book and the pamphlet, carrying “military treatises” and “pro-military propaganda,” respectively.¹¹ But on the side of a generalized encouragement for England’s imperial expansion, arguably no genre or set of texts was more influential than Richard Hakluyt’s treatises: *Discourse on Western Planting* (1584) and *Principal Navigations, Voyages, and Discoveries of the English Nation* (1589). In *Discourse on Western Planting*, Hakluyt juxtaposes England’s global role with that of Spain, inveighing against Spanish tyranny in “the New World” and suggesting a more effective commercial English version of global hegemony.¹² Hakluyt also saw global economic and military expansion as a way to manage the domestic population. The colonies, he said, would be a place where England’s “waste people” and “idle people” could be employed to avoid the damage they would otherwise do at home.¹³

Hakluyt’s travel narratives helped articulate the cartographic change of the new, expansive England. He was among those involved in “the articulation of England itself,” celebrating English navigation, on the one hand, and promoting its expansion, on the other.¹⁴ And because Hakluyt’s views of the nation’s domestic issues and its imperial aspirations were congenial to those of the ruling elite, he was sponsored by that elite.¹⁵ However, Hakluyt’s nation- and empire-building texts (and the other complicit books and pamphlets), which were absorbed into the Cecilian regime’s cultural governance strategies, were not the only genres addressing the newly militarized and surveillant state. Elizabethan drama was significantly implicated in both affirming and criticizing the Cecilian regime’s domestic terrorizing of the population as well as its foreign adventures. The dramatist most famously involved in the regime’s terror and militarization was Christopher Marlowe. On the basis of equivocal evidence, it has often been assumed that Marlowe, who was patronized by Francis Walsingham’s cousin Thomas, participated in the regime’s covert spying activities.¹⁶ Moreover, the traditional reading of his play *The Massacre at Paris* (1592) sees it as an unequivocal and passionate expression of horror about the slaughter of Huguenots by French Catholics. But others see a subversive element in the play, for example, Curtis Breight’s point that it “deploys Catholic propaganda written not by the French Catholic league but by English Catholic exiles [in a] direct and powerful attack on the

Cecilian regime.” Bright regards Marlowe’s violent death as a political assassination by agents of a Protestant-dominated regime that read such nuances in the play as subversive to a Protestant hegemony (116).

The case with respect to the position on the regime’s surveillance and militarization in Shakespeare’s historical plays is also ambiguous. Although some see Shakespeare as a promonarchy patriot, on one view Shakespeare’s historical dramas, particularly his *Henriad* and his *Richards*, are allegorical; the plays are read as treatments of contemporary Elizabethan politics and as implicitly critical commentaries on the effects of state terror and military adventurism on commoners. In the case of the *Henriad*, the dire effects of military recruitment are shown; for example, “Falstaff’s recruiting practices and the ultimate destruction of his men” are represented, reflecting the fact that many commoners died not in battles but as a result of the hardships of service (210). And *Coriolanus* “boldly exposes what the *Henriad* could only imply by accretion—that war functioned to dispose of commoners” (237). In addition, Shakespeare’s historical plays reflect on the abuses of the security apparatus. “Under the guise of historical remoteness,” they map aspects of the Elizabethan culture of surveillance and manifest a concern with the “lower-class victims of upper-class conflict” (172–73). In a close reading of the histories, Bright argues that rather than siding with the monarchy and its aristocratic henchmen, Shakespeare effectively “delineate[s] how the medieval modern state helps to manufacture itself by destroying alternative conceptions and practices of power,” in this case regional communities with inconvenient religious affiliations led by traditional elites.¹⁷ The contemporary policies of militarization and surveillance are also supported and contested within media genres, but rather than the stage, the primary venues are film and television. In what follows, I locate the contemporary politics of surveillance in space, in technologies, in bodies, and, finally, in the media.

The Contemporary Scene: Expanded and Resistant Bodies

One of the more familiar approaches to history of states is Anthony Giddens’s sociological gloss. His widely accepted treatment of the modern state’s history of violence is one of a successful process of the “pacification” of state populations and a subsequent “withdrawal of the military from direct participation in the internal affairs of the state.”¹⁸ However appropriate to the history of European states Giddens’s linear narrative may be—certainly episodes of militarization in a wide variety of global venues suggests that “military withdrawal from domestic affairs” has not been continuous—trends in post-Cold War sovereignty and secu-

rity practices present a new challenge to the narrative. In addition to a growing use of military technologies for crime fighting, domestically and abroad (for example, in U.S. antinarcotic assaults in Colombia), the post-9/11 developments in “homeland security” and the elaboration of a domestic intelligence network, which reconfigures CIA and FBI investigatory functions, permits unprecedented levels of domestic surveillance (under the Patriot Act of October 2001) and insinuates military tribunals into the domestic juridical network in the United States. Ultimately, the current security and intelligence policies dissolve many of the former distinctions between domestic crime fighting and global warfare.¹⁹

Along with the territorial ambiguities that the new warfare-as-crime-fighting entails, a new biopolitics is emerging. The criminalization of military adversaries has been accompanied by a biometric approach to intelligence and surveillance. The significance of this change becomes evident if one contrasts Giddens’s treatment of the surveillance technologies that paralleled the modern state’s monopolization of violence with the current ones. Throughout his discussion Giddens refers primarily to the use of paper trails. He begins with a treatment of the state’s use of writing, proceeds to the state’s “coding of information,” and concludes with some observations about cultural governance, the sponsoring of printed materials, not only for surveillance but also for enlarging the scope of the public sphere.²⁰ Certainly, the paper trail and its electronic realization in the form of computer files remain significant, but the new modes of warfare-as-crime-fighting involve the development of a biological rather than merely a paper trail, as new genetic tracing discoveries are being recruited into intelligence gathering.

Is the biometric, designer weapon far behind? Anticipating the role of biometric coding in futuristic forms of warfare, the science fiction writer William Gibson began his novel *Count Zero* with this passage: “They set a SLAMHOUND on Turner’s trail in New Delhi, slotted it to his pheromones and the color of his hair. It caught up with him on a street called Chandni Chauk and came scrambling for his rented BMW through a forest of bare brown legs and pedicab tires. Its core was a kilogram of recrystallized hexogene and flaked TNT.”²¹ Thanks to advanced cloning technology in Gibson’s futuristic war world, “Turner” is reassembled from some of his own parts and some others (eyes and genitals bought on the open market). He lives on as the novel’s main character, a commando, operating in a war over research and development products.

Whether or not the military logistics of biometric warfare is now underway, the surveillance dimension is being rapidly developed. And the use of pheromones in the Gibson account is technologically anachronistic. The technology of DNA tracing, now well developed, is complementing

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the photograph and paper trail to surveil and intercept dangerous bodies.²² Shortly after the destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, then–U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft sought changes in federal law “to allow the Federal Bureau of Investigation to maintain a DNA databank of profiles taken from al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters detained in Afghanistan and Cuba.”²³ Subsequently, “forensic experts” were dispatched to Afghanistan to test the human tissue found in one battlefield to see if any of the dead included bin Laden or his senior associates.

Of course, policy makers face legitimation issues when introducing new modes of surveillance and criminalization. When those operating the “reasons of state” are involved in implementing a historically unorthodox “governmentality”—in this case an extraordinary mode of surveillance, and management of the global order and the domestic population—they have to produce warrants for the new policy initiatives. Accordingly, after the 9/11 episode, the Bush administration began operating on two fronts to solicit acquiescence to its simultaneous intensification of domestic surveillance and preparation for global military incursions (a strategy of “preemptive defense”).²⁴ On the one hand, there was a feverish search for legal precedents, hence the designation of an American citizen as an “enemy combatant” to apply a law of war that was earlier applied only to foreign nationals; on the other hand, the administration approached film and television producers to encourage them to create patriotic feature films and TV dramas designed to elicit public support for the new policies.

For example, in early November 2002, the media carried a story about a meeting between White House adviser Karl Rove and several dozen top television and film executives. Aware of the film industry’s role in World War II, the Bush administration wanted to encourage “patriotic war movies that characterized the early years of that war.”²⁵ After that meeting, “nearly a dozen” patriotic war movies were under production and television dramas followed suit. Among the most notable of the TV genre was an episode of *LAG* (a CBS drama about military lawyers). The 30 April 2002 episode, produced with the Pentagon’s help, featured a trial of a defiant al-Qaeda terrorist (undoubtedly modeled after Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged twentieth 9/11 hijacker) by a military tribunal at which he received a “fair trial” (a promise by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to the media after the tribunal plan was floated). As one commentary notes: “The strategy behind the ‘Tribunal’ episode is more transparent than ever: the show creates the wish-fulfillment fantasy of capturing a terrorist responsible for the attacks, depicts an idealized military, yet ends with an ominous threat of more terror in the works, affirming the government’s real-life message that America must remain vigilant.”²⁶

Minority Report

Everybody runs; everybody runs.
—John Anderton (Tom Cruise)

The government's attempts at suborning the media and, in particular, the Hollywood film industry, and enlist its feature films in support of militarization and surveillance, face significant resistance. By virtue of their form as well as content, feature films often challenge the government's attempts at achieving public acceptance of its policies. Given the recent tendency of the official discourse on terrorism to criminalize "the enemy" and to employ biometric surveillance technologies, Steven Spielberg's film *Minority Report* (2002) provides the most notable ideational challenge to the state's surveillance practices. To place the film within the contemporary politics of surveillance, we must recognize what Gilles Deleuze has characterized as "societies of control." He suggests that the disciplinary societies, which Foucault saw as supplanting the old societies of sovereignty based on enclosures—the school, the factory, the prison—have been displaced by the societies of control. Rather than walls, this system of domination is based on modulations and coding procedures. "In the control societies what are important are no longer numbers and names but codes, a password instead of a watchword," codes that control movements from one function and setting to another and which, above all, control access to information.²⁷ While much of Deleuze's emphasis is on the control measures of corporations, his model of the control society also pertains to the control measures of the state.

Referring to the mode of security imposed by the state, Deleuze and Guattari put it this way: "The administration of a great organized molar security has as its correlate a whole micro-management of petty fears [amounting to] . . . a macropolitics of society by and for a micropolitics of insecurity."²⁸ Within such a process of securitization, the social order has two significant modes: machines of capture in which bodies and spaces are coded, and lines of flight, which are the mechanisms and routes through which people elude the machines of capture. The geometry of control is never complete; the pursuit of lines of flight constitute a micropolitical reaction to the macropolitics of capture, a departure from "normalizing individualization."²⁹

Spielberg's *Minority Report* plays out the tension between the machines of capture and the micropolitics of escape. Set in 2054 (and based on a Philip Dick short story by the same title) the venue is Washington, DC, where a "precrime unit," with aspirations to become a national program, deploys a policing function to arrest and incarcerate individuals who

will commit a future crime. They are identified by three “precogs” with predictive powers, suborned bodies held in a drugged state of suspended animation. While the eventual escape and return to normal life of one of the precogs is part of the film’s drama, the most significant body in the film is that of John Anderton, the chief arresting officer of the precrime unit. Throughout the film, his body is in motion, first as a wholly committed operative of the unit and then as a fugitive who has been marked as a future criminal. During his flight from the “justice” of the precrime program, he learns that the three precogs do not always agree. Some of those marked as future perpetrators have been identified as such by a majority report (of two precogs). As Philip Dick’s version of the story puts it: “The existence of a majority logically implies a corresponding minority.”³⁰ In the film version, Anderton learns that the minority reports have been suppressed (because the overall head of the program, eager to have it implemented nationally, has suppressed the minority reports in order to represent future criminal acts as certainties rather than probabilities). Anderton is told that his only hope is to find the one in his case, if it exists.

As in the current situation—former Attorney General Ashcroft’s “preventive detention” in which aliens and Muslims have been arrested, incarcerated, and denied legal representation because they are “of interest” to those seeking to end the threat of terrorist attack in the United States³¹—the future perpetrators in *Minority Report* are given no legal redress. While the narrative has a positive ending (ultimately Anderton is exonerated, the head of the program is discredited, and the precrime program is eliminated), the film’s most significant aspects are nonnarrative and micropolitical. In the opening scenes, Anderton’s body functions as a physical extension of the precrime surveillance and arrest functions; his movements are wholly modulated and choreographed by the system as, at first, his swinging arms are shown pulling up the relevant images on a large screen, and subsequently his moving body is shown closing in on the alleged perpetrator.

But while Cruise displays a wholly suborned body controlled by the state’s apparatus of capture at the outset, after he is set up and becomes another victim, he becomes a subversive body, one whose movements and gestures are no longer orchestrated by official policing policy. He manifests a counterenergy and goes so far as to modify his body to subvert the surveillance system, having his eyes replaced to subvert the coding system, which reads retinal patterns. Anderton is therefore a Deleuzian fugitive; “Everybody runs,” he says when the police first try to apprehend him, and thereafter his running requires him to move in ways that allow him to escape from the coding apparatuses and exemplify the Deleuzian suggestion that there are always forms of flow that elude the capturing, binary organizations.

But apart from his manifestation of Deleuzian lines of flight by

exploiting the gaps in the apparatuses of capture, the subversiveness of Anderton's body is also a function of a film form that opposes the body to the narrative. As Vincent Amiel notes, the tendency of classical cinema was to give in to the economy of narrativizing, to use bodies as vehicles for a story and thereby to abandon the body's density for the exclusive profit of functionality, that is, leaving the body "at the service of narrative articulations, precisely disincarnate."³² But in much of contemporary cinema (and Spielberg's *Minority Report* is an exemplar), "the idea is for cinema to dis-organ-ize the body, by means of revealing the notion/destiny of a coherent and unitary organism imposed into the body, by means of revealing its fragmented nature, by extracting it from the 'yoke of unity and consciousness, by giving it back the complexity of its own determinations.'"³³

The Deleuzian political inspiration to resist the apparatuses of capture is therefore enacted in *Minority Report*. But even those Hollywood films that appear to support the politics of surveillance and capture contain subversive elements. For example, although the Jerry Bruckheimer/Ridley Scott treatment of the U.S. intervention in Somalia, *Black Hawk Down* (2001), drew optimistic administration support (the Washington premiere was attended by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney), the film does not unambiguously provide the romantic soldatesque that the administration expected.³⁴ Although the film portrays an (unsuccessful) attempt to eliminate a political leader involved in violence unfavorable to American interests (now part of the administration's war agenda), it does not clearly valorize the policy or the attempt. Certainly, its version of good guys (American soldiers engaged in resolute duty, and often heroic mutual support), and bad guys (murderous Somali mercenaries) plays into the administration's hands, but, at the same time, no clear point of view on the policy or its failed implementation strikes the viewer.

An even earlier movie with a clearer stance on imperial overreach has attracted the attention of the U.S. military apparatus. As Michael Kaufman reports: "Challenged by terrorist tactics and guerrilla warfare in Iraq, the Pentagon recently held a screening of *The Battle of Algiers* [1965], which, ironically, was popular among anti-Vietnam War activists in the 1960s."³⁵ The film's historical gloss on the war between the colonial French military and Algerian nationalists moved many viewers to identify with Ali La Pointe, the leader of the urban part of the struggle, the network of resistance in the Casbah in the city's Muslim section. In contrast, the Pentagon viewers were fixated on the instruments of repression—torture, among others—used by the French military to extract information about enemy operations. However, as was the case with *Black Hawk Down*, the recent rerelease of *The Battle of Algiers* is open to other ways of seeing.

Moreover, the film, unlike *Black Hawk Down*, delivers a more heroic and idealistic set of images of the “terrorist resistance.”

What is the place of cinema in an era of hypermilitarization? As Kaja Silverman has suggested, such “aesthetic work is a privileged domain for displacing us from the geometrical point, for encouraging us to see in ways not dictated in advance by the dominant fiction.”³⁶ Moreover, in the case of film, unlike painting, for example, that “us” is a mass audience involved in “collective reception.”³⁷ Minimally, at a historical moment when a government is seeking support from the arts to extend its sphere of imperial violence while surveilling and closing what has been one of history’s most open societies, film can be seen as a site of challenge and resistance. In addition to the feature films to which I have referred, Errol Morris’s documentary of Robert MacNamara’s decision-making role during the Vietnam War (*The Fog of War*, 2004) and Michael Moore’s documentary response to the Bush administration’s Iraq war (*Fahrenheit 9/11*, 2004) counter the weapons of war with critical thinking, which, in its philosophical mode, Immanuel Kant figured as a permanently armed state, and in its cinematic mode, Gilles Deleuze figured as a life-creating weapon.

Notes

1. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1977), 139, 143.
2. Giorgio Agamben, “Security and Terror,” trans. Carolin Emcke, *Theory and Event* 5 (2000) at micro189.lib3.hawaii.edu:2146/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4agamben.html.
3. Judith Graham, “Library Users Warned of FBI Spying,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, 6 April 2003.
4. Roman Jakobson, *Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning*, trans. John Mephram (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), 1.
5. Curtis C. Breight, *Surveillance, Militarism, and Drama in the Elizabethan Era* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996), 50. I do an extended analysis of the Elizabethan case in Michael J. Shapiro, *Methods and Nations: Cultural Governance and the Indigenous Subject* (New York: Routledge, 2004).
6. Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Anthony A. Cipriano, “Patriotism and Profit Are Powerful Weapons,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, 21 July 2002.
7. Jeff Gerth and Don Van Natta Jr., “In Tough Times a Company Finds Profits in Terror War,” *New York Times*, 13 July 2002.
8. Breight, *Surveillance, Militarism, and Drama in the Elizabethan Era*, 31.
9. *Ibid.*, 57.
10. Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, *The Great Arch* (New York: Blackwell, 1985), 49.
11. Breight, *Surveillance, Militarism, and Drama in the Elizabethan Era*, 59.
12. See Richard Helgerson’s treatment of Hakluyt in *Forms of Nationhood* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

13. Breight, *Surveillance, Militarism, and Drama in the Elizabethan Era*, 33.
14. Helgerson, *Forms of Nationhood*, 152.
15. Rewarding his complicity with the cultural governance of the Cecilian regime, Walsingham, the head of the state spy network (to whom Hakluyt dedicated the initial edition of *Principal Navigations*), “bore or at least arranged part of the expense of the publication.” Sir Robert Cecil was one of Hakluyt’s patrons to whom subsequent editions of *Principal Navigations* were dedicated. The historical details and quotations are from “Hakluyt, Richard,” in *Catalog of the Scientific Community* at es.rice.edu/ES/humsoc/Galileo/Catalog/Files/hakluyt.html, accessed 16 December 2004.
16. Breight, *Surveillance, Militarism, and Drama in the Elizabethan Era*, 127.
17. Some see Shakespeare’s play differently, however. For example, Richard Helgerson reads Shakespeare as a loyal monarchist, arguing that the plays manifest a doubleness. They show “kingship in a narrative and dramatic medium that not only displayed power but revealed the sometimes brutal and duplicitous strategies by which power maintained itself.” They both celebrate authority and “bear a subversive potential” while playing to audiences that included everyone from commoners to kings. But for the “discursive community” of the theater, which, Helgerson states, was “far removed from the councils of power,” the plays (especially in Shakespeare’s case) were not subversive but rather “contributed at once to the consolidation of central power, [and] . . . to the cultural division of class from class” (Helgerson, *Forms of Nationhood*, 244–45).
18. Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 192.
19. For example, on 10 June 2002, the *New York Times* reported the arrest of an American citizen, whom the U.S. attorney general alleged to be an al-Qaeda operative (James Risen and Philip Shenon, “U.S. Says It Halted Qaeda Plot to Use Radioactive Bomb”). Commenting on this citizen’s legal status, Ashcroft said, “[He is an] enemy combatant. . . . We have acted with legal authority both under the laws of war and clear Supreme Court precedent, which establishes that the military may detain a United States citizen who has joined the enemy and has entered our country to carry out hostile acts” (“Ashcroft’s Announcement,” Associated Press, 10 June 2002). Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul F. Wolfowitz said in a press conference at the Justice Department that the suspect, Mr. Al-Mujahir, was being held by the Department of Defense “under the laws of war” (U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, 10 June 2002, www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t06102002_t0610dsd.html).
20. Giddens, *Nation-State and Violence*, 47, 179.
21. William Gibson, *Count Zero* (New York: Ace, 1987), 1.
22. Dexter Filkins, “U.S. Is Studying DNA of Dead Al Qaeda and Taliban Combatants,” *New York Times*, 15 March 2002.
23. David Johnson, “Law Change Sought to Set up DNA Databank for Captured Qaida Fighters,” *New York Times*, 2 March 2002.
24. David E. Sanger, “Bush to Formalize a Defense Policy of Hitting First,” *New York Times*, 17 June 2002.
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