“Dark Cloud Rising from the East”:
Indian Sovereignty and the Coming of King William’s War in New England

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In 1676, Boston’s leading minister, Increase Mather, published an account of King Philip’s War: its rise, its providential role in prodding New England to repentance, its battles and ambushes, and the capture and killing of its chief actor, Philip, or Metacom, of the Wampanoags. While Philip’s death ended hostilities in southern New England, peace eluded Maine and New Hampshire. Referring to those troubled regions, Mather wrote, “And there seems to be a dark Cloud rising from the East in respect of Indians in those parts, yea a Cloud which streameth forth blood.”¹ A treaty concluded the conflict in 1678, but after ten years of tenuous calm in the northeast, King William’s War erupted. Cotton Mather would call this episode the “decennium luctuosum,” or decade of sorrows.²

Scholars have largely ignored King William’s War, devoting their attention instead to the encounters that bracketed

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it—King Philip’s War of 1675–78 and the French and Indian Wars of the eighteenth century. King William’s War deserves study, though, if for no other reason than its connections—consequential and causal—to these better-known conflicts. Englishmen’s refusal to adhere to the treaty promises that helped end King Philip’s War led directly to King William’s, and Indians’ efforts to secure the rights they thought were their due prompted them to turn to the French, thus establishing a pattern of Indian-European alliance that would play a powerful role in the international quarrels that would trouble the Atlantic world through much of the next century. Beyond its relation to events out of which it emerged and toward which it pointed, however, King William’s War also deserves study in its own right, for it clearly illustrates the consequences of English failure to respect Indian sovereignty.

Respect for Indians’ sovereignty—that is, their status as a people independent of English authority—remained a possibility in Maine and New Hampshire long after it was no longer possible in Massachusetts. A number of historians have drawn on John Pike’s explanation of the causes of King William’s War, as outlined in Mather’s Decennium Luctuosum (see Bilodeau, “The Economy of War,” pp. 223–24). Few have gone beyond this familiar source to explain the war. In this article, I draw from both the traditional sources and two important unpublished documents: Joshua Scottow’s “Narrative of ye Voyage to Pemmacquid” and the 1684 royalist official’s negotiation with Indians (see below).
viable in southern New England. Initially in the south, the relative weakness of the English had compelled them to treat Indians as equals—"friends"—and to form agreements with them that were largely reciprocal. Such agreements, best demonstrated in the 1621 league of peace between the Wampanoags and Plymouth Colony, helped create expectations among the region’s Indians, and they clung to them even after the English began shifting the terms of the relationship. When the English denied them esteem and equality, Indians sought other ways to achieve their ends, through appeals to competing powers—the Mohawks, the English Crown, the French, the Dutch—and, as a last resort, by means of armed resistance. By the conclusion of King Philip’s War, even that final opportunity had been eliminated in southern New England, and Indians either accepted their status as subjects of the English or left the region. Further north and east, Indians had more options.

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I use the term “sovereign” here to mean ultimate governing authority over a land and people. Gregory E. Dowd argues that Indians lacked any word for “sovereignty.” Instead, he claimed, they asserted that the Great Spirit—God—had “made their country for them; God had given it to them” (War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002], p. 3; see also p. 181 for Dowd’s discussion of Sir William Johnson’s denial of English sovereignty over Indians). While the Iroquois may have lacked an explicit linguistic equivalent to “sovereignty,” their long-standing resistance to English and French attempts to assert sovereignty over them argues that they were well acquainted with the concept of authority over their own land and people. Evidence suggests a stronger linguistic basis for the concept of sovereignty among the Algonquians of New England. Ives Goddard and Kathleen Bragdon’s Native Writings in Massachusett (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1989) notes that the term sontimmoowonk, meaning “sachemship,” can also mean “sovereignty.” A related phrase, pakattassoo | tumoowonk, meaning “sachem,” was used in 1701 in reference to the reign of King William of England, suggesting that New England Algonquians recognized an equivalence between the status of the king and that of their own sachems (pp. 709, 689; see also p. 631).


The devastating impact of King Philip’s War on the power and population of Indian peoples in New England nourished the popular misconception that Indians had “disappeared” from the region in the war’s aftermath. Colin Calloway’s essay collection, After King Philip’s War: Presence and Persistence in Indian New England (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1997), lays this notion to rest.
The native people of Maine and New Hampshire—collectively called the Wabanaki—continued to insist on respect and to reject English attempts to exercise authority over them, and they were able to do so because they retained significant power relative to the English. Although European-borne epidemics had significantly reduced the Wabanaki population by the mid-seventeenth century, Indians still outnumbered Europeans throughout much of the period. As late as 1688, just before the outbreak of King William’s War, Maine’s English population was only six to seven thousand and New Hampshire’s four thousand, compared to at least three thousand Wabanaki, a much larger ratio of Indians to English than in the post–King Philip’s War south, where the Indian population had dropped to 8 to 12 percent of the English by 1680.

The proximity of the French also bolstered the Wabanakis’ power in relation to the English. During King Philip’s War, the English suspected that the Indians of Maine and New Hampshire were receiving assistance from the French, and evidence suggests that indeed they were. In the aftermath of

9There has been substantial disagreement over the proper identification of Indians in northern New England during the colonial period and on the relationship of those groups to modern Native Americans. For the most recent and authoritative discussions of this debate, see Bruce J. Bourque, “Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600–1759,” *Ethnohistory* 36 (Summer 1989): 257–84; and Emerson Woods Baker, “Finding the Almouchiquois: Native American Territories, Families, and Land Sales in Southern Maine,” *Ethnohistory* 51 (Winter 2004): 73–100. For the purposes of this paper, I have used the collective term “Wabanaki” for the Indians of the region northeast of Massachusetts and the traditional riverine names (i.e., Saco, Kennebec, Penobscot) for specific groups of Indians.

10The claim that Indian power persisted in Maine long after King Philip’s War, that it was recognized by contemporary Europeans, and that it gave Indians significant ability to influence the manner and terms of diplomatic negotiations and relations with Europeans has been argued persuasively in a recent article by Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, “Amerindian Power in the Early Modern Northeast: A Reappraisal,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 61 (January 2004): 77–106.


the war, many Indians from the region scattered to communities in the north, including Sillery, a Catholic mission village in Canada.\textsuperscript{13} The English worried that the Wabanaki would break agreements with them in favor of the French, and the Wabanaki capitalized on this fear, demanding that English officials observe treaty promises and treat them respectfully. Thus, much in the manner of the Iroquois to the west, the Wabanaki played the English and French against each other, dealing with one, then the other, according to what best served their interests at the time—a practice that demonstrated their independence from either power.\textsuperscript{14}

During much of this period, the English—with their greater population and cheaper trade goods—appeared more attractive as allies than the French.\textsuperscript{15} Accordingly, the Wabanaki entered into a series of agreements with the English, sometimes even conceding that they were “subjects” of the Crown, an acknowledgment that might appear to contradict their assertions of sovereignty. The Wabanaki did not believe that it did. Rather, they seemed to view the English king as a sort of paramount sachem, or a leader over other leaders. As such, the king might offer them protection in exchange for their loyalty, but he could not interfere in local governance.\textsuperscript{16} The promises of protection and mutual aid that always accompanied such agreements were appealing to the Indians, but they did not negate Indian sovereignty. English colonials, on the other hand, believed that, as the king’s representatives in America, they gained dominion over the natives who had submitted themselves to royal authority. The Wabanaki dismissed such an interpretation. They

\textsuperscript{13}Morrison, \textit{Embattled Northeast}, pp. 89–93.


believed that the English were fellow subjects of the king, which made them—at best—equal to the Indians. Colonials thus had no right to interfere in natives’ affairs.¹⁷

Two treaties illustrate the divergence between English and Wabanaki understandings of their status relative to each other and the resolution—at least on paper—of that discrepancy in favor of the Indians’ interpretation. The first English-Wabanaki treaty was signed in 1676, at the conclusion of King Philip’s War in the south. The English had soundly defeated the Wampanoags and Narragansetts, and the confidence stemming from that victory influenced their dealings with the more northerly Wabanaki. Mogg Heigon, the Saco sagamore, or leader, acting as an agent for the Penobscot sagamores Madockawando and Cheberina, traveled to Boston to negotiate the treaty in November 1676. Its terms were harsh. Massachusetts officials insisted that the sagamores forfeit all English goods seized during the course of the war, return all captives without ransom, and pay for all damages, if not immediately then in yearly payments of beaver, a requirement sounding suspiciously like tribute. Moreover, the treaty required that the sagamores persuade other Wabanaki peoples to adhere to the peace or, failing that, to go to war against them on behalf of the English.¹⁸

In making their demands, the English acted as if the Wabanaki were subject to local English authority. Alone in Boston, surrounded by thousands of English, Mogg had little choice but to accept the terms presented to him. But the treaty held only as long as he remained in English custody. Returning to the Penobscots, ostensibly to inform them of the treaty’s provisions and to obtain the captives and goods demanded, Mogg broadcast his contempt for the agreement. He scoffed at the

¹⁷A number of Indians from southern New England had earlier insisted on similar interpretations of their subject status, including the sachems Philip (Metacom) of the Wampanoags, Ninigret of the Niantics, and Pessacus and Canonicus of the Narragansetts. See Lincoln, Narratives of the Indian Wars, p. 73; Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 10 vols. (Providence, R.I.: A. Crawford Greene and Brother, 1856), 2:270; and David Pulsifer, ed., Records of Plymouth Colony, 12 vols. (Boston: William White, 1855–61), 10:415–16.

presumption of the English, boasted that he knew a way to burn Boston, and joined the attacks against coastal settlements that were soon mounted. During the following year, Indians continued their raids on the English, almost completely depopulating the towns along the Maine coastline and demoralizing Massachusetts' leaders, who had thought the war was over.

On 12 April 1678, English and Indians signed a second peace treaty, far different from the 1676 agreement. Now the English were forced to accede to the natives' view that subjection to the king gave them equal status with the English and that such subjection did not infringe on Indians' authority over their own people and land. One sign of this shift can be found in Joshua Scottow's account of the preliminary negotiations for the treaty. Over a period of weeks, the English attempted to persuade Penobscot sagamore Madockawando to travel to Pemaquid and make peace. When the sagamore finally arrived at the English fort, he signed articles of agreement, including one stating "that there should be a peace between him & all the English, they being subjects to the same King." Another indication that the English were yielding to Wabanaki expectations appears in two quite startling provisions of the treaty. First, it called for reciprocal justice; that is, the English were required to submit their grievances against Indians to Indian sagamores, while Indians would submit their grievances against English colonists to English authorities. Such direct reciprocity was unprecedented, extending as it did beyond the Plymouth treaty of 1621, which instructed Indians to seek justice in English courts but failed to recognize Indian judicial practices.

An even more dramatic proof that the English acknowledged Wabanaki sovereignty appears in the treaty's final provision: the
English were permitted to return to their homes on condition that each family pay the Wabanaki a peck of corn per year—in other words, that they pay tribute. That the English did, in fact, consider the corn to be tribute is clear from how Dover minister John Pike described the requirement: as the “yearly Tribute of Corn, agreed upon in the Articles of Peace formerly concluded with [the Indians] by the English Commissioners.”

English commentators were dismayed. Cotton Mather contrasted the outcome of King Philip’s War in Massachusetts, which “Extinguished whole Nations of the Salvages,” with its outcome in Maine, where “a sort of a Peace was patched up...with circumstances which the English might not think very Honourable.” The nineteenth-century Maine historian William D. Williamson wrote that “the terms of the peace were generally considered by the English, to be of a disgraceful character,” but he admitted that the Indians’ “remarkable successes through the late war, might very properly embolden them to dictate these hard conditions of peace.”

A similar recognition of Indian power may have influenced the terms of a later Indian-English agreement, which collapsed the seemingly contradictory conditions of sovereignty and subjection. This agreement was executed in September 1684, while the English were experiencing significant political turmoil. The Crown had revoked Massachusetts’ charter and dispatched a royal governor to the colony, whose arrival was imminent. At the time, an English official with strong royalist sympathies met with a number of Wabanaki sagamores at an Indian fort in Pejepscot. His purpose was to obtain their submission to the Crown as a means of ensuring their loyalty to the English, a goal made particularly urgent by French inroads into the region. He announced that the king was about to take “the

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22 Quoted in Mather, Decennium Luctuosum, pp. 186–87.
23 Mather, Decennium Luctuosum, p. 184.
24 Williamson, History of the State of Maine, 1:553.
25 See, e.g., Kenneth Morrison’s discussion of the growth of French Catholic missions at such places as Sillery. These missions drew in not only local Wabanakis but
whole of New England under his immediate Government,” and he suggested that an address “of subjection to the King” would be most welcome from the sagamores. According to the official, the sagamores “rejoiced” in this opportunity and promised that they and their children would “yield cheerful subjection to the King of England, and obey all his commands against all his enemies, and to endeavour to make his name great among the remoter Indians.” As he put it, “I followed their phrase as near as I could and drew it up, which they cheerfully signed, most of the Sagamores perfectly understanding it and being able to discourse of it in English.”

It is notable that the English official claimed to be acting as a scribe for the Indians, reproducing their words as best he could. The fact that the agreement preserves Indian authority while giving lip service to the king makes that claim plausible. The Wabanakis declared, “since our authority over our own people to exercise of our hereditary rights & ancient traditions & customs are the only means to keep them in obedience & to enable us to serve your Majesty, wee humbly crave the continuance thereof & most humbly offer entire subjection & obedience to your Glorious Crowne, praying your gracious protection.” Apparently, the Indians did not see a contradiction between the promise of “entire subjection” and the preservation of “authority over our own people.” The address was delivered along with confirmation of the Wabanakis’ sale of the Pejepscot lands to Richard Wharton, and the language of the deed sheds additional light on the intent of the address. In the deed, the Indians asserted their “hereditary rights & ancient traditions & customs,” including “liberty of fishing & hunting & improvement of our Ancient planting grounds,” a condition the Indians did not consider incompatible with “full & absolute

also refugees from King Philip’s War (Embattled Northeast, pp. 88–98). Bilodeau also discusses French efforts to nurture relationships with the Wabanaki within the context of Iroquois aggression to the west (“The Economy of War,” pp. 226–32).

resignation & confirmation to Mr Wharton & his heires for ever.”

The expansive concessions to Indian authority that characterized the 1678 and 1684 documents were, however, largely confined to paper. The English official negotiating the submission of 1684 seemed willing to overlook the obvious contradictions in the address in order to preserve the peace during a time of escalating tensions, not only between English and Indians but between the English and the French. But locals frequently behaved as if their own rights and authority were superior—as if the Indians were, in fact, subject to them, not just to their king. As it became increasingly clear that English settlers refused to abide by treaty promises, the Indians came to see war as a more promising approach than diplomacy.

The first rumors of war arose within a few years of the 1678 treaty that had ended King Philip’s War; they were accompanied by specific complaints about English violations of that treaty and of Indian sovereignty. In January and February 1684, several Maine settlers reported frightening conversations with local Wabanakis. The Indians had gone to New France “to fetch guns and ammunition,” the colonists learned, and “the Indians did threaten to burn English houses and make them slaves as they were before.” They promised that they would give a few settlers due warning, however, so that they might save themselves. The assurance of advance notice of impending hostilities suggests that the rumors of war may have been a form of diplomacy, allowing the English time to take corrective measures. Instead, the English began fortifying garrisons and preparing other means of defense.

27 Collection S-1280, misc. box 61/6, MS00 277, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine.
Indian threats to recapitulate the atrocities of King Philip’s War reflect their outrage over two specific violations of the treaty of 1678: expansion of English settlement and failure to pay tribute. The 1678 treaty had allowed the English to return to their houses on Maine’s coast, but the Indians apparently believed that they had granted permission only to maintain, not to expand, settlement. The Massachusetts government had insisted on a treaty provision stipulating that Indians remain ten miles distant from any English plantation, but Anthony Brockholt, the New York official negotiating on behalf of Massachusetts, preferred a more “certaine” division and stated that Indians must remain east of the western limits of Casco Bay. The corollary, of course, was that English settlers must remain west of that line. It is not surprising, then, that the first intimations of Indian dissatisfaction with the post-war settlement centered on the new English plantation of North Yarmouth, located squarely within Casco Bay.

The Massachusetts government incorporated the town of North Yarmouth, located on the Westcustogo River, also called Royall’s River, in 1680. By 1684 lot surveying was proceeding at an alarming rate, and proprietors of the town had recruited settlers from as far away as the Bahamas, where Spanish attacks on English plantations had produced scores of refugees in need of new homes. From the start of this rapid and ambitious settlement plan, local Androscoggin, Saco, and Kennebec Indians made it clear that they did not accept English claims to much of the land. For example, Moses Felt reported that after his brother George Felt, along with Francis Neale and Jenkin Williams, purchased a tract of land near the Presumpscot River, “there were other Indians which came . . . and told them that those Indians which had sold it to them had nothing

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item 1683, 14 May 1684. For rumors of war reaching province officials, see CSPCS, 11:606–7, item 1589, 14 March 1684.
30DHSM, 6:191.
to doe with said Land to sell it, for the Land was theirs.” The three men must have taken the charge seriously because, according to Felt, none of them or their heirs made any attempt to occupy or improve the land.33 Other Indians complained of “much deception practiced” in land sales conducted by Wabanaki sagamores Monquine, Abagadusset, and Robin Hood, the last of whom had sold the land on which the town of North Yarmouth was settled.34

Indians may have doubted the legitimacy of the sale, but unlike Felt, Neale, and Williams, most English did not take warning and remove themselves. On the contrary, they insisted that their claims to the land rested on James I’s 1629 grant to Ferdinando Gorges, a patent purchased by the Massachusetts Bay Colony, of which Maine was a part, in 1678. Asserting the superiority of the Gorges patent to any Indian deeds whatsoever, town and colony leaders cited Massachusetts’ 1680 declaration that no Indian deed was to be considered valid without the General Court’s sanction.35 At least one later commentator understood the danger of the policy that some New England officials had pursued. He asked whether the principle “that the Indians, because Pagans, have no Title to any Lands at all in this Countrey, be not the way to continue the friendship of the Indians to us? And whether after all the hard censures we have undergone, the World will not judge us the juster and more righteous of the two, who own they have though Pagans, a just Right to all their Lands but those which they have by fair Contract or just Conquest parted with?”36

34Williamson, History of the State of Maine, 1:606.
36Written in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution in New England, the tract asserts that in disregarding Indian land titles, Dominion of New England officials helped instigate King William’s War. See “An Appeal to the Men of New England, with a short account of Mr. Randolph’s Papers,” in The Andros Tracts, Publications of the Prince Society, vols. 5–7 (New York: Burt Franklin, 1868–74), pt. 3, p. 201. For another dispute over the legitimacy of Indian land titles, see “Considerations offered to prove that Indian grants in the Province of Maine are not sufficient to eject a present possessor” (n.d.), in DHSM, 6:362.
In addition to encroaching on Indian lands, the English had also failed to pay their promised tribute. The treaty provision had not received the consent of Maine’s settlers; indeed, it had not even been presented to them for consideration. And so, they did not feel bound by it. John Pike listed the settlers’ refusal to abide by the provision as one of the grievances “which began this long and bloody War.”

An exception proves the rule: Indians promised one of the few who did pay tribute, Walter Gendall, that they would warn him about imminent hostilities so that he could “hasten away with all speed.” Gendall’s long-time employee Tobias Oakman testified that “he hath often heard the Indians own & acknowledge the claim & right of the said Gendall as aforesaid and that they often demanded of the said Gendal a yearly quit Rent for the said Land & stream which was constantly paid them by the said Gendal in corn during the time that the Deponent lived with the said Gendall at North Yarmouth.” It is striking that Oakman uses the phrase “quit Rent” here. In English practice, quit rent was paid to the king or his patent holders, those who retained ultimate rights to land occupied by someone else. Here, Oakman places the Indians in the same category. Whether Gendall paid the tribute because he acknowledged Indian sovereignty or whether he simply recognized their power to enforce the demand is impossible to know. But the Indians seem to have read his willingness to pay tribute as evidence of the respect due to them as sovereign lords.

37The refusal of Maine’s settlers to recognize their treaty obligations presents an interesting irony. Historians frequently point out that this or that agreement between English and Indians was invalid because the Indians signing it lacked the authority to do so or had failed to obtain the consent of the Indians they represented. A classic example is Francis Jennings’s discussion of the “deed game” in his Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (1975; New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1976), chap. 8. English response to the 1678 treaty demonstrates that consent could be just as problematic in English as in Indian society. Other important discussions of English-Indian agreements in New England appear in Neal Salisbury, Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500–1643 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), esp. chap. 4; and Baker, “A Scratch with a Bear’s Paw.”

38Mather, Decennium Luctuosum, p. 186.

39“Pemaquid Papers,” pp. 60–64; Brackett to Davis, 23 February 1684.
In return, they offered the traditional reciprocal offering of protection.\textsuperscript{40} Those who refused to pay tribute, on the other hand, would be returned to “slavery.”\textsuperscript{41} Indeed, several seventeenth-century accounts describe Indians attacking other Indians in subjection to them for failing to pay tribute.\textsuperscript{42} Evidently they planned to do the same to the English who had dismissed their authority, that is, to return them to the subjection—the slavery—symbolized by their officials’ agreement that they would pay tribute.

The Indians’ grievances were not based on legalistic infractions alone but on a more general sense of the respect they felt was their due. Pennacook sachem Kancamagus, known in documents of the time as John Hawkins, is a case in point. In 1644 Hawkins’s grandfather Passaconaway had entered into an agreement with the Massachusetts government. Deputy Governor John Winthrop expressed his understanding of the relationship that had thereby been established with the Indians: “we did not receive them in as confederates but as subjects.”\textsuperscript{43} Winthrop’s care to draw this distinction suggests that the Pennacooks, or previous Indians seeking agreements with the English, had expectations of “confederacy,” or alliance. Hawkins, on the contrary, described the contract between his grandfather and the English as a “good govenant [covenant], they friend allwayes.”\textsuperscript{44} “Friend,” a word Hawkins would use

\textsuperscript{40}Tobias Oakman deposition, Lewis Family Papers, collection 36, box 2/1, Maine Historical Society, Portland. See also Kenneth Morrison’s discussion of the Wabanaki displeasure at English failure to pay this quit rent in his Embattled Northeast, pp. 112–15.

\textsuperscript{41}That is, the Wabanaki threat to “make the English slaves to them as they were before” (“Pemaquid Papers,” pp. 60–62).

\textsuperscript{42}For example, in 1668 Narragansett Indians attacked a group of Nipmucks and seized their wampum and other goods because they had failed to pay tribute (Massachusetts Archives Collections, vol. 30, pp. 140–42, 145–46, Massachusetts State Archives, Boston).


repeatedly in letters to English authorities, summed up his view of the agreement as precisely what Winthrop had rejected: a confederacy—a pact of mutual assistance.

The discrepancy between Hawkins’s view of his people’s relationship with the English and that of the settlers is evident in a 1685 exchange he had with Edward Cranfield, who had been appointed governor of New Hampshire in 1682. Not a native New Englander, Cranfield was, rather, a royal official who hoped, like many others, to elevate himself through the bureaucracy of empire. He had found New Hampshire a very inhospitable place to do so, and his letters to the Crown echo his frustration and contempt for colonists and fellow officials. Cranfield was very tender of his own authority, which colonists frequently flouted, and he may well have taken out his frustrations on Hawkins, who had traveled to Portsmouth in May 1685 in the company of fourteen other Indians, including Wabanaki sagamores Hope Hood and Simon Betokum, who acted as his scribe.\(^{45}\) Four letters document the events of that visit, during which Hawkins persistently and unsuccessfully pleaded with the governor for an audience.\(^{46}\)

In the first letter, dated 15 May 1685, Hawkins expressed alarm over recent threats from the Mohawks, longtime enemies of the Pennacooks, which had forced the Pennacooks to flee from the locale where they usually maintained their residences.\(^{47}\) The sagamore asked Cranfield to protect the Pennacooks and to supply powder and ammunition for their defense; he wrote, “pray help me you no let Mohogs kill me at my place at Malameke [Merrimack] river.” Hawkins likely knew that Cranfield had, indeed, “let” the Mohawks attack his people. Rumors that Indians from Maine had threatened the English, in combination with their longstanding suspicions of Wabanaki sympathy for the French, had prompted Cranfield and two Massachusetts officials to travel to New York the previous April to ask Governor Dongan to recruit the Mohawks

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\(^{47}\)Haefeli and Sweeney, *Captors and Captives*, p. 79.
as allies against the eastern Indians. Dongan was skeptical about Cranfield’s fears and reluctant to do anything that would “show the least suspicion of the Indians, & give them jealousy.” Cranfield insisted that the danger was real. Finally, Dongan promised to engage the Mohawks if he received word from Cranfield and Massachusetts Governor Joseph Dudley that attacks had actually occurred. Within a month, Cranfield and Dudley sent word that they had and again requested Dongan’s assistance. The hostilities that made Hawkins “afraid allwayes Mohogs he will kill me every day and night” were the result. Not only had Cranfield failed to provide protection the Pennacooks believed was their right according to the 1644 pact with Passaconaway; he was directly responsible for placing the Pennacooks in danger.

Hawkins sent two more letters to Cranfield, all three apparently written the same day and all signed by Hawkins and his fourteen companions. In the second, the sagamore again begged for a conference with the governor and invoked the long-standing obligations of friendship, declaring, “You my friend” and reminding him of the “old time” when his grandfather had made an everlasting covenant of friendship with the English. Apparently, this solicitation did not move Cranfield either, for a third letter followed. In it, Hawkins, clearly feeling aggrieved, complained of Cranfield’s punishment of some of the sagamore’s men: “if my Indian he do you long [wrong] pray you no put your law.” Instead, Hawkins asked that if one of his men did “mischief,” “you must let me know what he done because I will ponis [punish] him.” By punishing Hawkins’s subjects, Cranfield ignored judicial reciprocity and behaved toward the Indians as if they were subject to English government. Such treatment was a violation of the agreement of 1678, of a long-standing friendship, and of the respect Wabanakis expected as a result of their demonstrated power—“their remarkable successes through the late war.”

49 “Pemaquid Papers,” pp. 91–94.
50 CSPCS, 11:633–34, item 1683, 14 May 1684.
51 Williamson, History of the State of Maine, 1:553.
The fourth and final letter was written on the following day, 16 May, and was addressed not to Cranfield but to “Mr. Mason”—Robert Mason, a member of the New Hampshire Council and holder of the patent to its lands. In his letter, Hawkins revealed that he had finally seen the governor but that he had waved him off with the excuse that he was going away and that Mason would have authority in his absence. Cranfield apparently did nothing to resolve the sagamore’s grievances. Thus, Hawkins was forced to begin all over again, writing to Mason, “Pray I want speake you a few words,” and closing, pathetically, “pray com to me because I want go hom at this day.” Hawkins had brought furs for the governor, but there is no evidence that the governor offered a gift in return, let alone the requested powder and ammunition. Worse, Cranfield had not even given Hawkins his time but had passed him off to an equally unsympathetic member of his council.

Such snubs would have been offensive to any petitioner, but Hawkins and his company had shown themselves to be especially concerned about the issue of respect. Two of the men subscribing to the first letter, the sagamores Hope Hood and Jorge Rodunnonukgus, carry the title “Mr.” before their names. Because the honorific does not appear with the other names, we can assume that its use was intentional. Perhaps Hawkins took his cue from the two; on his last letter to Cranfield, he signed his name “Mr John Hogkins.” By appropriating a title reserved for men of high status in the seventeenth-century English world, the Indians were asserting their equality with the men to whom they wrote and demanding esteem from them.

Hawkins appears to have felt that his ties to the English had been severed. In early August, Francis Hooke reported from Cranfield departed the province for good soon after, on 9 June 1685, leaving his deputy governor, Walter Barefoot, in charge (Cranfield to Lords of Trade and Plantations, from Barbados, in CSPCS, 12:64, item 272, 10 July 1685).

Kittery that the Pennacooks living nearby had threatened the townspeople, killed their dogs, and “gathered all theyre corn, and are removed both pack and packidge.” The English interpreted this sudden removal as evidence that the Indians were about to go to war against them. In a panic, English leaders sent messengers to demand that the Pennacook and Saco Indians explain their actions. They also urgently sought to reconfirm the peace, arranging for a new treaty, signed on 8 September 1685. The treaty contained traditional terms: promises of English protection from Mohawks and other enemies in return for Indian promises to alert the English to any danger from other Indians. It also reasserted the 1678 treaty’s promises of reciprocal justice, promises Cranfield had clearly violated by punishing Hawkins’s men. In direct response to recent events, the agreement additionally required that the Indians give “fair and timely notice” to the English before removing their families from their usual dwelling places; failure to do so, the document stated, would be “taken pro confesso that the Indians do intend and design war with the English, and do thereby declare that the peace is broken.” Hawkins did not attend the conference at which the treaty was signed, an absence suggesting that Cranfield’s ill treatment still stung, but he was persuaded to make an appearance two weeks later, and on 19 September he signed his name to the document.

Over the next three years, despite the 1685 reconfirmation of the 1678 treaty’s terms, the English continued to expand settlement. Indians also complained that the English placed so many nets and seines over the mouth of the Saco River that fish could no longer swim upstream, thus violating “the Fishery of the Rivers...a priviledge [the Indians] Reserved Entire unto themselves.” They charged that English cows trampled Indian corn fields and hinted that such abuses may have been

54 Belknap, History of New Hampshire, 1:509.
55 The treaty is reprinted in the appendix of Belknap, History of New Hampshire, 1:510. See also Morrison, The Embattled Northeast, p. 113.
56 Belknap, History of New Hampshire, 1:115–16; 511.
intentional. Edward Tyng, appointed a member of royal governor Edmund Andros’s Council to oversee Maine, acknowledged that “the English were very much to blame in not keeping out their creatures which had been in once or twice before.” As the treaty stipulated, Indians lodged their grievances with the English, but nothing was done to satisfy them.

When John Pike listed the causes that drove Indians to war in 1688, each one related to English violations of Indian sovereignty over their lands, their independence from English authority, and the respect they thought they deserved as equals of the English—all of which were supposedly protected by treaty. Given the extent of the treaty violations, it is remarkable that the Indians responded with as much restraint as they did. The initial violence in Maine was directed against cattle, not humans, and was probably meant as a warning. In early August 1688, Indians near Saco, finding cows once more in their cornfields, fired on and wounded them with “small shot,” then threatened their English owners.

These threats might have prodded the local English to redress the Indians’ grievances had not outside events intervened. In July 1688, a party of eleven New England Indians who had fled to Canada during King Philip’s War raided settlements along the Connecticut River in western Massachusetts, killing several English colonists and friendly Indians. Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney have described the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as a time of “parallel” and “overlapping” wars, with Indians fighting to resolve wrongs they took quite personally rather than merely serving the interests of

57 Mather, Decennium Luctuosum, pp. 186–87.
their French allies. Indeed, the Connecticut River attack was motivated by revenge more than tactical alliances. Launched as it was from New France, however, it appeared to many English to be much more than it was; it seemed to be evidence of a French-led Indian uprising against all of New England. With Governor Edmund Andros away in New York, members of the Council of the Dominion of New England responded precipitously. They wrote to Maine justice of the peace Benjamin Blackman with orders that he seize any Indians who had behaved suspiciously. Blackman conveyed the orders to John Sargeant, who rounded up the usual suspects—those who “had been bloody murderous Rogues in the first Indian War, being the chief Ring-Leaders, and most capable to do mischief.” The English seized between sixteen and twenty Indians, among them Hope Hood, kept them in custody in Falmouth, Maine, for a few days, then sent them on to prison in Boston.

Within days the Indians of the region responded in kind, seizing English captives and carrying them away to their own secure locations. As with their earlier actions, the Indians continued to exercise restraint, assuring the English captives that they would be released just as soon as the Indian captives were. In early September, in response to the rising panic in the region,

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61 Haefeli and Sweeney, Captors and Captives, pp. 81–82, 84.

62 Accounts of these events appear in DHSM, 6:421–29, and Mather, Decennium Luctuosum, pp. 187–90. Mather seems to be quoting directly not from Shubael Dummer, as he says, but from Silvanus Davis, whose narrative of the outbreak of King William’s War appears in DHSM, 5:142–53. See also Williamson, History of the State of Maine, 1:608.


64 DHSM, 6:421.
Dominion of New England officials ordered Maine residents to move into fortified garrisons, and residents of North Yarmouth began building two such structures, one on either side of the Westcustogo River. This evidence that the English anticipated war could not have soothed Indian fears, and the fact that the North Yarmouth garrisons encroached on Indian lands—a long-standing grievance—compounded the offense. As Englishmen worked to complete the garrisons in September 1688, seventy to eighty Indians arrived to protest the construction. Insults and challenges quickly turned to violence. By the end of the night, several Indians and Englishmen, including Walter Gendall, lay dead, the first victims of a war that would soon engulf the region.65

Following the violence at North Yarmouth, Indians targeted other English settlements, including Merry Meeting Bay and New Dartmouth, that had sprung up since the end of King Philip’s War on land the Indians considered their own.66 Upon hearing news of the violence, Governor Andros quickly returned to Boston, released the Indian captives imprisoned there to the consternation of many colonists, and mounted a military expedition, seven hundred soldiers strong, to the eastward. They marched as far north as Pemaquid, establishing and strengthening garrisons and forts along the way. The English troops encountered no Indians, who had long since retreated to their winter hunting grounds, but the region was now much better defended than it had been.67

That might have been the end of it. Indians later testified that the defenses Andros set in place, as well as the restrictions


66DHSM, 6:443: Mather, Decennium Luctuosum, p. 192. Emerson W. Baker notes that the towns built after King Philip’s War, including New Dartmouth, did not follow the pre-war pattern of houses strung out along the coast. Instead, the towns were compact and provided with forts for defense from Indian attack (“Formerly Machegonne, Dartmouth, York, Stogummor, Casco and Falmouth: Portland as a Contested Frontier in the Seventeenth Century,” unpublished manuscript, p. 16, to be published in Portland as Place).

he had imposed on trading with the Indians, nearly starved them.\textsuperscript{68} Certainly, the measures left them in no position to wage war. Maine and New Hampshire colonists testified that after Andros’s garrisons were manned, they suffered no more attacks on their persons or property.\textsuperscript{69} Indeed, the Indians had continued to negotiate for peace even after the bloodshed at North Yarmouth because they had become increasingly dependent on goods supplied by the colonists.\textsuperscript{70} The Wabanaki also seemed to respect Andros’s power and were willing to forgive English abuses that he had not countenanced. Henry Smith, taken captive in the aftermath of Blackman’s seizure of the Indians around Saco, testified that his captors demanded to know “if the Governor had given orders for Blackman to take the Indians.” Smith had replied that he “was sure [Andros] had not for he was gone to New York & he had seen the orders from Captn Nicholson at Pemaquid which were not so & believed it to be only Blackman’s folly.”\textsuperscript{71} That Madockawando, at least, was willing to accept this explanation is suggested by the fact that he traveled to Boston in the spring of 1689 to treat for peace with Andros. His doing so demonstrates that, even though he still harbored substantial grievances, he believed that aligning his people with the English yielded more benefits than not.

But the balance of power that made treating for peace preferable to righting grievances through violence suddenly shifted. On 18 April 1689, Massachusetts’ colonists, incited by news of the Glorious Revolution in England, rose up against Governor Edmund Andros and his officers, imprisoned them, and reinstituted their former government. In one of its first actions, the restored regime released officers and troops from the defenses Andros had established to the eastward—defenses many southern New Englanders considered pointless and wasteful.

\textsuperscript{68}CSPCS, 13:115, item 316.
\textsuperscript{69}DHSM, 5:101–4; Petition of the Inhabitants of Maine to the King, 25 January 1689/90, in Andros Tracts, pt. 1, pp. 176–79. See also CSPCS, 13:120, item 336; 13:263, item 884. See also DHSM, 5:108.
\textsuperscript{70}DHSM 6:422, 443–47.
\textsuperscript{71}DHSM, 6:443–44.
Maddockawando was in Boston during the crisis, and he looked on as Andros’s power was being stripped away. Officials of the reinstated government did their best to assure the sagamore that Andros’s authority now rested with them, but Madockawando’s first-hand view of the chaos at the seat of power undermined his confidence in the stability of English government. After returning to Maine, Madockawando announced that the English no longer possessed any true authority. He refused to resume peace negotiations with them, declaring, “They were not Sagamores.”

In soliciting the Indians’ submission to the king on the eve of Andros’s arrival in 1684, the English official negotiating with them had promised that a stable royal government was about to be installed in New England. That government had now been dissolved, and in the succeeding months, Maddockawando and other Maine sagamores watched as the English withdrew a good deal of their military support from the region. Some English residents of Maine had long been aware that the stability of English authority was critical to maintaining good relations with the Wabanaki. In 1680, when Massachusetts officials challenged the royal government then in place in Maine, Nicholas Shapleigh warned his fellow colonists not to yield, saying, “that if the People did submit to the Government directed by the Massachusetts, the Indians would speedily fall upon them & begin a new war with them, as being Rebels to his Majesty.” This warning proved to be prophetic. Massachusetts did seize power in 1680, but the government had turned over several times since then—from royal government to Massachusetts rule; from Massachusetts rule back to royal provincial government; from that form of royal government to the Dominion government under Edmund Andros; then back to Massachusetts government after the Glorious Revolution. Such upheavals, combined with local violations of Indian sovereignty, convinced the Indians that there was little reason

73 Libby and Moody, eds., Province and Court Records of Maine, 3:xiii.
to maintain ties with the English, for they were no longer a trustworthy source of protection or alliance.

Indians’ disillusionment with the English opened the door to the French, who had worked for years to counter English influence with the Indians of the region. Silvanus Davis, captured and taken to Quebec by Wabanaki Indians in 1690, reported that the French had convinced the Indians not to appear at the scheduled exchange of captives with the English in the aftermath of the Blackman disaster. Reports from English captives claimed that Father Thury, one of the French Catholic priests living among the Wabanaki, urged them to kill all the English settlers as a means of restoring their sovereignty: “they would recover their former importance as sole masters of the land.” In this way, the French consciously targeted the Indians’ grievances against the English to promote an alliance with themselves. The French would not, as the English had, encroach on Indian land and authority. The French also told the Indians that the English were “rebels against [their] king” and thus outside of his protection. The Indians would have recognized the implicit invitation to attack the rebellious, and now vulnerable, English.

Not only recognizing but accepting that invitation, the Wabanaki launched a series of attacks just two months after Andros was removed from power. Indian raids quickly depopulated English towns along the northeast coast, including North Yarmouth. Repeated attempts by the English to fortify and resettle the town failed miserably. Finally, the English gave up and found refuge in other communities to the south, leaving

74 See Bilodeau, “The Economy of War,” chaps. 4 and 5. See also Morrison’s balanced discussion of French and English interactions with the Wabanaki in The Embattled Northeast. Haefeli and Sweeney offer a detailed overview of French, English, and Indian interactions leading up to King William’s and Queen Anne’s Wars in Captors and Captives, chap. 4. The journals and writings of Joseph Robineau de Villebon provide good evidence of French efforts to counter English influence from 1690 to the end of the seventeenth century (in Webster, Acadia at the End of the Seventeenth Century).

75 DHSM, 5:143.

76 Willis, History of Portland, p. 287.

77 Silvanus Davis’s account of the Indian War, in DHSM, 5:147.
the land, and authority over the land, to the Indians. It would be over thirty years before North Yarmouth would be rebuilt, and the English would remain a small, embattled population through most of Maine until after the fall of New France in the next century.\(^78\)

It is significant that King William’s War began a year before French and English hostilities erupted in Europe. That war, called the War of the League of Augsburg in Europe, is generally considered to be synonymous with King William’s War. But the violence in New England arose first, as a final response to English incursions on Indian land and independence. Rejecting alliance with the English, the Wabanaki would become, for a time, willing allies of the French in the European war that shortly converged with the American one. War between the French and English, supported by their Indian allies, would last until 1699, begin again in 1704, then rage off and on through much of the next century, until English victory in the French and Indian War led to France’s withdrawal from the continent in 1763.

Throughout this period, the Wabanaki maintained ongoing negotiations with the French and English. The possibility of turning from one to the other put pressure on both European nations to acknowledge Indian sovereignty and treat Indians with respect. Demonstrated Wabanaki power had allowed them to make demands that resulted in diplomatic agreements with the English that were more reciprocal than those Indians had been able to achieve in southern New England. English settlers often balked at fulfilling these agreements, but the Wabanaki could always push back with war, or the threat of war. The decade of peace following King Philip’s War was not nearly long enough for the English to forget the terrors of the previous war, but, evidently, it was long enough for them to forget the promises and acknowledgment of Indian sovereignty that enabled them to bring that war to a close. King William’s War, the Indians assumed, would remind them once again.

\(^78\) Russell, “History of North Yarmouth,” pp. 175–76.
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