

Patrick Deer

War is back and seemingly forever. In recent years the pacific neoliberal rhetoric of globalization has been replaced by the Hobbesian imaginary of endless war. The pervasive metaphorization of war blurs the boundaries between military and civilian, combatant and noncombatant, state and war machine, wartime and peacetime. But war discourse also operates as a strategy that partitions, separates, and compartmentalizes knowledge, offering a highly seductive, militarized grid through which to interpret the world. Like a virus, it seems, war tropes have spread throughout the body politic and global economy. What are the ends of war? This special issue of *Social Text* engages this critical question by challenging narratives of endless conflict, by confronting the seductions of metaphorization and militarization, and by analyzing the historical and material interests that they serve. “The Ends of War” insists on the contingent and instrumental nature of war discourse and on the need to think beyond its global reach.

The most seductive aspect of war discourse is its seeming power to manage the contradictory times and spaces of the present. Its greatest appeal lies in its claim to the future. If the prospect of an endless war on terror is less than appealing, it at least offers the compensations of proving “our” technological and economic superiority. The seductive mythology of high-tech, postmodern warfare still enshrined in the mythic active-combat phase of the invasion of Iraq has been kept carefully uncontaminated by the brutal, chaotic realities of the occupation. According to its unstable temporal logic, the invasion of Iraq (20 March–1 May 2003), like the 100-hour 1991 Gulf War, is completely incommensurable with the Cold War and old “hot wars.”

In his otherwise relentlessly bloodless Pentagon briefing two days after the launch of the initial “decapitation strike” and “shock and awe” aerial assault on Baghdad, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld paused for a moment before taking questions to make a historical point. “Just before coming down,” he said after the bombing campaign began in earnest at 1:00 p.m. EST, “I saw some of the images on television and I heard various commentators expansively comparing what’s taking place

With its rhetorical
emphasis
on precision
bombing and
“humane”
destruction,
the rhetoric of
postmodern
warfare claims
to have
superseded the
nuclear logic of
Cold War overkill.

in Iraq today to some of the more famous bombing campaigns of World War II. There is no comparison.”¹ Echoing the familiar claims made by the ideologues of high-tech “postmodern warfare,” Rumsfeld pointed out that today’s weapons had “a degree of precision that no one dreamt of in a prior conflict” and that the bombs were targeted with extraordinary care. “The care that goes into it, the humanity that goes into it, to see that military targets are destroyed, to be sure, but that it’s done in a way, and in a manner, and in a direction and with a weapon that is appropriate to that very particularized target. . . . And I think that will be the case when ground truth is achieved.” General Tommy Franks, who in Afghanistan in March 2002 had declared, “You know we don’t do body counts,” told reporters, “This will be a campaign unlike any other in history.” And in a September 2003 address, President George W. Bush claimed that the war in Iraq was “one of the swiftest and most humane military campaigns in history.”² Three years later, with the occupation on the brink of civil war, Rumsfeld was dismissed. Even as he likened himself jokingly to Winston Churchill, the outgoing defense secretary reiterated the futuristic claim that the Iraq war was like no other, describing it as “this little understood, unfamiliar war, the first war of the twenty-first century—it is not well-known, it was not well-understood, it is complex for people to comprehend.”³

With its rhetorical emphasis on precision bombing and “humane” destruction, the rhetoric of postmodern warfare also claims to have superseded the nuclear logic of Cold War overkill, even as depleted uranium-tipped shells and bunker-busting bombs routinely contaminate the battlefield with radioactive dust and cluster bomblets litter the landscape like high-tech land mines. This “clean,” scientific, positivistic neutrality is supposedly quite different from the old-style “dirty war” demanded by colonial policing to combat the low-tech horrors of guerrilla warfare and terrorist violence in Baghdad, Fallujah, and Basra, conducted with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and homemade Humvee armor. High-tech warfare is a computer-networked, virtual, information war in which simulation, artificial intelligence, and stealth weapons are the supposed keys to victory. In this respect, it replicates the rhetoric of high-tech globalization, which claims to occupy a clean, smooth space in the command-and-control networks of the first-world global cities, with their frictionless, speedy flows of metropolitan labor and capital, in stark contrast to the “dirty” quotidian world of the sweatshops and *maquiladoras* or the *favelas* and refugee camps of the underdeveloped global South. The “revolution in military affairs” is only the latest rationale for the U.S. permanent war economy, which has survived constant changes in management.

The obsessive turn toward the doctrine of counterinsurgency or low-

intensity conflict in the fourth year of the occupation of Iraq displays a similar presentism. What is needed, according to the doctrine, is a deployment of culturally sensitive, technologically nimble Special Forces soldiers to “clear, hold, and build” the territory as they persuade the civilian populations that the insurgents have no legitimacy.⁴ In the rhetoric of the armchair counterinsurgents, this doctrine has all of the futurity and appeal of “shock and awe,” promising to operate on the ground with a newfound cultural sensitivity. But the seeming newness of counterinsurgency is, ironically, also a product of the institutional amnesia of the military commanders who had spent the best part of thirty years trying to forget the failed coupling of counterinsurgency with the brute force of “technowar” bombing against guerrilla warfare in Vietnam. War provides an educational impulse as Americans are enjoined to learn from previous colonial conflicts, from articles studded with quotations from Lawrence of Arabia, and from nervous viewings of *The Battle of Algiers*. Once again the bloody, chaotic, and unglamorous realities of urban warfare and colonial policing in Iraq are disavowed in favor of the glamour of empire.

War discourse also lays claim to the past. The imperial nostalgia evident in much recent war discourse betrays the origins of “shock and awe” bombing in colonial air policing. The strategic doctrine of the “moral effect” of the bomber was developed to police and discipline “savage” colonized populations in European empires after World War I. The Royal Air Force, assisted by those keen imperialists Winston Churchill and Lawrence of Arabia, guaranteed its survival after the Great War by offering to police the British Empire on the cheap with what they could muster from the rudimentary technology of air power. The territories involved were Afghanistan, Somaliland (modern Somalia), and Mesopotamia (modern Iraq). The mystique of imperial air power depended on relegating the “savage,” colonized target population to an “other” time and space, where morale could be decisively shattered by shock tactics and the “moral effect” of aerial bombing.⁵ Backward conditions in the colonial laboratory or testing ground guaranteed the technological progress and ongoing modernization of the imperial war machine. Even if the technology did not yet exist, did not work well, or could not be afforded, the Western war machine was already projected into a future epistemologically and even ontologically inaccessible to the colonized other. When the colonized resistance movements shot back, adapted, or used guerrilla tactics involving space, movement, and surprise, the strategic discourse of air power had to work strenuously to deny the equality or coequality of its “other.” So much for the “benign imperialism” that apologists for U.S. neoimperial foreign policy, like historian Niall Ferguson, enjoin America

to emulate, only with greater fiscal responsibility. This is the long history of colonial violence that haunts any attempts by the United States or its British allies to intervene in whatever name.

In addition to laying claim to the past and future, war discourse struggles to monopolize and shape our cultures. As we saw after 9/11, and then more recently after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the popular social imaginary of World War II has frequently been mobilized in the present. We saw this in Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's enthusiastic endorsement of a book about the 1940 London Blitz as he assumed his autocratic Churchillian role in the days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and also in recent disavowals of the relevance of World War II after the press noted that the U.S. military had now been in Iraq for longer than it was engaged in that earlier war.⁶ Dissent or antiwar sentiment is routinely declared a sign of weakness, relegated to the same historical limbo as 1930s' appeasement of fascism. President George W. Bush has often likened the so-called global war on terror to World War II. As he asserted in his "Plan for Victory" speech in August 2005,

the veterans of World War II defended America when ruthless foes threatened our freedom and our very way of life. And after winning a great victory, they helped former enemies rebuild and form free and peaceful societies that would become strong allies of America. The World War II generation endured great suffering and sacrifice because they understood that defeating tyranny in Europe and Asia was essential to the security and freedom of America. . . . Like previous wars we have waged to protect our freedom, the war on terror requires great sacrifice from Americans.⁷

Beyond the obviously ideological attempts to co-opt the historical memory of a total, "people's" war against fascism, the inescapability of the invocations of World War II signals a powerful desire to legitimize our own culture of violence. World War II saw the emergence of the first fully modernized and mobilized democratic war cultures, which assumed the traditional cultural function of mediating between the state and its citizens; if citizens could not represent themselves during wartime, they had to learn to be represented by the official war culture.⁸ For British people living through the conflict, the official war culture helped them cope with trauma by offering an outlet for creative energies, a forum for intellectual debate about national identity and the purposes and nature of war, and a distraction from the violence and dehumanization of wartime. But the official culture claimed a monopoly on making sense of wartime. Despite its democratizing and radicalizing force, the official British culture of World War II promoted a reinvigorated form of popular imperialism that silenced and deferred the historic struggles of national independence movements

and critics of colonialism. It sought to expand over the entire cultural field to make itself identical with culture as a whole, normalizing and naturalizing war as a form of social, political, and economic activity. But this contradictory project had its limits since war culture, like the wider culture, was everywhere committed to separation, partitioning, and dividing up. Its attempt to colonize the dominant culture revealed its pervasive anxieties and parvenu status. It policed its boundaries, projected its demonology, expelled its others, and enforced its standards of taste and aesthetic values. Above all, modern war culture is self-perpetuating and self-replicating; it normalizes and naturalizes a state of war. Peace is not the end of war culture. At its core, war culture seeks a postponement of peacetime “for the duration”; it seeks an adjustment to a state of permanent war.

Compared to previous conflicts, recent wars have created a new low-intensity war culture in the United States. Official attempts to monopolize representations of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the more nebulous war on terror, are greatly aided by media consolidation, official secrecy, embedding of reporters, and the witchhunting of “unpatriotic” critics. But the midterm congressional elections of November 2006 revealed the failure of these attempts to capture the popular imagination. The real problem of course is that the bodily and psychic sacrifice is being borne at a great distance, its traumatic effects carefully contained and screened away; meanwhile, in plain sight, American citizens are asked to sacrifice their basic civil rights and constitutional protections. Where British or American citizens were asked to sacrifice in the name of a Second World War against fascism that promised postwar reconstruction or prosperity, the current conjuncture promises the rewards and the terrors preemptively.

Even torture, that most atavistic, corrupting, and degraded form of violence, is given a futuristic gloss by the U.S. culture of violence. Talk-show pundits spin extreme, apocalyptic “ticking time bomb” scenarios in “debates,” arguing that terrorists must be tortured in order to head off possible nuclear catastrophe. Reclassified as “enemy combatants” subject to “extraordinary rendition,” people are injected with drugs in the street and whisked off in unmarked CIA-chartered executive jets to “black sites” in countries with reliably shady human rights records. Meanwhile, on Fox, through the paramilitary antics of lead character Jack Bauer, the series *24* unabashedly stages these scenarios as showstopping spectacle. Lest the older networks think themselves superior, the forensic gaze of *Law and Order* and *ER* represents everyday life as a body-strewn battlefield in which the violated, stripped corpses are most often female, each resembling America’s next (dead) top model. This media arena is presided over by the inexorable logic of a police and judiciary increasingly influenced by the

Above all,
modern war
culture is self-
perpetuating and
self-replicating; it
normalizes and
naturalizes a state
of war.

logic of counterinsurgency and indefinite detention. The psychic impact of the Iraq war is a fairly constant feature of our own culture of violence, in stereotypes of traumatized veterans borrowed from the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Indeed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is constantly claimed as symptom on daytime talk shows, worn as a badge of what makes us most human. Yet the bodily impact of war remains an open yet hidden secret: coffins are shipped back in secret; wounded veterans are sequestered in military hospitals in Germany and in underfunded VA establishments at home.⁹

The environmental impact on both Iraqi civilians and American men and women in uniform also remains obscured; this “slow violence,” as Rob Nixon compellingly describes it, is consigned, like Gulf War syndrome, to the marginal twilight of “junk science” or popular conspiracy theory.¹⁰ And what of the astonishing asymmetry between U.S. military “casualties” and those wounded in combat? Or of a different kind of exchange rate, between “our” dead and the seemingly uncountable numbers of Iraqi civilians killed and maimed on a daily basis? An army that had spent decades projecting an image of social mobility and racial integration now finds itself engaged in the colonial policing of a multicultural Arab nation. Stretched to its limits in Iraq in 2005, the National Guard was unable to come to the aid of the predominantly poor and black victims of Hurricane Katrina. Yet the economic connections are seldom drawn between a war that, according to the National Priorities Project, is costing \$255 million per day and nearly \$11 million per hour, a permanent war economy sustained by military budgets that exceed Cold War levels, and the depleted state of the U.S. infrastructure.¹¹

These silences in contemporary war culture account, I would suggest, for the continuing appeal of representations of the 100-hour Gulf War of 1991, like David O. Russell’s film *Three Kings* or Anthony Swofford’s celebrated memoir *Jarhead*, which focus obsessively on the traumatizing effects of war as a nonevent on young men trained for combat but deprived of release in battle. Compared to the bloody realities of occupied Iraq, the virtual Gulf War that “Did Not Take Place” seems charmingly old fashioned. Even as this slim canon of Gulf War fiction represents the traumatic effects of a disembodied, distanced war that exploits the armored yet vulnerable minds and bodies of young men in uniform, it also stages the melancholy detachment and routinized fear of the domestic war on terror. These belated representations of mediatized warfare continue to obsess both the exponents of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and their leftist critics. Their structural absences and hallucinatory visual fields seem to vindicate theorizations of our violent culture in terms of foreclosure or primary repression, or of unrepresentable trauma.

Yet the forbidden and the taboo are more often hiding in plain sight in the U.S. culture of violence, disavowed but not foreclosed.¹² Ironically, it is from the unofficial, pornographic, and taboo subcultures of war that images have emerged to interrupt the silencing chatter of official war culture and to force the open secrets out into the light of day. The now infamous Abu Ghraib torture photos were produced by the guards themselves as a kind of war porn designed to document their own everyday lives, as screen savers, as amateur reality TV or a horrifying mutation of *America's Funniest Home Videos*. Disseminated to the press and to army lawyers, they became whistle-blowing documents of a wholesale violation of human rights. The insurgents themselves have used Web sites to post horrifying footage of beheaded hostages, and their chilling propaganda videos of IED and sniper attacks surface routinely on YouTube and Google Video, but so too do video clips of U.S. soldiers surviving roadside bombings. Are these images merely symptomatic, or do they bear witness to the unacknowledged cost of suffering, the moral confusion, the abuses of power, and the corruptions of empire? What do they say about the profound gender disturbances managed so routinely by the eroticized social imaginary of the "straight" war culture? The officially sanctioned war of images may struggle to police its own boundaries, to compartmentalize the experience of combatants and noncombatants, to divide and rule. But the cultural productions of the war machine, as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari remind us, obey their own logic and can often return to haunt and scandalize the state and its military institutions.¹³

As a force for modernization, as "a force that gives us meaning," war culture claims to be forever. But there is now a strong body of work that seeks to explore and contest the war culture's tangled disavowals and open secrets. Alongside the theorizations of Foucault, Agamben, Baudrillard, Žižek, Butler, and the Retort group, and complementing the burgeoning genre of investigative histories,¹⁴ are a growing number of narrative representations of the Iraq war. Charting the disturbances and dislocations of a conflict at once immediate, fully mediatized, and radically distanced, they straddle uneasily the generic divide between fiction, memoir, blogging, embedded reporting, and polemic.¹⁵ Like the satirical pastiches of news media on *The Daily Show* or *The Colbert Report*, they chart a world in which the Orwell-Chomsky-Moore tradition of plainspoken demystification seems no longer sufficient.

The continued and relentless militarization and colonization of everyday life can be resisted, but this takes more than simple demystification. By charting the genealogy, construction, and buried histories of a "post-modern" war culture, we can challenge its seductive mythology. This makes clear the historically contingent and limited nature of a "cultural

tradition” that seeks to make war a permanent and natural way of life. A true return to peacetime would require putting war culture in its own place, as a historic and historical remnant of a period of violent global struggle never to be repeated.

The essays in this special issue engage the newness and urgency of this warlike present but insist that the current proliferation of war discourse often masks older continuities and long-standing material interests. For Randy Martin, the financialization of conflict and the proliferation of risk visible in the current era of “derivative wars” reveal powerful continuities with Cold War regulation and the management of difference. Tracing the intimate exchanges between a postwelfare world, in which citizens must assume the maximum burden of risk, and the speculative violence of the revolution in military affairs and Special Forces warfare, he challenges the mythic futurity of an economy that generates endless preemptive conflict as the price for “security.” Jean Franco argues that rape, that most invisible of war crimes, has been deployed by the modernizing states of Peru and Guatemala as a weapon specifically targeting indigenous women in a scorched-earth policy that continues a long history of conquest and colonial domination. Confronting a horrifying sexual violence designed to render them abject, silent, and expelled from the human, and the tendency of truth commissions and international human rights organizations to position them as marginal and victimized, rape survivors have struggled to reclaim their voices and contest this pervasive weapon of war. Taking at its word the neoliberal claim of inflicting the “gift” of freedom on the Iraqi people at face value, Kennan Ferguson traces the violent genealogy and inequalities of gift giving. Focusing also on the violent gendered imaginary of war discourse, he argues, “If structures of masculinity depend upon giving, then both militarism and generosity become intertwined with conquest and the feminization and delegitimation of the invaded.”

Tracing the links between globalization and the war on terror, Leerom Medovoi argues that they share common strategies of biopower, culturalism, and internal threat. For Medovoi this represents a mapping onto the neoliberal globe of the Foucauldian dynamic of “race war” that can be seen haunting the bellicose imaginaries of European colonialism and U.S. Cold War strategy. In his ethnography of the militarized U.S.-Mexico border, Gilberto Rosas traces a tangled history of paramilitary policing, disciplining of labor, and popular resistance by those border crossers who claim the borderlands as a *Barrio Libre*. Though the border, like other militarized zones discussed in the issue, resembles the state of emergency theorized by Agamben, the forms of violence deployed there and the collective struggle of those who oppose them make clear that there are longer, bloody colonial

histories at work in these seemingly exceptional spaces. In an extended discussion of “shameless” warfare that takes images of the Abu Ghraib torture scandal as its point of departure, Rosalind C. Morris argues that the current conflict in Iraq has seen the emergence of a mediatized, desexualized form of conflict that departs from the traditionally patriarchal wartime goal of rescuing or capturing a victimized or vulnerable femininity. She asks, “By what processes did war, and the violence that accompanies it, come to exceed the question of sexual difference, by assuming so acute a form of racism? This is a question about the new nature of war, but it is also a question about the regression of our increasingly technologized forms of war making.” Excavating a neglected tradition of “counterplanning” for reconstruction, Jonathan Michael Feldman tracks the continuities between the U.S. permanent war economy that emerged in World War II and boomed during the Cold War and the Vietnam conflict and the current disastrous confluence of militarism, global outsourcing, and economic depletion. He argues for the relevance of “utopian realism” and alternative networks for reconstruction as ways out of a present addicted to war. Ashley Dawson’s discussion of the high-tech urban warfare currently being offered as a military paradigm for the era of global underdevelopment also warns of the historic limits of such colonial policing techniques and of their tendency to migrate to the metropolis, where they are deployed against enemies within. He contends that the “technologies deployed by imperial military forces around the globe . . . build on enduring practices of internal and external spatial apartheid and surveillance.”

War discourse makes powerful claims on the present. It offers a vision of endless, permanent warfare, of cutting-edge technological innovation, of the power to instill order and govern the epoch of globalization. It also claims to monopolize patriotism, to provide a proving ground for gender roles or citizenship, and to offer the prospect of a renewed, stronger nation. Even if these are shown to ring hollow, to have terrible long-term human and environmental consequences, then the war makers will settle for second best. They will settle for confusion, for fear and anxiety, for exploitation, and for the prospect of endless conflict “over there,” anywhere but here. By blurring the boundaries between civilian and soldier, between noncombatant and combatant, war discourse seeks to defer the human cost of permanent warfare for as long as possible. If we are all at war, if we are all traumatized, and yet people like us can get through the battlefield of everyday life, then it cannot be so bad, can it? This “sacrifice,” with all its consumer comforts and distant demonic threats, could be borne forever, could it not? How long can this go on? The immediate answer seems to be for as long as we can bear it. Or until we are able to interrupt the logic of endless war and keep other, nonviolent ends in sight.

By blurring the
boundaries
between civilian
and soldier,
between
noncombatant
and combatant,
war discourse
seeks to defer
the human cost
of permanent
warfare for as
long as possible.

1. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers,” Friday, 21 March 2003, www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t03212003_t0321sd1.html.

2. Office of the Press Secretary, “President George W. Bush, Address of the President to the Nation, September 7, 2003,” www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030907-1.html (retrieved 5 November 2003). To take one more blood-thirsty example, Harlan Ullman, the theorist of U.S. “shock and awe,” nicknamed a modern-day “Dr. Strangelove” by antiwar protestors, invoked approvingly the shattering blow delivered to the relentless Japanese by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, when “a society prepared to die was turned around.” See Seth Stern, “From Paper to the Battlefield,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 March 2003.

3. Office of the Press Secretary, “President Bush Nominates Dr. Robert M. Gates to Be Secretary of Defense: The Oval Office,” 8 November 2006, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061108-4.html.

4. For representative recent discussions, see Bruce Hoffman, “RAND Corporation Occasional Paper: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” OPC-127-IP EMCC, June 2004, www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2005/RAND_OP127.pdf; Robert R. Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” *Parameters* 34 (Spring 2004): 16–28, www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/04spring/tomes.pdf; and the article by the authors of the U.S. Army’s new draft Field Manual on Counterinsurgency, Eliot Cohen, Lt. Col. Conrad Crane, Lt. Col. Jan Horvath, and Lt. Col. John Nagl, “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” *Military Review* 86 (March–April 2006): 49.

5. See Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). For the colonial genealogy of air power, see Sven Lindqvist, *A History of Bombing*, trans. Linda Haverty Rugg (New York: Norton, 2003).

6. Mayor Giuliani recommended John Lukacs’s *Five Days in London: May 1940* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). The controversy over asserted parallels to World War II was fueled by Oren Dorrell, “WWII Vets Fought a Different Kind of Fight Than Those in Iraq,” *USA Today*, 23 November 2006, www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-11-23-iraq-wwii_x.htm.

7. Office of the Press Secretary, “President’s Radio Address,” 20 August 2005, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050820.html.

8. See Patrick Deer, *Culture in Camouflage: War, Empire and British Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

9. One notable exception is the recent HBO documentary about combat medicine in Iraq, *Baghdad ER* (dir. Jon Alpert and Matthew O’Neil, 2006), which was initially only available to cable subscribers already accustomed to the frank violence of such series as *Deadwood*, *The Wire*, and *The Sopranos*.

10. On depleted uranium and slow violence, see Rob Nixon, “Our Tools of War, Turned Blindly against Ourselves,” *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 18 February 2005.

11. National Priorities Project, “Local Costs of the Iraq War,” 29 September 2006, nationalpriorities.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=61 (accessed 3 December 2006).

12. For an incisive theorization of foreclosure and disavowal, see Henry

Krips's discussion of fetishistic subjectivity in *Fetish: An Erotics of Culture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

13. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, "Nomadology: The War Machine," in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 351–423.

14. See, for example, Slavoj Žižek, *Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle* (New York: Verso, 2004); Retort [Iain Boal, T. J. Clark, Joseph Matthews, and Michael Watts], *Afflicted Powers: Capital and Spectacle in a New Age of War* (New York: Verso, 2006); Judith Butler, *Prekarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence* (New York: Verso, 2006); James Der Derian, *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001); and Chris Hables Gray, *War, Peace, and Computers* (New York: Routledge, 2004). See also Chris Hedges's *War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning* (New York: Anchor, 2002).

15. Notable combatant writing from the Iraq war to date includes John Crawford, *The Last True Story I'll Ever Tell: An Accidental Soldier's Account of the War in Iraq* (New York: Riverhead, 2005); Kayla Williams, *Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female in the U.S. Army* (New York: Norton, 2005); Colby Buzzell's compilation of his pseudonymous blog, *My War: Killing Time in Iraq* (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Trade, 2006); Nathaniel Fick, *One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005). See also the embedded journalism of *Rolling Stone* reporter Evan Wright, *Generation Kill: Devil Dogs, Iceman, Captain America, and the New Face of American War* (New York: Berkeley Caliber, 2004). See also the documentaries *Gunner Palace* (dir. Petra Epperlein and Michael Tucker, 2004); *Soldiers Pay* (dir. Tricia Regan, David O. Russell, and Juan Carlos Zaldivar, 2004); *Operation: Dreamland* (dir. Ian Olds and Garrett Scott, 2005); and *Why We Fight* (dir. Eugene Jarecki, 2005).

